Dr. Chaziza is a lecturer in the Department of Politics and Governance at Ashkelon Academic College, Israel.
Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East has been primarily driven by a search for energy security and a desire to increase its overseas markets and investment opportunities.1 The core of Chinese policy is to maintain a stable and peaceful international environment that facilitates continued domestic reform and development. Consequently, Chinese Middle East policy seeks to promote economic and energy relations. It advocates dealing with conflicts and threats through cooperation, negotiation and conflict management rather than conflict resolution.2
Generally, Chinese foreign policy has long centered on a respect for sovereignty and on noninterference.3 Chinese President Xi Jinping has recently emphasized China's continued commitment to the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries.4 This is, in part, derived from China's historical experiences of victimization, which made the country extremely sensitive to unsolicited outside involvement in its domestic politics.5
Despite China's sensitivity about intervention and its reluctance to support interventionist actions, even against authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) poses a particularly grave threat to the security and stability of the region. However, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and having to manage the world's largest economy and an increasingly powerful military make such a noninterference policy increasingly untenable.6 Beijing now has its own overseas interests in the Middle East to protect and must act as a responsible power to help maintain regional stability. According to the Economist, China's economic ties with the Middle East increased more than 600% in the past decade, to $230 billion in 2014.7
Chinese foreign policy has long refused to interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign states, a principle pointedly directed at warning other powers to stay out of Beijing's domestic matters. For instance, when the United States decided to invade Iraq in 2003, China, like other countries, strongly condemned the war and showed no inclination to get involved.8 However, this approach could change if ISIS poses a threat to Chinese national security. Of particular concern are the impact of ISIS activities on the security situation in the Middle East and Iraq's stability, and the terror attacks in Xinjiang Province.
The growing threat from militants and separatists, especially Muslim militant groups in Xinjiang, led the Chinese government, in December 2015, to pass its first anti-terrorism law, allowing its army to take part in anti-terror missions abroad. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun outlined the possible limits on the participation of the People's Liberation Army in counterterrorism missions abroad: "Overseas anti-terrorism operations by the military and People's Armed Police must respect the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, adhere to the norms of international relations and fully respect the sovereignty of the country concerned."9 Although until now Beijing has shown neither the inclination nor the ability to conduct anti-terrorism operations overseas, this law laid the groundwork for China's armed forces to take part in counterterrorism operations against ISIS.
There are multiple reasons that China should fight ISIS or at least support the U.S.-led multilateral campaign. ISIS could become a serious threat to China's security if it gains more power and influence in the Middle East. In 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, detailing the expansion goals of ISIS over the next five years,10 declared that he planned to seek vengeance against those who took away the rights of Muslims in countries across the world, among which China was ranked first.11 Al-Baghdadi also criticized Chinese policy against the Uighurs, a Muslim minority in Xinjiang, and asked them to join him in a holy war.12
Furthermore, ISIS has expressed territorial aspirations toward Xinjiang, a real danger to Beijing's national security and a major threat to security and stability in the province. Like other countries, China is concerned that Chinese Muslim Uighurs who enlist with ISIS will receive training in terrorist techniques, acquire terrorist skills, and expand their connections in international terrorist organizations.13 This is a serious threat to China's counterterrorism strategy, given that Beijing has been experiencing frequent terrorist attacks by its radical Muslim population. There have already been reports corroborating these apprehensions. For example, in Iraq, the Ministry of Defense announced that Iraqi forces had captured what appeared to be a Chinese Uighur citizen fighting in the ranks of ISIS;14 and in Indonesia, two ethnic Uighurs were arrested on suspicion of ties to the Islamic State.15
The Chinese mainstream media, including newspapers, TV and a large number of websites, see the Islamic State as an extreme religious-terrorist organization that threatens China's national security. According to media reports, Uighur militants from Xinjiang were training with ISIS to acquire skills in order to carry out terrorist attacks at home.16
Wu Sike, China's special envoy to the Middle East, said that in 2014 at least 100 Chinese citizens from Xinjiang were training with ISIS in the Middle East in order to gain combat experience and guerrilla skills to bring terror back to China: "After being immersed in extremist ideas, when they return to their home country they will pose a severe challenge and security risk to those countries."17 According to Global Times, this number has increased, with some 300 Chinese extremists fighting with ISIS in Iraq and Syria.18 The Chinese diplomat asserted that China was a victim of terror whose roots are in the Middle East: "Terrorists in Iraq and Syria have provided a base where terrorists from Islamic states, Europe, North America and China have gathered, posing a great threat to all the other countries in the world."19
Second, terrorist attacks in China have been on the rise lately and are spreading from Xinjiang to other parts of China. The terrorist activity of the Uighur Islamist group in Xinjiang shows that terrorism and radicalization transcend boundaries and regions, threatening not only countries in the Middle East but also China's homeland security. In reaction, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged Central Asian states to step up the fight against religious extremism and cyber terrorism. "We should make concerted efforts to crack down on the 'three evil forces' of terrorism, extremism and separatism."20 China's permanent representative to the UN, Liu Jieyi, said that extremist groups like ISIS have become "a serious threat to peace and security in the Middle East and the world as a whole."21
Third, ISIS activities in the region threaten China's energy security. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported that China surpassed the United States at the end of 2013 as the largest net oil importer and projects that China will account for more than one-fourth of global oil-consumption growth in 2015. Beijing expects to import over 66 percent of its total oil by 2020 and 72 percent by 2040. Over the past decade, China's oil imports have increased dramatically, and the Middle East remains the largest source of its crude oil. In 2014, the Middle East supplied 3.2 million barrels per day (bbl/d) or 52 percent, although China is attempting to diversify its supply sources in various regions.22
Furthermore, since the Iraq War in 2003, Chinese energy companies have invested some $10 billion in Iraq's nascent oil industry. In recent years, China has been the destination for around half of Iraq's oil exports.23 In 2014, China's oil imports from Iraq rose by roughly 50 percent. This made the Iraqi oil industry China's fifth-largest source of foreign crude, with oil accounting for roughly 9 percent of China's imports.24 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), by 2035, 80 percent of Iraqi production will go to China.25
Although China has consistently tried to keep itself removed from the political and military crises roiling Iraq, Beijing has a legitimate interest in the stability of Iraq. In the short term, the Islamic State is a threat to China's energy security that will increase oil prices and may disrupt the regular supply of oil. In the long term, this may jeopardize China's heavy investment in the Iraqi oil industry and increase its imports from other producers or regions.26 However, aside from expressing diplomatic support for the Iraqi government's military operations against ISIS, China's most decisive action has been evacuating most of its 10,000 citizens from Iraq.27
PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
China recognizes that the ISIS threat is a rare opportunity to strengthen its engagement in Middle East affairs, advance its role in global leadership, improve its strategic relationships with Washington, and flex its military muscles without international criticism. The threat of the Islamic State to regional security and stability has brought the interests of the United States and China into close alignment. As Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated, China was "keeping an open mind" about operations that would "help maintain security and stability" in Iraq.28
Although Beijing appears less than enthusiastic about joining the U.S. coalition against the Islamic State, there are multiple incentives for the Chinese government to join in. First, if Beijing fights against ISIS, its military will gain valuable combat experience on the modern battlefield. Although the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing a process of modernization since the early 1980s, its actual fighting capabilities, as well as logistics, coordination and intelligence, remain unclear; it has not fought a real war in recent decades.29
According to Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim Jafari, China is willing to help Iraq fight the Islamic State by sharing intelligence and providing personnel training. Jafari revealed that, during a UN anti-terrorism meeting in New York, his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, proposed assisting Iraq with airstrikes against ISIS, although China would not join the U.S.-led coalition. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hong Lei, refused to comment on whether China was supplying air support or missiles to Iraq.30
Second, if China fights against ISIS, it will strengthen its engagement in Middle East affairs. This would be a very important step, given that Beijing has national and economic interests in the region.31 Over the recent past, the Chinese government has upgraded the strategic status of the Middle East to an important part of China's Great Peripheral Strategy. This is a higher level of Chinese pro-activism in foreign and defense policy and a broader definition of PRC national interests toward its periphery than has characterized Beijing's approach during most of the reform era.32 Therefore, security and economic-development issues in the Middle East have become an important part of Chinese diplomacy and an unavoidable element in its implementation of international responsibilities.33
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping revealed his One Belt and One Road plan, a proposal that refers to the New Silk Road Economic Belt, which will link China with Europe through Central and Western Asia, and the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road, which will connect China with Southeast Asian countries, Africa and Europe.34 The new Silk Road initiative would give China strategic control over the largest stretch of a global trade highway and could provide rapid connections to Europe.35 The consequence would be to expand China's economic and diplomatic influence westward through Central Asia and the Middle East at the expense of U.S. supremacy.
Moreover, the new Silk Road initiative will help Beijing reduce its reliance on the western transfer road, which currently creates strategic vulnerability for Chinese trade and energy security. This new Silk Road project would allow China to lock in energy supply from the Central Asian energy-exporting countries. It would also allow it to secure and improve supply routes for its oil imports and ameliorate the potential effects of supply cuts from the Middle East, Africa or Russia.36 Accordingly, the Islamic State's threat to the new Silk Road project will not become a reality and undermine China national security and economic development.
Third, if Beijing fights against the Islamic State, it will contribute to strengthening China's global leadership role and regional image as a responsible power. The Obama administration has been critical of late of Beijing's reluctance to get involved in international-security issues, given its expanding global interests. President Obama accuses China of being a "free rider for the past 30 years," not doing enough in terms of its responsibility for international security while importing oil and other resources from places like Iraq.37 Joining the fight against ISIS would give China a good opportunity to clarify its position and enhance its international image as a responsible stakeholder in the system.
Fourth, the U.S. military campaign against ISIS may change the American decision to shift the center of its strategy to the Asia-Pacific region.38 The Islamic State has become a major threat to the U.S. national interest and its allies in the region, a destabilizing factor for the security and stability of the Middle East. Accordingly, the Obama administration might abandon its "pivot to Asia" and shift its attention and resources back to the Middle East. In consequence, China's rising interest would probably be seen as a less pressing threat to U.S. national security and interests. The military campaign against ISIS can be a strategic opportunity for China to strengthen its engagement and intervention in the Asia-Pacific region.
Furthermore, China is likely to use the campaign against ISIS to step up its fight against the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a militant group operating in Xinjiang, and to intensify its repressive and discriminatory policies against the Uighur population. The worldwide campaign against the Islamic State gives the Chinese government the perfect excuse to take a hardline response to the ethnic unrest among Uighurs in Xinjiang.39 For instance, human-rights groups say the new anti-terrorism law could be used to crack down on dissidents as well as religious minorities.40
Finally, if Beijing fights against the Islamic State, it could also improve its relations with the United States, particularly at a time when the two powers are trying to reduce bilateral tension. Both have pledged to forge a new type of great-power relationship, but this effort has largely focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.41 Therefore, participating in military operations against ISIS can be a good place to start. Washington and Beijing have major economic interests in the Middle East that are nearly perfectly aligned, and thus a common interest in combating Islamist terrorism in the Middle East. The limited scope of the military campaign against ISIS, as demonstrated by President Obama's pledge not to pursue another ground war,42 allows the Chinese government to feel comfortable supporting restricted military action.
The key questions for Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East are several: What should China do regarding the ISIS threat? Should Beijing join the U.S coalition and fight against the Islamic State? What will China do when ISIS jeopardizes Chinese national security or economic interests in the region?
Currently, Beijing will probably stick to its traditional noninterventionist foreign policy and is unlikely to actively support the U.S.-led multilateral campaign against the Islamic State. At most, China will provide quiet diplomatic support. The Chinese government is reluctant to become heavily involved in military actions against ISIS in the Middle East, as everywhere else in the world, for a number of reasons.
First, Beijing's reluctance to fight the Islamic State directly or participate in a military campaign against ISIS stems from its distrust of Washington and Western intentions. Traditionally, Chinese policy has strongly opposed the U.S. approach of using anti-terror operations in the Middle East as an excuse to intervene to serve its own interests. China suspects that efforts by Washington or the West to encourage it to enter into a military campaign against the Islamic State are motivated by a desire to contain China's global ambitions, weaken its military and economic power, and undermine the Communist regime.43
Second, Beijing is unlikely to join the U.S.-led military campaign against the Islamic State because both countries have different interpretations of terrorism. The Chinese government is annoyed and disappointed with the Obama administration's criticism of Beijing's hardline response to ethnic unrest among Uighurs in Xinjiang.44
Third, Beijing will not actively support the U.S.-led military campaign against ISIS because it sees a greater advantage in taking a cautious approach and prefers to engage through investment and trade in the region. The Taliban in Afghanistan pose a more serious threat to China's national security than the Islamic State, but the government response has been limited in scale. Beijing prefers to let NATO lead the campaign against the Taliban, while China engages in energy investments in Afghanistan and refuses to allow even non-military supplies to pass through Xinjiang to those NATO forces.45 Finally, China's reluctance to participate in the U.S. military campaign against ISIS is also due to its lack of the necessary military capabilities and experience.
If China, as stated previously, is providing behind-the-scenes aid to Iraq in its airstrikes against ISIS, this would mark a significant change in Chinese noninterventionist foreign policy in the Middle East.46 In the past, China had strongly condemned U.S. military interventions in the region,47 but this policy is being tested anew. Although China is unlikely to actively join the U.S coalition against the Islamic State, it has been supporting Iraq's military action against ISIS. The Chinese approach to the Islamic State is a very significant indicator of a modification of its foreign policy. As President Xi Jinping said, China must establish "big country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" to make the nation a major strategic power.48 Yet, the key question is whether this represents a substantial change in Chinese non-interventionist policy in the Middle East or is limited in scale to the ISIS threat only. This is difficult to predict.
In summary, Chinese policy against the ISIS threat is multifaceted. China believes that in addition to its support for countering ISIS, others must take an active role. The United Nations and the Security Council should play a leading role in the global war on terrorism, including military actions. The international community should adopt a multipronged approach, including the political, security, economic, financial, intelligence and ideological aspects that target the roots of terrorism as well as its symptoms. It must follow a consistent standard in the global war on terrorism and come up with "new thinking and new steps" in its response to terrorism.49
1 Andrew B. Kennedy, "China's New Energy-Security Debate," Survival 52, no. 3 (June-July 2010): 137-158; and Zha Daojiong, "China's Energy Security: Domestic and International Issues," Survival 48, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 179-190.
2 John B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: The United States, China and the Middle East (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007).
3 China has not always practiced the noninterference doctrine that it preaches; this somewhat undermines the political legitimacy of China's present policy of rejecting interventionist policies when they do not serve China's national interest.
4 "In China's New Diplomacy, a Revival of 'Panchsheel,'" The Hindu, June 24, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/in-chinas-new-diplomacy-a-revival-of-panchsheel/article6145656.ece.
5 Chris Zambelis, "A Swan Song in Sudan and Libya for China's 'Non-Interference' Principles," China Brief 11, no. 15 (August 2011): 10-13.
6 Ivan Campbell, Thomas Wheeler, Larry Attree, Dell Marie Butler and Bernardo Mariani, China and Conflict-Affected States: Between Principle and Pragmatism (Saferworld, 2012); Mike Bird, "China Just Overtook the U.S. as the World's Largest Economy," Business Insider, October 8, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-overtakes-us-as-worlds-largest-economy-2014-10; and Ken Sofer, "China's Evolving Foreign Policy," Center for American Progress, March 8, 2012, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2012/03/08/11224/china-and-the-collapse-of-its-noninterventionist-foreign-policy/.
7 "The Great Well of China," Economist, June 20, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21654655-oil-bringing-china-and-arab-world-closer-economically-politics-will.
8 Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, "China's Position on the U.S. War in Iraq," March 26, 2003, http://www.chinaun.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/mideast/ylk/t537117.htm.
9 "China Says Overseas Anti-Terror Missions must Respect Host Nation," Reuters, December 31, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN0UE0NE20151231.
10 Colleen Curry, "See the Terrifying ISIS Map Showing Its 5-Year Expansion Plan," ABC News, July 3, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/International/terrifying-isis-map-showing-year-expansion-plan/story?id=24366850.
11 Alexa Olesen, "China Sees Islamic State Inching Closer to Home," Foreign Policy, August 11, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/11/the_islamic_state_chinese_media_hong_kong_phoenix_xinjiang.
12 "ISIS Plans to Take Holy War to Xinjiang," Want China Times, August 10, 2014, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140810000163&cid=1101.
13 Jack Moore, "Xinjiang's Uighur Muslims Receiving 'Terrorist Training' from Isis Fighters for Attacks in China," International Business Times, September 22, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/xinjiangs-uighur-muslims-receiving-terrorist-training-isis-fighters-attacks-china-1466594.
14 Jaime A. FlorCruz, "Capture of Chinese National Fighting with ISIS Gives China Jitters," CNN, September 5, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/china-isis/.
15 "Islamic State Suspects Are Chinese Uygurs," South China Morning Post, September 15, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1593082/indonesia-says-4-chinese-uygurs-caught-suspected-islamic-state-ties.
16 "ISIS Training Xinjiang Militants: Chinese Media," Hindustan Times, September 23, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/isis-training-xinjiang-militants-chinese-media/article1-1267296.aspx.
17 Teddy Ng, "Xinjiang Militants Being Trained in Syria and Iraq, Says Special Chinese Envoy," South China Morning Post, July 28, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1561136/china-says-xinjiang-extremists-may-be-fighting-middle-east.
18 Michael Martina, "About 300 Chinese Said Fighting alongside Islamic State in Middle East," Reuters, December 15, 2014, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0JT0UR20141215.
19 Bai Tiantian, "China at Risk from Syria Spillover," Global Times, July 29, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/873090.shtml.
20 Michael Martina, "China Urges Central Asian Neighbours to Step Up Extremism Fight," Reuters, September13, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/13/china-xinjiang-idINKBN0H802J20140913.
21 "China Calls for Enhanced Efforts to Combat ISIL through UNSC Resolution," Global Times, August 16, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/876532.shtml.
22 "China Oil Imports," EIA, May 14, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN.
23 Chris Zambelis, "China's Iraq Oil Strategy Comes into Sharper Focus," China Brief 13, no. 10 (May 2013): 10-13.
24 "China Oil Imports," EIA, May 14, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN.
25 Dexter Roberts, "Iraq Crisis Threatens Chinese Oil Investments," Business Week, June 17, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-17/iraq-crisis-could-threaten-chinese-oil-investments.
26 Du Juan, "Iraq Crisis May Change China's Oil Suppliers," China Daily, June 17, 2014, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-06/17/content_17595493.htm.
27 Robert Foyle Hunwick, "A Nervous China Is 'Interested' in a Possible Role in the Fight against ISIS," Business Insider, September 22, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/robert-foyle-hunwick-china-is-interested-in-against-isis-2014-9.
28 Alexa Olesen, "Notable & Quotable: The ISIS Threat to China," Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/notable-quotable-the-isis-threat-to-china-1409070141.
29 Marika, Vicziany, David P. Wright-Neville and Peter Lentini, eds., Regional Security in the Asia Pacific: 9/11 and After (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004); and "China's Military Rise: The Dragon's New Teeth," Economist, April 7, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552193.
30 "China Offers Military Help to Iraq to Defeat ISIS-Report," RT, December 14, 2014, http://rt.com/news/214243-china-iraq-military-isis/.
31 Zachary Keck, "Time for a U.S.-China Partnership in the Middle East?" The National Interest, September 21, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-us-china-partnership-the-middle-east-11318.
32 China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development Secretariat, "Important Speech of Xi Jinping at Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference," October 30, 2013, www.cciced.net/encciced/newscenter/latestnews/201310/t20131030_262608.html; and Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy," China Leadership Monitor, no. 44, July 28, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/clm44ms.pdf.
33 Liu Zhongmin, "On Political Unrest in the Middle East and China's Diplomacy," Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 6, no. 1 (2012): 1-18.
34 "Xi Suggests China, C. Asia Build Silk Road Economic Belt," Xinhua, September 7, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-09/07/c_132700695.htm.
35 Anna Beth Keim and Sulmaan Khan, "Can China and Turkey Forge a New Silk Road?" YaleGlobal, January 18, 2013, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/can-china-and-turkey-forge-new-silk-road.
36 Camille Brugier, "China's Way: The New Silk Road," European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2014, http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/chinas-way-the-new-silk-road/; and Brenda Goh, "China Pays Big to Expand Its Clout along the New Silk Road," Reuters, November 10, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/us-china-silkroad-idUSKCN0IU27R20141110.
37 Bree Feng, "Obama's 'Free Rider' Comment Draws Chinese Criticism," Sinosphere, August 13, 2014, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/obamas-free-rider-comment-draws-chinese-criticism/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2.
38 Robert G. Sutter et al., Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability (Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University, August 2013), 11-12, http://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf.
39 Joseph Grieboski, "Repression, and Discrimination: China's Uyghurs under Threat," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, September 24, 2014, http://journal.georgetown.edu/tension-repression-and-discrimination-chinas-uyghurs-under-threat/.
40 "China Passes Controversial New Anti-Terror Laws," BBC News, December 28, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35188137.
41 Peter Mattis, "Nothing New about China's New Concept," National Interest, June 7, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/nothing-new-about-chinas-new-concept-8559.
42 Rebecca Kaplan, "Obama Says It Again: No Ground Troops in Iraq," CBS News, September 17, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-says-it-again-no-ground-troops-in-iraq/.
43 Zihao Liu, "Why China Will Not Fight ISIS," Diplomacist, September 21, 2014, http://diplomacist.org/articles/2014/9/18/why-china-will-not-fight-isis.
44 United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2013," April 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225050.pdf.
45 Andrew Small, "China's Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan," Washington Quarterly 33, no. 3 (July 2010): 81-97.
46 Mordechai Chaziza and Ogen S. Goldman, "Revisiting China's Non-Interference Policy towards Intrastate Wars," Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 1 (January 2014): 1-27.
47 "Do Not Abandon Hope for Peaceful Resolution to Libyan Crisis," People's Daily Online, March 21, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-03/22/content_12207029_2.htm; and "Do Not Give up Efforts for Peaceful Solution of Syrian Crisis," People's Daily Online, August 25, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/102774/7923371.html.
48 Ting Shi and David Tweed, "Xi Outlines 'Big Country Diplomacy' Chinese Foreign Policy," Bloomberg, December 1, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-01/xi-says-china-will-keep-pushing-to-alter-asia-security-landscape.html.
49 "Spotlight: China Backs UN's Leading Role As Security Council OKs Anti-Terror Resolution," Xinhua, September 25, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/25/c_133671747.htm.