In the past few decades, intra-Arab conflict has taken many forms including at times armed conflicts. A few of these conflicts have been put off due to external intervention, but negative feelings linger. Attempts to revive Arab solidarity or to maintain any Arab regional order collapsed in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the second Gulf war as well as the peace agreements with Israel on the Palestinian and Jordanian tracks.
The ongoing Syrian-Iraqi conflict, dating from the early 1970s, is one of those Arab conflicts that do not seem amenable to finding a solution. While there have been attempts to improve Syrian-Iraqi relations by symbolic visits like the exchange of Iraqi and Syrian business delegations to Damascus and Baghdad in May and June of 1997 respectively, such visits always raise questions relating to the dialectic between economics and politics and the process of normalization. Both countries want to use any warming in their relations to reduce their regional isolation and enlarge their future regional role. The economic factor is used for a purely political objective.
The collapse of Iraqi economic and military power has caused Syria much concern as Syria has historically viewed Iraq as its strategic depth. Its concerns were heightened when the possibility of dividing Iraq became more probable after the declaration of a federal government in Kurdistan. Syrian, Iranian and Turkish foreign ministers met in Ankara in November 1992 - and again in 1995 - to coordinate policies over the future of Iraq.1
Iraq compensated for its political losses with Jordan by opening up to Syria. For instance, the Syrian minister of health took a medical delegation to Baghdad. The Syrian team brought with them 12 trucks of medical equipment and performed some surgeries. Further official visits by Iraqi and Syrian ministers took place in 1998 to deal with commercial and economic issues, especially operating an oil pipeline. Syrian commodities were advertised on Iraqi TV. Iraq also reopened its commercial center in Damascus, and a few days after that Syrians were allowed to enter Iraqi territories without visas and free of charge. While Iraq has been more persistent in its attempts to open up, Syria has been very cautious. However, this normalization is the most important development within the Arab world.2
After the United Nations issued UNSCR 986 and began the "Oil for Food" program, many business deals were made between Iraq and other countries, including some Arab governments that opposed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and participated in the international alliance to liberate it. Given Syria's poor economic situation, the Syrian government has become interested in sending a business delegation from the private sector to Baghdad. This was supposedly a purely economic calculation. However, a government source in Syria declared that any business deal with Iraq would have to be approved by the United Nations and that Syrian businessmen would revive old business relations with Iraqi businessmen that were severed in 1980. 3 The Syrian Chamber of Commerce announced that the visit was to restart the relations between the private sectors of Syria and Iraq.
The visit of the Syrian delegation coincided with a Turkish intrusion into northern Iraq, a Turkish-Israeli military rapprochement and a stalling of the Arab Israeli peace process, including the Syrian Israeli track. It also coincided with the activation of Syrian diplomatic efforts in the Arab world, especially the Gulf, to explain Syrian positions on the Turkish Israeli alliance and on Qatar's hosting of an economic conference for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which would be attended by Israel.
In Baghdad, the delegation met with many Iraqi officials, including eight ministers, and the visit was hailed as beginning a new stage of cooperation. However, no deals were signed. The Iraqi foreign minister announced that Syrian ports were ready to facilitate bringing food to Iraq and that Iraq was considering reopening its oil pipeline through Syria, which was closed in 1980. The pipeline provided Syria with a hefty income. In 1971, as part of the Tehran and Tripoli price agreement, a new transit agreement emerged between Syria and Tapline that would double Syrian revenues at full capacity. Syria requested from Iraq the doubling of transit fees and favorable prices for crude oil used domestically. Iraq yielded but determined to thwart Syria's command over Iraq's exports. In 1975, Syria again requested renegotiation of the 1973 terms, but pumping stopped in 1976 and the strategic oil pipeline was diverted south. In April 1982, the IPC line was closed as a result of a deal with Iran to supply Syria with oil. The motive was clearly aimed at weakening Iraq's war capabilities.4
From the Syrian perspective, the economic benefits of the visit to Baghdad were minor. An agreement was reached to open three border crossings and three free-zone areas in the east and north of Syria, which was seen as an important step to ease business transportation between the two countries. The two countries agreed to export Syrian goods valued at $500 million. Jordan declared that the rapprochement between Syria and Iraq should not be at Jordan's expense and that Jordan would import from Syria goods that were not produced in Jordan such as grain and clothes. This agreement would also lead to facilitating economic relations with Lebanon through Syria.
The Iraqis wanted to open up to Syria since they believed that the oil-for-food program would lead to lifting U.N. sanctions, a feeling that was enhanced by visits of Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese delegations.5 The Iraqi press viewed the normalization of relations and cooperation with Syria as well as Iran as a step to turn the balance of power in favor of the three countries so that they could stand up to the Israeli-Turkish alliance and influence the Arab-Israeli peace process and become a front that would strengthen the Arab nation and Iran.6
Syria was the only country that totally supported Iran against Iraq and was somewhat isolated from the Arab world. Partially driven by their enmity to Saddam Hussein, Syria and Iran maintained an alliance over a diversified range of issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the two regimes have differed ideologically over the nature of political rule, the convergence of their interests and fear of isolation helped in crafting policies that seemed similar. At times there were sharp differences, of
As to the visit, Syria was very cautious, and the Syrian media ignored it. Syrian officials considered it as part of their effort to coordinate Arab stands on holding a summit to revive Arab solidarity and convince the international community that the Arabs were ready for a fair and just peace with Israel on the bases of U .N. resolutions and the Madrid process. The Syrian activities were aimed at strengthening its hand, through some carrots and sticks, with Arab, especially Gulf, countries. Most Syrian media tried to dispel the political dimension attached to this visit and focused instead on the economic and humanitarian objectives.
Syrian caution has been governed by a long and bitter history of ideological and political conflicts with Iraq. Still, Syria has been trying to reduce tension through procedures like the 1992 resumption of postal services and has been contemplating an end to the conflict that ruptured relations between the countries. Since 1996, border crossings have frequently been opened to ease movement of delegations to discuss such matters as the distribution of Euphrates water against Turkish threats or allowing foreign delegations such as that of Louis Farakhan to visit Iraq.
One trend in Syria, represented by Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam and the Baath leadership, is to develop relations on the basis of the ideological unity of the Baath party and the geographic depth of the Arab East. Its proponents believe that pressuring Iraq means pushing it to normalize relations with Israel at the expense of Syria and the Arab nation or the dividing of Iraq on ethnic/religious grounds. This trend has called for opening up the borders because of their economic importance in importing into Iraq grain, clothes, food and chemical products and in reopening the Tapline to export Iraqi oil. Others, more security oriented, believe that opening up borders means increasing terrorist activities inside Syria since Saddam Hussein cannot be trusted. This also means that Syria should expect a large increase in the migration of Iraqi workers, estimated around one million. Such a situation would constitute an economic burden and security risk for Syria.
Equally important, Iran, Syria's closest ally, rejected Vice President Khaddam's view and turned down in principle the idea of normalization of relations with Iraq. This Iranian view has restrained Syria's move toward Baghdad, especially as it came about when the Iraqi regime was giving substantial additional support- a new headquarters, cars and improved radio transmission directed against the Syrian regime to Syrian Muslim Brothers residing in Iraq. Nonetheless, Syria has upheld the necessity of maintaining Iraq's unity and sovereignty, meanwhile declaring that the opening up of borders with Iraq was a purely economic move to facilitate the transportation of goods and individuals.8
Generally speaking, relations between Iraq and Iran have been very negative, especially after the revolution of 1958 in Iraq, and both sides have adopted very ideological discourses against each other since 1968. While the 1975 agreement signed by the two parties in Algeria led to a period of good co-existence from 1975- 79, the arrangement fell under the Nixon Doctrine, which focused its security on two proxies, Tehran and Riyadh. The collapse of the shah's regime in 1979 and the beginning of the war in 1980 brought about the Carter Doctrine, which stipulated the direct intervention of U.S. forces in the Gulf, successfully tested ten years later in Desert Storm.9 After 1988, Iraq appeared as a strong regional power, armed to the teeth but financially empty-handed and subject to internal social and security explosions. Kuwait became the new Iraqi target under the pretexts of disputed financial deals and loans, shares of oil production and border issues. Thus, while Desert Storm neutralized Iraq, Iran did not replace it. Iran, instead, has increased its influence over and entered into a strategic alliance with Syria.
Syria has a historic and distinguished place in the history of Islam and the Middle East, for Damascus was the first seat of the Islamic Empire; Baghdad was the second, then finally Istanbul. Since independence from France in 1946, two factors have dominated Syrian thinking: first, unity with other Arab countries that might include Jordan and Iraq in the Arab East, or Greater Syria, or all of the Arab countries under the banner of Arab nationalism; second, Syrian dependence on foreign aid due to a heavily regulated economy that has weakened agriculture and focused on purchasing arms. In addition to all of this, the rivalry between the two wings of the Baath party in Syria and Iraq and the antagonistic relations between Asad and Saddam Hussein complicated their countries' relations and led to interference in each other's affairs.
Historically, the Syrian-Iraqi ideological conflict, since the Baath came to power in 1968, has had ramifications on other issues, chief of which is the distribution of the water from the Euphrates. The civil war in Lebanon also increased the misunderstanding between Iraq and Syria. While Syria initially supported the leftist forces for ideological reasons, later it supported the Lebanese government and the rightist forces in order to maintain regional security and to keep good relations with the Christian population. Iraq then moved to support the leftists in order to circumscribe Syrian influence. 10
Meanwhile, Syria improved its relations with the United States during 1989-91, after the Taif Accord was negotiated to end the civil war in Lebanon. It was signed in 1989 by most Lebanese parliamentarians after General Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Army and one of two Lebanese "prime ministers," launched the War of Liberation against the Syrian forces stationed in Lebanon. Aoun was an ally of Iraq, which provided him and other anti-Syrian forces with military equipment and heavy artillery. General Aoun was only removed in 1990, when Syria joined the U.S.-led alliance to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 11
Unlike the Syrian visit to Baghdad, the Iraqi delegation to Syria in June 1997 received considerable media attention in Damascus. Vice President Khaddam explained this time that there were political dimensions to such an exchange of visits, foremost among them the subversion of plans that would facilitate Iraq's isolation and subordination to Turkish designs and surrender to Israeli plans. Syria has looked at Iraq from a pan-Arab perspective, not from a purely Syrian perspective. Syria did not want enmity between Iraqis and Syrians. Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Sharaa viewed this visit as a Syrian initiative that might have an important impact on the future of regional politics. In Syrian thinking, the normalization of relations between Syria and Iraq would serve the interests of the two peoples as well as the other Arab countries, especially those that have been hurt by the Gulf War.
The Iraqi perspective is not much different from the Syrian. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said that Iraq desired economic development with Syria in order to improve political rapprochement between the two countries since Iraq's stand had called for opening up to all Arab countries, even those with which Iraq had had conflicts. More important were the present and the future, because the entire Arab nation was under the same threats. Thus, the Arabs need to find a new formula that would reflect realism in maintaining a minimum level of security. 12
Syria enjoys a pivotal geopolitical position that forces it to play a distinct regional role. However, steps like the Oslo Accords, the Israeli-Jordanian treaty and the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon are gradually reducing this role. Israel, through other moves, like its alliance with Turkey, has increased pressure on Syria to sign a peace deal, which would weaken Syria's regional role. The developing relations between Turkey and Israel are alarming to both Syria and Iran. They could lead to problems between Tehran and Ankara. Turkey's entente with Israel may also have emboldened the Turkish military to flex its muscles on issues such as the Kurds. Iran's strategic alliance with Syria risks bringing Iran into conflict with Turkey on issues that are peripheral to Iran's national interests.
On the other hand, Iraq is seen as a problem to Iran. Iran and Iraq still engage in border skirmishes and low-level proxy wars. The entire region - the arc from Iraq, with the Shia in the south and Kurds further north, through the Kurdish regions and Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia, on through Afghanistan and Tajikistan - is one of overlapping ethnic disputes. Iran has been host to large numbers of refugees from its immediate neighbors to the west and east.13 Iraq will always seek strong military forces, including WMD, and try to gain influence in the Gulf and access to its waters. Also, any Iraqi government will distrust Shiite Iran's potential for influence in Iraq. Any Iraqi government may be tempted to use Iranian opposition elements as leverage against Tehran. And any government in Iraq may be tempted to fuel an economic recovery by flooding the oil market.14
The SyrianIraqi rapprochement should be seen from this angle. It is an attempt by Syria to pressure other countries, like the Gulf states, to halt the process of normalization with Israel. It also sends a political message to the United States, Turkey and Israel. Its primary objective is to prevent the isolation of Syria. More specifically, Syria's move towards Iraq reveals a need for: (1) a close market for its food and industrial goods in order to compete with Jordan, (2) a strategic depth against Israeli challenges, (3) an alliance with Iraq to counterbalance the pressure of the Israel-Turkey relationship, and (4) achieving an understanding on dividing the Euphrates water between Syria and Iraq in anticipation of Turkish manipulation of this important weapon. Thus, both Syria and Iraq have found themselves in a dire predicament that might lead them to cooperate in the face of common dangers, despite a history of turbulent relations.
In March 1994, Turkish troops penetrated 40 kilometers into northern Iraq, close to an oil pipeline whose rehabilitation Turkey and Iraq were negotiating to eliminate the Turkish Kurdish Worker's party (PKK). Turkey called on the Iraqi government to send its troops to the north. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz announced that Turkey and Iraq have common security interests. However, Turkey changed its position under pressure from the United States, and, consequently, Iraq demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops. A visit of the Turkish prime minister to Washington followed. Syrian and Iranian fears were expressed, especially after Turkey accused Syria and Iran of giving safe haven to the fighters of the PKK. More alarmingly, Turkish troops were deployed on the Syrian-Turkish border, and threats were made about the Euphrates water against a background of collapsing peace talks between Syria and Israel.15 Syria and Iran considered such activities a prelude to a Turkish/Israeli/American alliance against Iran and Syria.
The meaningful development of Syrian-Iraqi relations is not only prevented by American threats but also because of deep suspicions between the two regimes. History testifies to the failure of the two states to reach even the lowest level of accord. Thus, Syrian overtures to Iraq cannot be seen as a Syrian strategy but simply represent a high level of dissatisfaction with current regional and international politics, especially those of the United States. The Syrians also have failed to get Iraq included in any possible Arab summit without the consent of the Gulf states and the international community.
Normalization of relations with Iraq is then a Syrian strategic maneuver to pressure international and regional actors to satisfy some of its demands, for Syria participated in the international alliance against Iraq and has entered into the peace process with Israel. Thus normalization cannot but be a card played by the Syrians to buttress its regional role; the Syrians will not cross red lines. Still, Syria has been justifying its position by the ideology of the Baath, which rejects the dismemberment of Arab countries, in this case Iraq. Iraq has gone along with this, since it is desperate to reduce its isolation.
The American presence in the Gulf has limited Iranian and Syrian influence over the Iraqi opposition and preempted any Iraqi change in favor of Syria. Washington has aimed at isolating Iran and pressuring Syria to give concessions to the Israelis and limit its support of Hizbollah. However, on issues relating to regional security, Syria has been able to galvanize other countries into action. When the Pentagon leaked a scenario for dividing Iraq into four regions, Syria was able to galvanize other countries to take part in the 1995 Tehran meeting between the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran and Turkey that issued a statement opposing any attempt to divide Iraq under any pretext because its division would lead to regional and international instability.16
The Arab-Israel conflict or its resolution will have a major impact on Syrian Iraqi relations. The direction of these relations wi11 hinge on Syria's strategic view of realities in the Arab world and the regional balance of power. For now, all possible fundamental and positive changes toward Iraq are on hold because they could lead to more economic and political pressure on Syria from the United States and Israel, which might transform the dual containment of Iraq and Iran into triple containment, to include Syria. Put simply, any Arab cooperation at a regional level that is perceived as a threat to Israel, even in the form of an Arab common market, will not be allowed to survive.
In the Gulf, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are the pivots of any regional stability. While Iran's power is based on its security, military and demographic factors, Iraq has focused more on Arab nationalism to supplement its geopolitical position. Thus, Iraq raised the need to unify the eastern wing of the Arab world and gave itself the role of curbing Iranian ambition. This is not new. Since the rule of Abdulkarim Qasim, there have been extensive efforts to sell this idea, to the point where Baghdad clashed with Cairo and Damascus over it. This was, again, the cornerstone in Iraq's expensive war with Iran, 1980-88.
There is talk today, according to senior Iraqi officials, that Iraq could probably benefit from the change in the political map of the Middle East. There "are indicators we [Iraqis] have some room to maneuver, if we play our cards right," including the fact that Iraq is no longer a military threat to the Gulf states. What remains is improving relations with Turkey and Israel. Turkey plans to sell water from the Euphrates and the Tigris to the Arab world, including Syria and Iraq, the two downstream beneficiaries. As to Israel, it has been rumored that Iraq is ready to sign a non-aggression treaty with Israel and to settle about 300,000 Palestinians in Iraq as its contribution to ending the Middle East conflict. Earlier this year, the Iraqi government granted 60,000 Palestinians living in Iraq a limited right of home ownership. 17
While the Damascus Declaration linking Syria and Egypt to the Gulf Arab states ended long before Syrian President Hafiz Asad died in June of 1999, the two sides still have strategic interests that require them to begin a new process of improved relations. Because of the need for Arab solidarity after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the six GCC states entered into an alliance with Syria and Egypt, but later developments showed the weakness of this six-plus-two alliance. Since America has directly dominated the important security, political and economic affairs in the Gulf, the Damascus Declaration was never more than an informal meeting. Syria was the ideological party in the alliance, being a "progressive" country ruled by the same Baath party that rules Iraq.18 While it was true that the late Syrian president launched his "corrective movement" in 1970, ideologically the Syrian regime did not change much. The Baath party remained in control. Asad was elected president in 1971. While he brought stability to Syria, the country is suffering economic underdevelopment since spending on arms purchases has caused other sectors of the economy to lag behind in essential areas of economic growth, even in oil production and agriculture, the basic components of the economy, which are outdated and inefficient. The slow pace of economic growth led to local and regional criticism of official Syrian economic policies. 19 Historically, Syria has depended on the public sector since 1963, when the Baathists took over the government and raised the banner of social justice. In the past, the Syrian economy depended on support from the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc as well as the Gulf and oil revenues. However, the Soviet Union is not around anymore and the Gulf aid, estimated at around $2 billion, is not sufficient to support the economy. 20
Syria's relations with the GCC did not rise above the level of diplomatic correctness, with the exception of those with Saudi Arabia. In light of the late Syrian president's extreme reluctance to present free gifts to the Israelis, the Syrians were also bothered by the Israeli infiltration of the Gulf region. Furthermore, Syrian policy was completely different from that of the GCC in other fields as well. During the Iran-Iraq War, Asad totally supported Iran, while the GCC supported and financed Iraq. While during the second Gulf war Syria officially stood against the Iraqi invasion and became a member of the Damascus Declaration, Syria managed to keep a delicate balance between its relations with the GCC and with Iraq. Like some other Arab countries, Syria participated in the 1991 Gulf War but it did not permit its forces to bomb or invade. Asad managed to strike a very delicate balance between his country's relations with the Gulf states and what he saw as his ideological commitments. These commitments obliged the Syrian leader to reject Gulf states' requests that he silence or expel Damascus-based opposition groups.
Today, despite U.S. pressure, Syria still serves as a safe haven for Arab dissidents. Anti-Oslo Palestinians and others can still engage in relatively free political activity from the safety of Syria.21 On the other hand, Syria plays a pivotal role in regional Arab relations for all sorts of Iraqi opposition groups: Marxists, nationalists, Islamists and Kurds. The late Syrian president thus reconciled Syria's own interests with those of Arab nationalism. Given the resources of his country, he succeeded in managing his country's economy after the severe recession of the 1980s, as well as in minimizing the negative effects of the Turkish-Israeli alliance. His intervention in Lebanon succeeded in containing that country's civil war.
Asad wanted to ensure his continuation in power through his son Bashar after his death and had been preoccupied with the political transition, which required the gradual and slow transfer of power from the Old Guard to a new group of Bashar loyalists. Former Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zoughbi's suicide and allegations of corruption about the once strong army chief of staff who fled Syria were indications that the days of President Asad were numbered.22
It will take some time to predict how Syria's relations with the Gulf states are going to develop under Bashar Asad. But Bashar will find it hard to achieve a significant political breakthrough on the Gulf front, especially since Israel is on the lookout for any steps Syria might take. But Syria's stature in the Arab world will provide it with some degree of protection if the new leadership exploits it shrewdly. Still, for the time being, the Syrian leadership will pay more attention to regional politics and the security of the regime than to economic welfare. 23
Furthermore, the Syrians and the GCC states agree that Iran should be dealt with positively, especially now that the reformist camp in Tehran has adopted a policy of cooperation with the Arab Gulf states. Syria and Iran share a long history of friendship. Besides standing together against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran also provides Damascus with cheap oil, and the two countries hold a common position vis-a-vis Israel and support to the Lebanese Islamic Resistance. This close relationship has provided the Syrians with considerable strategic backing and the Iranians with a foothold in the Arab world. The Israeli defeat in South Lebanon can also be used by Damascus as a card in its upcoming political battle with Israel. It is generally agreed that post-Asad Syria will witness changes both in its domestic and foreign policies. As far as the Gulf countries are concerned, the future path of their relations with Syria will depend on to what degree Syrian policies can be brought into harmony with GCC foreign policy objectives.24
While the United States is the main guarantor of Gulf security, the Gulf states have resisted American pressures up till now, hoping for progress on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the peace process before they normalize relations with Israel. Damascus has been calling on the Gulf states to slow down the pace of normalization with Israel and encouraging the GCC states that have established relations with the Israelis to freeze or abrogate the agreements they have reached, because of their negative effects on the general Arab bargaining position. Open opposition in the Gulf to normalization with Israel has been showing up in public meetings, as happened at a gathering in Kuwait a few months ago, and in the media and religious establishments.
The issue of Iraq is most sensitive to Syria. Syria wishes to see a regime change in Baghdad, but not according to U.S. and Western desires, which would further tilt the regional balance of power in favor of the United States and Israel. The Gulf states, on the other hand, do not want to encourage a radical shakeup in Iraq that could lead to a democratic system or disintegration.
1 Salim Mashkur, ''Itijhat al-Mu 'arada al-Iraqiyya," Shu'un al-Awsat, No. 16, 1992, pp. 14-31.
2 Al-Taqrir al-lsratiji al-Arabi 1998, January 1999, pp. 148-151.
3 Mamun Kiwan, "Al-Taqarub al-Suri al-Iraqi fi Mizan al-Jiopolitiqa," Shu'un al-Awsat, no. 67, August 1997, pp. 95-97.
4 On pipelines in the Middle East, Paul Stevens, "Pipelines or Pipe Dreams? Lessons from the History of the Arab Transit Pipelines," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 224-241.
5 On Sanctions, see Amatzia Baram, "The Effect of Iraqi Sanctions," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 194-223.
6 Kiwan, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
7 Alfred Prados, "Al-'Alaqat al-Amrikiyya al-Suriyya," Shu'un al-Awsat, No. 14, 1992, pp. 51-72.
8 Kiwan, op. cit., pp. 100-103.
9 Abd al-Jalil Marhun, "Al-Arnn fi al-Khalij: AI-Tafa'ulat al-Iqlimiyya," Shu'un al-Awsat, No. 40, April 1995, pp. 33-46.
10 Majid Khadduri, Al-Iraq al-lshtiraki (Beirut: al-Dar al-Muttahida Ii al-Nashr, 1985), pp. 274-275.
11 Kami I Faour, "Lubnan Yattajih nahwa al-Tatbi'," Shu 'un al-Awsat, No. 2, June/July 1991, pp. 36-45.
12 Kiwan, op. cit., pp. 104-5.
13 Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Strategic Predicament," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. I, Winter 2000. pp. 10-24.
15 Salim Mashkur, "Al-Iraq al-Khasir al-Akbar," Shu 'un al-Awsat, No. 40, April 1995, pp. 17-21.
16 "Ali Juni, Ba'da Hudu' al-'Asifa al-'Iraqiyya," Shu'un al-Awsat, No. 45, October 1995, pp. 7-15.
17 "Ten Years on, the War of Attrition Continues," The Middle East, No. 301.
18 On Iraq and the Baath, Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), and on the Baath generally, see Jalal al-Sayyid, Hizb al-Ba 'th al-Arabi (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, I 973).
19 "Syria Looks Forward," The Middle East, no. 303.
20 "Syria at the Crossroads," The Middle East, Feb. 2000, No. 298.
21 'The Gulf and Syria under Bashar," Mideast Mirror, June 14, 2000.
22 "Syria Looks Forward," The Middle East, July/August, no. 201, 2000.
23 "The Gulf and Syria under Bashar," op. cit.