Dr. Seeberg is associate professor at the Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark. He is also director of the DJUCO-project, an academic cooperation effort with universities in Jordan funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This paper was first discussed in an author workshop, organized by the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University and the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies at the University of Southern Denmark — in the framework of the DJUCO-initiative, funded by the Danish Arab Partnership Programme, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The terrorist attacks in Paris on Friday, but also recent attacks in Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey and Iraq, show once more that we are confronted with threats that are global. …We have to build together a safer environment. …This is precisely the purpose of the current review of the ENP.
— Federica Mogherini, European Commission press release, November 18, 20151
The launching of the review of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) took place only a few days after the terror attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015. In her press release, the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini added that "the new ENP will take stabilization as its main political priority."2 Furthermore, it was said that "differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP."3 This article discusses to what degree the EU's foreign and security policies towards the regimes in the Mashreq are capable of contributing to the stabilization of this highly differentiated Middle Eastern subregion. The article analyzes how important foreign- and security-policy dimensions emphasized in the ENP review are dealt with in the context of the Arab regimes in the Mashreq: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria.
The ENP, when presented in 2004, was an attempt at building bilateral cooperation with states south and east of the EU. Based on positive conditionality, this was supposed to be more efficient and sustainable than the regionalist setup formed in 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).4 The ENP agreements, taking their point of departure in Association Agreements (AA), were based on general Strategy Papers by the EU and Action Plans (AP) signed by the EU and the partner states. The developments in 2011 following the Arab uprisings led the EU to review the ENP and present an updated version, "A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood," with "more for more" as the central concept.5 Furthermore, the EU presented the so-called SPRING program, aiming at responding "to the pressing socioeconomic challenges that partner countries of the southern Mediterranean are facing and to support them in their transition to democracy."6 The program was funded, according to ENPI, by grants of €65 million in 2011 and €285 million in 2012.7
As the initially promising uprisings gradually developed into problematic scenarios, a need for yet another review of the ENP became obvious, not least as a result of the crisis in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic State (Daesh) — a reality reflected in the consultations leading to a review of the ENP.8 The consultations had taken place with stakeholders and academia in Europe and the partner states discussing a redesign of the ENP. The review pointed to the recent challenges and mentioned the ongoing conflicts, rising extremism and the high migration pressure as the most significant recent tasks for the EU to confront. Seen from an overall regional perspective, the situation before the Arab uprisings was different from the recent reality. As mentioned by Fawaz Gerges, there is hardly any doubt that the developments in the states of the Mashreq over the last five years have led to an increased differentiation among them.9 This obviously has consequences for the analysis of this subregion; the recent conditions influence not only the ENP, but a wide range of EU policies, in particular their lack of coherence.
It is the purpose of this article to develop an analytical framework to help explain the change in EU policies from regionalism to bilateralism and, further on, to differentiated local agreements. The analysis takes as its point of departure the claim that the foreign and security cooperation between the EU and the Mashreq regimes tends to develop security partnerships on different levels. The ambitions of the EU to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in its southern neighborhood were based on the assumption that positive changes in the regimes in the Arab Mediterranean would lead to stability, founded in economic, political and social progress.
As mentioned by Stephan Roll, the Egyptian military might be preoccupied with its autonomy within the state and with maintaining its economic interests, but in order to be able to pursue these agendas, stability is an urgent necessity.10 Half a decade after the uprisings against the regime of former President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has ended up with a new and more repressive power configuration and more autonomous state institutions than during the reign of Mubarak. The question in the context of this article is, then: What does this reality mean for the cooperation between the EU and the Egyptian state?
For obvious demographic and geostrategic reasons, Egypt is a significant actor in the Mediterranean, which the EU therefore has had to approach and make agreements with. It is relatively easy to identify common interests, not least within the realm of security. The dramatic developments following the uprisings in early 2011 became something of a test case for the EU's Lisbon-Treaty-based foreign-policy institutions. The unexpected and tumultuous developments since the fall of Mubarak have challenged EU leaders and spawned discussions about how to deal with an Islamist government.11 The recent EU "team" (Federica Mogherini, Donald Tusk, Jean-Claude Juncker) have had to try to manage cooperation with the government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
This cooperation, seen from the side of the EU, can be described as based on a pragmatic policy approach. Egypt has received significant financial assistance from the EU through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) — from 2014, the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) — the latest allocation focused on poverty alleviation, local socioeconomic development and social programs of various kinds. At the more official level, we find significant examples of cooperation, as when Mubarak became appointed co-president of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008. However, when it comes to norms and standards regarding democracy, human rights and the rule of law, Egypt has been unwilling to adapt to these EU political ideals. This was true for the three decades under Mubarak and, in particular, during the last five years.
A vital issue in EU-Egyptian relations is the question of migration. This issue has become increasingly securitized and has never been more salient, in both the general public discourse and high politics. The Mashreq is the subregion in the Middle East with by far the highest level of out-migration, and Egypt has traditionally been one of the most significant contributors of migrants: up from 2,041,214 in 1990 to 3,469,449 in 2013, the vast majority remaining within the Arab region.12 Official migration into Egypt is substantial, yet the level is much lower than out-migration, less than 10 percent. Added to that, illegal migrants and refugees from Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan arrive in Egypt, some of whom transit on towards Europe. Egypt and the EU have many common interests in this area, not least in managing migration flows affecting the Mediterranean security environment.
It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that, unlike Jordan and Lebanon, Egypt and the EU have not initiated a Mobility Partnership (MP) agreement. Rather, according to Vera van Hüllen, the Egyptian authorities have refused to cooperate on mobility, partnership and security.13 The Egyptian authorities agreed to participate in exploratory talks in June 2013 about a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), but the improvements within this field have been rather slow. The EU side wanted to support economic reforms undertaken by Egypt and also to improve opportunities for Egyptian products on the European market. The EU is Egypt's main trading partner, ranking highest in both imports and exports. The EU offered cooperation with Egypt in both areas (MP and DCFTA) in 2011, but the Egyptian authorities have been reluctant to take the EU up on its offers.14
The UfM platform for cooperation has established relevant activities in which the EU and Egypt can work together: renewable energy, transportation, programs promoting women's empowerment and youth employment. In a recent communication, the UfM congratulated Egypt on the adoption of a new constitution, "an essential step in the transition process [that] will certainly lay the ground for new political, economic and social achievements for the Egyptian people."15 This neutral but supportive statement was not critical of the Egyptian partner. Shared interests are the focus, not common values or identities.
A Jordanian survey conducted by the Opinion Polling and Research project (OPPOL) paints a positive picture of the EU.16 The EU is seen as active and efficient; 91 percent of Jordanian opinion leaders say the country has benefited from EU policies. Without doubt, the EU and Jordan have had close cooperation. As mentioned in the report by the EU Commission and the High Representative assessing the progress made in the implementation of the EU-Jordan Action Plan, Jordan has been severely affected by the ongoing armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The report emphasizes that "Jordan has shown great resilience in the face of regional crisis and continued to remain a moderate and tolerant regional key player with a stabilizing role both regionally and internationally."17
Jordan has joined the international coalition against Daesh and plays an active role in regional security cooperation related to the crisis in Syria. Jordan receives significant funding from the GCC-states, in particular Saudi Arabia, and from the United States and the EU. Jordan has furthermore been active in the context of the UfM. When the UfM was launched in 2008, the first general secretary in office in Barcelona was from Jordan. More significant, in 2012 Jordan took over the co-presidency of the UfM, and in September 2014, the UfM senior officials endorsed the renewal of this responsibility until September 2016.18
Jordan's relationship with the EU is based on financial support via the ENI. For the period 2014-17, EU assistance may range between €312 million and €382 million, for the purpose of "reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public delivery, employment and private-sector development, and renewable energy and energy efficiency."19 Furthermore, the EU has allocated support specifically for humanitarian assistance and development, in 2014 amounting to €211 million. The question is whether the relationship between Jordan and the EU can be seen as a pragmatic trade-off, where the EU provides Jordan with political and financial support and Jordan contributes to providing the EU with a stable security environment in the Mashreq.
The assessment of the degree to which Jordan has implemented the conditions mentioned in the ENP AP is an indication of the level of adaptation to EU norms and standards. The results are not too convincing. Jordan needs, according to the EU, to reapply a moratorium on the death penalty, to adjust its electoral system, and to improve the working conditions for Jordanian civil society, trade unions and NGOs. Furthermore, Jordan should strengthen the fairness and independence of the judiciary system, improve the working conditions for journalists, and address the issue of equal treatment of women. Finally, the corruption issue needs to be dealt with. Summing up, there is an obvious discrepancy between EU goals and Jordanian realities when it comes to democracy, human rights and the rule of law.20
The Jordanian population a few years ago was somewhat critical of the regime, regarding both its domestic and foreign policies. However, a recent survey conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman shows that almost "three-quarters of Jordanians (74 percent) believe that Jordan is generally going in the right direction, and this shows an increase of 23 percentage points from the December 2014 poll."21 Furthermore, Jordanians express support for Jordan's being a part of the coalition against Daesh, probably because of the crisis in Syria. This consensus seems, in an indirect way, to include the EU. The EU has expressed its concern over a number of issues related to political conditions in the country, human rights and the rule of law but has apparently decided not to insist.
This reality indicates that the EU prioritizes security and stability over reform and adaptation to EU political and legal norms. The EU mentions explicitly in its assessment of political progress in Jordan, that the role Jordan plays as co-chair for the UfM is appreciated. Furthermore, the EU acknowledges the efforts by Jordan regarding migration and that Jordan was the third country in the Middle East to sign an MP agreement. Jordan is a very important country in this respect; according to ESCWA, migrants make up 40.2 percent of its population. A large proportion of these are refugees, obviously also a part of the reason the EU is supportive. There are significant interests at stake with wide geopolitical dimensions. Because of this reality, the EU and Jordan maintain a security partnership, building on common interests in the stability of Jordan and European support for the welfare of refugees in the Mashreq, in particular Jordan and Lebanon.
It is somewhat surprising that the political institutions of Lebanon still exist. This seems more or less to be the message of a recent EU-Commission ENP report.22 The political situation in Lebanon has been fragile for a long time. Sectarian controversies still play an important role in the internal political environment, and in recent years the Syrian crisis has had significant destabilizing spillover effects. The long-term "dual power" arrangement, in which Hezbollah plays a major role, has been reinforced as a result of the war in Syria, not least because Hezbollah takes part in the fighting, creating a permanent internal conflict in Lebanon between supporters of the regime in Damascus and supporters of the Syrian opposition. This contributes to making Lebanon's political institutions even more unstable, creating a long-lasting political crisis.23
Traditionally, Lebanon has had close relations to EU member states, in particular France and Italy. Bilateral relations with the EU as such are not particularly strong, partly because the EU has had problems dealing with the complexity and instability of the Lebanese polity — characteristics that were exacerbated by the Arab uprisings. The EU's assistance via the ENI to Lebanon in 2014-16, projected between €130 million and €159 million, was to focus on five priorities: "Justice and security-system reform, reinforcing social cohesion, promoting sustainable economic development, protecting vulnerable groups and promotion of sustainable and transparent management of energy and natural resources."24 Added to the ENI support, Lebanon receives financial help from the EU for work related to Syrian refugees, reported by UNHCR in May 2016 to number 1,048,275.25
The EU focuses in its critical comments on Lebanon's implementation of the ENP on institutional weaknesses and political threats. The assessment speaks of defusing tensions and ensuring internal security, restoring the functioning of political institutions, including the holding of postponed parliamentary and presidential elections — but also carrying out reforms of the electoral framework. Security is the center of attention, with recommendations for reforming the security sector's capabilities, conduct and accountability — including the judiciary — promoting counter-radicalization measures and enhancing the national response to the Syrian refugees. Specifically regarding migrants and refugees, a significant development seems to be unfolding: the "nonencampment" policy (a prohibition against living in camps) imposed on Syrian refugees, rather than being a problem, is seen by Lebanese politicians as a partial solution to security issues, as discussed by Lewis Turner.26
Nonencampment and the facilitation of labor-market participation are attempts by the Lebanese state to increase the labor supply and put deflationary pressure on wages. The EU emphasizes that a deteriorating economic and social situation threatens the Lebanese population and that therefore it is important for the government to undertake activities to stimulate the creation of jobs — indirectly stating that radicalization can have root causes that stem from a lack of socioeconomic development. A weak economy, together with a more or less permanent political stalemate, establishes very difficult conditions for social improvements. And the domestic instability is worsened by the ongoing regional turmoil. The view of the EU is shared by the IMF, which expects little growth, despite a minor improvement in Lebanon's fiscal position, partly due to the positive effect of a decline in international oil prices.27
The EU's major concern regarding Lebanon is the low level of national economic and political stability, exacerbated by the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis. In the context of the ongoing civil war, the role of Hezbollah is significant for the EU. The EU foreign ministers have decided to put the armed wing of Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organizations. The official explanation was the alleged involvement of Hezbollah in a terrorist attack in Bulgaria. However, behind closed doors it was indicated that the participation of Hezbollah in the war in Syria in support of the Baath regime, in direct opposition to EU sanctions policy against Syria, was the main reason for the unusual measure.
As mentioned above, EU policies in relation to Lebanon are focused on security and stability. Apart from the decision on Hezbollah's military wing, the measures are pragmatic, based on common interests in a stable Mashreq and — as in the case of Jordan — to prevent the Syrian refugees from leaving the countries to which they have fled in the first place. The Lebanese nonencampment policy, seen from the perspective of the EU, is constructive, particularly in contrast to the failed integration policies of EU member states.
According to the EU Neighborhood Barometer in November-December 2012, the EU is perceived positively by the Palestinians, in particular in comparison with the UN and NATO, which enjoy a much lower level of trust.28 The EU is a large donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and to the organizations working with Palestinian refugees. In a press release issued in March 2016, Mogherini emphasized that the EU stands behind the Palestinians in their demand for a Palestinian state, but she also took the opportunity to underline that "viable and inclusive institutions, based on respect for the rule of law and human rights, are crucial, in … the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian State."29 The press release also mentions the EU's financial assistance to Palestinian refugees in the states of the Mashreq and, via UNRWA, in Gaza and the West Bank. It also states that the general conditions in the Palestinian territories are deeply problematic, as documented by reports and reference works.30 It appears that the Palestinian regime has developed in a negative direction and is becoming increasingly authoritarian, influenced by the occupation and attacks from Israel, and the conflict between the leading Hamas factions in Gaza and the PLO leadership in the West Bank. Reports refer to arrests of individuals from opposition organizations and critical journalists as well as misuse of "official" West Bank media reporting against Hamas, emphasizing responsibility for the latest Gaza war and plans for coups against President Mahmoud Abbas, and highlighting the harassment of Fatah members in Gaza.31
The Israel-Palestine conflict, once dominant in the media and academic discourse, has disappeared from the international public sphere — displaced by the Arab uprisings, the crisis in Syria and the emergence of Daesh. But the problematic situation in the territories has made the need for financial assistance even greater. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that aid from donors be used as efficiently as possible to help deal with the crisis in Gaza and the West Bank. This, however, is not necessarily happening, as noted by Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir, who argue that in the recent context the donors "seem content to stick with the same Investment in Peace aid model they have followed since 1993."32 They show, building on interviews with 44 international aid experts, that, seen from a security perspective, the main effect of aid may tend to be pacifying the Palestinians and promoting regional security. This seems to be in accord with the political practices pursued by the EU in the Mashreq.
For the period 2014-15, the EU was planning to support the Palestinian authorities with a bilateral allocation under the ENI in the range of €508-€621 million. However, in practice, it is very difficult to estimate the precise amount of support.33 Prioritized areas of EU-Palestine cooperation are governance at the local and national levels, the Palestinian private sector, economic development, and water and land development. Planned allocations of EU financial support amount to a maximum of €252.5 million.34 Palestine is, furthermore, involved in a significant number of UfM projects, which mainly have a local focus, in accordance with UfM policy. Added to that, the EU supports UNRWA activities in Gaza and the West Bank and gives yearly contributions to East Jerusalem. The projects have focused on water and environmental issues, economic development and local empowerment, and promotion of women's rights and youth employability.
The general objective behind EU policies is relatively pragmatic. EU support is given in order to "maintain the viability of the two-state solution by avoiding the fiscal collapse of the PA and sustaining basic living conditions of the whole Palestinian population."35 It is obvious that by helping to improve local conditions for the Palestinians, the EU avoids rocking the boat. The purpose is to maintain stability in the Palestinian territories; this is indirectly emphasized in the recommendations of the EU in the EU Commission progress report. The PA should pursue positive steps, with a view to an early resumption of the Middle East peace process — preceded by reconciliation among Palestinian factions. Furthermore, the EU recommends the holding of free and fair presidential and legislative elections and promotion of reform within the judicial and security sectors, so that they meet international human-rights standards. Added to this are more abstract hopes related to integrity and transparency within the PA administration. The EU raises demands but does not in practice require any positive behavior as a precondition for the continued funding of activities in Palestine via ENI or the UfM projects. The EU and the PA share common interests in stability and security, and cooperation appears to be based on decades of well-known practices, which do not change much but are simply renewed in more or less identical form.
When it comes to cooperation with the EU, Syria is somewhat exceptional. Neither an AA nor an AP has ever been signed by the EU and Syria, and by May 2011 the EU had suspended all its bilateral cooperation with the regime, although the work on an AA had been ongoing since 1998.36 It was a Cooperation Agreement begun in 1977 that governed relations between the EU and Syria. Following the start of armed conflict in the spring of 2011, the EU imposed comprehensive sanctions against Syria. Later on, in February 2015, when the realities in Syria had changed, the EU issued a "regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Daesh threat" with a broader perspective.37 The EU is the largest contributor to the international response to the Syrian crisis. Its latest expression was the EU Commission's decision on special measures for the Syrian population of December 2015.38 Before the suspension of bilateral cooperation, the EU maintained activities supporting reforms in the political and administrative sectors, based on a Country Strategy Paper for Syria 2007-13. The budget allocated to a National Indicative Programme for 2011-13 was re-allocated to the measures for the Syrian population affected by the Syrian crisis.
The activities and projects within the framework of the UfM — infrastructure, environmental programs, youth activities — which from the start included Syria, are still being carried out, but now they exclude Syria. The main EU activities concerning Syria do not include undertakings carried out in cooperation with the state. Officially, it is EU policy that the regime in Damascus be held responsible for the crisis and that "there cannot be a lasting peace in Syria under the present leadership."39 Furthermore, it is the viewpoint of the EU that, as a consequence of its policies, the Assad regime cannot be a partner in the fight against Daesh. Summing up, the EU activities aim at easing the difficult situation for the Syrian refugees internally displaced and those in the neighboring countries (primarily Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) and to bring stability back to Syria. The policies also aim at dealing with two security-related goals. First, the EU's "Syria and Iraq: Counter-Terrorism/Foreign Fighters Strategy," launched in January 2015, should be seen as situated in a wider regional context, not only related to Syria.40 Second, the strategy should be seen as a part of the overall EU ambition of avoiding an increase in migrants and refugees arriving in Europe.
Country-specific analyses have demonstrated that the level of adaptation to EU norms and standards concerning democracy, human rights and the rule of law is limited in all states in the Mashreq, yet in very different ways. The case of Jordan, which showed a relatively high level of consensus behind the policies of the regime, is an exception in the Mashreq, but this reality does not lead to an integrative approach towards the EU. The conclusion seems to be, therefore, that the cases discussed in this article represent a sobering reality: the EU interest in maintaining relatively close relations with partners in the south must include a pragmatic acceptance of being ignored — when it comes, for instance, to the recommendations in ENP progress reports. The EU's strategic interest in stability is obvious, for instance, when, in the context of Jordan, a blind eye is turned to regime practices related to the judiciary. Seen from a human-rights perspective, these are problematic, and they are explicitly mentioned in agreements with the EU.
Another example is the case of Lebanon, where, as described, an interest in defusing tensions tends to make the EU apply policies that overlook flaws in its attempts at democracy. From the side of the EU, dealing with the Mashreq in the context of security involves long-term as well as short-term geostrategic interests. Taking the Syrian refugee crisis as an example, there are obvious interests from the sides of both Jordan and Lebanon and from the side of the EU in managing the crisis, so that policies lead to mitigating the obvious security challenges. These interests — due to the very different perspectives — are not identical, and it is hardly meaningful to speak of integrative tendencies within this field. Close cooperation is not a relevant perspective, at least not in a short-term context.
It has been the ambition of this article to discuss relevant approaches for analyzing the EU's foreign and security policies in the context of the Mashreq. The key words are stability and security, and the degrees to which relations between the EU and the Mashreq regimes are developing towards integration, or towards different levels of security partnerships. The article has shown that, generally, there is a low level of institutional integration between the EU and these partners. Furthermore, the article has demonstrated that the levels of partnerships are highly differentiated. Syria and Palestine represent extraordinary cases. In the Syrian case, cooperation for political reasons has deliberately been suspended. Regarding Palestine, the goal is defensive; EU policies aim at maintaining the viability of the two-state solution.
Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon represent different realities, but still, as shown, there is little movement in the direction of integration. All three states show expressions of common interests with the EU related to stability in the Mashreq, from time to time in the form of what we might call pragmatic security trade-offs. Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon are all part of elaborate agreements within the framework of the ENP, but in different ways and at different levels. The same is the case for the cooperation organized in the context of the UfM, emphasizing local differences, and the overall tendency, on behalf of the EU, to concentrate on forms of cooperation in the local context.
1 European Commission, "Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Stronger Partnerships for a Stronger Neighbourhood," press release, November 18, 2015.
2 Ibid. The document that launched the review is: European Commission, "Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighborhood Policy," November 18, 2015.
4 European Commission, "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours," March 3, 2003.
5 European Commission, "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood," May 25, 2011.
6 European Commission, "EU Response to the Arab Spring: The Spring Programme," press release, September 27, 2011.
8 For a discussion of the consultations preceding the reviewed ENP, see Senén Florensa, "Reviewing the European Neighbourhood," PapersIEMed 18 (2015).
9 The different development in the Arab states following the Arab uprisings is covered in Fawaz Gerges, "Introduction. A Rupture," in The New Middle East. Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, ed. Fawaz Gerges (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
10 Stephan Roll, "Managing Change: How Egypt's Military Leadership Shaped the Transformation," Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 1 (2016).
11 Peter Seeberg, "The EU and Constitutionalism in Egypt: EU Foreign and Security Policy Challenges with a Special Focus on the Changing Political Setting in the Mena-Region," European Foreign Affairs Review 18, no. 3 (2013).
12 ESCWA and IOM, "2015 Situation Report on International Migration. Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region," United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) & International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2015.
13 Vera van Hüllen, EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and Authoritarianism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 178.
14 This is based on interviews by the author with EU officials in Cairo.
15 Union for the Mediterranean, "Info Center News: UfM Congratulates Egypt on the Adoption of a New Constitution," January 1, 2014.
16 OPPOL, "Active and Efficient, Like a Horse. Series: Perceptions of the EU in Neighborhood Partner Countries," news release, December 14, 2012.
17 European Commission, "Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in Jordan. Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for Actions," March 25, 2015.
18 Peter Seeberg, "Jordan, the European Neighborhood Policy, and Commonalities of Interest: Building a Security Partnership Rather Than a Security Community," in External Governance as Security Community Building, ed. Pernille Rieker.
19 European External Action Service, "Programming of the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) — 2014-2020. Single Support Framework for EU Support to Jordan (2014-2017)" (European Commission 2014).
20 Interviews by the author with EU-officials in Jordan.
21 CSS-Jordan, Public Opinion Survey. Some Current National Issues, February 2015. Main Findings (Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015).
22 European External Action Service, "Programming of the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI)."
23 Tamirace Fakhoury, "Lebanon's Perilous Balancing Act," Current History 350 (December 2015).
25 UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response. Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal" (Beirut, 2016).
26 Lewis Turner, "Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan," Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 3 (2015).
27 The Middle East and North Africa 2016, 62nd Edition (Routledge, 2015).
28 TNS Opinion, "European Neighborhood Barometer, Perceptions of the European Union, Palestine," Brussels, 2012.
29 Florensa, "Reviewing the European Neighbourhood."
30 The Middle East and North Africa 2016, 62nd Edition.
32 Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir, "Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied Palestine in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings," Mediterranean Politics 19, no. 3 (2014), 445.
33 European Commission, "Commission Implementing Decision of 29.2.2016 on the Annual Action Programme 2016 Part 1 in Favour of Palestine to Be Financed from the General Budget of the European Union," February 29, 2016.
35 Ibid, 9.
36 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as Well as the Isil/Da'esh Threat," March 16, 2015.
38 European Commission, "Commission Implementing Decision of 4.12.2015 on the 2015 Special Measure for the Syrian Population to be Financed from the General Budget of the European Union," December 4, 2015.
39 Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Syria," press release, October 12, 2015.
40 Council of the European Union, "Note: Outline of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Syria and Iraq, with Particular Focus on Foreign Fighters," January 16, 2015.