Dr. Denoeux is professor of government at Colby College in Waterville, Maine. This article draws on interviews he conducted in Morocco in August 2006 and July 2007
Morocco “has been spared weapons of mass destruction, but it is being destroyed by weapons of mass corruption." This often-heard statement in the kingdom suggests that, for all the rhetorical emphasis that successive governments since 1998 have placed on "fighting corruption," and despite the flurry of legal and institutional changes they have initiated in this area in the past several years, the problem remains pervasive.
Corruption is ubiquitous in all its dimensions and manifestations: petty as well as grand, in business transactions as well as in the country's political life, in the private sector as much as throughout the government bureaucracy, in daily human interactions as well as at critical junctures in the country's public life (e.g., during elections), and at the national and local levels alike.
Both Moroccan entrepreneurs and foreign investors continue to describe corruption as the primary deterrent to investing in the kingdom. Corruption's toll on economic growth and job creation thus can hardly be overstated, and neither can the extent to which it has eroded public confidence in state institutions, the political elite and the political system in general. In short, corruption is not merely one of the many daunting challenges that Morocco faces; it lies at the very heart of its economic and political troubles. Significantly, during interviews conducted in Rabat and Casablanca in early July 2007, independent experts and civil-society activists, as well as journalists, consistently used the following words to summarize the scope of corruption in Morocco: "commonplace" (banalisé), "systematized," "entrenched," "institutionalized" and "endemic."
At a very fundamental level, therefore, Morocco's political economy remains driven primarily by the logic of clientelism and patronage. In fact, as will be developed further below, in the past five years or so, the far greater involvement of the monarchy in the country's private sector, as well as the enhanced visibility and economic weight of prominent businessmen who enjoy close ties to the palace, have exacerbated old transparency-related problems. Moroccan society itself still can be conceptualized as a gigantic patronage machine – a web of patronage networks in which, at each level, a patron seeks to maintain his position of influence through the distribution of favors to clients below him (who, in return, support the patron in his endeavors), as well as by retaining the support of a patron above him. At the top of this system sits the king, who, in addition to his intertwined roles as religious leader, final authority on government matters, chief orchestrator of the country's political life, ultimate referee on contentious issues, and leading entrepreneur and landowner in the country, can also be viewed as Morocco's "Patron-in-chief" – in a way that has changed far more in its particular manifestations than in its basic logic.
In fact, if one is to believe the most commonly used indicators to measure it, corruption in the kingdom has worsened in the past decade, as reflected for instance in the table below, which summarizes the evolution of Morocco's performance on Transparency International (TI)'s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI assesses the incidence, gravity and extent of corruption, as viewed by business persons, risk analysts, independent experts and diplomats. As an indicator, it is not without problems. For one, it does not measure the actual scope of corruption, but merely perceptions of it by those most likely to be familiar with it (country analysts) or directly exposed to it (business persons). In addition, the number of countries included in the index has increased over time, which complicates the task of evaluating the significance of changes in a particular country's ranking. Still, the CPI is generally viewed as a credible indicator, and what it says about Morocco is worrisome. After a very short-lived improvement in its ranking and overall position (from forty-fifth to thirty-seventh) between 1999 and 2000, the kingdom's CPI deteriorated markedly and steadily between 2000 and 2004 (from 4.7 in 2000 down to 3.7 in 2002 and 3.2 in 2004). For three consecutive years (2004 through 2006), Morocco's score stagnated at a mere 3.2, and this year it rose to only 3.5 – still far below where it was in 2000, and not even back to its 1998 level.
Even when compared to other Arab countries, which as a region fare very poorly on the CPI, Morocco's performance is not particularly impressive, especially when considering views of the kingdom as a trailblazer for reform in the Arab world. In 2006, Morocco ranked eleventh out of 17 Arab countries, and while the results for
2007 ranked it in eighth position, it still lags behind Qatar (which scored 6.0 for the second consecutive year), the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Kuwait and Tunisia. In short, the quest for greater transparency represents one of those areas of political reform in which the kingdom has been most clearly lagging in the eight
years that have elapsed since the Youssoufi government made the fight against corruption official policy in 1999.
Drivers of Corruption
Three basic features of Morocco's political economy provide the underpinnings of corruption in the kingdom: the persistence of a significant degree of impunity for well connected individuals and members of powerful institutions, the intertwined nature of political and economic interests in the country, and the existence of a large and dynamic informal economy – a significant portion of which is tied to the production and export of cannabis. Each of these factors is developed briefly below.
- Senior members of the armed forces and the security agencies, as well as prominent entrepreneurs with close ties to the monarchy (including through business partnerships), frequently benefit from a variety of unfair advantages, among them a degree of official tolerance for illicit enrichment. Many continue to use their political connections to deny others the opportunity to compete with them on a level playing field, and they often are not held to account for engaging in corrupt behavior. The military, in particular, remains rife with corruption, and allegations and reports of illegal practices in its ranks tend to be systematically suppressed. The military budget is opaque and not subject to parliamentary debate and approval. Senior military officers have taken advantage of their positions to amass huge fortunes, including in the fishing industry.1
- Morocco also continues to display a marked concentration of wealth and economic power, and it still suffers from excessive blending of political and economic interests. The political and economic spheres do not operate sufficiently independently, and personal connections to individuals well-located in the country's power structure remain a source of unfair advantage in business transactions. In several key respects, Morocco has maintained a rentier economy in which the people whom one knows, and one's proximity to those in power and to the channels through which wealth is produced and circulates, typically are far more decisive than personal merit or the quality of products or services. In such a system, the special privileges and exemptions to which one has access because of personal relationships to key decision makers tend to take precedence over the logic of the market.
One aspect of this longstanding problem that has assumed new salience in recent years consists of the monarchy's deepening involvement in the kingdom's economic life. Ever since independence, the monarchy has been the country's main entrepreneur as well as its largest landowner. The royal family remains the primary shareholder in Morocco's largest private conglomerate, ONA-SNI, which controls the distribution of a broad array of goods and equipment in the kingdom, in addition to dominating the agribusiness, financial-services and mining sectors.2 Through ONA-SNI, its networks of subsidiaries, and other interconnected companies and financial holdings, the monarchy is heavily implicated in all keysectors of the economy – from agriculture to banking, insurance and real estate, and traditional retail distribution to new communication technologies. During the 1990s, however, as his health was declining, Hassan II showed a diminished interest in business. Increasingly, he oversaw his extensive financial, commercial and industrial affairs from a distance, leaving the direct management of those affairs to close associates. It is revealing as well that ONA played a very limited role in the privatization process – no doubt, in part, because Hassan II understood the need to create space for a new entrepreneurial class that, through its readiness to take risks, would help the kingdom meet the challenges associated with an increasingly globalized economy.3 Against this background, when Mohamed VI ascended the throne in July 1999, many rumors circulated to the effect that the new king was not particularly attracted to business and that he understood the transparency and accountability problems inherent in the country's highest political authority also playing the dominant role in the country's private sector. Consequently, some analysts speculated that the new reign might herald a progressive disengagement of the monarchy from national economic life, beginning with the Palace's gradual withdrawal from ONA.
Eight years later, these rumors are long gone. Instead, since 2003 in particular, the Palace has become even more implicated in the economic life of the country, both directly and through close associates. A watershed in this process was the November 2003 takeover of Wafabank (then the fourth-largest private bank in the country) by Banque Commerciale du Maroc (BCM), Morocco's largest private bank and the "banking wing" of the ONA-SNI conglomerate. The result of this merger was a new "megabank" or "national champion," Attijariwafa, which can be relied upon to provide regular infusions of cash into the ONA-SNI royal holding. The dominant perception in the kingdom today is that there is more wheeling and dealing than ever before by the monarchy itself, as well as by individuals ("the king's businessmen") close to it. The presence of the monarchy in the business life of the country is both unprecedented and felt very heavily by economic operators. Discussing the growing weight within the economy of holdings and companies tied to the monarchy, two observers have suggested that "Alawization" has followed privatization.4 This phenomenon has several negative implications for the fight against corruption:
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- Whenever the royal family is implicated, observers and economic operators alike become far more hesitant to expose and denounce corruption, irregularities or suspicious transactions. Those sectors of economic activity in which the palace is directly or indirectly present are not subjected to the same level of scrutiny as others.
- Whenever the monarchy itself or interests closely tied to it are involved, there is a reduction in the likelihood that transactions will be fully transparent, and that the rules on the books will be respected. The chance of being able to appeal – and even more so, of gaining redress – if these rules are not enforced diminishes even more markedly. That is not to say that the Palace, or entrepreneurs with connections to it, always prevail because of their political clout. Nonetheless, whenever the stakes are high, royal interests are involved, and market forces might not produce an outcome consistent with the Palace's preferences, experience suggests that the political card will be played and that there will not be a level playing field among economic operators.
- Sometimes the mere involvement of interests tied to the monarchy convinces other operators not to enter the race for certain contracts or markets, either because they assume that those with connections to the Palace are bound to prevail or for fear of incurring the wrath of those in power. The desire not to appear to be challenging the king, or to be seeking to compete with him, still drives these reflexes, as does the knowledge that those who have dared to do so (or have merely appeared to be engaged in this type of behavior) sometimes have paid a heavy price for their audacity. After all, which entrepreneur wishes to do anything that might trigger an audit by the tax authorities?
- Along similar lines, transactions between the Attijariwafa bank and ONASNI subsidiaries are far less likely to be investigated for possible irregularities than operations between other banks (not tied to royal interests) and competitors of ONASNI. For that matter, some financial institutions are likely to think twice before providing credit facilities to competitors of entities that are dominated by royal interests.5 The opposite may be true as well: everything else being equal, companies that can pose a threat to rivals of ONA subsidiaries or affiliates may find it easier to secure loans.
Against this background, the past few years have witnessed the rising influence and visibility of a group of young, assertive and dynamic business people with close ties to the Palace, as well as the increased involvement in private-sector activity of several key figures in the king's inner circle. This phenomenon has gone hand in hand with the growing perception that most of these individuals have accumulated enormous wealth, not primarily because of their competencies (which in many cases are real), but because of their association with the monarchy – and because there is no real political will at the top of the political system to address the issue of influence peddling and cozy business partnerships that are made behind closed doors, often with disregard for legal provisions and the logic of the market. In the past two years, the Moroccan press has reported extensively, and with concern, about what it often refers to as the ambiance of affairisme (a word that conveys an excessive preoccupation with business and profit-making, bordering on greed and unencumbered by ethical or legal considerations) that prevails within the royal entourage.
The print media's attention to this issue will not be diminished by the recent scandal involving Mohamed Mounir Majidi. As director of the personal secretariat of the king and president of SIGER (the royal holding that controls ONA, SNI and the Attijariwafa bank), Majidi's primary responsibility consists of overseeing the monarchy's extensive business interests.
He has long been described as someone with a penchant for secrecy whose business dealings tend to take place behind an opaque screen. Far more damaging to his reputation, however, were revelations in May 2007 that he had used his proximity to Minister of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs Ahmed Tawfiq to buy a prime piece of real estate in Taroudant at only a fraction of its market price (1/90th according to most reports), and with complete disregard for the legal procedures supposed to govern such transactions. The fact that the land in question was part of the religious endowments (awqaf) conferred upon this scandal a particularly sensitive politico-religious dimension. In effect, a plot of land supposed to be used only for religious and charitable purposes instead helped enrich even further the personal secretary of the king, who, in his status as Amir al-muminin, is supposed to be the supreme guardian of such properties, given in trust to the community. The operation, furthermore, took place without the public bidding process required under a dahir dating back to 1913 and in violation of other stringent provisions designed to limit the transfer of awqaf assets to private individuals.6
- Morocco's sizable informal economy also represents a key force behind corruption in the kingdom. For one, the production and export of cannabis in the north is believed to generate revenues well above $10 billion, a significant portion of which is laundered. Drug-trafficking and drug smuggling networks are tied to the bribery of judges, police and customs officers, as well as public prosecutors. More generally, the existence of a broadly based underground economy feeds corruption, in that it often leads to the use of money to convince state officials to look the other way.
Historical Perspectives
Corruption has particularly deep and solid roots in contemporary Morocco. It is important to understand how this situation came about, if only to grasp more fully the systemic nature, gravity and scope of the problem and to realize how difficult and protracted the struggle to confront it will be. At least through the 1980s, corruption was at the very heart of King Hassan II's ruling strategy. He relied heavily on it to buy off actual and potential challengers and solidify support among key constituencies, such as military officers, members of the security apparatus, senior civil servants, rural notables and urban elites. Corruption, therefore, was not merely tolerated; it was
deliberately encouraged as a strategy of political control and management. As a result, it became thoroughly woven into the kingdom's administrative, political and economic systems. Individuals who benefited from various scams involving the abuse of the public trust shared part of their good fortune with friends, relatives and associates; in turn, they expected the beneficiaries of their largesse to protect their interests. Thus, the pervasive and institutionalized nature of corruption in Morocco today largely reflects a particular mode of governance that has yet to be dismantled. The strategic positions that those who benefited from it for decades were able to achieve in both the state apparatus and business now provide them (and their offspring) with great leverage to resist, block and foil attempts to improve transparency and accountability.
The second half of the 1990s nonetheless witnessed genuine efforts to overcome this legacy. Specifically, shortly after King Hassan appointed him prime minister in March 1998, Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi made the fight against corruption official policy. It was the first time in the kingdom's history that the government recognized publicly the scope of the problem in Morocco and stated its determination to combat it. This new attitude was important, not only in that it gave rise to several official initiatives to tackle the problem – the most significant of which was the adoption in December 1998 of a decree that improved bidding, review and award procedures for public procurement contracts7 – but also because it made it much easier for both civil-society organizations and the press to discuss the issue and seek to energize the public behind it. The Youssoufi government gave Transparency Maroc (TM), the local chapter of TI that had been created in 1996, far more political space within which to operate. TM was even allowed to release its findings, and there was a marked reduction in the harassment and intimidation previously directed at its members. In January 1999, Youssoufi met with representatives of TM, and by 2001, TM was collaborating with the Ministry of Education on activities aimed at sensitizing school children to the damage of corruption. In this context, the press also became more assertive in its reporting on transparency-related issues.
Investigative reports revealing the extent of, and the mechanisms sustaining, corruption under King Hassan II became commonplace, as did articles that looked into suspicious or illegal activities by well-connected individuals previously thought to have been untouchable.
Unfortunately, the Youssoufi government was unable to deliver on a battery of corruption-related measures it had announced in 2000. Thus, by the time Driss Jettou became prime minister in September 2002, the "fight against corruption" appeared to have stalled, fueling public skepticism about the authorities' actual determination to tackle the problem in meaningful ways. Since then, several institutional and legislative initiatives have been initiated that provide a good basis on which to build. Still, as discussed earlier, the required political will to confront grand corruption head-on has yet to materialize. With this in mind, the main features of the current situation now may be examined.
Achievements and recent advancements
On transparency-related matters, the most significant improvements in the past few years have involved the upgrading of the country's legal and regulatory framework. That framework is now generally adequate to enable the kingdom to make significant headway in the fight against corruption. As will be shown, Morocco's primary challenge in this area is not the inadequacy or insufficiency of the necessary laws and regulations, but the lack of enforcement – or the selective, arbitrary and politically motivated application – of the laws and regulations that do exist.
Changes in Laws and Regulations
Most corruption-related offenses are covered satisfactorily by Morocco's Penal Code, which, for instance, sanctions embezzlement of public funds, collusion between private and public interests, conflicts of interest, the solicitation and acceptance of bribes, the use of public office for private gain, and influence peddling. But from a legal and regulatory standpoint, the single most important development in many years occurred on May 9, 2007, when the kingdom officially ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which it had signed in December 2003.8 As elsewhere, the UNCAC requires the kingdom to live up to its many obligations under it and thereby provides a critical reference point for donors, civil-society activists, reform-oriented government officials and media outlets. It can be used to put pressure on the authorities to implement specific legal and institutional changes, and it provides an objective benchmark (which, de facto, has been endorsed by the Moroccan government) through which to assess both progress and continued shortcomings.
The legislation required to combat money laundering also has been put in place. Though the scope of Morocco's money-laundering problem is unknown, it is reasonable to assume that a significant portion of the multi-billion-dollar proceeds from the export of cannabis, as well as other revenues generated through the country's underground economy, are laundered. And yet, prior to 2003, the Moroccan government had not genuinely confronted the money-laundering issue, despite pressure from international institutions. A tentative first step took place through the antiterrorism legislation that the kingdom adopted in June 2003 in the wake of the Casablanca bombings. That legislation included provisions meant to prevent and prosecute money laundering linked to potential terrorist financing. For instance, banking secrecy could be lifted in the case of organizations suspected of being linked to terrorism. Suspicious transactions or funds of dubious origins could prompt the freezing or seizure of the accounts involved. Building on this legislation, in December 2003 Morocco's Central Bank required banks and other financial institutions under its supervision to carefully examine and monitor transactions by their customers and to report evidence of potential wrongdoing.
However, it was only in March 2007 that the kingdom passed comprehensive anti-money laundering (AML) legislation – nearly three years after draft legislation to that effect first was introduced into parliament and almost five years after work on it began. The law defines and criminalizes money laundering and specifies related penalties, which include jail sentences. It contains all the standard provisions required to fight money laundering. For instance, banks and financial institutions must require proper identification from all their customers and must inquire regarding the origin of funds deposited. They may not open or keep anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious or symbolic names and must keep records of transactions as well as customer-identification information.
This new legislation will require that Moroccan banks and financial institutions noticeably improve their internal control systems so as not to serve as venues for money laundering. Since the law was passed, the Moroccan authorities have stepped up their efforts to sensitize banks and financial institutions to money-laundering issues, but there is ample evidence to suggest that these organizations have a long way to go before they find themselves in compliance with the new legislation.9
Asset and income disclosure legislation has been another area where some progress has taken place recently. In the spring and summer of 2007, the Moroccan parliament adopted a battery of laws requiring that several categories of decision makers – judges, senior civil servants, MPs and local officials – disclose their assets (both movable and immovable) and net worth, as well as those of their spouses and minor children. They must do so at the beginning of their tenure, at specified regular intervals thereafter, and upon leaving office. This new legislation is far from flawless, but it represents a step forward in the long struggle to put in place the mechanisms required to deter illegal behavior by officials.
Institutional Advances
The development of those institutions that can make a significant contribution to the fight against corruption unfortunately has lagged far behind the modernization of laws and regulations. In recent years, and as examined at length elsewhere,10 parliament has asserted its oversight prerogatives more vigorously than ever before – as reflected, for instance, in the role it played between 2001 and 2003 in the investigation of the CIH and CNSS scandals. By and large, however, the Moroccan legislature still has a long way to go in terms of being able to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by officials, enforce a greater measure of accountability throughout the system, and compel powerful, well-connected individuals to abide by the law.
Ironically, the greatest advance affecting institutions has not involved the creation of new ones or the strengthening of existing ones but the abolition of the highly controversial Special Court of Justice (CSJ) in September 2004. Established in 1965, the CSJ had been given primary responsibility for dealing with cases of official corruption. Anti-corruption activists had long demanded that it be abolished, pointing to the following problems:
- First, the CSJ operated under a special legal status which, in the name of providing for severe and speedy sanctioning of corruption, allowed it to disregard conventional protections of individual liberties and to deliver much harsher penalties than those the Penal Code specified for similar infractions (thus, in effect, creating two different standards of justice).
- Second, and compounding the first problem, the CSJ lacked political independence. Since only the justice minister was empowered to activate it, it could be used (and frequently was) to settle political accounts, whereas politically connected individuals were unlikely to be targeted by it. For instance, the infamous "sanitization campaign" (campagne d'assainissement), launched by former Interior Minister Driss Basri in December 1995, had seen blatant reliance on the CSJ to punish some critics of the regime and send a message to others. This ill-fated campaign – which rocked Morocco for six months, spread fear throughout the business world, and entailed a highly selective and arbitrary enforcement of laws and regulations – had done much to tarnish even further the reputation of the CSJ and to strengthen the determination of anti-corruption activists to see it eliminated.
The Jettou government's decision to do away with the CSJ and to have corruption cases handled by courts of first instance (in the cases of lesser offences) and by nine of the 21 courts of appeal found in Morocco (for more serious crimes), therefore, represents an important step in the fight against corruption. And when the CSJ was abolished, the Penal Code was adjusted to provide for harsher penalties for corruption-related offenses.
Unlike governmental institutions, a variety of advocacy NGOs have continued to demonstrate vigor and effectiveness in their efforts to expose and curb corruption. TM, for instance, has a solid track record in terms of educating the public, raising awareness and lobbying the authorities.
More generally, since the mid-to-late 1990s, Moroccan civil society has played an instrumental role in undermining the idea that corruption is acceptable and/or inevitable; enhancing public awareness of the negative impact of corruption on job creation and national well-being; striving to place the issue at the forefront of the public agenda (thus increasing pressure on the authorities to deal with it); exposing cases of grand corruption; commenting on transparency-related government initiatives; and improving knowledge of the roots and mechanisms of this phenomenon, the forms it assumes in the Moroccan context, the sectors most affected by it and the steps through which it can be reduced.
The independent press, too, has made growing contributions to the fight for transparency, through its own analyses and commentaries, by relaying the activities of advocacy groups (and, in the process, amplifying their impact), as well as by opening up its columns to civil-society activists, academics and independent experts. Since 2000, it has become more proactive, daring and capable in its coverage of official corruption cases. It has delved into highly sensitive areas, such as corruption in the ranks of senior military officers or individuals in close proximity to the king. It has become more sophisticated in its understanding of corruption-related issues and better able to unravel complex financial scams, especially in such sectors as banking, real estate, tourism and housing. The weekly Tel Quel and the daily L'Economiste deserve particular praise in this respect.
Even granting the persistence of red lines and the occasional crackdowns on journalists and editors who cross them, censorship and self-censorship have not prevented regular and detailed press coverage of high-level corruption. Indeed, for all the recent talk in the United States and Europe about the "marked deterioration of press freedoms in Morocco," the fact remains that freedom to discuss and denounce corruption has never been greater.11 The overarching problem is not so much the capacity to expose corruption, but the lack of follow up investigation and sentencing by the responsible institutions.
In this regard, as TM President Azzeddine Akesbi noted to the author, freedom of expression can be a double-edged sword.12 On the one hand, it operates as a safety valve by allowing individuals to vent their outrage at official corruption. On the other hand, the consistent inability of the relevant authorities to bring to account those who are shown to have engaged in illicit practices is creating mounting popular anger.
The fragile balance between the "safety valve" component of the equation and the "frustration building" one is rapidly shifting toward the latter, a development that should receive the attention it deserves from the new government headed by Abbas El-Fassi.
Persistent Obstacles and Recent Setbacks
As underscored above, the institutional framework for preventing, detecting and prosecuting corruption remains very problematic. The public lacks confidence in the effectiveness and independence of the relevant institutions, and the poor track record of those institutions seems to support that skepticism.
The Judicial System
The dysfunction associated with Morocco's judicial system remains the single greatest impediment to progress on the anti-corruption front. Magistrates still lack independence relative to powerful political and economic interests, and their rulings are frequently influenced by outside pressure. In addition, many judges and lawyers are themselves corrupt. Bribery of judges is a widespread practice. Despite the efforts by senior decision makers within the Ministry of Justice and the Higher Judicial Council (Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature) to discipline corrupt judges, and despite the cases of demotion, reassignment, forced early retirement or dismissal that have affected dozen of judges in the past few years, judicial corruption remains pervasive. It is particularly severe in northern Morocco, where drug lords engaged in smuggling cannabis to Europe have bribed judges and prosecutors alike. The drug industry could not continue to thrive (often in the open) without the complicity of members of the judicial profession.
Two recent scandals illustrate this dire situation. The "Rkiya affair," which unfolded in early 2007, involved judges acknowledging on tape having received money in exchange for rendering certain verdicts. The "Tetouan scandal," for its part, broke out in August 2006, when seven lawyers from that city sent to the weekly As-Sahifa a "Letter to History" denouncing the corruption that prevails in judicial circles in Tetouan. They specifically identified numerous wrongdoings by city magistrates during judicial cases involving drug lords, and highlighted evidence of systematic complicity between magistrates and these criminals. Most important, the Tetouan scandal demonstrated that, instead of being protected, judges or lawyers who might come forward to denounce corruption in their ranks are likely to be targeted for retaliation. Barely a week after the "Letter to History" came out, magistrates in Tetouan went on the offensive and initiated judicial proceedings against its authors (thereby conveniently placing themselves in the position of being both judge and litigant). Ultimately, all seven lawyers who had signed the letter were dismissed and disbarred, following a process marred by serious irregularities.
The Audit Court (Cour des Comptes) and Regional Audit Courts (Cour des Comptes Régionales)
The Court of Accounts (COA), Morocco's primary audit body, also displays considerable weaknesses. Its primary responsibility, as specified under Article 96 of the 1996 Constitution, is to conduct "overall supervision of the implementation of the budget." Thus, it is empowered to review all expenditures by ministries and other public or semi-public agencies (any institution that uses public funds) in order to ensure that they are consistent with what is authorized under the budget. The text of the constitution grants the COA enough autonomy and authority to carry out these functions. The court operates independently of all three branches of government and is responsible for setting its own annual program. Its members enjoy the same status and protections as magistrates. Administrators of public entities must provide it with all the documents and information that it may request from them in the course of investigating their financial operations.
Despite these considerable constitutional prerogatives and the technical competence of its members, the COA suffers from significant limitations as a corruption-preventing body. Its reports, which are not publicly accessible, are rarely followed up on by those institutions charged with doing so, including the judiciary. It also lacks enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, while the constitution states that the COA "shall take action, when necessary, against violations of the rules governing … the agencies placed under its control," in practice the COA cannot perform that function. It is not even
an important force in enabling other institutions to do so.
As for the nine regional audit courts, they were put in place only in 2003 and are not yet fully operational. Though they are charged by the constitution with "checking the accounts and assessing the management of local governments," they lack the resources, authority and experience to live up to that mandate, and thus do little to curb the pervasive corruption that exists at the local level.
The Government Auditing Office (Inspection Générale des Finances, IGF)
Created in 1960, the IGF is charged with conducting both regularity and performance audits of government institutions and other public entities and with monitoring the use of the foreign loans and credits that donors have extended to Morocco.13 In the past several years, IGF investigations have uncovered evidence of embezzlement, misappropriations and gross mismanagement of public funds in the banking, real estate and tourism sectors, as well as within the main government agency responsible for vocational training, the Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Promotion du Travail (OFPPT). In the process, the IGF's probes have exposed the ways in which private-sector CEOs, senior civil servants, and/or managers of public or semi-public entities have often colluded in scams that have cost the Moroccan taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars. Unfortunately, while technically competent, the IGF staff is much too small to provide adequate coverage of the kingdom's enormous needs in the areas of financial evaluation and oversight. In addition, the IGF lacks autonomy since it is not empowered to initiate audits on its own. The decision to do so rests with the Ministry of Finance and Privatization (which can act upon a request from another ministry). In politically charged cases, therefore, the IGF may not be activated. Finally, and perhaps most important, the judiciary typically fails to follow up on the reports of the IGF, even when the latter's investigations have uncovered blatant irregularities. Unless and until the judiciary steps up to its responsibilities, the IGF will be unable to realize its potential as an anti-corruption tool.
The Central Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (ACPC)
On January 31, 2007, the cabinet, presided over by the king, adopted a decree providing for the establishment of the ACPC, which was formally established
in May 2007. The creation of a specialized body charged with preventing, detecting and sanctioning corruption has been a longstanding demand of civil society in Morocco. For instance, it featured prominently in the memorandum that the Network of Associations for the Fight against Corruption presented to then-Prime Minister Youssoufi back in 1998. The UNCAC, which Morocco now has both signed and ratified, also calls for the establishment of such an institution, explicitly conferring upon it several key responsibilities: (1) to help coordinate, implement and monitor the effectiveness of governmental policies as they relate to the fight against corruption; (2) to perform educational and sensitization functions, including broadening and disseminating knowledge of corruption-related phenomena and processes; and (3) to detect, investigate and prosecute corruption.
From these perspectives, the limitations of Morocco's ACPC are striking. It lacks independence, since it is attached to the prime minister's office;14 the resources placed at its disposal are scarce; it is insufficiently representative of the broad variety of actors concerned with corruption; it is confined to a primarily advisory role; its mandate does not include the detection, investigation and suppression of corruption; it lacks investigative, auditing and monitoring prerogatives; and its responsibilities and overall mission are unclear and fairly circumscribed. In sum, the ACPC falls far short of a truly empowered, independent and unified structure to detect, investigate and sanction abuses of the public trust.
The General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises: A Declining Asset in the Fight Against Corruption?
Some of the developments that have recently affected Morocco's business syndicate, the CGEM, also deserve close monitoring, as they could undermine the country's ability to curb corrupt practices. In the mid-to-late 1990s, the CGEM played a very active role in the national debate about corruption. In addition to commenting on governmental policies (and occasionally being critical of them), it gave a voice to business owners or executives in smalland mid-sized enterprises who were not part of the government patronage networks and were keen to agitate for a leveling of the playing field among economic actors.
The CGEM lobbied particularly hard for greater transparency in all economic operations in which the state plays a leading role, from the awarding of public procurement contracts to the manner in which privatization is conducted.
Recently, however, the CGEM has adopted a much lower profile on issues related to corruption and influence peddling. This potentially significant development stems from changes in the leadership, management and outlook of the organization, which themselves reflect the increasing weight in the economy of both the monarchy and elements in the royal entourage. The impact of this new situation on the CGEM deserves to be examined briefly.
In a July 2005 interview in the weekly La Vérité, the president of the CGEM at the time, Hassan Chami, expressed strong reservations regarding the quality of governance in Morocco. His remarks were widely interpreted as an indirect criticism of the leadership of the king on this issue, as disapproval of the growing influence of "the king's businessmen" in Morocco's economic life, and as an effort to assert the autonomy of the CGEM relative to those interests. The regime's response was quick and unforgiving, despite Chami's well-known close personal ties to Prime Minister Driss Jettou. Those in the royal entourage who had been waiting to move against him (and who had already nearly succeeded in forcing him out of the CGEM leadership in the election of 2003) found in Chami's interview the material they needed to convince the supreme authority in the country that Chami should now be viewed as persona non grata. Significantly, the president of the CGEM was no longer invited to official ceremonies held by the king, and in September 2005 one of his firms was subjected to a fiscal audit, the timing of which may not have been fortuitous.
It did not take long before it became known that the Palace backed Moulay Hafid El-Alamy, the dynamic and successful head of the Saham holding, to succeed Chami in the election to the syndicate's presidency, scheduled for June 2006. By the time the election was held, El-Alamy ran unopposed and won with 94 percent of the ballots cast – the first time since 1988 that an election to the leadership of the CGEM was uncontested. The royal entourage, it seemed, had prevailed, and by silencing a critic, it had sent an important signal to others.
During his "campaign," as well as after assuming the leadership of the organization, El-Alamy stressed that the syndicate should refrain from taking stands on "political issues" and should instead concentrate on its core mission: to serve the professional interests of its members. He suggested that under his predecessors, the CGEM had too often taken unnecessarily confrontational stances relative to the government, and that this attitude was not only contrary to the vocation of the organization, but had ended up backfiring on it.
Many analysts interpreted these comments to indicate that, under El-Alamy, the CGEM would not stand in the way of the powerful politico-economic interests that exist by the king's side. And while it certainly is too early to assume that in the next few years Morocco's business syndicate will be reduced to an instrument of those interests, it nevertheless seems clear that, for the moment at least, the organization's inclination to dissent has been markedly reduced. There is also evidence that a new deal has been struck between the regime and the CGEM: in exchange for the latter's assuming a lower public profile, the former has extended to it benefits denied earlier, such as the valuable status of association d'utilité publique.15
One reading of El-Alamy's emphasis on the need to "depoliticize," "modernize" and "professionalize" the CGEM is that it represents an effort to tame or domesticate it. That interpretation strikes this writer as one-sided, excessive and unfair to El Alamy, a credible and competent manager who appears to have a genuine vision for the organization that cannot be reduced to doing the bidding of others.16 Nonetheless, when examined against the broader background described in this article, recent changes in the leadership and tone of the CGEM cannot be viewed as encouraging from the perspective of the fight for greater transparency and a clearer separation of political and economic interests in the kingdom. For the time being, in effect if not by intent, the CGEM appears to have been neutralized by those who stand to benefit from the persistence of at least some degree of opacity in key economic transactions, particularly those that involve elements in the royal entourage.
A way foreward
By way of conclusion, one may identify a few priorities for reducing corruption in the kingdom. These priorities provide benchmarks against which one will be able to assess the performance of Abbas El Fassi's new government in this area. They should also be useful to donors’ intent on using the real leverage they possess, but do not always choose to exercise, to bring about greater transparency.
Need for an Integrated Strategy
For over a decade, the call for a comprehensive national strategy to combat corruption has been a leading demand of civil-society activists and independent experts. That request for an integrated approach embodying a broad consensus among all key stakeholders has yet to be satisfied. Significantly, both the creation of the ACPC and the disclosure-of-assets legislation in 2007 did not involve meaningful consultations with civil-society groups. In this context, a priority for the donor community should be to promote a more broadly based, participatory and coordinated approach to such issues. Specifically, donors should act as a catalyst for the elaboration of a long-term anti-corruption strategy, the design, implementation and monitoring of which should involve a genuine partnership among the executive branch, the legislature, civil society and the private sector. All parties involved should agree on a set of core objectives, on the steps that need to be taken to meet them, on a timeline for their adoption, on benchmarks, and on evaluation criteria and methods. Donors can also play a key role in providing the technical assistance needed to measure achievements and continued shortcomings. They can help disseminate the results of those evaluations so as to maintain forward momentum, and they can facilitate a consensus on subsequent modifications that may need to be made to the strategy, the measures to be adopted and the timetable.
The Imperative of Judicial Reform
The analysis conducted above underscores the dismal state of Morocco's judiciary, especially its lack of independence from political interests as well as the extent to which it is penetrated and manipulated by forces engaged in illicit practices. This situation represents the single most important obstacle to advances on the anticorruption front. Even when overwhelming evidence of significant wrongdoing has been brought to light, the judicial system often fails to step in, especially when the unlawful activities in question involve well-connected individuals or institutions that continue to enjoy a high level of impunity. In this regard, the fate of anticorruption efforts will remain inextricably tied to broader progress in the rule-of-law sphere. Improving the skills of magistrates in such technical subjects as money laundering (the detection and prevention of which constitute an area in which Morocco is a latecomer) should also receive some attention. In short, strengthening both the independence and the capacity of the judicial sector should be the foremost priority of any strategy to combat corruption in the kingdom. It will not be an easy task, since the judiciary not only remains one of the most problematic institutions in Morocco, but also one that has proven to be particularly resistant to reform.
Procurement and Delegated Management Processes
The rules required for transparent and competitive procurement processes are generally in place, and analysts usually agree that the past decade has seen some progress in this area. However, there remains considerable room for improvement. For one, in practice at least, military contracts are not subject to standard procurement procedures, a major problem in light of the size of these contracts and the numerous opportunities they present for corruption. Another special concern relates to what is usually referred to as "gestion déléguée" or "service public délégué" ("delegated management"). The expression refers to the delivery of a specific public service (e.g., water, electricity distribution or garbage collection) by a private firm contracted to do so by a public entity (e.g., municipal authorities).
The contracts involved usually represent very lucrative markets and, consequently, longstanding sources of corruption. Proper bidding procedures are frequently disregarded, as happens, for instance, when the wali, the governor or the president of the municipal council decides to award a concession without having given all potentially interested economic operators an opportunity to bid. Improvements in this area, therefore, are necessary. The recent Loi sur le service public délégué, adopted in 2006, represents a promising step in that direction, but it will need to be enforced if it is to make a difference. In addition, and with respect to both procurement and delegated management processes, the Internet represents a promising venue for enhancing free and fair competition and for giving small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are not necessarily politically connected greater opportunities to bid on government contracts. The government is already beginning to place requests for proposals (RFPs) on the Internet. Further progress toward "E-procurement" should help improve transparency and represents a natural entry point for donors.
Improvements in the Legislative Framework
As shown earlier, Morocco's legal and regulatory framework is sufficient to provide for significant strides toward greater transparency. Nonetheless, in this area as well, there is room for improvement. First, much remains to be done to harmonize Moroccan legislation with the requirements of the UNCAC, and donors are ideally placed to facilitate this process by providing the required technical assistance. One important step would be to amend the Penal Code to criminalize the use of funds generated by corruption.
Even more critical would be the adoption of whistleblower-protection legislation. Back in 2002, then-Prime Minister Youssoufi made promises in this regard, but no progress has been achieved to date. As things stand, many witnesses to official corruption fail to report it because they know they will expose themselves to retaliation if they do. If whistleblower protection measures were put into place and enforced, much more corruption would be exposed. After all, many civil servants are well aware of the corruption going on around them and could often point investigators to the relevant evidence, but they will not do so until they are assured they will not be made to pay a heavy price for it. As the previously discussed case of the lawyers in Tetouan demonstrated, whistleblower protection is particularly imperative for members of the judicial profession. It would also make it easier for corruption among senior military officers to be exposed, particularly as the memory of the Adib Affair remains fresh.17
Institutional Reforms and Training
Now that the kingdom has ratified the UNCAC, it should develop a detailed action plan to enforce all of its key provisions. As underscored above, that plan should involve the collaboration of all main stakeholders.
Each year, a report should be issued and widely disseminated that summarizes advances made, areas in which progress has been insufficient, and next steps. That report should entail broad-based consultations among government officials, independent experts and civil-society activists and should represent a consensus among them.
It should focus not only on the application of the UNCAC, but also, more generally, on the extent to which Moroccan legislation is being enforced, and the kingdom's institutional framework is proving adequate to combat corruption.
Donors should also support further simplifications of administrative procedures. Technical assistance in the area of e-governance can play a critical role in reducing red tape and, in the process, bureaucratic corruption. Much more can be done to make government services and related information accessible online, to harness modern communication technologies in order to facilitate the filing of complaints against public officials, and to rely on the internet for procurement-related RFPs and tenders.
Finally, as discussed earlier, Morocco is still in the very early stage of developing the skills, procedures and mechanisms needed to combat money laundering.
Consequently, the need for training is considerable, whether in the private sector (banks and financial institutions), the judiciary, the police or customs authorities. The proper legal and regulatory framework is just being put into place, and it will take years before it can be implemented effectively. A long-term strategy for ensuring results in this area – perhaps with an initial focus on the first three-to-five years – is desperately needed. And since a variety of donors (the EU, France and the IMF) have already expressed a readiness to assist Morocco to develop greater capacity to fight money laundering, some coordination of efforts among donors will be required.
1 The military is charged with policing Morocco's territorial waters. Many of its leaders have used that mandate to develop, for themselves and members of their families, controlling interests in companies involved in the export of fish to Spain.
2 In July 1999, Omnium Nord African (ONA) took over SNI (Société Nationale d'Investissement).
3 See for instance Aboubakr Jamaï and Fedoua Tounassi, "Le Palais à l'assaut du patronat," Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 17-23 June 2006, pp. 16-19.
4 See Ali Amar and Fédoua Tounassi, "La 'alaouisation' de l'économie," Le Journal Hebdomadaire 7-13, October 2006, pp. 20-25.
5 In fact, rumors still circulate in Casablanca business circles that one of the reasons Khalid Oudghiri, the former president of Attijariwafa, was forced to step down in May 2007 was that he had refused to play this game, and that he had endeavored instead to maintain the autonomy of his bank. Specifically, he had extended profitable loans to ONA competitors such as Maroc Telecom (a rival of the ONA affiliate Wana), while assigning strict conditions for credit facilities to ONA-related entities, the performance of which was questionable. Many in the royal entourage are said to have resented such good business practices, which were not compatible with ONA's and their own interests.
6 For instance, it must be shown that the general interest is clearly served by the transaction — a case particularly hard to make in this instance, since the price was well below the market level, and the beneficiary was limited to a single individual.
7 For details, see Guilain P. Denoeux, "The Politics of Morocco's 'Fight Against Corruption'," Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (February 2000), p. 181.
8 Transparency International (TI) rightfully has described the UNCAC as "the most recent and most comprehensive anti-corruption convention to be adopted and the only one with global reach." As such, the UNCAC provides a critical tool for adjusting national corruption-related legislation according to emerging international norms and standards. UNDP country offices as well as the UNDP's Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS, located in Beirut) rely heavily on the UNCAC to engage host governments in a dialogue over the implementation of anticorruption programs. Several other donors and transnational organizations also have seized upon the convention to advance many of the anticorruption reforms which they have long advocated. Governments that have signed and ratified the UNCAC are asked to provide evidence of progress toward the convention's implementation. Indicators of such progress include changes in, or additions to, their legal codes to reflect UNCAC provisions; implementation decrees to reflect updated legislation; and effective law-enforcement actions and procedures consistent with the new legislation.
9 See, for instance, "Blanchissement d'Argent: Les banques ne jouent pas le jeu," Le Journal Hebdomadaire, April 28-May 4, 2007, p. 14.
10 See Guilain P. Denoeux and Helen R. Desfosses, "Rethinking the Moroccan Parliament: The Kingdom's Legislative Development Imperative." The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 79-108.
11 This situation, in fact, may help explain Morocco's poor performance on the CPI. In countries where people are less free and/or prone to discuss corruption, there is greater self-censorship and less awareness of the prevalence of corruption.
12 Interview in Rabat, July 8, 2007.
13 Regularity audits are intended to ensure that financial and accounting transactions by government institutions and public-sector entities, or by any organization that uses public funds, are proper and consistent with professional accounting principles. Performance audits analyze specific projects, programs or institutions with a view to determining the extent to which the organizations involved discharge their mandated functions efficiently and by making the most effective use of the resources at their disposal.
14 Both its board and executive committee are placed under the presidency of a senior civil servant chosen and appointed by the prime minister.
15 The Ministry of Interior can confer upon an association the coveted label of "Association of Public Utility" (association d'utilité publique, or AUP). An association that secures this label is allowed to raise funds, receive donations and gifts, own property, and benefit from various fiscal exemptions. By contrast, members' dues (which for most NGOs are very modest) represent the only source of financing that is legally available to the vast majority of associations that do not enjoy AUP status.
16 This comment is based, in part, on a lengthy interview this writer had with El-Alamy in early August 2006. 17 Adib was the captain who, in 1999, ended up in jail and spent more than two years there, after he denounced corruption by senior military officers and exposed his superiors' double-dealings in gasoline purchases.
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