IRAQ
To start by stating the obvious, Saddam Hussein’s regime is a serious problem. He is a brutal dictator responsible for horrendous wars. He has manufactured weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has used them against his neighbors as well as his own people. He attacked Iran and occupied Kuwait. Saddam personally, as well as his regime, poses a serious threat to the stability of the region and world peace.
We seem to share this assessment on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, how should we deal with Saddam today? The West, and most particularly the United States, supported him against revolutionary Iran in the 1980s – a mistake in retrospect. An international coalition fought him in 1991. We disarmed him to a great extent through U.N. weapon inspectors until 1998. The international community continues to contain Iraq through a U.N. sanctions regime, although to a lesser degree recently. Basically, over the last 11 years, containment has achieved the objective of keeping Saddam “in his box.”
But will it do so in the future? Fears are growing that he might be able to produce WMD again. We, the international community, must therefore increase the political pressure on Saddam with all available means and on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284 in order to keep him from producing these weapons and to destroy or eliminate any such existing weapons. The U.N. inspectors must be allowed back into the country unconditionally and without any restrictions as to the scope or duration of their work.
We appreciate the recent approval of a Goods Review List leading to what have been called “smart sanctions” against Iraq. This is a refined tool to keep the regime from buying weapons or their components, while allowing more imports that improve the living conditions of ordinary Iraqi people. This also helps us clearly identify the regime of Saddam Hussein as being responsible for the continuing humanitarian disaster in Iraq. If the conditions set out in the relevant U.N. resolutions are not met, we have to think of ways to enforce them; the U.N. Charter is very clear on this. As to military actions to bring about regime change in Baghdad, there is a lot of skepticism in Germany (and in the rest of Europe). In recent weeks and months, skepticism has been on the rise in Washington, too, including on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to media reports.
Many questions have been raised in the German debate on Iraq:
-
- Does a military attack lead to a better situation in Iraq and in the region, or will it do great damage to the region far beyond Iraq? Could the possibility of an Iraqi attack on Israel with WMD be ruled out? Or would it be provoked – and what would be the consequences?
- How can we ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and stability in the region? Think of Turkey and the Kurds; think of Iran. What if Iraq broke up into several political entities, each with its own WMD?
- Could the reactions in Arab countries harm our shared determination to combat worldwide terrorism, our first priority? There is no proven link between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
- How would an attack on Iraq affect the principal Middle East conflict?
- What is the post-Saddam scenario? What kinds of institutions could we rely on for the “day after,” or rather the years after?
- After an attack, the United States and the West would have to remain engaged in Iraq for years, if not decades. What share would Washington be prepared to assume of the financial burden of economic reconstruction, democratization and nation building in Iraq? Would Congress be prepared to authorize U.S. aid for this huge long-term task at a time when all of us are still engaged in the Balkans and have only recently started to help in Afghanistan? What would our exit strategy look like?
There are similarities in the U.S. and EU analysis of the threat. But I see differences in the political debate on how to deal with Saddam. I do not see differences in policy right now, because there is no presidential decision yet on how to deal with Saddam. President Bush has declared repeatedly that he will consult with the European allies on Iraq, and we will determine our position when it is time to do so.
One last point on Iraq: the quest for legitimacy under international law in the case of an attack against Iraq (as in any attack against any country), ideally a U.N. mandate, is much stronger in Europe than in the United States.
IRAN
In the case of Iran, there is also a lot of common ground in our assessments: a people striving for more freedom and opportunity, a powerful clerical elite and a democratically elected parliament struggling for its rights. I think we agree that Iran is in no way comparable to the monolithic dictatorship of Baathist Iraq. Iran is a country in motion, with an emerging civil society, with a freer press than exists in many other countries of the region, with more than half the students being women. There are bright and dark sides to Iranian foreign policy.
Perceptions are somehow different on both sides of the Atlantic, though. From a Washington vantage point, the glass seems to be half empty: support for terrorism, especially for Hizballah and radical Palestinian groups, negative interference with Afghan warlords destabilizing the central government in Kabul, opposition to Israel’s existence and to any attempt at peace in the Middle East, and, perhaps most important, Tehran’s wish to acquire or develop WMD, including the necessary delivery systems (Shahab missiles).
From a German and European point of view, and without neglecting what has just been said, the glass seems to be half full: the responsible Iranian role during the Afghan campaign, with Tehran being a de facto member of the coalition through its support of the Northern Alliance, the helpful role at the Bonn conference, commendable efforts to combat drug smuggling and overcome Iran’s international isolation. Of course, Europeans, too, acknowledge the serious problems Iran’s foreign policy poses. We ourselves have first-hand experience with the effects of the internal Iranian power struggle (the Mykonos bombing, the Hofer case, the Böll Foundations symposium). We are not naive.
How to deal with Iran? Here, prescriptions differ greatly between the United States and Europe, especially since September 11. President Bush has classified Iran as one of three members of an “axis of evil,” putting Iran into the same category as its archenemy Iraq and Stalinist North Korea. The effect has been that moderates who had advocated contacts with the United States were pushed into the arms of hard-liners.
The EU has decided to intensify contacts with Iran in the aftermath of September 11 in a controlled step-by-step approach. We believe in increased contacts, in cultural exchange but also in political dialogue about our concerns, such as proliferation or missile development. We believe WTO accession talks would bring more transparency into Iran’s economy. EU foreign ministers in early June 2002 decided to start negotiations on a trade agreement with Iran. It will be conditioned, though, on simultaneous progress on human rights and rigorous counterterrorism measures.
Such a policy – cooperation under certain conditions – can, in our view, do more for positive internal development in Iran and stability in the region than antagonizing the country. In spite of a lot of ups and downs and a rather slow evolution of the internal situation, we think Iran is on an irreversible path toward more civil society, more participation and more freedom. In the long run, Iran will be a stabilizing factor in a very volatile region. And, by the way, EU contacts and information gathering in Iran have proven useful to the United States, not least in the fight against terrorism.
SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia is a very different case, of course, a country that has been a partner to the West for decades, a country with a crucial role in the international oil market, but at the same time a country with a corrupt and repressive regime, no free media, no religious freedom – not even for differing Muslim denominations, let alone Christians – a country that denies rights to women and has a very poor human-rights record. Fifteen of the 19 high-jackers on September 11 came from Saudi Arabia. Well-known deficits have since come into much sharper focus: economic problems, lack of modernization and a deepening alienation between the royal family and the population. The long-term stability of the regime appears uncertain. U.S. media highlighted this in an unprecedented “Saudi-bashing campaign” some time ago.
In the meantime, we see some very limited change in Saudi Arabia. The government is taking cautious steps toward modernization, including economic liberalization and identification papers for women. A debate has arisen about the exclusive right of ultra-orthodox clerics to interpret Islam and thus influence policies. In a very welcome effort, Saudi foreign policy has taken constructive steps for more stability in the region. Crown Prince Abdullah’s peace plan for the Middle East, including an intensive and ongoing operational follow-up with the United States, the EU and others, stands out. It is too early to say whether there will be serious Saudi efforts to cut the cash flow from members of the ruling elite to radical Islamic organizations worldwide.
It is in our interest to encourage reformist trends and to improve antiterrorism cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Germany is therefore trying to intensify contacts with Saudi Arabia, not only through enhanced political consultation and by increasing personnel at our diplomatic posts in Riyadh and Jidda, but also through a variety of measures, such as the following:
-
- increasing cooperation among universities;
- initiating exchanges between young people, e.g., through sports teams;
- inviting more Saudi journalists to Germany;
- placing more texts in Arabic on the Internet;
- offering intensified cooperation on professional education;
- and fostering contacts between German and Saudi medium-sized companies, which could become the backbone of a much lacking middle class in Saudi Arabia;
CONCLUSION
The Gulf today offers risks and opportunities for all of us. Terrorist threats have to be taken very seriously; terrorists have to be confronted by all appropriate means. But terrorism will never be defeated by military means alone, just as the existence of a police force cannot reduce crime to absolute zero. One important point should be kept in mind: We have to worry about the increasingly negative perception of the West, and especially of the United States, in the entire Middle East. On the other hand, the fact that a majority of Iranians are aspiring to the Western, or should I say American, way of life is encouraging. The same would most certainly apply to Iraq, if Iraqis could speak freely. There is a real chance for dialogue. But we will not reach these people if dialogue only means better marketing for a policy that is perceived as hostile by many in the region. Properly addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict certainly is one important way to get things right with the Gulf region as well.
Middle East Policy is fully accessible through the Wiley Online Library
Click below to subscribe to the online or print edition of Middle East Policy and gain access to all journal content.