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| In The Tanks |
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| In the Tanks: a list of noteworthy reports/papers on U.S. policy in the Middle East from think-tanks, NGOs and universities. |
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Press Release: Gaza Coastal Municipalities Water Utility
Press Release
Coastal Municipalities Water Utility, Gaza, Palestine
January 10, 2009
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Excerpt:
Due to the current situation in the Gaza Strip that was imposed by the Israeli military operations since Saturday 27/12/2008, the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility "CMWU" hereby announces its inability to (failure) maintain its services in both the water sector in terms of production and distribution and wastewater sector in terms of collection and discharging in Gaza Strip governorates. Despite our several appeals to all international aid agencies and organizations to help out and support our technical teams in keeping all water and wastewater facilities operational and repairing the infrastructure damages and destructions caused by the Israeli bombarding, but all these requests were declined until this moment.
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HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics
by Dr. Sherifa D. Zuhur
Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College
December 23, 2008
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Synopsis:
Efforts to separate HAMAS from its popular support and network of social and charitable organizations have not been effective in destroying the organization, nor in eradicating the will to resist among a fairly large segment of the Palestinian population. It is important to consider this Islamist movement in the context of a region-wide phenomenon of similar movements with local goals, which can be persuaded to relinquish violence or which could become more violent. Certainly an orientation to HAMAS and its base must be factored into new and more practical and effective approaches to peacemaking in the region. At the same time, HAMAS offers a fascinating glimpse of the dynamics of strategic reactions and the modification of Israeli impulses towards aggressive deterrence, as well as the evolution in the Islamist movements’ planning and operations. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict bears similarities to a long-standing civil conflict, even as it has sparked inter-Palestinian hostilities in its most recent phase.
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People in Muslim Nations Conflicted About UN
Survey/Poll
WorldPublicOpinion.org
December 2, 2008
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Description:
A poll of seven majority Muslim nations finds people conflicted about the United Nations. On one hand there is widespread support for a more active UN with much broader powers than it has today. On the other hand, there is a perception that the UN is dominated by the US and there is dissatisfaction with UN performance on several fronts, particularly in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams While Drawdown Looms: A USIP Trip Report
By Rusty Barber and Sam Parker
United States Institute of Peace
December 2008
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Synopsis:
Two USIP specialists recently traveled to Iraq to examine the effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Their primary findings were that PRTs play a critical role in facilitating the expenditure of Iraqi funds on Iraqi reconstruction and development. Moreover, the PRTs perform a range of secondary tasks that contribute greatly to the broader US civilian-military effort in Iraq. However, PRTs face a number of administrative and security-related challenges (despite improvement in certain areas) and are also engaged in a number of long-term development activities to which they are poorly suited. This USIPeaceBriefing describes the effort.
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Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting (PDF)
By By Maria Figueroa Küpçü, Michael A. Cohen
New America Foundation
November 5, 2008
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Description:
This paper calls for civilian and military leaders to fully integrate private contractors into the military force structure.
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Impact of the US Financial Crisis on GCC Countries (PDF)
By Eckart Woertz
Gulf Research Center
October 2008
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Abstract:
After giving a short overview of the current crisis, this report gauges its possible impacts on the GCC economies, namely the exposure of banks and sovereign wealth funds to asset write downs, higher financing costs and widening bond spreads for corporations and banks. It also takes a look at the likely impact on demand for GCC export goods such as oil, petrochemicals and aluminum.
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Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options (PDF)
Edited by James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, Kurt M. Campbell
Center for a New American Security
September 2008
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Summary:
Dealing with Iran and its nuclear program will be an urgent priority for the next president. In order to evaluate U.S. policy options, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) convened a bipartisan group of experts on foreign policy and national security, retired military personnel, former diplomats and other government officials, and specialists on Iran and the region. Each of these papers represents an important contribution to a much-needed national discussion on U.S. policy toward Iran.
Based on these papers and expert group discussion, as well as additional research and analysis, three CNAS authors proposed that the next administration pursue “game-changing diplomacy” with Iran. While both Iran and the international community would be better off if Iran plays ball, game-changing diplomacy is designed to improve prospects for the United States and the international community irrespective of how Iran responds.
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From Irgun to AIPAC: Israel Lobby's US Treasury Dept. Follies Hurt America
Grant F. Smith
Institute for Research: Middle East Policy
Think Tank Watch Analysis - 9/11/2008
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Summary:
AIPAC and its associated think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), were instrumental in lobbying the president for the creation of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence unit early in 2004. The Israel lobby also vetted Stuart Levey who President Bush approved to lead the new unit. TFI claims to be "safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats." However its actions--and more important, inactions--reveal it to be a sharp-edged tool forged principally to serve the Israel lobby.
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How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida (PDF)
(9 page summary available here.)
Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki
The Rand Corporation
RAND National Defense Research Institute, July 2008
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Summary:
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.
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The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S. (PDF)
Marina Ottaway & Mohammed Herzallah
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Middle East Program, Number 94, July 2008
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Summary:
Many Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are showing increasing reluctance to follow Washington’s lead in addressing regional problems. This tendency toward an independent foreign policy is particularly evident among the Gulf countries. Even states that host major U.S. military facilities on their soil, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, consider U.S. policy in the region counterproductive and are forging a new diplomacy.
Gulf countries have refused to enter into an anti-Iranian alliance with the United States, and have chosen instead to pursue close diplomatic contacts with Tehran, although they fear its growing influence. They are trying to bring about reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, while the United States is seeking to isolate Hamas. They have helped negotiate a compromise solution in Lebanon, while the United States has encouraged the government to take a hard-line position. Yet, the new diplomacy of the Arab countries is not directed against the United States, although it contradicts U.S. policies.
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Why Selective Engagement? Iranian and Western Interests Are Closer Than You Think (PDF)
Riccardo Redaelli
The Stanley Foundation
Policy Analysis Brief, June 2008
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Summary:
Post-9/11 events in the Middle East have strengthened Iran’s geopolitical and strategic role. The containment of Iran is an unrealistic solution, given that coercive isolation has only fostered a more radical and security-dominant domestic Iranian brand of politics.
Iran is not Ahmadinejad, and Iranian goals and aspirations cannot be confined to the nuclear file—as important as it might be. This brief argues for selective engagement, putting the nuclear file within a larger, regional geopolitical context. The United States and Iran have more pragmatic interests and converging strategic needs than are generally perceived: avoiding Iraqi and Afghan fragmentation; coordinating antidrug smuggling; and working on new, more sustainable security arrangements in the Gulf area to name a few.
It is in a time of rhetorical and ideological posturing that diplomacy and negotiations are most useful. By getting out of the “capitulate or escalate” framework, the United States could entertain a realistic agenda, including a detailed, reciprocal, step-by-step timing.
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