Dr. Dris-Aït-Hamadouche is professor of international conflict at the University of Algiers. She also teaches at the High Institute of Studies in National Security and is a researcher with the Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée pour le Développement.1
It is impossible to discuss democratization, human development and human rights anywhere in the world without including the role of women. Before evaluating it in the Maghrebi countries, it is important to point out that female representation in public life (governments, parliaments, civil society, economic enterprises, etc.) is a universal issue. With the exception of some Scandinavian countries, almost all countries lack significant female representation at most levels of society. Nevertheless, 2005 marked a new record of accomplishment for women politically: one out of five parliamentarians elected in 2005 was a woman.2 In ten countries (Rwanda, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Andorra, Burundi, Iraq, New Zealand and the United Republic of Tanzania), more than 30 percent of those either elected or returned to parliament were women. However, while some developing countries in Africa and Latin America (Honduras, Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia) are progressing, little progress can be noted in the Arab world.3 Arab countries demonstrated the lowest increase in female political participation (2.5 percent) between 1995 and 2005; this anemic progress was due to the quotas imposed in some countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia.
The perception of women's issues in North Africa is often linked to several well spread prejudices related to history, culture and religion. The Western media focus on discrimination, violence, the veil and polygamy, which they attribute to so-called religious barriers and the patriarchal system.4 Consequently, Western public opinion has developed negative stereotypes of Muslim women. But the Maghreb is a developing region, in direct touch with Europe, the Middle East and Africa. This crossroads position prevents the Maghrebi countries from remaining static. As a result, they are undergoing political, economic and cultural changes. Women's issues must, then, be included in the framework of these sociopolitical changes, sometimes called "transition."
Under what circumstances will social changes occur? For some analysts, deep change comes from social ways of thinking. For example, Malek Bennabi, an Algerian intellectual reformist, focused his studies on the belief systems that allow societies to resist external domination and develop their own capacities for development.5 The Mulsim Brotherhood movements think that a country as a whole cannot change if the social base does not change first.6 This kind of change is
and men. They believe that political parties represent only the party elite and that politics is a game with special or sham rules. The second structural reason is persistent conservative values, which limit women's initiatives in the public domain in favor of men. Almost twice as many men as women support the idea of an Islamic society: 44 percent of men placed themselves at the highest level of the scale of "support for some aspects of the model of Islamic society," compared with 23 percent of women.59 In addition, among individuals who most favored women's emancipation, 67 percent were women, compared with 20 percent of men.60 These positions have no relationship to religious practices (prayer, fasting and abstaining from alcohol). It means that conservatism and religiosity are different.
Governmental Reforms
In Morocco, Algeria and Libya, official reforms to improve women's status derive either from the application of a strategic choice or from the consequences of internal and external pressures. Tunisia represented the avant-garde with its 1956 code, which introduced reforms that were more progressive than the laws of many contemporary Western countries. At the opposite end of the spectrum was the 1958 Moroccan mudawana, which reinforced the traditional Moroccan patriarchal order. It stipulated that the duty of a woman was to be obedient to her husband and that her husband had to authorize his wife to work. In the three other countries, woman's issues have been held hostage to political rivalries, ideological disputes and circumstantial compromises. The 1984 Algerian Code was very restrictive, especially concerning divorced women. They did not
have access to a conjugal house, with or without custody of their children; the father had sole parental authority; and repudiation and divorce were easy for men to initiate. Since that time, criticism of the Code has continued, but in vain. The debate remained moribund until 2005, when the rise of Islamist opposition and the general
crises of legitimacy convinced the governments to engage in deeper changes.
Therefore, the Algerian government finally accepted the reform of the family code adopted in 1984. The new code sets conditions on the practice of polygamy, obliges the father to pay a pension to his ex-wife and children, guarantees a house for a mother with custody of her children, and recognizes the mother as a parental authority. The new Moroccan mudawana has banned guardianship, maintained polygamy with legal recognition and the agreement of the first wife, maintained repudiation with legal recognition, and affirmed the mother's child custody with home and pension.
As in the Algerian and Moroccan cases, Libyan authorities have dealt with the issue of women according to religious and political pressures. During the 1980s, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi publicly called for the reform of women's rights, including ending the obligation of women to leave the house with a hijab (veil) and to be accompanied by a male relative. A decade later, the Islamic threat had arisen, deterring the Qadhafi government from further ameliorating women's rights. Hence, the Socialist state party introduced important measures for the emancipation of women, such as admitting women into the judiciary system and the armed forces; creating a center for women's studies; fixing a minimum age for marriage for both genders and restricting progressive and includes all social actors and spheres. Because this process is lengthy, other analysts recommend change from the top. In this framework, the ruling elites have to create the changing dynamic and push the society to evolve.7 Yahya Sadowski calls for abandoning "the quest for the mysterious 'essences' that prevent democratization in the Middle East and focus instead on the practical itemization of the forces that promote or delay this process."8 The Latin American experiences can provide examples of how transitions "from the top down" can be implemented.9 What is the role of women in this transition process? Are they leading this process or being drawn along by it?
Actors In Combat
Maghrebi women are present in a variety of political, economic and social sectors and dominant in some others. To some extent, they already possess the means for improving their socioeconomic status. However, they still face a major obstacle: the entrenched conservative mentality that dominates the political spheres.
Education and Culture
Education is certainly one key to achieving female emancipation. Economic independence is an important second component of self-confidence and social engagement. Raising the level of education is one way to facilitate change in the Maghrebi societies, as it can encourage the rise of professional aspirations among women. These aspirations are increasingly possible because of later marriage age and declining birth rates.
In the Maghreb the education of women is undoubtedly improving. According to the National Economic and Social Council (CNES),10 90.9 percent of Algerian girls between the ages of 6 and 15 were educated in 2004, compared to only 36.9 percent in 1966 and 80.7 percent in 1998. The gap between educated girls and boys decreased from 20 percent in 1966 to 3.6 percent in 2002. In 2004, women received 65 percent of baccalaureate degrees, 10 percent more than in 1997. At the university level, 55.4 percent of the students are female, compared to only 39.5 percent in 1991. Only 35 percent of Algerian women were illiterate in 2002, an improvement from 85 percent 1966. However, the UNDP 2005 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) puts the rate of illiteracy among Algerian women at 60.1 percent,11 a figure that seems too high when compared to Algerian official statistics.
In Libya, health care and education are free to all citizens.12 In 2002, adult female illiteracy had fallen to 29 percent from 35 percent in 1998, though it exceeds by 10 percent the rate for men.13 Moroccan female adult illiteracy is 64 percent, compared to 38 percent for males. In rural areas, it may be as high as 90 percent.
Primary-school enrollment is 86 percent of boys and 67 percent of girls.14 Generally, the rate of illiteracy in Morocco decreased from 48 percent in 1998 to 43 percent in
the period 2004-2005.15
The more educated Maghrebi women have changed their behavior. For instance, since the end of, the 1990s, the total fertility rate (the number of births per woman) has fallen from 7.5 children to 2 children per woman, closely resembling the current birth rate in Europe.16 This phenomenon is the result of several factors.
First, contraceptives, are no longer taboo. Contraceptives use increased in Tunisia from 5 percent in the 1960s to 60 percent in the mid-1990s, in Algeria from 8 percent in 1970 to 62 percent in 2001, and in Morocco from 5 percent to 59 percent since the end of the 1960s. Second, the marriage age has risen considerably. This trend began in Tunisia and occurred later in Algeria and in Morocco. In Tunisia, the average marriage age increased from 18 in 1966 to 27.8 in 2001; in Morocco, from 16 in 1960 to 26 in 1995; and in Algeria, from 18 in 1966 to 27.6 in 1998. More than 50 percent of Tunisian women between the ages of 25 and 29 were not married in 2001.17 Algeria and Morocco demonstrate the same trend. In the Maghrebi countries, statistics show that as the education level of women increases, they respond by marrying later in order to develop their own careers and achieve financial security. Currently women are less dependent on family men for their livelihood and identity.
Economic Weight
Information and access to education do not always lead to power or even autonomy. Maghrebi women remain underrepresented in the labor market, comprising a meager 14 percent of workers.18 Women are better represented in the public sector, however, with 45 percent participation, and 80 percent in education and medicine. In Algeria, unemployment among women increased by 11 percent a between 1977 and 2003, and, according to the AHDR 2005, women's activity constitutes 31.6 percent of total economic activity,19 versus 37.7 percent in Tunisia. It is estimated that 1,500 Tunisian women hold senior positions in businesses.20 They earn on average $3,840 per year, which is more than Algerian women with $2,896, or Moroccan women $2,299.21 The low figure in Tunisia (37.7 percent) is surprising given the political support for women since independence.
Moroccan women comprised more than one-third of the workforce in 2000 and 41.9 percent in 2003. Thirty percent of doctors and 25 percent of university professors in Morocco are women.22 Women are also highly represented in agriculture, manufacturing and domestic labor.23 Almost 50 percent of active women in urban areas work in the industrial sector, mainly in the textile industry, but the majority of them do contract work at home. Female workers in this industry do not belong to labor unions, range in age from 12 to 32, are single, and have no social security. Moreover, their working conditions are poor: 50 percent receive the same salary for day or night work; 64 percent have no accident insurance; 30 percent complained of being insulted by supervisors or employers, and 7 percent said they had been victims of physical abuse.24 In Algeria, data on female workers show that 70 percent are urban; 58 percent are single; and 33 percent are married. This last figure indicates that marriage is no longer an impediment to female employment.25
In Algeria in 2005, the government passed legislation that created a special provision to protect women in the workforce. The goal was to increase their representation. This action also mandated equality in wages and salary by specifying that men and women shall receive equal pay for equal levels of qualification and performance. Tunisia also implemented several measures to facilitate women's participation in the workforce. The government established maternity leave and employment protection for mothers in 1966. Libyan men and women are equal under the law, but the lack of application and control reduces this equality in practice. Consequently, women comprise less than 25 percent of the labor force.26 There are also generational differences among Libyan women. For instance, women born before the 1969 revolution tend to stay at home and have a markedly lower level of education than the younger generations. Women under the age of 35 are more likely to receive public education and participate in the public sphere. Finally, it appears that female enrollment in secondary and tertiary education is higher than male enrollment, though primary-school enrollments tend to be equal.27
Do these economic activities allow women to be economically independent and to advocate for their constitutional rights? Existing data are not positive. In Algeria for example, after women complete their education, 50 percent want to work, versus 33 percent who want to pursue a specialization and 6.2 percent who prefer marriage.28 In this last category, 72.42 percent want to keep their jobs during their marriage.29 The rate of female workers increased between 2000 and 2005. However, in June 2006, the rate was only 18.7 percent, with 8 percent of women in positions of responsibility and only 8 percent in the private sector.30 Women represent no more than 5.9 percent of CEOs of businesses.31 Education is an important determinant for the sectors in which women work. Hence, under-educated women represent 60 percent of informal workers, 6.4 percent of workers in the private sector and 33.5 percent in the public one. Educated women most often work in the public sector: 78 percent, versus 20.8 percent in the private sector.32 In general, they are less protected; only 47 percent have open-ended contracts. Furthermore, Sihem Bachiri, a judge in Algiers, deplored the lack of legal protection for women and the fact that many of them are unaware of their new rights as outlined in the 2005 reformed Family Code. While women go to the hospital (9000 of them are victims of violence), they still hesitate to go to court.33
Is a higher economic status the solution to the empowerment of women? An affirmative answer is based on the principle that modernization, development, knowledge and welfare are interconnected. This does not always hold true, as Arab women suffer more in countries with the highest per capita income.34 Studies show that the improvement of women's economic status is not dependent on wealth and high per capita income, but rather on development. The paradox between education and work is not difficult to explain. According to the AHDR 2003 survey, Arabs believe that education is as important for a girl as for a boy. However, they also think that a man has more of a right to a job than a woman. There is a cultural explanation for this way of thinking. In Arab (Muslim) societies, men alone must provide for their families. In general, the wife has the right to keep her income, and she cannot be forced to contribute to the household expenditures.
Politics
In Maghrebi societies, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between religious principles and rooted traditions. Based on a historical survey of the eighteenth through twentieth centuries, Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot has concluded that the principles of Islam do not so much determine the position of women as do social practices and political structures.35 The importance of religion in Muslim societies explains why women use it as an instrument of their militancy. Afshar argues that Islamic history offers feminist role models that can be used in the struggle to gain greater freedoms for women.36 For example, Khadija ( the prophet's first wife) was known for her economic independence. Aisha (called the prophet's favorite wife) is famous for her political skill and religious knowledge, and Fatima (the daughter of the prophet) is the symbol of morality and strength. Afshar demonstrates how, through both religious arguments and compromises, including the acceptance of the veil, women were confirmed as equals and regained some of their position within the liberal professions
Although Islam offers economic control to women with regard to ownership and wealth, in practice these rights are not fully exercised. For example, while the Quran clearly affirms that woman can inherit, this rule is not respected in some Maghrebi areas. Furthermore, a women's family often retains the dowry (mahr), though it is legally owed to the bride. Since there is no concept of joint property in Islam, the wife's wealth is, in some cases, unjustly considered by her husband to belong to him.
Women's participation in the war for independence in Algeria did not overcome traditional conservative attitudes. Although they participated in the war from beginning to end as nurses, cooks, guides and fighters, the status of women did not improve much after liberation. The Tripoli Congress in June 1962, just a month before independence, briefly recognized the existence of a "non-egalitarian mentality about the role of women" and underlined the necessity to change it.37 However, the fighters did not push for reform, compelling the mujahidat (women fighters) refugees in Tunisia to go on a hunger strike to obtain the right to study and go out. Only two women were included in the first national assembly. As in Europe (France and the UK) and the United States, revolutionary movements do not necessarily lead to revolutionary changes in ways of thinking.
Despite important social and cultural changes, Maghrebi societies are still widely conservative and influenced by traditionalist values, which are often confused with religious principles. Hence, large parts of Maghrebi societies follow and apply some Middle Eastern discourses. For instance, Muhammad Al-Musayyar, a scholar at AlAzhar University, affirms, "Under no circumstances are women qualified to be heads of state. Being male is a condition for heading a state, because a president is a kind of imam, and the position of imam is restricted to men. In addition, the ruler may have to be present in circumstances forbidden to women, such as private meetings with men. Moreover, during her menstrual period, a woman's temperament or thinking may be affected."38 Another scholar from the same university, Said Farahat Al-Mungi, confirms this viewpoint: "Even when it comes to the position of judge, which is a lower position than the position of ruler or head of state, three of the four [Sunni] jurisprudents-Malik, AlShafei and Ibn Hanbal-agreed that women are not allowed to become judges, let alone when it comes to the position of ruler."39 The only one to dissent was Imam Abu Hanifa, who said women can serve as judges in commercial matters.
Fortunately, a response to Muhammad Al-Musayyar's assertions came from the same institution. Suad Saleh reacted by arguing that the mufti [of Egypt] issued a fatwa permitting women to become judges. In addition, she pointed out that there is a difference between a woman as head of state and a woman in the position of caliph. "The [Arab] regimes are nothing like the Islamic Caliphate. The Islamic countries are mini-states. These countries are subject to the system of free elections.
They are subject to a constitution, which regulates politics, and too legislative, parliamentary and legal institutions, and so on. So the choice is in the hands of the people, men and women alike."40 This social conservatism is encouraged by the political class, or at least a great part of it. Louisa Hanoun, leader of the Algerian Workers Party, said that her candidacy in the 2002 presidential elections was well accepted by people, adding that obstacles do not come from public opinion, but from politicians.41
Militancy
Maghrebi female militancy is a kind of Islamic feminism, concerned with the role of women in an Islamic society.42 This movement started in the late nineteenth century.43 Egyptian jurist Qasim Amin, the author of Women's Liberation (Tahrir alMara), is often described as the father of the Egyptian feminist movement.44 In his work, Amin criticized practices such as polygamy and sex segregation, arguing that they are contradictory to the spirit of Islam. His work has influenced several women's political movements, demonstrating that defending women's rights is also a male issue. The term "Islamic feminism" was coined in the 1990s, thanks to Iranian scholars Afsaneh Najmabadeh and Ziba Mir-Hosseini. They explained the rise and use of this term in the Tehran women's journal Zanan, which Shahla Sherkat founded in 1992. Saudi Arabian scholar
Mai Yamani and Turkish scholars Yesim Arat and Feride Acar followed in 1996. Their goals are the promotion of full equality for Muslims in public or private life, without regard to gender. Islamic feminists advocate women's rights, gender equality and social justice grounded in an Islamic framework. Although rooted in Islam, the movement's pioneers have also used secular and Western feminist discourses, and they recognize the role of Islamic feminism as part of the global feminist movement. The movement's advocates try to highlight the fact that equality is deeply rooted in the Quran and hadith (sayings of Muhammed) to argue for an equal and just society. In general, the Islamic feminist movement is considered one of the more liberal movements within Islam.45 Margot and Badran argues that Islamic feminism is overall more radical than secular Muslim feminism.46
Political militancy is not easy in closed or semi-closed political regimes. When women undertake actions in the framework of the ruling parties, they are automatically accused of pursuing personal interests.47 In Tunisia, a number of civil society groups exist that represent women in politics. While they are more or less dependent on the government, they are not part of official government institutions. The largest one is the National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT), a nationwide organization that leads the national education campaign for women. A second organization is the Tunisian Association of Women Democrats, which is active in debating and publicizing women's issues.
One of the leading research centers on women in the Arab region, the Center for Studies, Research, Documentation, and Information on Women (CREDIF), is based in Tunisia. However, the authoritarian regime has denied representation to several women's organizations because they are seen as too "political."
Thus many women's associations have decided since the 1980s to change their strategy in an effort to stop the marginalization of their issues inside political parties. In 1992, the Moroccan UAF (Union for Women's Action) launched the "million signatures" campaign. They asked for equality of men and women in both public and private life and for the elimination of both polygamy and guardians at maturity. This reform also implied placing divorce in the hands of a judge, with the same conditions for men and women vis-à-vis custody over their children. By acting independently, the UAF did not achieve all its objectives.
Other feminist associations are affiliated with political parties. They include the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Actions, the Association 95 Maghreb for Equality, and the Moroccan Association for Women's Rights. These feminist organizations give priority to combating gender discrimination: inequality of civil rights, violence against women and sexual harassment. The Algerian Women's Observatory (OAF) was created to complete the missions of the National Council of the Family and the Woman. The OAF's purpose is to protect women from violence and discrimination, as well as to provide them with education and training.48 Traditionally limited to the private sphere and to specialists in theology, their main goal is to open a debate within the entire society, as well as to introduce a long-term vision. These associations also question the validity of the personal status code and civil rights as inscribed in the Constitution.
Instruments of Combat
The political regimes in the Maghreb have at least one common characteristic: they suffer from a lack of legitimacy.
Regimes have decided that using the issue of "women" may be one method to gain some legitimacy. Government policies that provide education for women, introduce family-law reforms, encourage women's organizations and promote some women to high professional levels are necessary but insufficient to satisfy feminist organizations. Are they sufficient to maintain leaders in power and/or to control the political opposition?
Women and Rulers
"Equality between men and women is above all a question of mentality and political courage to go forward"49 It should be pointed out that the debate over the role of women in the Maghreb moves back and forth between secular values and religious (and traditional) principles. It appears that the status of women as an issue is not really profiting from this debate but is becoming a victim of a duel in which the two opposing forces manipulate the women's issue as a pretext.
Political Inertia
Maghrebi authoritarian regimes have never been consensual. They are full of internal contradictions, and the issue of women is one of them. Schematically, the reform of the status of women was the "progressive" discourse of the francophone elite, while Arabic speakers defended tradition using a more "conservative discourse." Therefore, women's issues became ideological rather than social.50
The supporters of the progressive discourse were accused of being the "illegitimate children" of colonization, using language to do what the traitors failed to do with arms during the war. Conversely, progressives described the supporters of conservative discourse as extremists, reactionaries and heirs to an earlier closedminded era, refusing progress and science in the name of religion. According to Zakya Daoud, a Moroccan sociologist, this radical polarization is the direct consequence of the "confiscation of historical initiative."51 Unlike in Western countries, colonization interrupted the national development and maturation of the Arab-Islamic world. This is why Western values in the Maghreb did not allow for mutual exchanges or influences, but instead were considered part of an imposed culture. The reaction of many Maghrebis was to turn inward, developing a strong loyalty to their own traditional and "authentic" culture.
In Algeria, women are more present in responsible roles, but are still absent from decision making. They are ministers, judges, members of parliament and CEOs, but the doors of high political office remain closed. The government has officially recognized this state of affairs. Hence, while the rate of women staff (cadres) is 40 percent, only 5 percent concern decision-making jobs.52
The first woman was appointed as a minister in 1984. In 2007, there are only three women in the government. In the parliament, 94 percent of the MPs are men and 100 percent of the local district chiefs are men. However, the weak political representation of women must be put into its regional context. When compared to all the Mediterranean countries, the Maghreb countries are quite progressive, closer to the Mediterranean European states (Spain excepted) than to the Middle Eastern countries. Europe can be divided into three groups. In the first, women's representation in parliament is the highest (between 32 and 45 percent)..53 In the second group, women represent 20 percent of the MPs.54 Mediterranean countries constitute the last group and the worst in terms of women's representation in politics (12 percent).
How can we explain this phenomenon?
The circumstantial reasons concern the novelty of having pluralist elections. This practice needs some time to be integrated into society. The brutal Algerian conflict in the 1990s also played a role; improving the status of women was a low priority. Furthermore, this bloody period led many Algerians to conclude wrongly that democratic pluralism was a flawed system synonymous with chaos, and that the previous system was better, or at least safer.
There are also structural reasons that impede women's progress, including a lack of interest in politics and political parties. This indifference is shared by both women and men. They believe that political parties represent only the party elite and that politics is a game with special or sham rules. The second structural reason is persistent conservative values, which limit women's initiatives in the public domain in favor of men. Almost twice as many men as women support the idea of an Islamic society: 44 percent of men placed themselves at the highest level of the scale of "support for some aspects of the model of Islamic society," compared with 23 percent of women.59 In addition, among individuals who most favored women's emancipation, 67 percent were women, compared with 20 percent of men.60 These positions have no relationship to religious practices (prayer, fasting and abstaining from alcohol). It means that conservatism and religiosity are different.
Governmental Reforms
In Morocco, Algeria and Libya, official reforms to improve women's status derive either from the application of a strategic choice or from the consequences of internal and external pressures. Tunisia represented the avant-garde with its 1956 code, which introduced reforms that were more progressive than the laws of many contemporary Western countries. At the opposite end of the spectrum was the 1958 Moroccan mudawana, which reinforced the traditional Moroccan patriarchal order. It stipulated that the duty of a woman was to be obedient to her husband and that her husband had to authorize his wife to work. In the three other countries, woman's issues have been held hostage to political rivalries, ideological disputes and circumstantial compromises. The 1984 Algerian Code was very restrictive, especially concerning divorced women. They did not have access to a conjugal house, with or without custody of their children; the father had sole parental authority; and repudiation and divorce were easy for men to initiate. Since that time, criticism of the Code has continued, but in vain. The debate remained moribund until 2005, when the rise of Islamist opposition and the generalcrises of legitimacy convinced the governments to engage in deeper changes.
Therefore, the Algerian government finally accepted the reform of the family code adopted in 1984. The new code sets conditions on the practice of polygamy, obliges the father to pay a pension to his ex-wife and children, guarantees a house for a mother with custody of her children, and recognizes the mother as a parental authority. The new Moroccan mudawana has banned guardianship, maintained polygamy with legal recognition and the agreement of the first wife, maintained repudiation with legal recognition, and affirmed the mother's child custody with home and pension.
As in the Algerian and Moroccan cases, Libyan authorities have dealt with the issue of women according to religious and political pressures. During the 1980s, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi publicly called for the reform of women's rights, including ending the obligation of women to leave the house with a hijab (veil) and to be accompanied by a male relative. A decade later, the Islamic threat had arisen, deterring the Qadhafi government from further ameliorating women's rights. Hence, the Socialist state party introduced important measures for the emancipation of women, such as admitting women into the judiciary system and the armed forces; creating a center for women's studies; fixing a minimum age for marriage for both genders and restricting polygamy; correcting schoolbooks; setting up a department of women's affairs and supporting women's non-governmental organizations.61
Nevertheless, looking to achieve a difficult balance, Qadhafi has also emphasized the role of women as mothers and housewives. Actually, this lack of coherence has reinforced the cultural resistance to substantive change.62 This situation resembles the position taken by the Algerian and Moroccan governments, which try to manipulate Islamic values.
To a certain extent, the Maghrebi rulers use the women's issue either to avoid or to simulate political openness. Rulers make some compromises to guarantee secularist support, or they restrict reforms so as not to anger the conservatives. They hope to stay in power by balancing the different tendencies. For instance, the first measure Algerian authorities introduced after pluralism was the cancellation of the automatic proxy vote.63 Indeed, the regime made the decision after the 1990 FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) victory in the municipal elections. At that time, many analysts suggested that the automatic delegation to the husband or father of a woman's right to vote facilitated this victory. The legislation has authorized men to vote on behalf of their wives since 1970 and has extended the practice to all female members of the family, particularly in rural and semi-rural areas, where women rarely go to the local government offices. The 1991 reform did not cancel the husband's right of proxy but required him to legalize it by asking his wife to confirm her agreement in writing to the local authorities.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Libyan leadership tried to strengthen its power by bringing women into the military and the revolutionary councils. The government established a Department of Women's Affairs as part of the secretariat for the General People's Congress, the national legislative institution. Overseen by an assistant secretary of the General People's Committee, the department collects information and controls the integration of women into all spheres of public life. The government also established the General Union of Women's Associations as a network of nongovernmental organizations that address women's employment needs. Obviously, there is still strong governmental control over the issue. Salma Ahmed Rashid is one of the few women appointed to a high political position. Between 1992 and 1994, she was assistant secretary for women and then secretary in the General Secretariat of the General People's Congress for Women's Affairs (deputy chief of government). In 1996, she was the first woman ambassador to the League of Arab States.
Before the September 2002 legislative elections in Morocco, King Mohamed VI reserved 30 seats of the 325-seat House of Representatives for women, and every major political party provided female candidates. As a result, 34 women were elected to the legislature, making Morocco one of the few Arab nations where women comprise 10 percent of the parliament.
Explaining his decision, the king remarked that because women represent 50 percent of the population, they ought to have similar representation in the legislature. Since coming to power Mohamed VI has appointed three women to senior positions, including a royal adviser. He also appointed, in November 2002, a new cabinet of 37 ministers, of whom three were women.64 Nevertheless, women in the government at the ministerial level represent less than 6 percent of the total number of positions. In 2003, the secretary of the House of Representatives was a woman, Milouda Hazib, from the Democrat Constitutional Group.
In Algeria, the 2007 legislative elections increased the number of female members of the Popular National Assembly from 25 in 2002 to 33 of a total of 389 members (7.7 percent of the MPs) against 13 MPs in 1997.65 The governments of both prime ministers Ali Benflis and Ahmed Ouyahia included five women ministers and secretaries of state.66
In Tunisia, although women hold only 3 percent of ministerial positions, they won 21 of the total 182 seats in the 1999 parliamentary elections. In 2006, the Tunisian Parliament boasted the highest proportion of women members in the Arab world: 11.5 percent. Paradoxically, this rate is considered quite high by any international standards.67 The ratio of elected women is even higher in local councils. More than 21.6 percent of the members of the country's municipal councils are women. The government decided to address this low female representation by creating a number of governmental bodies to deal specifically with women's issues: the Ministry of Women and Family Affairs, the National Women's and Development Commission, and the National Council of Women and the Family. The ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) has used its majority position to encourage the candidacy and election of women to public office. The presence of women in the leadership bodies of the party is substantial, and 22 percent of the members of the RCD's central committee are women. In addition, Tunisia stands apart from its neighbors with respect to women in the military. In December 2002, the Ministry of Defense announced that military service would become mandatory for Tunisian women. Just prior to this, some parliamentarians, including female members, had called for mandatory military service for Tunisian women.68
Have these measures led to deep-seated changes in the role of women in society? Generally, the results have not been spectacular. Concrete application is hampered by human and technical difficulties. Moreover, subjective interpretation and deep-rooted opposition have hindered the adoption of these top-down reforms.
Cherifa Kheddar, president of the association Djazaïrouna, (Our Algeria), an association of victims of terrorism, an association of victims of violence, wonders if the new Algerian code has not created new problems instead of resolving them.69 For instance, in some isolated areas (especially in the West), the medical certificate for marriage includes virgin status for the bride, which is of course not required by law.70 Additional confusion concerns the recognition or not of the Fatiha71 (traditional contract) as a legal marriage, and the woman's right to divorce. Although the new family code has expanded women's rights regarding divorce, the procedure remains too complex, since the judge still has to decide whether the request is even warranted.72 Furthermore, feminist organizations as well as lawyers denounce article 68, related to child custody, which stipulates that the mother loses custody of her son at age 10 or her daughter at age 19. She also loses her pension at this time. The same deficiencies exist in Morocco, where many women’s rights organizations face great difficulties in implementing the new family code, which does not yet provide for legal equality between men and women. These reasons include vague legal requirements and the government's inadequate information policy. As before, women still suffer from discrimination, domestic violence and patriarchal patterns of behavior. Mina Tafnout, a member of the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (ADFM), explains that old practices such as polygamy or the marriage of underage girls is still commonplace.73 The Democratic League for Women Rights confirms this. As for Algeria, the implementation of the new family code has caused difficulties. In many respects, the new law is vague, and judges were not prepared to work with the new moudawana or to face the negative reactions. Many men feel threatened by the new code and fear the loss of their traditional role as head of the family.
Women's Stake and Political Opposition
Rulers are not the only ones to use women's issues for their own ends. The opposition (secular and Islamist) has also been adept at using the issue of women to support their own interests. To understand the positions of these actors requires an understanding of how parties break down along the ideological spectrum from secular to Islamist.
Feminist Secular Militancy
In secular thought, political militancy starts with the necessary recognition of citizenship as a direct relationship to the state and other individuals. Recent empirical evidence and analysis show that citizenship is a goal, not a reality, a goal that is more difficult for women to achieve. Hence, the relationship between the state and women in the Maghreb countries is not direct, but mediated rather by men (father, brother, husband). The right to vote, to access social protection schemes, to send children to school, to marry, to travel, and to pass on citizenship to their children are either denied to women or granted through the mediation of a male family member. This is the reason feminists often start their resistance with symbols of emancipation, including the Islamic veil.
In Tunisia, feminists consider the laws that forbid headscarves as emancipating. They connect the wearing of headscarves to support for militant Islamist parties rather than a private religious act. In Turkey, which inspired this restriction, civil society is present in the debate between Kemalism (secularization/ Westernization) and conservatism.74 However, in Tunisia, there is no authorized political opposition, and the antireligious measures are "accepted" as a guarantee against the Islamist threat.75
Is Morocco following in Tunisia's footsteps? At the end of 2006, the government introduced major changes in religious education, particularly regarding headscarves. A picture of a mother and her daughter wearing headscarves is being removed from the latest editions of a textbook. A verse from the Quran that suggests women wear veils has already been taken out of the books. An Education Ministry official, Aboulkacem Samir, stated, "The headscarf for women is a political symbol, in the same way that the beard is for men. But we in the ministry must be very careful that the books are fair to all Moroccans and do not represent just one political faction."76 In Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey, decision makers seem to have forgotten that in 1990 and 1991 many young women, wearing short skirts and tight jeans, as well as young men with long hair and piercing, voted in favor of the Islamist FIS. At the same time, lots of women in headscarves and men with beards rejected Islamist parties, they refused to link politics and religion. Moroccan secular political parties have nearly erased the issue of women from their stated political concerns. All political parties, without exception, ignored the 1992 initiative by the UAF (Union for Women's Action) to support the reform of the mudawana. The Istiqlal party, the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces), and even the PPS (Party of Progress and Socialism, formerly the Moroccan Communist party) actively opposed women on the mudawana issue. Leftist parties believe that women's equality is associated with class liberalization. The "democratic" coalition called Kutla77 refuses to prioritize the promotion of women in the name of political consensus. In reality, they do not want to challenge the monarchic religious discourse, and its legitimacy. Furthermore, women's status appears to some as merely an extravagant demand from the upper– middle class of urban feminists; the issue does not motivate the overwhelming majority of rural women. In addition to their non-supportive attitude, secular parties and organizations criticize Islamist parties because they mistrust the Islamist women's motives. In their view, the involvement in women's commissions represents a strategy of infiltration and power grabbing.78
From the beginning of the multiparty system in Algeria, women's participation was weak, as Imane Hayef has pointed out.79 The rate of abstention among women was notably higher than that among men in the first two democratic elections. The first round of legislative elections of 1991 showed 30 percent abstention, of which three-quarters were women. The majority of these women were poorly educated or illiterate. Hayef's study showed that few women took part in other forms of involvement, such as demonstrations, strikes, conferences, meetings, associations, and political discussions. Women's associations focusing on welfare and cultural activities, which are often led by Islamist militants, are much more numerous than those organizations working on women's rights. Most women's organizations are involved in social work, such as training girls in manual labor, handicrafts or secretarial work. However, there are now a few organizations interested in issues directly related to women's status, such as the Association for the Defense of Oppressed Women. Some organizations before the multiparty system have inspired women who are closely associated with the liberal opposition parties. The embryonic "feminist" movement started in secret at the end of the 1970s. Hayef explains that the movement mainly focused on the family codes, discussed since the 1970s and adopted in 1984. The movement was always opposed to this code in the name of the constitutional equality between the sexes, as well as the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The 1990s conflict in Algeria has created a condition in which women now feel directly involved, especially regarding the consequences of terrorism and antiterrorist policies. For example, Cherifa Kheddar became the head of Djazaïrouna Nacera Dutour leads an association that deals with cases related to disappeared people. It is noteworthy that both women are opposed to the national reconciliation policy that guarantees amnesty to security forces as well as to members of armed groups who have surrendered and allegedly did not commit collective massacres.
Regarding politics, Algerian women do not run for office in significant numbers. In 2007, the Algerian legislative elections produced 4,500 candidates, but only 250 were women.80 This occurred despite the Workers party naming 12 women to head its list and supporting the principle of affirmative action, which introduced quotas to improve the status of women in the political sphere.
Islamist Opposition
Support for a more traditional way of life still exists, especially among those who think that Western colonization (and with it Western culture) has sown the seeds of immorality and heresy.81 According to traditionalists, the solution to these problems can be achieved either by returning to the pre-colonial era or by emulating traditional Arab societies. This view also explains why many women (and men) are attracted to Arab television that broadcasts from the Gulf or the Middle East, guaranteeing "culturally and politically correct" programs. Ghita Al-Khayat, a Moroccan psychologist, suggests that with the elimination of the influence of colonization, "Maghrebi women must reinvent a new way of living as Muslims."82 She uses the example of how many women embrace an active and more aggressive form of Islam. Regarding the reasons for women's oppression, Islamists point to two factors. The first is linked to the "retarded elements" who speak in the name of religion, but advocate ignorant traditions sometimes forbidden by Islam. The second reason for women's oppression, according to Islamists, is the fact that they try to be "equal" to men, putting them in unnatural settings, which denigrate them and take away their integrity and dignity as women. For example, "women are 'forced' to go out and compete in the labor market, a task which means women may come into contact with sexually repressed men (as in public transportation) in a humiliating and 'unsuitable' way."83
Islamist political parties do not use the same discourse towards the place of women in society.84 They commonly say, "Islam has given women many rights," "Islam has liberated women from oppression and the abuses they knew during the Djahiliya" (era of ignorance before Islam), or "Muslim women are better off than their Western counterparts who are not respected." The most conservative Islamists advocate an extremely restricted role for women. For Ali Benhadj,85 number two in the banned FIS, most of the economic, social and cultural problems of Algerian society are due to the fact that women no longer stay at home.86
In Morocco, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has often displayed its feminine force. In March 2000, it organized a large demonstration in Casablanca with an impressive women's participation to denounce the reforms of the Abderrahman Youssoufi government, especially with respect to the status of women. Women's rights organizations accuse the PJD of having a double standard. Though all the members of the PJD voted in favor of the personal-code amendment in parliament, the Islamist press has regularly and abundantly published critical and negative articles. Nadia Yassine also appears ambivalent. On the one hand, she functions as an informal spokesperson for Justice and Welfare, the country's biggest Islamist movement, which has always taken a clear stance against revising the family code; on the other hand, she openly propagates an "Islamist feminism."
In Tunisia, the semi-governmental opposition to Islamists includes militant women. Nadia Selini (contributing author to the 2005 Arab Human Development Report) has declared that Islamism is an obstacle to women's improvement, denying the distinction between moderate and extremist Islamists.87 Nevertheless, Rached Ghannouchi, exiled leader of Tunisia's Al-Nahda, argues that development and defense against enemies are impossible if half of the society is restricted to working in children's education and the clothing and food businesses.
The Algerian MSP (Movement for a Peaceful Society) has a very active women's section inside the party and through the numerous non-political associations that the party controls. Furthermore, the 2005 Arab Human Development Report affirms that globally, because of their social influence, Islamist movements can be at the forefront of women's economic and political development. The 2006 EuroMesCo Report shares this opinion.88 Elaborated for the European Commission, the report states that female Islamist militancy contributes more to the breakdown of the patriarchal system and the promotion of an active political role for women than the so-called "democratic parties" do.89 Actually, Maghrebi women take part in almost all areas of social activity, work and politics wearing religious clothes. Generally, Islamist parties are known for having important and active women's sections within their organizations. However, a feminist position that does not justify itself within Islam is bound to be rejected by the rest of society and is, therefore, self-defeating. Moreover, some Muslim feminists feel that to attempt to separate Islamic from secular discourse (whether they are accused of being Western or not) can only lead to serious fragmentation within the society. Prominent writers who advocate this stance include the Moroccan Fatima Mernissi, the Pakistani Riffat Hassan and the Arab American Azizah Al-Hibri.90 Because of the influence of Islamist discourse, secular feminists have become reactive instead of proactive. Nonetheless, analysts argue that as Islamist parties try to gain power, they become more pragmatic and adapt their positions to the society they live in. They are either inclusive and open to women or exclusive and repressive, according to the way the whole society integrates or marginalizes women.
Conclusion
Pragmatic analysts believe that "confusing the advancement of democracy and the advancement of women is not only a mistake but also dangerous."91 They argue that modern democracy has never represented the people but rather the elite in the name of the voting majority. They also point out that decision making, political influence and economic power remain largely in the hands of men all around the world. In the best cases (Scandinavian), the balance of power is just less unbalanced. Regarding Maghrebi countries, the most pessimistic admit that to change old habits, belief systems must change first.
However, these countries do not have the time to wait for this lengthy process. The result is a no way out and the status quo. Conversely, optimistic analysts think of democracy in terms of an ongoing process that must always be deepened and ameliorated until citizenship guarantees justice and equality. If we subscribe to this last point of view, what prevents the Maghrebi countries from becoming democratic?
First, elected institutions have very little credibility because they do not have the power to make decisions. Women's marginalization is due to this lack of legitimacy and to the immaturity of democratic regimes. Achieving legitimacy is a sine qua non for resolving women's marginalization, and resolving the women's issue can be done through democratic means. The Maghreb countries have an opportunity to resolve two major difficulties through a single process. The question is, do they have the will to do so?
The Maghrebi regimes seem to be hesitating between perpetuating the status quo (Tunisia and Libya) and opening their systems slightly (Algeria and Morocco). In the latter cases, improving the status of women has accompanied minor political reforms, while Tunisia and Libya have used women's concerns to mitigate their increasing lack of legitimacy. However, it seems that all Maghrebi rulers are convinced that using the "women's issue" can help them counter the Islamist opposition groups. The ambiguous positions of the Islamist parties, have reinforced this political tactic.
1 The writer wishes to thank Dr. Clement Henry for his helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.
2 Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in parliament in 2005: the year in perspective," Switzerland 05, a review of parliamentary elections and renewals. General elections took place in 39 single or lower houses of parliament. 1,548 women gained seats, accounting for 20 percent of members elected to parliament in 2005, against 18 percent in 2003, 16 percent in 2004, and 11 percent in 2000.
3 Regarding the abnormal conditions in which the elections took place in Iraq, the legitimacy of the present political representation needs to be confirmed by elections organized in appropriate conditions.
4 See Ben-Salah, "Profils de femmes: une typologie de conflits familiaux en contexte d'immigration," in Femmes marocaines et conflits familiaux en immigration: quelles solutions juridiques appropriées? (Anvers, Edition M-C Foblets, 1998); J-Y.Carlier, "Deux facettes des relations entre le droit et l'Islam: la répudiation et le foulard," in Facette de l'islam belge, (Louvain-La-Neuve, Bruylant-Académia, 1997); "Mauritanie: La Mauritanie lutte contre les violences faites aux femmes," Africa Time, July 12, 2005; "Mali: L'excision et les mariages précoces violent les droits de la femme," All Africa, July 1 2005; "Pakistan: La justice du Pakistan rouvre le dossier d'un viol collectif," Le Monde, June 30, 2005.
5 See Malek Bennabi, La production des orientalistes, (Alger, Libraire Amar, 1970) ; Le phenomene coranique, (Beirut, Dar al Fikr, 1946); Le probleme de lat culture, (Beyrouth, Dar al Fikr, 1957).
6 Samuel Huntington is one of the proponents of the view that Islam is incompatible with democracy. However, he recognized that those who contended that Catholic countries would have difficulty in establishing democratic governments were wrong.
7 Some intellectuals and scholars consider the woman issue as a social and political priority, including Soumya Naâmane Guessous, Fatema Mernissi, Feriel Lalami-Fates, Kamara Djeynaba, Noureddine Saadi, Salima AitMohamed, Keltoum Bendjouadi, Fatima Doukhan, Sakina Mdaoui, Haytham Manna, Imed Melliti, Sihem Najar, Zazi Sadou, and Leila Sebbar.
8 Yahya Sadowski, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate," The Middle East Report [MERIP], July-August, 1993, p. 19.
9 Yahia H. Zoubir, Roy Nelson, and Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, "Democratic Transitions from Above: Is Algeria Emulating the Brazilian Experience?"
10 Abdelmadjid Bouzidi, "La femme dans l'économie algérienne: beaucoup reste à faire," Le Quotidien d'Oran, December 30 2004.
11 United Nations Development Program. Arab Human Development Report 2005, p. 330.
12 On Libya's government policy toward women, see Maria Graeff-Wassink, "Les relations hommes-femmes en Libye, hier et aujourd'hui," in Olivier Pliez. La nouvelle Libye:Sociétés, espaces et géopolitique au lendemain de l'embargo, (Paris, Karthala-IREMAM, 1999), pp. 177-93.
13 The 2005 Arab Human Development Report considers that women's illiteracy remains at a very high level: 70.7 percent.
14 See: http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=12.
15 Maghreb Arabe Presse, October 15, 2005.
16 Dominique Lagarde, Mounia Daoudi, and Baya Gacem, "Le Mariage et les traditions dans le Maghreb Arabe: Tunisie, Algérie, Maroc, Mauritanie, et Libye," L'Express, January 25, 2001.
17 Ibid.
18 Although this figure is low, it has more than doubled since 1987, when women constituted only 6 percent of the labor force.
19 The rate of women workers is only 18.68 percent, according to the National Center for Social and Cultural Anthropological Research, which does not take into account the informal sector. See Naïma Hamidache, "Violence contre la femme en Algérie," L'Expression, December 26, 2006.
20 Ibid.
21 Arab Human Development Report 2005, p 305.
22 See http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=12.
23 Agriculture, which contributes approximately 20 percent of overall production, continues to be the largest source of employment, accounting for nearly half the active population.
24 The first study on women in the Moroccan textile industry was undertaken by the Democratic League for the Rights of Women in April and May 1996. Quoted in Hanan Nasser, "Why Arab women are still in the slow lane of reform," Daily Star, June 6, 2005. Available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=15672.
25 Samar Smati, "Ce que ne veulent plus les femmes algériennes," Liberté, December 25, 2006.
26 See http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=10.
27 Marina Ottaway, "Women's Right's and Democracy in the Arab World," Carnegie Papers, Middle East series, No. 42, February 2004, p. 7.
28 One can easily find women holding high responsibilities in important firms asserting that they would stop their professional careers if they got married and had children.
29 Djamila Kourta, "La femme et le marché du travail" Algiers, El Watan, December 26, 2006.
30 Ibid.
31 Fatiha Amalou, "La femme absente aux postes-clés," Algiers, L'Expression, March 18, 2007.
32 Ibid
33 Fatiha Amalou, "Code de la famille, Peu de femmes connaissent leurs droits," Algiers, L'Expression, March 21, 2007.
34 Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, former UN assistant secretary general and director of the Regional Bureau for Arab States in charge of publishing the Arab Human Development Report 2002, cited in Hayat Alvi, op. cit., p. 152.
35 Mai Yamani, "Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives," http://www.soas.ac.uk/Centres/ IslamicLaw/Feminism_Intro.html.
36 Ibid.
37 Claude Liauzu, "Djamila Amrane, Les femmes algériennes dans la guerre," CLIO, no. 9, 1999.
38 "Egyptian Islamic Scholars Debate Whether Women May Serve As Heads of State," Special DispatchEgypt, televised debate on Al-Arabiya TV on January 28, 2007. http://www.memri.org/bin/ opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD156207.
39 See Muhammad F?r?q R?tib, Women in Islam, Aalam Al Kotob, 1988; Barbara Freyer Stowasser, Women in the Quran, Traditions and Interpretation, (Oxford University Press, 1996).
40 "Egyptian Islamic Scholars Debate Whether Women May Serve As Heads of State," op cit.
41 Hakim Kateb, "La femme dans la vie politique," Algiers, L'Expression, March 22, 2007.
42 Feminism is used according to Nancy Cott definition: "Feminism asks for sexual equality that includes sexual difference. It aims for individual freedoms by mobilizing sex solidarity. It posits that women recognize their unity, while it stands for diversity among women. It requires gender consciousness for its basis, yet calls for the elimination of prescribed gender roles." Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, (Yale University Press), 1987, p 5.
43 In the 1890s, feminism and then "feminist consciousness" grew up in Egypt in the framework of the reformists (Muhamed Abdou, Rachid Reda), who tried to break the linkage between Islam and repressive practices imposed in the name of religion. Soon feminism was introduced in the rising discourse of secular nationalism, which called for equal rights of all Egyptians, be they Muslim or Christian.
44 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_feminism.
45 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminism.
46 Margot Badran, "Islamic Feminism: What's in a Name?, " El Ahram, Weekly Online, January 17-23, 2002, Issue No. 569, in http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/569/cu1.htm.
47 UNFA (Algerian women National Union) is one of the numerous organizations manipulated by the FLN during the single-party regime.
48 Djamila Kourta, "Création de l'Observatoire algérien de la femme," El Watan, June 26, 2007.
49 Mekioussa Chekir, "La législation face aux contraintes de la réalité…", Algiers, La Tribune, March 19, 2007.
50 Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, "Women in the Maghreb," in North Africa in Motion: The Limits of Transformation, in Yahia H. Zoubir, Haizam Amirah-Fernandèz (El-Cano Royal Institute, Madrid) and Michael Willis (Oxford University), editors, (Routledge Press or University Press of Florida), [forthcoming, 2007].
51 Quoted by Dawn Marley, "Interactions between French and Islamic Cultures in the Maghreb": http:// clio.revues.org, accessed on July 20, 2005.
52 Fatih Amalou, op cit.
53 This group comprises Sweden (45 percent), Denmark (38 percent), Finland (37 percent), Netherlands (36 percent), Belgium (35 percent), Austria (33 percent), Germany (32 percent) and Spain (36 percent).
54 Letonia (21 percent), Poland (20 percent), Slovakia (19 percent), Estonia (18 percent), Czech Republic (17 percent), Portugal (19 percent), United Kingdom (17 percent), and Luxembourg (16 percent) constitute this group.
55 http://www.oboulo.com/etat+niveau+local+italie+espagne.
56 Arab Human Development Report 2005 P. 309.
57 "Women in Parliament in 2006: The Year in Perspective, " Antiparliamentary Union, at http:// www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmn06-e.pdf.
58Arab Human Development Report 2005, P 309.
59 Imane Hayef, "Algerian Women and Political Choice, Time of Transition, " Gender and Development, Vol. 3, No. 3, (October 1995), p. 25.
60 Ibid, p. 26.
61 "Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, A/49/38, par. 126-185 (180), April 12, 1994.
62 Ibid.
63 The feminist movement in Algeria did not have to fight for the right to vote, since the constitutions have recognized it since independence. However, it has asked for equal application of the law for men and women in the exercise of this right. The feminist slogan was, "A vote is like a prayer, no one can do it for you."
64 See http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=12.
65 Erwin Delaplace, "La parité en marche," Arabies, September 2006, p. 49.
66 UN Development Program: http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=1, accessed in 15 December 2005.
67 American women occupy only 14 percent of the seats in the House Representatives and 13 percent in the Senate.
68 See http://www.pogar.org/countries/gender.asp?cid=20.
69 Ghada Hamrouche, "Un code et des applications," Algiers, La Tribune, Janvier 21, 2007.
70 Article 8 of the Algerian Family Code requires a medical certificate for the couple.
71 The Fatiha is the first sura in the Quran and is uses in the religious marriage contract. Many couples face serious problems in a case of childbirth before signing the legal marriage contract.
72 Before the amendments, women were allowed to divorce if their husbands stopped paying their pension or sharing the conjugal bed; or he is invalid, in jail or absent for one year. The amendments added two new reasons: recognized injury and moral fault.
73 Beate Stauffer, "Women's Rights in Morocco, New Family Code Faces Many Hurdles," Qantara.de 2006, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-545/i.html?PHPSESSID=5.
74 In October 1998, four million protesters demonstrated in various Turkish cities in support of female students who had been suspended from universities for refusing to remove their hijab. A wild campaign then denounced the police who attacked thousands of demonstrators for participating in the protests. See Sahar Kassaimah, "The Shameful Conspiracy against Honorable Women in Tunisia and Turkey," January 26, 2001. Available at: http://www.islamonline.net/english/Politics/2001/02/article53.shtml.
75 For the most authoritarian regimes, the 90s Algerian experience remains the example that is dangerous to follow. For them, prevention is assimilated to repression.
76 Richard Hamilton, "Morocco Moves to Drop Headscarf," BBC News, Rabat, October 6, 2006. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5413808.stm.
77 The Kutla is a coalition of opposition parties, constituted in 1994, which cover a wide spectrum from the nationalist and pan-Arab to the socialist and communist left.
78 Beate Stauffer, op. cit.
79 Imane Hayef, op. cit., p. 25.
80 Hakim Kateb, op. cit.
81 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Women, Islam, and the Moroccan State: The Struggle over the Personal Status Law", Middle East Journal, Summer 2005.
82 Dawn Marley, "Interactions between French and Islamic Cultures in the Maghreb." available at http:// clio.revues.org.
83 Azza M. Karam, "Contemporary Islamisms and Feminisms in Egypt," Dossier 19: Contemporary Islamisms and Feminisms in Egypt; February 1998, http://www.wluml.org/english/ pubsfulltxt.shtml?cmdpercent5B87percent5D=i-87-2680.
84 Ibid.
85 Abbasi Madani, for his part, declared that women have their place in social and economic life, and condemned in 1989 attacks against the "Westernized" girls in the streets.
86 Adel Hussein, member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, considers that women's work outside the home has led to many negative social consequences.
87 Ghania Khelifi, "Situation de la femme dans le monde arabe," L'Expression, December 9, 2006.
88 "Les femmes en tant que représentantes à part entière de la communauté euro-méditerranéenne des états démocratiques", EuroMeSCO, April 2006.
89 Ibid, pp. 29-30.
90 Azza M. Karam, op. cit.
91 Marina Ottaway, op. cit., p 13.
Middle East Policy is fully accessible through the Wiley Online Library
Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal content.