On October 26, 1994, the prime ministers of Jordan and Israel signed a treaty of peace ending a state of war that had lasted for nearly half a century. Article 6 and Annex II of the treaty addressed one of the most contentious aspects of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship: water.
Water-related matters figured prominently in a bilateral relationship whose evolution began in 1948. In the 1950s Jordan (within the Arab League) and Israel worked closely (albeit separately) with American mediator Eric Johnston, nearly enabling him to establish a water regime for the entire Jordan Valley. Indeed, for over a decade Israel and Jordan respected several key aspects of the allocation plan they had helped Johnston develop.
The 1960s saw, however, a significant breakdown. Seeking to counter Israel's diversion of Jordan River waters from Lake Tiberias, a 1964 Arab summit authorized three states-Syria, Jordan and Lebanon-to undertake a project that would have channeled two of the Jordan River's sources (the Hasbani River in Lebanon and Banias River in Syria) around Lake Tiberias through Syria to the Yarmouk River, the Jordan's largest tributary, where they would have been regulated by a Jordanian dam at Mukhaybah. The diverted water then would have entered the Jordan Valley within Jordanian territory south of Lake Tiberias, thus depriving Israel's National Water Carrier system of key sources. The Arab diversion scheme and Israel's violent reaction to it were key scene setters for the June 1967 War. Israel's quick, decisive victory gave it control of the Banias River and new frontage on the lower course of the Jordan by occupying the West Bank, and an extended frontage on the Yarmouk River by occupying "Palestine" up to the 1922 international boundary and the Golan Heights up to Wadi Ruqqad, a major channel of winter floods into the Yarmouk.
The breakdown was never fully overcome until peace was achieved in 1994. Indeed, the rise of Palestinian military power in Jordan late in the 1960s led to Israeli air attacks on Jordan's East Ghor Main Canal (today's King Abdallah Canal). When the focus of Palestinian military activism shifted to Lebanon after 1970, however, Jordan and Israel gradually managed to achieve a more civilized, if still tense, modus vivendi with respect to water.
From the 1970s onward the principal focus of Israeli-Jordanian water interactions has been the Yarmouk River, a highly variable stream arising mainly in Syria. As noted below in the discussion of treaty provisions pertaining to the Yarmouk, Jordan and Israel have respectively been able to use (on average) 130 MCM (million cubic meters) and 70 MCM annually from this waterway, with the balance of the average annual streamflow either depleted by Syria (something in excess of200 MCM) or lost to the Dead Sea in the form of raging winter floods (about 70 MCM).
A Jordanian dam on the Yarmouk at Maqarin Station, spanning the Syrian-Jordanian border, had been planned since the early 1950s. The dam's reservoir would have been tapped directly to provide potable water to the cities of Amman and Zarqa. A weir downstream near the Jordanian town of Adasiyah, designed to divert additional irrigation and drinking water into the King Abdallah Canal, was supposed to operate in conjunction with the dam. But Israel's violent reaction to the Arab diversion scheme of the 1960s, including the bombing of the Jordanian dam under construction at Mukhaybah, had left Jordan understandably reluctant to proceed unilaterally with engineering modifications to the flow of the Yarmouk.
Indeed, after June 1967, the place at which the planned diversion weir would cross the Yarmouk was, on one bank of the river, occupied by Israel. Over time (starting in the 1980s) Israeli and Jordanian technicians, meeting during the summer irrigation months under U.N. auspices, would adjust flows more or less cooperatively, dredging the river bed and using sand bags to slow down and divide the waters. Even so, Israel was adamantly opposed, absent legally binding water allocations, to the damming of the Yarmouk at Maqarin Station and to the construction of a diversion weir at Adasiyah.
In 1980 the United States, represented by veteran diplomat Philip Habib, sought without success to broker an agreement between the parties that would allow Jordan to build the dam and the diversion weir. In 1989 and 1990, formal American mediation was renewed under the leadership of former Defense Department official Richard Armitage after Jordan, which received Syria's permission to build a dam at Maqarin Station, applied to the World Bank for financial assistance in its construction. The "Armitage round" was short-circuited by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Notwithstanding the long and honorable history of American mediation of the Jordan Valley water issues, in the end Israel and Jordan would settle on their own without outside intervention. Yet outside intervention, in the form of external financial assistance, will be the key to whether or not a peace treaty with Israel actually improves Jordan's water situation.
The Israel-Jordan peace treaty seeks to finesse longstanding water disputes rooted in scarcity by citing the potential availability and usability of Jordan River water subject to funding for storage, conveyance and desalination infrastructure; money that must come, for the most part, from external donors or investors. In this regard paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Water) is key: "The Parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods including projects of regional and international co-operation."1
Instead of allowing longstanding differences over water allocations to obstruct the successful conclusion of a peace treaty, Jordan and Israel agreed to cooperate in the planning and implementation of water projects. As the Jordanian side has made clear in a written submission to the European Union, "Without these projects, Jordan would have insisted to obtain [sic] more water from Israel to reach an agreement."2
TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE YARMOUK RIVER
What follows is a listing of the provisions of Annex II (Water Related Matters) affecting the Yarmouk River and a brief analysis of each provision. The Yarmouk is the main tributary of the Jordan River. Its headwaters arise almost entirely within Syria, which utilizes more Yarmouk water than do Israel and Jordan combined. In 1987 Jordan and Syria signed a treaty conveying Syria's permission for Jordan to dam the Yarmouk at Maqarin Station in return for Jordan's endorsement of Syrian water projects in the Yarmouk watershed. Jordan subsequently sought American help in securing Israel's acquiescence (a requirement in order to gain financing from the World Bank) in the "Unity Dam" project. Syria went full speed-ahead with its exploitation of the Yarmouk's headwaters, but Israel's consent to Jordan's dam project was forthcoming neither in the Armitage mediation nor in the treaty of peace. Treaty provisions specifically affecting the Yarmouk are as follows:
1. "Summer period-15 May to 15 October of each year. Israel pumps (12) MCM and Jordan gets the rest of the flow" [Article I: 1.a].
This provision represents a potential net gain of about 8 MCM per year for Jordan, according to Munther Haddadin, Jordan's chief water negotiator. 3 Israel's customary usage of Yarmouk water during the "summer period" had (according to Haddadin) amounted to an average of 20 MCM (12 + 8).
The Jordanian negotiator's claim of a net gain for Jordan is defensible in terms of the arithmetic. Still, the amount of "summer" water actually left for Jordan after Israel's priority usage is open to question. There are no provisions in the treaty for "adversity sharing" occasioned either by drought or upstream Syrian use, although Jordanian and Israeli technicians have a history of cooperation in this regard. The salient point of this provision is that Israel has received a specific entitlement and enjoys priority over Jordan's usage during the critical irrigation months. This outcome is fully consistent with a provision proposed by the Arab Technical Committee in the 1950s during the Eric Johnston talks, when Jordan's notional annual authorized allocation of Yarmouk River water was 377 MCM, nearly three times what Jordan currently captures from the river.4
2. "Winter period-16 October to 14 May of each year. Israel pumps (13) MCM, and Jordan is entitled to the rest of the flow subject to provisions outlined herein below: Jordan concedes to Israel pumping an additional (20) MCM from the Yarmouk in winter in return for Israel conceding to transferring to Jordan during the summer period. . . . (20) MCM from the Jordan River directly upstream from Deganya gates on the river. Jordan shall pay the operation and maintenance cost of such transfer through existing systems (not including capital cost) and shall bear the total cost of any new transmission system. A separate protocol shall regulate this transfer" [Articles I: 1.b and 2.a.].
Combined with Israel's "summer" quota of 12 MCM from the Yarmouk, the "winter" authorization of 13 MCM yields an annual figure of 25 MCM, the same amount cited in Eric Johnston's 1955 summary of the Jordan Valley Plan. 5 For nearly 40 years a cardinal point of Jordanian water diplomacy has been that Israel is, subject to the construction of a Jordanian dam at Maqarin Station, entitled to 25 MCM annually from the Yarmouk; not a drop more.
Paragraphs 1.b and 2.a of Article I seem, in a manner completely uncomplicated by the "Unity Dam" issue, to address Israel's "customary use" of Yarmouk River water as it has evolved over the past four decades. Jordanian negotiator Haddadin claimed that Israel's allocation of 13 MCM during the "winter" months yields a net gain for Jordan of 37 MCM, 6 thereby suggesting that Israel has been capturing an average of 50 MCM in winter (13 plus 37), for a total annual average capture of 70 MCM (20 summer plus 50 winter) from the Yarmouk. In view of the fact that Jordan cannot capture (particularly without a diversion weir) much of the winter flood water surging past its diversion point at Adasiyah, Jordan's "concession" to Israel of an additional 20 MCM may not, as a practical matter, amount to giving anything away. Indeed, if the extra 20 MCM moves quickly enough, Israel may not be able to capture it.
Yet Israel has agreed "to transfer to Jordan" 20 MCM of Jordan River water during the critical irrigation season, provided Jordan bears all costs related to the transfer. Assuming that Jordan is physically unable to capture and store the 20 MCM of Yarmouk water it has "conceded" to Israel, this provision could enable Jordan to acquire water it has "missed," and to acquire it during a time of the year when it can be used beneficially.
As for the clause referring to the "Deganya gates," at present Jordan does not use water from the lower course of the Jordan River, which has been polluted by the infusion of saline water diverted into it by Israel, by chemicals leeching from the intensively cultivated Yarmouk Triangle of Israel, and by contaminated runoff from both the east and west banks of the river. However, the site specified with respect to the transfer ("directly upstream from Deganya gates") is a short stretch of the Jordan River artificially separated by the gates from the river's polluted lower course and containing clean water from Lake Tiberias. In an interview with the author, Jordan's chief water negotiator maintained that the 20 MCM to be provided by Israel will enter Jordan's distribution system by means of 3.2 kilometers of pipe that will link the King Abdallah Canal to Israeli water pipes drawing water from Lake Tiberias. Dr. Haddadin stated that (as of mid-January 1995) a survey team was examining the terrain and determining whether or not a pumping station might also be needed. He expected that the pipe might be installed by July 1995. Jordan's preferred destination for this water is ultimately Amman and Zarqa, where it would be used for municipal and industrial purposes.7
3. "In order that waste of water will be minimized, Israel and Jordan may use, downstream of point 121/Adassiya Diversion, excess flood water that is not usable and will evidently go to waste unused" [Article I: 1.c.].
This provision, combined with the preceding two, could enable Israel to approach its customary annual average capture of 70 MCM from the Yarmouk River. At present Jordan (unlike Israel) has no diversion facilities downstream of Adasiyah, so for the time being this provision authorizes Israel to capture everything Jordan misses.
Yet, as will be discussed below in a review of the treaty's provisions concerning the Jordan River, Israel and Jordan contemplate the construction of storage facilities on the Jordan south of Lake Tiberias but north of the West Bank. The parties hope, by means of these facilities, to capture and store flood waters that would otherwise flow unused to the Dead Sea.
4. "Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a storage/diversion dam on the Yarmouk River directly downstream of the point 121/Adassiya Diversion. The purpose is to improve the diversion efficiency into the King Abdullah Canal of the water allocation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and possibly for the diversion of Israel’s allocation of the river water. Other purposes can be mutually agreed" [Article II: 1].
This provision refers to the long-envisioned Adasiyah diversion weir. Without it Jordan's ability to get more Yarmouk River water will be limited. In the late 1980s Harza Engineering Company estimated that the weir, operating in conjunction with a dam upstream, would have increased Jordan's diversion of Yarmouk water into the King Abdallah Canal from an average of 133 MCM to 158 MCM annually, assuming (a) the upstream diversion by Jordan of 50 MCM per year from the reservoir at Maqarin Station to Amman and Zarqa for drinking and industrial purposes, (b) upstream Syrian depletion of 170 MCM, (c) downstream Israeli use of 25 MCM and (d) an annual average loss of 44 MCM to the Dead Sea. 8 During the Armitage round, however, the American mediators concluded that Syrian depletion had exceeded 200 MCM annually and was growing. Furthermore, Israel (as noted above) was capturing an average of 70 MCM annually, not 25 MCM.
Yet even assuming that much of the 50 MCM that would have been supplied to Jordan's cities by the Unity Dam is now being used by Syria, the diversion weir will enable Jordan to divert into the King Abdallah Canal some water it cannot currently capture. Inasmuch as most of the Yarmouk's headwaters arise in Syria, however, the issue of Syrian depletion will be a continuing concern to both downstream riparians, but especially to Jordan.
According to Jordan's chief negotiator, Jordan's current plan is to finance the weir internally at a cost of about 7 million Jordanian dinars (roughly $10 million). Prior to construction it will be necessary for Jordan and Israel to agree on the design and performance specifications of the structure. The current inclination of Jordanian planners is to locate the weir some 400 meters downstream of its original prospective site and create, unlike the facility envisioned as operating in conjunction with the Unity Dam, a reservoir holding upwards of three MCM. Dr. Haddadin has stated that Jordan is open to the possibility of external financial assistance for the weir and associated storage, and that Israel's participation in the financing of the structure will be required should Israel opt to take its allocation of Yarmouk water directly from the diversion weir.9
5. "Artificial changes in the course of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers can only be made by mutual agreement. . . . Each country undertakes to notify the other, six months ahead of time, of any intended projects which are likely to change the flow of either of the above rivers along their common boundary. . . " [Article V: 1 and 2].
The parties agreed in Article II: 1 and 2 to cooperate in the construction of the Adasiyah diversion weir on the Yarmouk and a system of water storage on the Jordan. This provision enshrines in law something Jordan has, as a practical matter, recognized for decades: an Israeli veto over unilateral Jordanian damming of the Yarmouk River. Likewise, should Israel seek artificially to change (for example) the course of the Jordan River above Lake Tiberias, Jordan's agreement would be required.
PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE JORDAN RIVER
The key element of the Jordanian-Israeli attempt to finesse disputes rooted in shortage by increasing the supply of water is the prospective rehabilitation of the lower course of the Jordan River. At present the Jordan channel from below the Deganya gates to the Dead Sea is a chemical, saline soup, utterly useless to the riparians. Provided international assistance is forthcoming, Israel and Jordan hope to clean up the river and to create, through damming, storage facilities to capture and hold winter floods entering the Jordan River from the Yarmouk.
The peace treaty contains several provisions pertaining to the Jordan River. One such provision (Annex I: 2.a) describing the "swap" of 20 MCM of "summer" water to Jordan from the Jordan River "directly upstream from Deganya gates" for 20 MCM of Yarmouk "winter" water to Israel has already been analyzed. Other provisions are as follows:
1. "Winter period-16 October to 14 May of each year. Jordan is entitled to store for its use a minimum average of (20) MCM of the floods in the Jordan River south of its confluence with the Yarmouk (as outlined in Article II). Excess floods that are not usable and that will otherwise be wasted can be utilized for the benefit of the two Parties including pumped storage off the course of the river.... Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water storage on the Jordan River, along their common boundary, between its confluence with the Yarmouk River and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis, in order to implement the provision of paragraph (2.b) of Article I above. The storage system can also be made to accommodate more floods; Israel may use up to (3) MCM/year of added storage capacity" [Article I: 2.b, Article II: 2].
At present Jordan does not, due to poor water quality, pump from the Jordan River. It would appear that three steps must be taken in order for this provision to be of practical use to Jordan: the river must be cleaned up (requiring diversion or desalination of saline spring water now routed by Israel into the lower Jordan); storage facilities must be built; and Jordan must devise ways to move the water to places where it might be used or stored.
According to Dr. Haddadin two places on the Jordan River are being examined as potential storage sites: one, just south of the Yarmouk-Jordan confluence in the vicinity of a former railroad crossing at Majamah, that might accommodate 10 MCM of stored water; and one further south, where Wadi Yabis enters the Jordan channel, a facility that could possibly store 20 MCM. Jordan would hope to take from these storage facilities an average of 20 MCM per year and an additional 35 MCM from the river's normal flow, which would be piped southward to irrigate 8,000 hectares of land north of the Dead Sea.10
Considerable study will be required to identify feasible sites and to determine the likely contribution of the Yarmouk River in light of such factors as Syrian depletion, the effects of a diversion weir/ storage facility at Adasiyah and Israeli capture of Yarmouk River water.
2. "In addition to the above, Israel is entitled to maintain its current use of the Jordan River waters between its confluence with the Yarmouk and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis. Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity equivalent to that of Israel, provided however, that Jordan's use will not harm the quantity or quality of the above Israeli uses. The Joint Water Committee (outlined in Article VI) will survey existing uses for documentation and prevention of appreciable harm" [Article I: 2.c].
In order for this provision to be of value to the parties, two costly projects must be undertaken: the river must be cleaned up and ways must be found to move the water to places within Jordan where it will be of use. Israeli "current" use, however, has priority.
3. "Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of (10) MCM of desalinated water from the desalination of about (20) MCM of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River. Israel will explore the possibility of financing the operation and maintenance cost of the supply to Jordan of this desalinated water (not including capital cost). Until the desalination facilities are operational, and upon the entry into force of the Treaty, Israel will supply Jordan (10) MCM of Jordan River water from the same location as in (2.a) above, [i.e., "directly upstream from Deganya gates"] outside the summer period and during dates Jordan selects, subject to the maximum capacity of transmission" [Article I: 2.d].
This provision represents another (and very expensive) example of the parties identifying a potential source of water whose actual availability depends on external funding. Indeed, much of what Jordan hopes to obtain from the lower course of the Jordan River depends on Israel's ceasing its longstanding diversion of saline water into the channel (see discussion of Article III below). In its present condition the river's lower course is essentially unusable to both parties. As is the case with other provisions relating to the Jordan River, Jordan's ability to capitalize depends not only on the availability of water clean enough to use, but on the construction of conveyance facilities to move the water from the river to destinations within Jordan.
According to Dr. Haddadin, Jordan hopes to send the desalinated 10 MCM to lrbid for municipal and industrial purposes, along with an additional 10 MCM from an as-yet-unspecified source.11 In order to offset (at least on paper) this potential concession of 10 MCM to Jordan, Israel obtained (Article IV: 3) the right to increase by up to 10 MCM per year (provided the Joint Water Committee finds the undertaking "hydrogeologically feasible" and not harmful to "existing Jordanian uses") its use of water from wells located on Jordanian territory in Wadi Araba (south of the Dead Sea) that are leased to Israel.
PROVISIONS CONCERNING BOTH RIVERS
Article III (Water Quality and Protection) applies to both the Yarmouk and the Jordan. The provisions may be summarized as follows:
1. The parties will protect, within their own jurisdictions, both rivers from "pollution, contamination, harm or unauthorized withdrawals from each other's allocations."
2. A Joint Water Committee will establish stations to monitor water quality along the Israel-Jordan boundary.
3. The parties "will each prohibit the disposal of municipal and industrial wastewater in the course of the [rivers] before they are treated to standards allowing their unrestricted agricultural use." This prohibition becomes effective on October 26, 1997.
4. Water supplied by one party to the other from a given spot shall be equivalent in quality to water used by the supplier at that same spot.
5. "Saline springs currently diverted to the Jordan River [by Israel) are earmarked for desalination within four years. Both countries shall cooperate to ensure that the resulting brine will not be disposed of in the Jordan River or any of its tributaries."
6. The parties will protect water they supply to each other "against any pollution, contamination, harm or unauthorized withdrawal of each other's allocations."
Finally, Article I: 3 states that "Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply to Jordan of an additional quantity of 50 MCM/year of water to drinkable standards. To this end, the Joint Water Committee will develop [by late 1995] a plan for the supply to Jordan of the above-mentioned additional water. This plan will be forwarded to the respective governments for discussion and decision." Fifty MCM is the quantity of municipal and industrial water to have been supplied by the Unity Dam. Together with water from Lake Tiberias stored above the Deganya gates, from the (yet to be) "rehabilitated" Jordan River, from the (yet to be built) Adasiyah diversion weir, from the (to be constructed) storage facilities on the Jordan River and from the (prospective) desalination facility, the 50 MCM in drinking water from currently unidentified sources represents a large portion of "new water" cited by Jordan, water whose actual availability rests on a significant infusion of assistance funding for new infrastructure.
It is the understanding of Jordan's chief water negotiator that Israel has, by virtue of Article I: 3, committed itself to supplying Jordan with 50 MCM of water per year from Israel. This water would be shipped to Amman and Zarqa via a conveyance Jordan hopes will be built with funding supplied by external sources, a new pipeline system that would lessen the risk of contamination by avoiding the use of the King Abdallah Canal for the transmission of drinking water.12
Israel and Jordan have set the stage for an era of genuine cooperation in water matters. Indeed, cooperative professional relationships established over many years between Jordanian and Israeli water experts should greatly facilitate the rapid implementation of those provisions of Annex II not dependent on external assistance.
The parties also have before them some unresolved issues worthy of consideration:
1. International assistance will be essential for the implementation of key provisions. International financial institutions and bilateral donors, notwithstanding the euphoria of peace, may link some, if not all, of their help to the accomplishment of internal water-related reform in both countries. By subsidizing relatively unproductive agricultural uses of water, both parties have long been guilty of considerable waste. As Natasha Beschorner has noted, the real water crisis in the Middle East "relates fundamentally to the nature of water allocation and use within states rather than to water allocation between states." 13
2. Although an Israel-Jordan peace treaty clearly cannot address the influence and interests of a third party, Syria's importance is obvious. A 1987 Syrian-Jordanian treaty gave Jordan Syria's permission to build the Unity Dam across the Yarmouk, the boundary between the two states. In return Syria was authorized to dam many of the wadis (intermittent streams) feeding the Yarmouk during the winter and to irrigate land within the Yarmouk watershed. Syria's depletion of the Yarmouk's base flow (from springs) and winter runoff exceeds 200 MCM annually; well over 40 percent of the river's "historical" average annual flow. As matters now stand Jordan is caught in the middle of ever-increasing Syrian depletion and specific, quantitative obligations to Israel. Jordan, which needs the Yarmouk much more than do its neighbors, has no legally recognized allocation-neither a numerical quantity nor a percentage of the river's flow.
The expansion of peace in the region to include Syria should, one would hope, inspire an international assistance effort aimed at sharply reducing Syria's depletion of the Yarmouk's headwaters. Pressure pipe and drip irrigation methods, commonly employed throughout Israel and Jordan, coupled with new, less water-intensive cropping patterns, can enable Syria to forgo significant amounts of water in favor of downstream users while still meeting the municipal and agricultural needs of southern Syria.
3. Downstream of both parties lies an emerging Palestinian entity. It is clear that Israel and Jordan took care, during the course of their negotiations, to limit their discussion of the Jordan River to places north of where the West Bank fronts on the Jordan River. Although the rehabilitation of the Jordan River would be a gift of unsurpassed value to downstream users, it is possible that the expectations of both Jordan and Israel as to future uses of Jordan River water will need to be weighed alongside downstream expectations.
Viewed in the context of a relatively short but often violent history, Israel and Jordan deserve to take pride in what they have accomplished. Yet even though they settled their differences without the aid or involvement of outsiders, the implementation of their undertakings now depends very much on external actors, both regional and international. Annex II of the peace treaty is a good beginning, but a beginning nonetheless.
1 All direct references in this essay to the treaty are drawn from an English-language transcript provided by the Israel Information Service entitled The Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, As Approved by the Knesset October 25, 1994.
2 Water Projects in the Peace Treaty: Terms of Reference for Engineering Consulting Services ("Draft No. 1"), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Brussels, November 28, 1994, p. ii.
3 "Negotiator on Water Accord; Allocations Detailed," Jordan Times, October 20-21, 1994, pp. 1-2 [FBIS-NES-94-204].
4 The Jordan Valley Plan (typescript memorandum), U.S. Department of State, September 30, 1955, p. 16.
6 Jordan Times, op. cit.
7 Author's interview with Dr. Munther Haddadin, Arlington, VA, January 11, 1995. Reuter subsequently reported (February 5, 1995) that Jordan had awarded a contract for $5 million to a local firm to connect Israel's pipeline to the King Abdallah Canal.
8 All references is this essay to estimates and projections of the Harza Engineering Company made in connection with the Unity Dam Project are based on the author's notes and recollections. The author is also indebted to Mr. Michael P. Saunders of Harza Engineering Company, who reviewed a draft of the present essay.
9 Haddadin interview with author, op. cit.
11 Haddadin interview with author, op. cit.
13 Natasha Beschorner, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," Adelphi Paper 273, Winter 1993/1994, p. 3.