An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Ninth Gulf Research Meeting (GRM), July 31-August 3 2018, which was organized by the Gulf Research Center Cambridge at the University of Cambridge.
Rapprochement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia since 2014 started with of the rise of new political actors on both sides: Haider al-Abadi and Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq and Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia. Both share pro-Western attitudes and rivalry with Iran. Both were also seriously challenged by the temporary rise of ISIS, and the defeat of the organization by Abadi's Iraq prompted further cooperation to prevent its reemergence. Iraqi-Saudi relations have a complex and fraught history. The new beginning, reaching its height with Prime Minister Abadi's visits to Saudi Arabia in June and October 2017, were accompanied by great expectations on the Iraqi side for major reconstruction projects. The Saudis are engaged in securing the hegemony of Muhammad bin Salman at home and in countering Iran regionally. For the Saudi government, Iraq is a zone of contention to be pulled from the Iranian orbit and to be denied as a battleground for radical groups like ISIS. The kingdom has come to terms with making the Shiite-led government its main interlocutor instead of Sunni groups; but Riyadh is still waiting to fully engage.
BACKGROUND
Since the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and even before, Iraqi-Saudi relations were usually contentious. The establishment of Iraq was followed by raids of Saudi Ikhwan tribesmen, prompting the British to establish the Iraqi army in January 1921, initially as a border guard. The British installed a Hashemite dynasty in both Iraq and Jordan. Originally from the Hijaz, the Hashemites were engaged in a family feud with the Al Saud family. After the 1958 revolution, a radicalized Iraq leaned toward the Soviet Union, considering all Arab monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, as political and ideological rivals. This endured until the 1980s, when, impoverished by a long war against Iran, Saddam Hussein pleaded for Saudi help and was given financial and military assistance worth around $80 billion in loans. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 shook the Saudis. They broke with Saddam, and agreed to host the allied troops fighting Iraq. Relations were not resumed until after the American invasion of 2003. In 2009, Iraq nominated an ambassador to Riyadh, and in 2012, Saudi Arabia named a nonresident ambassador to Baghdad. Finally, in 2014, still under King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia opened an embassy in Baghdad, and in March 2015, named its first resident ambassador to Iraq.
CHANGES IN POLICY
The change in the Saudis' Iraq policy was prompted by the emergence of two major strategic factors: Iran's increasing involvement in regional conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon (and for a time also in Iraq and Bahrain) and the rise of ISIS. The policy of the Obama administration on both ISIS and the Iranian nuclear agreement did not dispel Saudi fears. Then in June 2014, ISIS occupied a third of Iraq's territory, erased the border between Iraq and Syria and seemed to be heading south toward the Saudi border. The Iraqi government, under Nuri al-Maliki, could not block the stampede. Shiite militias were recruited, and Iranian commanders provided support. Two major threats to Saudi security, ISIS and Iran, converged on Iraqi soil.
The change in Saudi-Iraqi relations was hastened by a shuffle of leaders. In August 2014, Haider al-Abadi became prime minister of Iraq, replacing Maliki. In spring 2015, the Iraqi security forces won their first significant territorial achievements and abruptly disengaged from the Iranian embrace. Working closely with the American-led coalition, the Iraqi forces continued to liberate Iraqi territory from ISIS, finally driving the organization out of Iraq. By 2015, cleric Muqtada al-Sadr emerged as the champion of Baghdad. He began a crusade against corruption and, in the summer of 2016, sent his supporters to invade the government compound known as the "Green Zone." Around that time, Abadi decided to break away from the Dawa party and joined al-Sadr in a political alliance. The Saudis noticed the shift; this alliance, to a large extent, would weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. The Saudis had been the main donors to Sunni parties until they saw their efforts were in vain. Shifting from supporting Sunni parties and their cause in Iraq to working with the Shiite government was the root of the change in Saudi policies. It is only since late 2014 that Saudi Arabia has officially recognized the sectarian change in Iraqi politics.
King Abdullah died in January 2015 and was succeeded by his ailing half-brother Salman. The latter nominated his son Muhammad bin Salman as crown prince. He rapidly became the de facto ruler of the kingdom. Much younger than the former Saudi leaders, Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) is relieved of the prejudices characterizing the previous Saudi attitude toward Iraq. He soon perceived that the Iraqi army is the only guarantee against the expansion of ISIS and that these forces are led by Shiite and Sunni generals with American military education and not by Iranians.
In February 2017, another young Saudi official, Adel al-Jubeir, visited Baghdad — the first time a Saudi foreign minister had done so since 1990. At the time, the visit was interpreted as easing tensions. Abadi met the new King Salman briefly on the fringes of an Arab League summit the following month in Amman.
The new American president, Donald Trump, helped mediate the rapprochement. In March 2017, Abadi visited Washington and discussed with the American president the fight against terrorism as well as questions of economic support from the United States and its allies. In May 2017, Trump visited Riyadh and spoke loftily about Iraq. Trump was trying to craft an anti-Iranian alliance among U.S. allies in the region, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudis declined to invite Abadi to attend the Islamic summit that hosted Trump. In his stead, Iraq's Kurdish president, Fuad Masum, a figure not carrying much political weight, represented Iraq.
In June 2017, Abadi was invited to an official visit in Jeddah. This was the peak of the rapprochement. However, the crisis between Saudi Arabia and Qatar broke out, and Abadi delayed his visit so as not to take sides. It eventually took place when Iraq was approaching the final round of the battle against ISIS. Abadi returned to Saudi Arabia, this time to Riyadh, in October 2017, ostensibly to head a meeting of the Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council. Victorious, Abadi was celebrating the liberation of Mosul; visiting Saudi Arabia twice in less than six months was a clear sign of the relationship's solidity.
Even more exceptional was the official Saudi invitation to Muqtada al-Sadr, who visited the kingdom in summer 2017. The visit was reportedly very successful; al-Sadr was cordially received by his Saudi hosts and met Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. Al-Sadr does not have an official role in the Iraqi government. When he visited Saudi Arabia, he was not even heading the biggest bloc in parliament and his anti-American views had not changed at all. But the Saudis spotted him as a strong potential ally with whom they could weaken Iranian influence in Iraq. Al-Sadr is also a cleric who downplays sectarian identity in favor of Iraqi identity and constantly advocates reconciliation with the Sunnis. Al-Sadr used the meeting to get a Saudi donation of $10 million to displaced Sunnis and to dissuade the Saudis from opening a consulate in the shrine city of Najaf. Rumors about that intention were spreading in the Shiite south by political rivals of al-Sadr and Abadi. The fact that these rumors were causing harm shows how sensitive Iraqi-Saudi relations are, given the sectarian make-up of Iraqi politics. For the Saudis, the visit provided an opportunity to get to know al-Sadr better and forge an alliance with him.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS
Other than general talk about victory over ISIS, counterterrorism, and Arab solidarity, the two countries also discussed several joint projects. In 1990, in retaliation for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Saudis closed the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu. This pipeline, opened during the Iran-Iraq War, was the cradle of economic cooperation between the two countries at that time and allowed Iraq to transport 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) through Saudi territory when the Gulf was too risky — the Syrian pipeline to the Mediterranean was closed in 1982. For 27 years, the pipeline was idle and rusting. Iraqi policy is to increase oil production and export, standing now at 4.8 million bpd, an all-time record, and diversify export routes. A pipeline to the Red Sea would allow Iraq to reach European markets more rapidly without relying on the northern pipeline, controlled by Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. The marine route through the Gulf is vulnerable to Iranian pressure in the Hormuz Strait. With American pressure on Iran following U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, Iraq would rather decrease its oil exports through the Gulf. All information on the possible reopening of the pipeline came from the Iraqi side and started in 2015, well before the warming of relations. Saudis reportedly conditioned restarting the pipeline on limiting Iraq's relations with Iran.
In August 2017, Iraqi oil minister Jabbar al-Luaybi visited Saudi Arabia to discuss the stabilization of oil prices. As leading members of OPEC, Saudi Arabia and Iraq share a common interest in stable (and high) prices. Yet, Iraq was selling more than its OPEC quota. Later, in October 2017, the Saudi oil minister paid a high-profile visit to Iraq, ostensibly to shore up OPEC cooperation and ensure Iraqi compliance with the quotas. The two countries need oil money to fund reconstruction and reform, but Iraq needs it more urgently. The subject of the pipeline was not mentioned during the two visits. Iraqi colleagues were trying to check it with their oil ministry, to no avail. The pipeline has not reopened. This could be because of the maintenance work required. Alternatively, the Saudis might be reluctant to help Iraq further exceed its quota by transporting oil through their territory.
As of 2018, the only project that was completed was the building of a barrier along the Saudi-Iraqi border. Over 800 km long, this is one of the most sophisticated international borders today. Construction started in 2014 on what is often referred to as "The Great Wall of Saudi Arabia." The Saudis were much alarmed by the ease with which the border was breached by jihadists from Saudi Arabia to Iraq. Saudis were the second largest group among IS commanders after the Iraqis. Fearing a return of Saudi IS recruits, Saudi Arabia embarked on a costly fence along the desert border. This was a unilateral initiative financed solely by the Saudi budget. The Iraqis gained protection against jihadi encroachments from Saudi territory trying to access the vulnerable shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf, as well as the western Sunni province of Anbar. Building the wall enabled the opening of the Arar border crossing between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in August 2017, which had been closed for 26 years. Its main function will be to serve Iraqi pilgrims on the road to Mecca. Iraqis need a visa to almost all Arab countries; Saudi Arabia is no exception, and getting the visa might take time. Mutual cancellation of the visa requirement is a precondition for better relations.
Yet the main issue behind the Iraqi drive for rapprochement was its need for Saudi donations to fund the long and costly process of war reconstruction. As almost all the damage was in the Sunni countryside, Baghdad counted on the Saudi desire to gain influence through generosity among Iraq's Sunni population. In February 2018, Kuwait hosted an international conference of donor states, which all Gulf states attended. The Iraqis expected to garner $88 billion. To their dismay, the total sum raised was only $30 billion; $15.6 billion in sovereign loans, $12.1 billion in credit and investment and only $2.3 billion in aid. The Saudis contributed only $1.5 billion, less than the UAE ($6 billion), Turkey ($5 billion), the United States ($3 billion), and Kuwait ($2 billion). A third of the Saudi contribution is in export credit. The Saudis may have contributed to the willingness of other Gulf states to donate, as a third of the total comes from Gulf states ($9.5 billion; $10.5 billion if you include Qatar). Yet the Iraqis expected a much larger Saudi donation. The failure to garner more funds for reconstruction, especially from the Saudis, might have affected the standing of Abadi's party in the 2018 elections.
FOOTBALL DIPLOMACY
There is only one field in which great Iraqi expectations meet reality: football. Iraq and Saudi Arabia are conducting "football diplomacy" to promote friendship and improve relations. This diplomacy is also upgrading Iraqi football and contributes to Iraq's acceptance both regionally and globally. Football relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were not always so friendly. In 2013, Iraq was preparing to host the Gulf championship of 2014. At that time, Iraq was still banned from hosting international games for security reasons. However, the Gulf countries promised Iraq could hold the championship in the south, with Basra serving as the hub. The Iraqi Ministry of Youth allocated funds to build several stadiums, the most impressive being the so-called "Palm Trunk" in Basra. In March 2013, the ban on Iraq's hosting of international games was lifted, but only for friendly matches. The Iraqis were deeply deceived when, in October 2013, the ban was resumed. Eventually, the championship was transferred to Saudi Arabia. The Iraqis considered the Gulf states responsible for the ban.
In May 2017, relations with Saudi Arabia having warmed up, FIFA decided to allow friendly games in Iraq, before the war on ISIS was over. The Gulf countries and the Saudis are known to have great influence in FIFA: the president of the Asian Football Federation, Sheikh Salman bin Khalifa from Bahrain, is one of the most influential figures in the organization and works closely with the Saudis. In February 2018, Iraq hosted Saudi Arabia, a participant in the 2018 world championship, for a friendly match in Basra. The Saudis were nicely welcomed by 60,000 Iraqi spectators to be beaten 4-1. Following that, in March 2018, the Saudis and Sheikh Salman bin Khalifa were involved in the decision to lift the ban on international games from a large part of Iraq, not including Baghdad. A major step was the invitation by the West Asia Football Federation (WAFF), including 12 Arab countries, to host the Federation's championship in November 2018 in Basra. This will be the first international tournament to be staged in Iraq since the 1950s. Getting Iraq back to the international stage in football contributes to boosting Iraqi morale and national identity. The tournament in Basra enhances this city's orientation toward the Gulf. As of mid-November 2018 it is still not clear if the tournament will be played in Basra. In October 2018, the Iraqi team was invited to participate in a friendly tournament in Riyadh along with Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Argentina. This invitation to play against such prestigious South American teams was a significant Saudi gesture.
Saudi Arabia had one more football gift for Iraq. While all other stadiums were built by Iraqi money and Turkish companies, the flagship of Iraqi stadiums, the "Shaab" in Baghdad, still banned for international matches, had deteriorated. King Salman promised Abadi to build a new stadium on this site with a capacity of 100,000 spectators, the biggest in Iraq. Construction work has already begun. Yet, with the ban on playing in Baghdad still on, and Baghdad teams playing in front of smaller crowds in any case, the "Shaab" might well be a "white elephant." So far, this is the only tangible project that the Saudis are financing in Iraq.
Football diplomacy is an indication of Iraq's adopting a Gulf orientation. The south of Iraq, particularly Basra, where secessionist ideas once echoed, is developing strong commercial relations with the nearby Gulf countries. So far, this orientation is largely economic, commercial and cultural.
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
In July 2017, following a visit by the Saudi Joint Chiefs of Staff to Baghdad, the two countries announced the signing of a bilateral agreement to exchange intelligence in the field of counterterrorism, the contents of which were not made public. The Saudis may be interested in tracking some senior ISIS commanders of Saudi origin who are believed to be in eastern Syria. The most senior is Tarad al-Jarba (better known as Abu Muhammad al-Shimali), one of the four most-senior commanders under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Iraqi military intelligence is the primary authority on tracking ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The existence of an agreement in this field may not contribute greatly to fighting ISIS, but it signals growing trust between the two countries. This trust exists despite repeated allegations, from those who oppose the warming of relations, that the Saudis still finance and support ISIS in Iraq. In December 2017, the Afaq TV channel — associated with the pro-Iranian camp — showed an exhibition of documents proving alleged Saudi support. Counterterrorism is an issue of high priority to both countries, and it should not be a surprise that it is the sole subject mentioned publicly regarding the bilateral agreement. The announcement did not indicate an exchange of intelligence on Iran in that context. The Saudis need information on Iranian activities among their Shiite population and may ask Iraq for help in time of need.
The history of unofficial Saudi involvement in terrorist attacks in Iraq and in the ranks of ISIS continues to thwart increased cooperation in counterterrorism. Thousands of Saudis joined ISIS, and many became commanders in the organization, manning the moral police (hisba), the mosques and the sharia courts of the so-called caliphate and oppressing ordinary Iraqis. Before and after the proclamation of the caliphate, Saudi recruits "excelled" as suicide bombers, and carried out some of the worst terrorist attacks in Iraq since 2003. ISIS and other jihadi organizations received significant financial support from Saudi (and other Gulf) donors. Many Iraqis are convinced that the Saudi government was behind this support. Arguments that the Saudi government also sees ISIS as a threat and was trying to cut private donations to the organization fail to convince Iraqis. The newly signed military intelligence agreement will hopefully build trust. At the same time, the exhibition of Saudi documents by military intelligence and its exploitation by anti-Saudi elements keep suspicions alive.
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
The warming of relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia is the result of a change in both political leadership and perception. Elated by the victory over ISIS, Iraq under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Muqtada al-Sadr was relinquishing perceptions of strong sectarian affinity to Iran in favor of the Sunni Arab camp headed by Saudi Arabia. Terrorized by Iranian supremacy in the Gulf — and, at the time, also by ISIS — Saudi Arabia, under the young crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman, relinquished its championing of the Sunni cause in Iraq in favor of working with its Shiite government and effectively recognizing the new post-2003 Shiite Iraq. For both sides, these were significant political and conceptual changes.
Overall, the Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement is rather one-sided. Iraqi expectations of Saudi Arabia are greater than Saudi expectations of Iraq. Iraqis expect the Saudis to contribute to the reconstruction of the Sunni periphery and the city of Mosul. The great expectations are reflected in official visits. Since 2017, the number of high level Iraqi officials who visited the kingdom was much higher than of Saudis who visited Baghdad. The Iraqis are motivated primarily by economic interests and secondarily by geopolitical and domestic considerations that cause the Abadi and al-Sadr camp to align with the West and pro-western Arab countries, for a cross-sectarian government in Iraq. The Saudis' main motivation is geopolitical: to free Iraq from the Iranian grip.
The problem with great expectations is that they may end in disappointment. Saudi Arabia under Muhammad Bin Salman is undergoing economic reforms that may affect its level of generosity to Arab neighbors in great need. As far as the Iraqis are concerned, the Saudi performance at the conference in Kuwait was far from satisfactory. They expected Saudi Arabia to be the main donor but only received $1.5 billion. To date, no major project in Iraq is financed by Saudi Arabia, with the sole exception of the football stadium in Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Sunni areas of Iraq are in urgent need of reconstruction, and over 2.6 million internally displaced Iraqi Sunnis are still living in camps. The danger is that Sunni anger could be rekindled. For the time being, Iraqis are not disclosing their dissatisfaction, perhaps still wanting to give time to the relationship.
The Saudis gambled on the moderate Shiite camp of Abadi and al-Sadr. In the May 2018 elections, this camp won a modest victory, but that does not guarantee its persistence in power. The Iraqi political system entered a period of negotiations to form a new government, which ended with the October 2018 announcement of Barham Salih as president and Adel Abdul Mahdi as prime minister. This is an encouraging sign to the Saudis that the rapprochement with Iraq can continue. The new government reflects a political compromise between the two factions in Shiite politics. While Abadi was sacrificed, the pro-Iranians, headed by Hadi al-Ameri, played a leading role in its formation. This, along with other concerns such as the Saudi embarrassment over the assassination of journalist Jamal al-Khashoggi, might slow the intensity of the rapprochement.
For the relationship to be based on more solid ground, the Saudis need to understand the Iraqi dilemma. The Saudis silently expect the Iraqis to downplay Shiite identity politics in favor of a pan-Arab identity. It is on this precondition that they can work with the Iraqi government. Yet, because of the change in 2003, Arab identity in Iraq is declining, and sectarian Shiite identity is still significant for many. Perhaps Iraq should not be asked to renounce its Shiite identity altogether or expected to disengage completely from Iran.
Despite the obstacles, Saudi-Iraqi relations may deepen and improve. They are based on a convergence of interests: lessening Iran's hold on Iraq, fighting radical Islamic organizations and deepening economic ties. The Saudis should take the lead in the reconstruction of the Sunni areas in Iraq and thus contribute to reconciliation and mitigate Sunni anger. By doing so they would also improve their negative image in Shiite Iraq as the supporters of the Saddam regime and ISIS. The Iraqis have gained precious experience in counterterrorism, which can benefit the kingdom. The bulk of the Iraqi population prefers Saudi Arabia, with its rather detached presence in Iraq, to Iranian encroachment and Turkish patronage. In the short term, each side should consider the limitations and sensitivities of the other and be patient.
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