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| In The Tanks |
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| In the Tanks: a list of noteworthy reports/papers on U.S. policy in the Middle East from think-tanks, NGOs and universities. |
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Impact of the US Financial Crisis on GCC Countries (PDF)
By Eckart Woertz
Gulf Research Center
October 2008
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Abstract:
After giving a short overview of the current crisis, this report gauges its possible impacts on the GCC economies, namely the exposure of banks and sovereign wealth funds to asset write downs, higher financing costs and widening bond spreads for corporations and banks. It also takes a look at the likely impact on demand for GCC export goods such as oil, petrochemicals and aluminum.
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Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options (PDF)
Edited by James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, Kurt M. Campbell
Center for a New American Security
September 2008
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Summary:
Dealing with Iran and its nuclear program will be an urgent priority for the next president. In order to evaluate U.S. policy options, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) convened a bipartisan group of experts on foreign policy and national security, retired military personnel, former diplomats and other government officials, and specialists on Iran and the region. Each of these papers represents an important contribution to a much-needed national discussion on U.S. policy toward Iran.
Based on these papers and expert group discussion, as well as additional research and analysis, three CNAS authors proposed that the next administration pursue “game-changing diplomacy” with Iran. While both Iran and the international community would be better off if Iran plays ball, game-changing diplomacy is designed to improve prospects for the United States and the international community irrespective of how Iran responds.
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From Irgun to AIPAC: Israel Lobby's US Treasury Dept. Follies Hurt America
Grant F. Smith
Institute for Research: Middle East Policy
Think Tank Watch Analysis - 9/11/2008
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Summary:
AIPAC and its associated think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), were instrumental in lobbying the president for the creation of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence unit early in 2004. The Israel lobby also vetted Stuart Levey who President Bush approved to lead the new unit. TFI claims to be "safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats." However its actions--and more important, inactions--reveal it to be a sharp-edged tool forged principally to serve the Israel lobby.
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How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida (PDF)
(9 page summary available here.)
Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki
The Rand Corporation
RAND National Defense Research Institute, July 2008
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Summary:
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.
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The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S. (PDF)
Marina Ottaway & Mohammed Herzallah
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Middle East Program, Number 94, July 2008
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Summary:
Many Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are showing increasing reluctance to follow Washington’s lead in addressing regional problems. This tendency toward an independent foreign policy is particularly evident among the Gulf countries. Even states that host major U.S. military facilities on their soil, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, consider U.S. policy in the region counterproductive and are forging a new diplomacy.
Gulf countries have refused to enter into an anti-Iranian alliance with the United States, and have chosen instead to pursue close diplomatic contacts with Tehran, although they fear its growing influence. They are trying to bring about reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, while the United States is seeking to isolate Hamas. They have helped negotiate a compromise solution in Lebanon, while the United States has encouraged the government to take a hard-line position. Yet, the new diplomacy of the Arab countries is not directed against the United States, although it contradicts U.S. policies.
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Why Selective Engagement? Iranian and Western Interests Are Closer Than You Think (PDF)
Riccardo Redaelli
The Stanley Foundation
Policy Analysis Brief, June 2008
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Summary:
Post-9/11 events in the Middle East have strengthened Iran’s geopolitical and strategic role. The containment of Iran is an unrealistic solution, given that coercive isolation has only fostered a more radical and security-dominant domestic Iranian brand of politics.
Iran is not Ahmadinejad, and Iranian goals and aspirations cannot be confined to the nuclear file—as important as it might be. This brief argues for selective engagement, putting the nuclear file within a larger, regional geopolitical context. The United States and Iran have more pragmatic interests and converging strategic needs than are generally perceived: avoiding Iraqi and Afghan fragmentation; coordinating antidrug smuggling; and working on new, more sustainable security arrangements in the Gulf area to name a few.
It is in a time of rhetorical and ideological posturing that diplomacy and negotiations are most useful. By getting out of the “capitulate or escalate” framework, the United States could entertain a realistic agenda, including a detailed, reciprocal, step-by-step timing.
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