Restricted
Now that Iraq is ostensibly under control by U.S. and coalition forces, the focus of effort has shifted to the process of reconstruction. This entails rebuilding society in the aftermath of conflict (or other catastrophe). The extent of the reconstruction effort in Iraq and the way it is conducted will reveal much about the motives for this war. One justification for the war was to bring peace and freedom to the Iraqi people. If this was indeed a principal motivation, we can expect the welfare of the people of Iraq to improve; peace and freedom are both the means and the ends of development.2 But development is a much-contested process. It can be regarded as an attempt to achieve an ideal state3 or it can be regarded as an attempt to envelop societies within the western-dominated capitalist world system.4 These two notions of development may not be incompatible, at least as far as neoliberal development theory is concerned.5 However, when “development” as integration into the world system requires Western values of liberty, secularism and progress, then conflict over the meaning and practice of development is inevitable.
This paper discusses some of the larger political and economic challenges in reconstructing Iraq in order to foster domestic peace and development. It does not speculate about the motives for, or the legality of, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq;6 nor does it consider the regional security implications of developments in Iraq. Our concern is broadly to consider the capacity of a U.S.-imposed reconstruction to promote peace and sustainable development in Iraq, and the problems that must be resolved.
RECONSTRUCTION
The post-Cold War era has seen a growing confluence between security and development, with increasing attention to humanitarian intervention, peacemaking and peacekeeping, “complex emergencies” and post-conflict reconstructions.7 The interventions in Somalia and Kosovo, violent internal wars in Rwanda and Liberia, U.N. peace missions in Central America, U.N. transitional administrations in Cambodia and East Timor, and the reconstruction of Afghanistan all offer lessons for the future of both development and security in theory and practice. The mix of places and cases, the supposed novelty of this post-Cold War agenda, and the incompleteness of many actions have meant there is no single set of concepts, uncontested lessons or established codes of practice for post-conflict reconstruction.
Reconstruction is taken here to mean rebuilding peace and sustainable socioeconomic development after conflict. It is an enormous task, depending on the extent of infrastructure damage, the state of government and civil society, the state of the economy, the quality of human resources, the level of physical and psychological trauma and ethnic and tribal tensions, and the degree of mistrust among combatants.
Commonly, humanitarian interventions are said to have three distinct phases: relief, reconstruction and development.8 This three-stage approach was based on traditional interventions to provide relief in times of natural disaster. However, the political economies of post-natural-disaster societies are different from those in post conflict societies. For example, the World Bank characterizes post-conflict societies as having a dominating narrow elite, fragile peace, a lack of confidence between political and economic actors, and weak judicial, financial, fiscal, administrative and regulatory institutions.9 In such places, hasty interjections of significant resources can exacerbate and sustain conflict rather than relieve it, as was dramatically revealed in the case of Somalia.10 So now it is considered that planning for reconstruction and development should occur at the same time as planning for relief. In the case of Iraq, however, there appears to have been little planning for relief (and what exists has not been well coordinated with relief agencies), let alone any detailed planning for longer-term processes.11
There are nine key clusters of tasks that may be required to restore peace and development in post-conflict societies (many of these are discussed in detail later in this paper):
1) Establish border control and security.
The U.S. and British forces have spent considerable effort intercepting traffic to and from Syria, and preventing major incursions from Iran.12 The ability of the U.S. administration or an independent Iraqi government to sustain border control and national security will be a function of the size of its armed forces and the legitimacy of the ruling regime in the eyes of its neighbors and the international community. There have been sporadic violent episodes, resulting in deaths, between U.S. forces and suspected remnant Baathist forces.13
2) Provide relief to displaced persons.
The U.S. invasion did not trigger the mass movement of refugees that the United Nations and aid agencies had expected.
3) Restore basic services.
Efforts to keep transport channels open – roads, railways, ports and airports – have been successful. However, the restoration of basic services such as water, power and communications has been slow and piecemeal, to the frustration of many.14
4) Establish law and order.
The widespread looting immediately after the war ended and ongoing civil violence in Baghdad are the result of a prolonged failure by the occupying forces to restore law and order.15 Beyond this civil/criminal element, restoring law and order involves maintaining peace between combatants, disarmament and demobilization, redressing extralegal conflict transfers; reintegrating ex-combatants into society (expensive but essential to sustain peace), and clearing land mines and unexploded ordnance. Forms of reconciliation between parties to the conflict or among groups divided about the conflict are important too.
5) Establish a longer-term system of public administration.
Decisions must be made about the degree of decentralization and autonomy, the balance of representation of different groups within society, the structure of the armed forces and police, and the creation of an independent judiciary. The United States is seeking to reinstate the former bureaucracy of Iraq, excluding some 30,000 Baath party members, and to disband the Iraqi armed forces.16 This is not unproblematic, and there has been some reinstatement of former police and bureaucrats in Baghdad and Basra.17
6) Design and implement social policy.
Critical issues here are the education system – including the balance among primary, secondary and tertiary levels, and decisions about curriculum reform and teacher training; the health-care system, involving balancing provision of basic care at district levels, as opposed to regional and major hospitals, and the provision of
mental-health services (particularly important in post-conflict situations); and developing institutions that promote human rights and protect minorities.
7) Establish a transitional administration.
This involves decisions about the appropriate mix of foreign and local personnel and of expatriates and in-situ people. Should those complicit in past abuses be excluded? There is still no clear plan for the formation of an interim administration and no clear identification of which Iraqis would be involved.
8) Institutionalize a democratic system.
More must be done than initiating electoral processes, organizing political parties and reforming the constitution. Civil-society institutions and “democratic culture” must also be fostered.18 There has been some spontaneous formation of political parties in Iraq, but the U.S. administration has no clear timetable for elections and constitutional reform.
9) Regenerate the macroeconomy.
This involves stimulating private-sector legal market activity, balancing the extent of state control of the economy against the degree of freedom, determining trade policy, making decisions about foreign debt, making rules on foreign investment and aid, reconstructing banking and taxation systems, and rehabilitating the agricultural sector. It is too early to tell what the United States plans in this regard. However, it is expected that for the period that the United States is in control there will be considerable private foreign investment in the oil sector.19 In late May, the United States began a process of dialogue with British and American banks to provide credit to companies prepared to trade with Iraq.20
Simply to list these tasks is to reveal not only the enormity of the task of reconstruction, but that it is by nature a highly contested process. These are not technical tasks to be objectively identified and then “solved.” Some guidance is provided by international law, which should govern U.S.-Iraqi interactions. However, these tasks all involve political decisions over which different groups – Americans, Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, Baathists, Turkomans, Kurds, northerners, southerners, urbanites and farmers, rich and poor – hold different opinions.
IRAQ, UNRECONSTRUCTED
To say that there will be some reconstruction of Iraq is to assume that Iraq is still a meaningful single category since the U.S.-led invasion. It cannot simply be assumed that there exists a national consensus. The abrupt end of a decades long dominating regime in just three weeks has created a political vacuum that is evident in shifting coalitions and divisions among religious groups, ethnic groups, regional groups and even classes. The United States may not be able to contain these divisions. Just as the Afghan state has little control outside Kabul, it may be that a single state will not emerge from this disorder in Iraq.21
Iraq’s isolation from the international community for more than thirteen years, and its refusal to release economic data, mean that there is little information about its economic and social conditions.22 Even so, some problems are evident. The militarization of the Iraqi economy in the 1970s and 1980s saw a massive reallocation of civilian labor to the military and a corresponding huge increase in military spending.23 Sanctions and earlier conflicts have greatly reduced Iraq’s capacity to cope with the latest war and have increased people’s vulnerability.24 Some 60 percent of the population relies directly on the oil-for-food-program that was imposed in 1990 (but not with the intention that it would remain in place a decade later).25 It is estimated that Iraq’s economy shrank by five-sixths between 1990 and 1991; in 2001 GDP was still only half what it had been before the invasion of Kuwait.26
It is difficult to separate the effects of the sanctions from those of the dictatorship and two wars. However, the intensity and longevity of sanctions are considered to be the main driver of conditions in Iraq.27 Sanctions also brought about a thriving black market controlled by elites, and this social structure can now be exploited again as humanitarian aid is entering markets.
The reconstruction of Iraq has to contend, therefore, not simply with the damage caused by this most recent war (provisional estimates put the number of civilian deaths at 1,700 with 8,000 injured), but also with the impacts of the Iran-Iraq and first Gulf wars, twelve years of U.N. sanctions, the material and political legacy of twenty-four years of violent rule by Saddam Hussein, and the effects of these overlapping violent episodes on Iraqi society.28 Thus, Iraq is characterized by a large shadow economy, widespread unemployment and population displacement, an abundance of light arms, low volumes of external trade, and a weak NGO sector.29 Many of those who can do so have left for other countries, reducing Iraq’s stock of human capital.30 More than a quarter of all Iraqi children are malnourished, and half of the adult population is illiterate.31 In addition to this vast internal agenda, the complex mix of relationships among U.S.-occupied Iraq, Iran, Israel, Palestine, the United Nations, Saudi Arabia and Syria will be critical in determining the extent, timing and nature of the reconstruction process.32
BUILDING AND SUSTAINING
It is important to establish law and order in post-conflict situations so that it is safe for local people to resume their livelihoods and for international and local agencies to bring in relief services and begin reconstruction. With the collapse of a ruling regime comes destabilization of previous rules and systems of enforcement. In this climate some people and groups pursue extralegal entitlements in order to increase wealth. Ex-combatants who have not been demobilized can resort to banditry. The continued presence of “warlords and conflict entrepreneurs,” coupled with ongoing militia resistance to U.S. dominance, has impeded relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan,33 and there is speculation that excombatant banditry is a problem in East Timor.34 Iraq is already experiencing similar problems with violent crime, small-scale battles and resistance to U.S. forces.35 The existence of numerous militia groups, large numbers of unemployed former Iraqi soldiers plus the availability of light and heavy weapons makes widespread organized crime and banditry a real risk in Iraq.36
Disarmament, demobilization and economic reintegration of combatants are therefore critical tasks for peace and reconstruction. Historically this had been one of the most neglected and poorly funded aspects of post-conflict reconstruction.37 Beyond its decision to abolish the Iraqi armed forces on May 24, the United States must make decisions about future force structure. Under the Baathist regime, the Iraqi military has been a massive employer and an instrument of nation building.38 It costs money to destroy chemical, biological and conventional weapons, to reintegrate military personnel into the economy, and to offer officers “golden parachutes” to prevent them from resorting to banditry and contesting power through threat or use of force. It will be difficult for the United States to demobilize and disarm Iraq, since it is an invading force with strong alliances to certain factions within the country (not to mention the widely held belief that the United States is an agent of an enduring “crusader-Zionist conspiracy”).39 Remembering the different U.S. approaches to the armed forces of Western Europe and Japan in post-war reconstruction, it is likely U.S. handling of the Iraqi military will be determined by the degree of confidence it has in Iraq as an ally.
Oil-exporting economies have the potential to become semi privatized, enabling rulers to extract rents for personal gain (as in Angola, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar and – arguably – Suharto’s Indonesia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia).40 The principal source of state revenue is oil rents rather than taxation, so state survival is principally a function of the use of this wealth to co-opt challengers economically or to suppress them forcibly. Oil companies tend to ignore the domestic ramifications of their business transactions. Systemic self-interest among rulers and co-opted challengers converges due to the dire nature of the alternatives (persecution, poverty). And systems of governance are unable to withstand the collapse of power-balanced democratic rule.41 In such states there is little social or economic development beyond the elite. Thus, oil and other resource-dependent economies are more prone to violent internal conflict than are diversified economies.42
The reconstruction of Iraq should aim to prevent such a venal state from reemerging. Structures of governance need to ensure checks and balances in political power at the national level, for example, by separation of powers among the executive, judiciary and legislature, through an independent civil service and auditing agencies, and by depoliticizing military and police forces. Genuine representative democracy, freedom of political association and a free press are integral. A diverse and vibrant civil society, including religious groups, is also widely seen as integral to a robust democratic system.43 These questions of power also involve the distribution of powers between the central state and geographical regions. At present, northern Iraq is effectively run as a separate country, and it will be a challenge to reconcile long-held ethnic, territorial and political differences.44 Iraq could be divided for administrative purposes along regional, ethnic or religious lines, with a loose federal structure seen by many to be the preferred model.45 Decisions here will influence not only development within Iraq, but also relationships with neighboring countries. Without such a dispersal of power throughout society, Iraq may revert to a dictatorship.46
Wars are notable for the way they can reposition or consolidate wealth and power within societies vertically (class based), horizontally (ethnicity-based) and geographically (in particular, rural-urban divisions).47 Indeed, it is the differences between power and wealth, and efforts to sustain or contest them, which drive many internal wars. Therefore, as well as seeking to distribute political power and prevent its excessive concentration, the reconstruction of Iraq should also seek to prevent excessive concentration of economic power, particularly among associates of the former regime, among distinct religious or ethnic groups, or in urban areas.
To the extent that centralized state control of resources permits violent dictatorships to fund themselves, peace and democracy in Iraq may require a free market economic system. Davies and Young even advocate that the oil industry “be broken up and privatized.”48 However, peace and development also require social-development programs and a minimal social-welfare system that is available to all and financed from oil revenues, domestic taxation and reduced military spending. Such a system would necessitate some degree of central control. While it may be in the interests of sustainable human development and peace, this idea of a distributive state is inimical to the U.S.-driven, neoliberal development ideology. A worrying precedent is that the minimal-state/free-market agenda has been imposed by the United States and multilateral banks in Central America, to the detriment of peace building and post conflict reconstruction.49 External factors also matter, including international pressure to force greater accountability of the transactions of oil companies (as was evident in the Shell-Ogoni affair in Nigeria and the United Kingdom).
There has been considerable prevarication about how Iraq is to be run now that the war has ended, demonstrating at least that while the allies carefully planned the war, there was little planning for the postwar period.50 The administrative model that seems most likely to prevail in the immediate future is a central administration consisting of 23 ministries, almost all of which will be headed by Americans, but with some staffing by Iraqis.51 The United States will be in control for the next year or two, but little is yet known about how the transition to independent Iraqi control will transpire. On May 17, the United States deferred indefinitely plans to form a national assembly and an interim Iraqi government, preferring instead to talk of a forthcoming “interim authority” with lesser status than a “government.”52
It is important that appropriate and reasonably legitimate Iraqis be involved in the governance of Iraq to confer a semblance of Iraqi sovereignty.53 Clearly there is no place for any of the 55 U.S. fifty-five “most wanted” figures from the previous regime. However, the architecture of power that sustained the regime extended beyond the 55 and well into the bureaucracy and the private sector. A mass purging will impede reconstruction; however, failure to remove those who were most complicit in acts of violence and repression will further undermine the moral authority of the administration. Determining and moving beyond complicity is no easy task, as truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa, Cambodia and East Timor have shown.
There is a range of views about who should be involved in the reconstruction process and the transitional administration of Iraq. The United States, the United Nations, international NGOs, multilateral bodies like the World Bank and IMF, other governments and private companies all have their own views based on their respective experiences, interests and agendas.
The United States has a poor record of post-conflict reconstruction since the Cold War. It was ill-prepared for post-war operations in Kuwait and Haiti, and recent history in Afghanistan confirms the U.S. emphasis on war fighting rather than peace winning.54 The U.S. failure to support and maintain the task of nation building in recent times is perhaps a matter of choice. A recent report produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), Play to Win, examined the U.S. capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction and found the current level of capability to be “woefully inadequate.”55
Yet since September 11, 2001, the United States has been involved in reconstruction endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is notable that the engagement in both cases has been military. Diplomacy is now a second-order tool. This militarized U.S. foreign policy extends into the reconstruction process. The whole U.S. administration in Iraq operates under the aegis of the Pentagon rather than the State Department or the United Nations. This military control and the Pentagon’s advocacy of an unpopular leader (Ahmed Chalabi) cast doubt over the political sustainability of reconstruction.
As well as marginalizing the State Department, the Pentagon-led operation has marginalized the United Nations. Despite the experience of U.N. agencies in recent reconstruction processes in Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the United States has limited U.N. involvement to short-term humanitarian relief and the non-binding advisory role from a special representative (Sergio Vieira de Mello). The U.N. Security Council controlled the oil-for-food program instituted after the first Gulf War, but this was lifted on May 23, with the legal authority to sell oil transferred to the U.S. administration, effectively granting it complete control of Iraq for a period of at least one year.56 Thus governance, planning, appointments, contracts and reconstruction of the oil industry are all tasks now for the most part denied to any group outside the Pentagon.
Unlike almost all other international territorial administrations and cognate examples of post-Cold War peacekeeping engagements in Africa and Central America, the U.S.-led administration in Iraq was not invited, and has no U.N. mandate. Therefore, it is to be expected that any U.S.-led interim administration – whose legitimacy rests more on the monopoly of force than on moral authority – will be increasingly unwelcome in Iraq. The U.S. intention to “use the assets of the people of Iraq, especially their oil assets, to benefit their people” is also a significant potential source of legitimacy problems.57
These questions about control are a key to whether the reconstruction will be accepted by the people, based on their perception of the moral worthiness of the rulers and of their authority under law. Popular acceptance of the reconstruction and transition process will also shape the ability of the subsequent Iraqi state to sustain peace and further development. Imposed regimes, puppet regimes, corrupt regimes and undemocratic regimes are morally if not always legally illegitimate, and unless they are strongly repressive (like North Korea) they are unstable and frequently embroiled in violent conflict.
The extent to which Iraqis themselves will be engaged in the reconstruction process is still very unclear. If domestic policies, local communities and the private sector are not meaningfully engaged and their capabilities used, then reconstruction processes are prone to fail.58 Endogenously formed political groups and their leaders should be free to lobby the United States and future transitional administrations, build domestic support, and advance proposals for reform. Any proposals from any group, including for an Islamic cleric-led state, should be tolerated by the U.S. administration. The process should be one of dialogue and engagement among parties in the spirit of democracy and the proliferation of free speech. Thus, U.S. administrators cannot afford to marginalize Muslim clerics from decision making (as they appear to have done thus far) merely because they do not want to legitimize the idea of an Islamic state.59
There also needs to be widespread public consultation on major projects and reforms – including the determination of an electoral process, the institutions of government and executive branch, the constitution and the judicial system. Systems imposed by the U.S.-led administration that do not match with customs and that lack popular acceptance will not be sustainable in the longer term. Indeed, such systems, no matter how rational, are likely to be resisted, if only because they were imposed without popular consultation.
The reconstruction process needs to maximize the employment of Iraqi firms and labor to prevent perceptions of economic colonization by the United States, to offset the microeconomic impacts on prices and wages that come with large influxes of Western personnel, and to stimulate economic activity and employment. The legitimacy of transitional regimes in part depends on their ability to deliver a peace dividend.60 If improvements in employment, income and social services fail to materialize, a mismatch between expectations and reality can lead to widespread frustration and crime, offering a powerful grievance for those seeking to foster political unrest.61
Thus far, however, the only contracts for reconstruction have been awarded to U.S. companies.62 These are focused on restoring physical infrastructure – particularly in the oil sector – as opposed to social services. This is not uncommon. In other reconstruction operations donors have put too much emphasis on the reconstruction of physical infrastructure at the expense of institutions of governance and social services.63 The fact that infrastructure will take priority in the initial phases of reconstruction reflects a number of factors: the decayed state of infrastructure due to sanctions; the damage sustained during the recent war; the importance to economic activity of non-oil infrastructure such as roads, electricity, ports and water services; the importance to the Iraqi economy of resuming oil exports; the expertise of U.S. companies in oil-engineering services; and the manner in which such contracts – potentially to be paid for by oil exports – recycles expenditure within the U.S. economy.
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. armed forces have come to power in Iraq through war. The benefits and costs of this to the people of Iraq are far from clear, but much depends on the reconstruction that is now beginning. The pervasive difficulty of the reconstruction process will be that those who have a monopoly over the use of force control choices. This was exactly the basis of authority of Saddam’s regime. The U.S. led transitional administration may be no more legitimate and so may be equally incapable of delivering peace and development. A reconstructed Iraq that serves U.S. security interests may not be an Iraq in which there is much human security. In the interests of peace and development, there should be a democratization of the reconstruction process through widespread popular consultations, a maximization of the participation of Iraqis in political and economic processes, and increased involvement of the United Nations.
1 Corresponding author: SAGES, University of Melbourne, 3010, Victoria, Australia. Ph: +61 3 8344 3786. Fax: +61 3 8344 4972. E-mail: [email protected].
2 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
3 For example, as seen by Sen, ibid.
4 For example, as seen by G. Rist, The History of Development (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997).
5 C. Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996).
6 But see: R. Bleier, “Invading Iraq: The Road to Perpetual War,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 35-42; L. Hadar, F. Anderson, F. Mohamedi, and I. Lustick, “In the Wake of War: Geo-Strategy, Terrorism, Oil and Domestic Politics,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 1-28; and D. Hepburn, “Is it a War for Oil?,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 29-34.
7 M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001).
8 J. Macrae, et al., “Conflict, the Continuum and Chronic Emergencies: A Critical Analysis of the Scope for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Planning in Sudan,” Disasters, Vol. 21, 1997, pp. 223-243.
9 The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
10 I. Ahmed and R. Green, “The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, 1999, pp. 113-127; and B. Munslow and C. Brown, “Complex Emergencies: The Institutional Impasse,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, pp. 207-221.
11 E. Schmitt, “Military Prepares to Put on Humanitarian Face in Case of War,” The Age, February 12, 2003.
12 CBS, “U.S. Talking to Tehran,” http://www.cbsnews.com/29/05/03.
13 J. Krane, “Two U.S. Soldiers Die in Iraq Firefight,” The Age, May 28, 2003, p. 13.
14 A. Thompson, “War Ends, But Leaves a People Living on the Brink,” The Age, May 21, 2003, p. 14.
15 P. Tyler, “U.S. Forces Deadly Threat to Looters,” The Age, May 15, 2003, p. 13; P. Tyler and E. Andrews, “U.S. Dispatches New Rebuilding Team,” The Age, May 13, 2003, p. 8; M. Wilkinson, “Quiet Achiever Takes the Hot Seat in Baghdad,” The Age, April 16, 2003, p. 8; S. Wilson, “Death Squads Track Down Fleeing Baath Party Members,” The Age, May 21, 2003, p. 14; and H.Young, “Iraq Situation Calls for a New Way of Thinking in U.S.,” The Age, May 14, 2003, p. 15.
16 P. Tyler, “Britain, U.S. Delay Plans for Iraqi Rule,” The Age, May 18, 2003, p. 12; and Wilson, “Death Squads Track Down Fleeing Baath Party Members.”
17 M. Baker, “U.S. to Recruit Ex-Saddam Regime Officials,” The Age, April 28, 2003, p. 7; M. Sedra, “Who Will Govern Iraq?,” Foreign Policy in Focus, April 2003, http://www.fpif.org.
18 Y. Mirsky, 1993, “Democratic-Politics, Democratic Culture,” Orbis-A Journal Of World Affairs, Vol. 37, pp. 567-580.
19 Sedra, “Who Will Govern Iraq?”
20 Krane, “Two U.S. Soldiers Die in Iraq Firefight.”
21 S. Bakarat, “Setting The Scene For Afghanistan’s Reconstruction: The Challenges And Critical Dilemmas,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, 2002, pp. 801-816; S. Chesterman, “Walking Softly In Afghanistan: The Future of U.N. State-Building,” Survival, Vol. 44, 2002, pp. 37-46; and P. Marsden, “Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process,” International Affairs, Vol. 79, 2003, pp. 91-105.
22 A. Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions and Underdevelopment (London: Greenwood Press, 2002).
23 A. Alnasrawi, “Iraq: Economic Sanctions And Consequences, 1990-2000,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, 2001, pp. 205-218.
24 Thompson, “War Ends, But Leaves a People Living on the Brink.”
25 M. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
26 Ibid.
27 Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions and Underdevelopment.
28 L. King, “Baghdad Counts the Cost of its Freedom,” The Age, May 19, 2003, p. 11; and J. Yaphe, “Reinventing Iraq: The Regional Impact of U.S. Military Action,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 25-34.
29 R. Lineham, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Putting The Jigsaw Together,” New Zealand International Review, Vol. 28, 2003, pp. 16-20.
30 Yaphe “Reinventing Iraq: The Regional Impact of U.S. Military Action”; and P. Davies and P. Young, Towards an Economic and Governance Agenda for a New Iraq (London: Adam Smith Institute, 2003).
31 Davies and Young, ibid.
32 E. Wainwright, Building the Peace: Australia and the Future of Iraq (Canberra: ASPI Policy Briefing, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003).
33 Barakat, “Setting The Scene For Afghanistan’s Reconstruction: The Challenges And Critical Dilemmas.”
34 D. Ball, “The Defense of East Timor: A Recipe for Disaster?,” Pacific Review, Vol. 14, pp. 175-189; and E. Wainwright, New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia and the Security of East Timor (Canberra: ASPI Policy Briefing, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2002).
35 C. Radin, “Ethnic Battles Threaten Northern Iraq,” The Age, May 21, 2003, p. 14; Sedra, “Who Will Govern Iraq?”; Tyler, “U.S. Forces Deadly Threat to Looters”; Tyler and Anderson, “U.S. Dispatches New Rebuilding Team”; Wilson, “Death Squads Track Down Fleeing Baath Party Members.”
36 E. O’Loughlin, “Market Forces Going Great Guns in a Country Awash With Weaponry,” The Age, April 25, 2003, p. 8; and Yaphe, “Reinventing Iraq: The Regional Impact of U.S. Military Action.”
37 M. Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and G. Harris, ed., Recovery From Armed Conflict In Developing Countries (London: Routledge,1999).
38 Yaphe, “Reinventing Iraq: The Regional Impact of U.S. Military Action.”
39 Y. Haddad “Islamist Perceptions of U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” The Middle East And The United States: A Historical And Political Reassessment, ed. D. Lesch (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2003), pp. 467490, quote from p. 467.
40 H. Beblawi and L. Luciani, eds., The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987); K. Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and B. Munslow, “Angola: The Politics of Unsustainable Development,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, 1999, pp. 551-568.
41 P. Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000); P. le Billon, The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know (London: Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Practice Network Paper, 2000); E. Nafziger and J. Auvinen, “Economic Development, Inequality, War and State Violence,” World Development, Vol. 30, 2002, pp. 153163; and Munslow, “Angola: The Politics of Unsustainable Development.”
42 Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy; and I. de Soysa, Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, Grievance and Governance (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research Discussion Paper, 2001/42).
43 J. Howell and J. Pearce, Civil Society and Development: A Critical Explanation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
44 Davies and Young, Towards an Economic and Governance Agenda for a New Iraq.
45 Yaphe, “Reinventing Iraq: The Regional Impact of U.S. Military Action”; and A. Cordesman, J. Wilson, R. Takeyh and G. Kemp, “War With Iraq: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 1-24.
46 Davies and Young, Towards an Economic and Governance Agenda for a New Iraq.
47 Le Billon, The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know; and Nafziger and Auvinen, “Economic Development, Inequality, War and State Violence.”
48 Davies and Young, Towards an Economic and Governance Agenda for a New Iraq, p. 6.
49 J. Boyce, “External Assistance And The Peace Process In El Salvador,” World Development, Vol. 23, 1995, pp. 2101-2116; J. Pearce, “From Civil War to Civil Society: Has the End of the Cold War Brought Peace to Central America?,” International Affairs, Vol. 74, 1998, pp. 587-615; and C. Santiso, “Promoting Democratic Governance and Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of the United Nations Development Programme in Post-Conflict Peace-Building,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 34, 2002, pp. 555-587.
50 J. Borger, “U.S. Turns Its Mind to Postwar Carve-Up,” Guardian Weekly, February 27-March 5, 2003, p.6.
51 Sedra, “Who Will Govern Iraq?”
52 Tyler, “Britain, U.S. Delay Plans for Iraqi Rule.”
53 E. Djerejian, F. Wisner, R. Bronson and A. Weiss, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq (Texas: Council on Foreign Relations and the James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2002).
54 C. Crane and A. Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges And Missions For Military Forces In A PostConflict Scenario, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003); and Marsden, “Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process.”
55 Play To Win: Final Report Of The Bi-Partisan Commission On Post-Conflict Reconstruction, (Washington, DC: CSIS/AUSA [Center for Strategic and International Studies/Association of the U.S. Army], 2003), quote from p. 3.
56 M. Forbes, “Growing Doubts About Weapons Search,” The Age, May 25, 2003, p. 6; S. Goldenberg, “Oil to Flow as U.N. Gives Power to Allies,” The Age, May 24, 2003, p.19; and E. Leopold, “U.N. Vote Ends Sanctions, Accepts Allied Rule in Iraq,” The Age, May 23, 2003, p. 11.
57 C. Powell, 2003 Press Release, U.S. State Department, March 21, 2003, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 2003/18915.htm 29/05/03.
58 T. Addison, From Conflict to Reconstruction (Tokyo: U.N. University Discussion Paper, 2001), p. 16.
59 M. Baker, “U.S. Signals Opposition to Islamic State,” The Age, April 25, 2003, p. 8; J. Mintz and D. Priest, “New Battles Loom as Shiites Jockey for Power,” The Age, April 17, 2003, p. 10; and S. Sachs, “Returned Cleric Urges Iraq to Stick to Islam,” The Age, May 12, 2003, p. 9.
60 Chesterman, “Walking Softly In Afghanistan: The Future of U.N. State-Building.”
61 The Transition from War to Peace: An Overview, World Bank.
62 Borger, “U.S. Turns Its Mind to Postwar Carve-Up”; and C. Overington, “U.S. Forced to Scramble for U.N. Plan,” The Age, May 22, 2003, p. 10.
63 Lineham, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Putting The Jigsaw Together.”
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