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The Woes and Worries of Hizbullah
Levant Update 3
July 2008
By: Antony T. Sullivan
President, Near East Support Services
As these occasional postings have noted, Hizbullah's apparent "victory" in its mini-coup on the streets of Beirut in mid May has been more apparent than real. Today, Hizbullah is a deeply worried organization. Perceived dangers loom almost everywhere.
A multitude of reports from Lebanon and elsewhere, including especially from within Hizbullah itself, indicate that Hizbullah now believes that its very survival as a military organization is at stake.
One Hizbullah source recently stated, "Any gains made by the Lebanese government mean equal losses for Hizbullah." This source added that "Hizbullah will not permit the Lebanese government to get stronger at its expense." And Hizbullah sees a significant number of such gains and potential gains. Ironically, the Doha Agreement is now perceived by Hizbullah as having "placed it on the spot in Lebanon," and increased the pressure on it to come to terms with the government and the March 14th movement.
One perceived threat is the American push to strengthen the Lebanese internal security system, which is strongly anti-Hizbullah, by the delivery of new police cars and a general upgrading of the government's security capability. In addition, Hizbullah is concerned about a new American push to have Shibaa Farms ultimately designated as Lebanese territory, thereby depriving Hizbullah of any convincing reason to retain its arms. Furthermore, Hizbullah does not believe that Prime Minister Siniora is interested in forming a new cabinet. Farther afield, the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire in the Gaza Strip has been more bad news for Hizbullah. Looming over all of this is the apparent agreement, or understanding, between Ehud Olmert and Bashar al-Asad, which, if it does produce a framework for a Syrian-Israeli peace settlement, will be the worst possible news for Hizbullah. In any such case, Hizbullah can surely expect Syria to tighten the vise around it, quietly supported by at least the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia.
Iran is as concerned about these developments as is Hizbullah. Ahmadreza Aqamiri, the new Iranian military attaché recently sent to Damascus, receives his orders directly from Ayatollah Mojtaba Hosseini and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Teheran. One of Aqamiri's primary responsibilities is to ensure that the al-Asad regime does not turn against Hizbullah or block aid to Hizbullah. Teheran is also reported to want Aqamiri to extract Syrian assurances that Syria will not prevent Hizbullah from opening a front against Israel in the event of an attack on Iran. Clearly, Teheran is concerned that such eventualities are all too possible, given the current state of international play.
In view of the above, Hizbullah now seems determined to take matters into its own hands. Another source within Hizbullah states that henceforth Hizbullah:
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-Will operate on the assumption that Syria has exited the Iranian alliance. Given that assumption, Hizbullah has already begun to disengage from Syria.
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-Will take matters into its own hands and eliminate as many of its domestic enemies as possible.
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-Seeks to become the sole militia in Lebanon.
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-Regards "all of Lebanon as a legitimate theater of operations." This is necessary to "secure its physical security."
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-Will establish a "strategic presence in all parts of Lebanon, not only in heavily Shiite areas."
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-Will continue to encourage dissent within the Sunni community to undermine the power base of Sa'd al-Hariri and the moderate Islam that he represents.
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-Seeks to impress on Fouad Siniora that unless Hizbullah's demands are met in full, it will resume military operations.
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-Will create "one problem after another in order to keep the government and army too busy to turn their attention to implementation of U.S. Security Council Resolution 1701."
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A source within the Lebanese government agrees that this is precisely what Hizbullah will attempt to do. This individual states that Hizbullah is "determined to sabotage the Doha Agreement and has decided to keep Lebanon in turmoil." This source believes that fighting in the central Beqaa serves Hizbullah's objectives well, since military activity there is much less likely to attract international attention than fighting in Beirut or even in the north. This individual adds that Hizbullah appears determined to take over pro-Hariri positions in the central Beqaa, especially in Sa'dnayil, which controls the Beirut-Damascus road and can easily be used to cut off Hizbullah lines of communication with the northern Beqaa as well as Beirut.
As discussed in prior updates, Lebanon is now full of Jihadists, many sharing the ideology of al-Qaeda. One should expect these Jihadists to move increasingly against Hizbullah, with Syrian toleration or even endorsement. This Sunni move against Hizbullah may already have begun, as suggested by the events in Tripoli in June, when Sunni militants of Jihadist background joined the fighting against Alawites and their Hizbullah allies. Although Syria is reported to be unhappy about the situation in Tripoli, it is said not to object to a "quick" Sunni victory.
Numerous political and military sources in Lebanon report that the next round of fighting between pro- and anti-Hizbullah forces will most likely occur in and around Tariq al-Jadidi in Beirut, which is Sa'd al-Hariri's main power base. A loss of Tariq al-Jadidi, most observers agree, would "decisively undermine al-Hariri within Lebanon's Sunni community."
Perhaps even more importantly, combat in Tariq al-Jadidi is likely to once again paralyse Lebanon and cut it off from the outside world. Certainly, fighting in Tariq al-Jadidi would result in a new closure of Beirut International Airport. Tariq al-Jadidi covers a highly strategic area in Beirut, stretching from Corniche al-Mazraa in the north to the Shiite southern suburbs, while straddling the old airport road to the east and abutting UNESCO in the west.
Lebanon is unlikely to remain quiet during the rest of the summer. Now the evidence is that the Doha Agreement really settled nothing. Even if there is not a new Israeli invasion of Lebanon late this summer or autumn, the flux on the international chessboard almost guarantees that Lebanon will suffer continual turbulence. For its part, Hizbullah seems likely to exert its own best efforts to make sure that that such turbulence continues.
-End-
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