The author wishes to thank professors Jamal Nassar, Charles Smith, Muhammad Hallaj and Peter Koper for sharing their thoughts with him on the subject. Comments by Carlos Mentley and Catherine Elizabeth Stuckey on the earlier draft of this paper are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this study are solely mine.
The tide of Islamic ideology that is sweeping the Arab world continues to appeal to the dispossessed. Radical Islam is largely a backlash against the cumulative economic stagnation, social injustice and political corruption of the secular regimes that have long characterized Islamic societies. Radical Islam has driven wedges into a number of these societies, creating divisions between and within political, economic and social interests. Palestinian communities have not escaped extremist Islamic trends. They have been relatively successful in containing them because of the unifying effect of the Palestinian struggle for national liberation, but radical Islam has still become a major factor in Israeli Palestinian relations.
Since the peace process began in 1991, many disagreements and divisions have surfaced among Palestinians. Some have involved the 1993 accord sometimes called Oslo I. Phase Two of the interim agreement, known as Oslo II, also faces many challenges. The future of state building and political sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is still problematic. The ideological challenges involved in reconciling democratization and Islamic radicalism are formidable. They account for the divisions between the secular Palestinian nationalists and radical lslamists. The Islamic Resistance Movement, Barakat al-Maqawama al-Islamiyya, more popularly known as Hamas (Arabic for "zeal," "bravery" or "ardor") represents a major challenge to the peace process.
ADJUSTING TO NEW REALITIES
Although its governing structures have been shaped largely by Palestinians living outside the occupied territories, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) must now operate and rule with the consent of those living within the territories. Given the PLO's bloated bureaucracy and obsolete administrative structures, such an operation is bound to encounter many difficulties. The PLO now faces the old challenge of reconciling the two wings of the Palestinian movement, namely, the outside and inside Palestinians.1 Decision making in the PLO occurs in institutions which for the most part are not effective under current circumstances. The failure of the PLO institutions to adjust to new realities points to an emerging crisis as their ability to govern is rapidly called into question. Moreover, Arafat's autocratic style of management, which defies the basic principles of accountability, has added to this problem.
Several developments late in 1994 and early 1995 cast ominous shadows over troubled peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians and have spurred the debate about the future of the PLO leadership since Gaza came under Palestinian control in May 1994. These include the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, who was executed hours after then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO chief Yasser Arafat won the Nobel Peace Prize; the bus bombing in Tel Aviv on October 19, 1994, which left 22 dead and 40 others wounded; the Israeli-Jordanian agreement, which affords Jordan the role of supervising Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem; the assassination of Hani Abed, who was one of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip; a suicide attack on an Israeli army position in Gaza, which killed three Israeli soldiers; the open street fighting (November 18, 1994) between the Palestinian police and Gaza's Islamic militants at Gaza City's Palestinian Mosque, which left 13 Palestinians dead and at least 200 wounded; and the Beit Lid massacre of January 22, 1995, which claimed 21 Israeli lives-mostly soldiers-and wounded more than 62 others.2
Some of these developments occurred as two types of negotiations were unfolding: Israeli and PLO officials were engaged in talks about expanding the areas of autonomy around Gaza and Jericho, and Israeli and Jordanian negotiators were ironing out details of a new accord.3 The accord, which blocks future Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, has resurrected the old fears among Palestinians that the assertion of Jordan's role with respect to the holy sites may be a prelude to a reassertion of its claim to the West Bank and thus to representation of the Palestinians. All of the Palestinian groups have united behind Arafat on this issue, including Hamas and the leftist opponents of the peace accord.4 Even so, in its struggle to protect peace and deter violence, the PLO finds it increasingly difficult to overlook its differences with Hamas.
CONFRONTATION OR ACCOMMODATION
Arafat faces two choices: he can accommodate or confront the Islamic extremists. He either has to clamp down on extremists in the autonomous zones and confront them head-on, or he has to control them by maintaining the balance of forces among various Palestinian factions. The latter choice, if not handled properly, risks the autonomy's future in the West Bank. The continued violence by Hamas can be attributed largely to the fact that many Palestinians believe that the new Palestinian Authority (PA)-also led by Yasser Arafat-is increasingly influenced by Israel.5 The growing popular support for radicalism among Palestinians, especially at street level and among the Gazans, and the importance of retaining broad-based Palestinian support present a daunting task for Arafat. He must incorporate Hamas into the Palestinian Authority and into any future elections in order to unite Palestinians behind his rule, but he must also satisfy the Israelis' demands that he contain Hamas's violent attacks without appearing an Israeli lackey.
The escalating terrorism is an attack on not only the credibility of the peace process, but also on the secular PLO leadership and its limited autonomy under the terms of the Israeli-PLO accord. The PLO-Hamas rivalry has enormous implications for Palestinian self-rule. The growing influence of Hamas in the post-Gulf War era will affect the future shape of Palestinian society: not only will it influence economic development and political reforms in the occupied territories, but it will also have a tangible impact on democratization and any final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
OPPORTUNITIES AND SETBACKS
Since the December 9, 1987, Palestinian intifada in the occupied territories, the PLO has experienced both opportunities and setbacks. The uprising put the spotlight on the Palestinian crisis and generated tremendous international support for their cause. International opinion came to regard as "legitimate" the response of the Palestinians to military occupation. In addition to rendering Palestinian self-determination inevitable, the most significant yet indirect effect of the uprising was the legitimation of the PLO.6 But the uprising was a youth movement driven by, among other things, the disenchantment of young Palestinians with their elders.
The intifada reflected the existence of a powerful internal nationalism largely immune to outside influences. For the first time in the history of the Palestinian struggle to recover land and gain autonomy, the Palestinian political community saw a shift in the balance of power between the Palestinians residing inside the occupied territories and the PLO leadership outside. This shift forced the PLO leadership, which was mostly in Tunisia, to accept the influence of West Bank and Gaza personalities, several of whom later represented the Palestinians in the 1991 Madrid Conference.7
THE GULF CRISIS
The Gulf crisis in 1990-91 increased the world's awareness of the Palestinians' problem. Disillusioned by Israel's failure to respond to the PLO's peace initiative of 1988 and frustrated by the continued, massive immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, Palestinians suffered many potentially serious demographic and political changes. They felt threatened as they saw themselves closer than ever to expulsion.8 They displayed their frustration by offering moral support to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This support had a high price for the Palestinians, since the income of the intifada institutions originated in the rich Arab states. When the Arab consensus concerning the Palestinian issue crumbled, the PLO lost the financial support of the Gulf states. Nevertheless, international attention once again pressed the Palestinian issue to the forefront of world politics. In the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, it became obvious that pressures for a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were irresistible.
With the defeat of the Likud and the ascendancy to power of the Labor party and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in June 1992, Israel ushered in a new era, with peacemaking-not military occupation-as its main objective. Having participated in suppressing the intifada since 1987 and having witnessed Likud's inability to cope with Israel's growing social and economic problems in the post-Cold War era, Rabin's government initiated its peace policies with practical motives. Despite the flexibility of the new Israeli government, however, many Palestinians remained skeptical about the future. Rabin's assassination on November 4, 1995, places Shimon Peres, the new Israeli prime minister, in a unique position to vigorously pursue his own pragmatic policies. How those policies will fare in implementing and promoting peace remain to be seen.
THE DEPORTEE ISSUE
The Israelis cracked down on the Muslim radical movements and the Hamas organization on December 15, 1992. They expelled 415 Palestinians, sending them to a makeshift encampment in Marj Al-Zouhour in Israel's self-proclaimed security zone in southern Lebanon. This deepened pessimism among the Palestinians, but the deportees captured the world's attention with nearly the same intensity and passion as had the intifada. The Rabin government's decision to expel the Palestinians resulted in several negative consequences for the PLO's political standing among the Palestinians. The most important was a constant disregard of the PLO's appeals to local shopkeepers to avoid strikes called by the occupied territories' leaders. The deportations led to many consultations between the PLO and Hamas, which were competing, at times violently, for political influence in the territories. These contacts, however, resulted in little or no leverage for the PLO. While the deportation decrees stood until the end of 1993 for the vast majority of the deportees, some were immediately readmitted.
HAMAS: FROM LOYAL OPPOSITION TO DEFIANCE
When the status of the deportees was resolved and the Israelis and PLO began talks about interim arrangements, the divisions between the PLO and Hamas sharpened. Radicalism of individual Palestinians and Islamic militancy increased significantly as the PLO leadership proved unable to effectively resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its "outside" position.9
Although active since 1982, Hamas officially entered the political scene in January 1988. Its activism was fueled by the decline of the Islamic Jihad's activities in the occupied territories, which followed an Israeli crackdown in the spring of 1988 that led to the arrest or deportation of key Islamic Jihad leaders. Initially formed by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, Hamas rejected the Brethren's passive approach to the Palestinian issue. In February 1988, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted Hamas as its military wing. Participating in various aspects of the intifada-and especially through its military wing, known as the Ju al-Din al-Qassam Brigade-Hamas carried out several armed missions against the Israeli authorities. These earned increasing support within the Palestinian ranks.
In more recent years, Hamas has exploited the rampant Palestinian discontent with the peace accord, especially the deferral of key issues that must be resolved between Israelis and Palestinians. The Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed on September 13, 1993, is a general framework for cooperation and not an operational plan. In fact, some have noted that the terms accepted by Arafat in the Oslo agreement, which came to be known as DOP, bore little relation to the original conditions sought by the PLO in successive rounds of talks since the Madrid peace conference in October 1991.10 The DOP does not mention issues of water, land and control of roads. Furthermore, the so-called "final status" negotiations will not begin in the immediate future.11
Israelis, too, have played a part in the rise of Hamas. They have sometimes fostered it as a counter to the PLO and turned a blind eye to its operations against the PLO. Israel's policy even involved financial support for the Islamic extremists to strengthen them at the time when Yitzhak Rabin was defense minister.12 The power of Hamas grew, however, largely as a result of the highly repressive environment that Israeli military occupation created. Today, Hamas continues to call for the creation of a Palestinian state, based on religious principles, in all of former Palestine. It rejects the two-state solution advocated by Arafat in December 1988 and presents its position as an alternative to the PLO political agenda.13
The Hamas Covenant was published in August 1988. It defined Palestinian nationalism as an "Islamic struggle against the Jews." It added that Hamas "strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine." Rejecting a political settlement of the conflict through regional and international forums, the covenant emphasized, "The only solution to the Palestine question is through Jihad; other means are all a waste of time and vain endeavors."14 One commentator notes that the attitude of Hamas toward the PLO can be deduced from the language of the Covenant:
The PLO is the closest to the heart of the Islamic resistance movement. It contains the father and the brother, the next of kin or friend. Our homeland is one, our situation is one, our fate is one, and the enemy is a joint enemy to all of us. However, until the PLO "adopts Islam as its way of life," Hamas must have reservations about it.15
Internally, Hamas receives its strongest support in Gaza and also in Nablus, although the overall support in the West Bank is essentially less.16 Externally, its financial and moral support come from a broad range of Islamic countries, including the conservative Gulf states and radical states such as Iran, Libya and the Sudan.
As the financial, organizational and factional difficulties of the intifada were exacerbated by the Gulf War, the PLO and the clandestine leadership of the intifada, known as the Unified National Command (UNC), found themselves in a much weaker position vis-a-vis the Islamic militants. The Gulf states' petrodollars and subsidies were denied Yasser Arafat and the PLO when neither condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. At the same time Hamas vowed further bloodshed and sabotage of the peace talks. In retaliation for an extremist Jewish settler's massacre of 29 Palestinians at prayer in the Hebron mosque in the West Ban1c on February 25, 1994, Hamas launched several attacks, including the bus bombings at Afula and Hadera. These acts of violence by extremists on both sides complicated the peace process and pulled momentum away from the negotiating table. Hamas has demanded a political party that would run "on a platform emphasizing Islamic values," but the PLO leaders have avoided confronting their cultural and legal challenge.
Palestinian women, however, have reacted differently to this challenge. It is easy to understand why: Palestinian women have gained their own personal freedoms. They challenged both the British Mandate (1922-47) and the Israeli occupation (since 1967) and have played an important role in the intifada.17 They are thus the element of Palestinian society least likely to concede to the strict enforcement of Islamic codes proposed by the militant Islamic groups. The Palestinian feminist movement has become highly suspicious of the PLO's deference to the ideological and legal demands of the radical Islamic groups.18
Although the PLO leadership has slighted the issue to avoid a battle with the Islamic extremists, the fact remains that Palestinian women tend to be more "secular" than men and constitute a strong potential force for secularism.19 The PLO must heed the demands of this group.
WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES
Arafat knows well that a clampdown on Hamas would begin an interfactional war and that punitive actions against Hamas would have the deleterious effect of reducing the unity of his polity. If anything, a crackdown would widen the divisions among Palestinians. A division could jeopardize and perhaps create a dangerous political vacuum. Reports from Gaza indicate that disorganization within the ran1cs of Fatah, the most prominent PLO faction, is on the rise. Sara Roy writes that "the internal breakdown of Fatah appears to be the dominant and defining dynamic in Gaza, one that seems to supersede even the traditional tensions between Fatah and Hamas."20
Confrontation is even less attractive given the growing public support for Hamas in the street. The rise of Hamas's popularity and political force was confirmed by a peaceful demonstration in late November 1994 that attracted an estimated 20,000 people in the Gaza Strip. The show of support is a further testimony to Hamas's ability to challenge the PLO. Some optimistic analysts, however, call our attention to encouraging reports: about 65 percent of the Palestinians living in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip were in favor of the accord when it was signed on September 13, 1994, in Washington.21 Others argue that the threat of Hamas' s power is exaggerated as part of the furor about the "Islamic threat" that has come to dominate Western policy and journalism. Edward W. Said writes that in the occupied territories, the "threat" posed by the Hamas "has been marketed by policymakers in Israel, the PLO and the United States as a way of forcing more concessions on the Palestinians and trying to sell the deal to Israel."22
FROM AUTONOMY TO SOVEREIGNTY
The first phase of the accord on autonomy, known as Oslo I, placed the Gaza Strip and Jericho under Palestinian self-rule in May 1994. It soon faced serious opposition because it did not address the most difficult issues in the dispute between the Israel and the Palestinians. These included the applicability of Resolution 242, the final status of borders, refugees, Israeli settlements and Jerusalem, and sovereignty over the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Instead, the accord engaged the two parties in negotiations during a five-year interim arrangement.23
Oslo II, the pact signed on September 28, 1995, addresses some-but not all-of these outstanding issues. The pact includes six key points:
(1) Israeli redeployment: Israeli forces will be completely withdrawn from six West Bank towns within six months: Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem. The town of Hebron will be dealt with separately, with Israeli forces remaining in control of the Jewish settlements and Palestinian police taking control of security for the rest of the town.24 The withdrawal will establish an interim period of self-rule which is to last until a final settlement is reached no later than May 1999. During this period, Israel will control borders, and Palestinians will not be permitted to exercise full control of their external affairs.25
(2) Elections: Palestinians will elect an 88-member Council to administer Palestinian areas after troops withdraw in January 1996. A separate election for chief executive will also be held.
(3) Prisoners: some 5,000 Palestinian prisoners will be released in three phases. The details regarding those phases remain subject to future negotiations.
(4) Palestinian Covenant: Palestinians will revoke the articles in their Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel. This will occur within two months of the inauguration of their elected council.
(5) Resources: Israel will increase the amount of water allocated to Palestinians on the West Bank.
(6) Religious sites: Jews are guaranteed access to Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem and Joseph's Tomb in Nablus. The Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, sacred to both Arabs and Jews, will remain open to both but will be segregated and guarded by Israeli troops.26
Several important issues were postponed until further negotiations scheduled for May 1996. These included four major areas: negotiations to determine the final status of the emerging Palestinian entity, the future of Jewish settlers, the status of Jerusalem and the positions of Palestinian refugees. The most important of these issues is how a new agreement will pave the way for eventual statehood for the Palestinians, given the fact that Israelis control most of the land, water and security of the West Bank.
Clearly, the establishment of a Palestinian state depends on the successful development of political capacity within newly self-ruling West Bank communities. One observer notes that only when Arafat has the political capital-that is, sovereign authority-to run the Palestinian authority on a political basis can he successfully operate and resist the charge that he operates only under Israeli patronage.27
The possibility of statehood at the end of the process appears realistic. For the time being, the Israelis remain primarily preoccupied with security issues and concerns.28 They seem reluctant to concede anything beyond administrative autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank. One specialist proposes a framework for future negotiation-a Palestinian state with sovereignty over Gaza/Jericho and administrative authority over the West Bank-to be agreed upon prior to the next Israeli elections. The rationale here is to have, within the ongoing peace process, a dialogue between two states (Israel and Palestine) as to who is sovereign over the West Bank.29 From the Palestinian perspective, the maintenance of settlers in Hebron, whether armed, organized or not, is unacceptable. Such a presence would challenge Palestinian security and guarantee further friction and instability within the boundaries of the proposed Palestinian national entity.30
Hamas and other militant Islamic movements, which are opposed to the peace accord, are divided over how to react to the new agreement. While some view it as creating a tactical advantage, others renounce it as an Israeli ploy. Those who see a tactical advantage in such an accord are willing to participate in the electoral process. Some of them have already become the voice of the thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.31 Their growing political power and constituency are increasingly important. A potentially legitimate role for Hamas is critical. While resisting Hamas's violence, Israel and the PLO must be careful not to undertake extreme repression and must be prepared for Hamas's participation in elections.32 Any closure of the territories by the Israeli authorities will result in further economic discontent and collective punishment for about 110,000 Palestinians who work in Israel; this plays into Hamas' s hands and is bound to be highly counterproductive for Israel.
The most daunting task for the PLO leadership is to incorporate Islamic groups into civil society when their social and political visions differ vastly from those of other Palestinian groups. Hamas has been successful in establishing effective organizations within the occupied territories to provide basic necessities and social services for Palestinians living there. As a result, many developing segments of Palestinian society have become dependent upon Hamas. The latter has in turn transformed this dependency into a means for political mobilization.33
THE FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN CIVIL SOCIETY
The desire for a civil society is a force contrary to both the continued Israeli occupation and undesirable aspects of the PLO's political apparatus. Whereas most of the Palestinians regard the PLO's use of cooptation and patronage as a necessity for the establishment of Palestinian civil society, Islamic groups reject it. Linking Islamic codes not only to sociocultural spheres but also to nationalistic impulses, Islamic groups have called into question the secular vision of the PLO authorities. Muhammad Muslih aptly summarizes the position of the Islamic groups:
[T]he Islamic groups in the occupied territories reject not only Israel and the policies of the PLO, but also the system of secular ideas and institutions prevalent among the Palestinians and Arabs in general. They maintain that true Islam as a system of politics and social life is the solution to the Palestine problem and other problems in Arab societies.34
The Islamic camp, which stands in stark contrast to the nationalist camp, consists of three groups: the Muslim Brotherhood-often referred to as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad movement and the Islamic Liberation party. The Muslim Brotherhood Association is the oldest Islamic movement in Palestine. Its participation in the intifada in 1987 called more attention to it than to other Islamic groups. Hamas is the major Islamic movement in the occupied territories. The Islamic Jihad movement is the second most influential faction. Some factions, such as the Islamic Jihad Movement-Jerusalem, the Islamic Jihad Movement-the-al-Aqsa Battalions, and Hizb-Allah in Palestine, have broken off from the movement. The latter two organizations are military in nature and have no public membership. Islamic Jihad lost much of its momentum, in both an ideological and strategic sense, when Hamas was formed. Other factors accounted for the weakening of the organization: internal splits were rampant, many of its leaders were expelled and, most importantly, the organization failed to create an infrastructure capable of sustaining its survival. The Islamic Liberation party, which discontinued its activities in 1967 and resumed them a few years ago, draws its constituency from student circles in Palestinian universities.35 Founded in 1953, this party has suffered from a lack of political presence and has failed to offer any practical vision. Historically, the party has not participated in the resistance and intifada.36
While it is easy to measure the extent of public support for the secular groups, it is difficult to estimate accurately the support for the Islamic movements since their activities are underground. Islamic groups seem to win between 30 and 35 percent of the vote in elections in student and professional associations. In the campus elections of Bir Zeit University in the West Bank in November 1992, the PLO list won 67 percent of the vote; Hamas won 32 percent; and Islamic Jihad, 1 percent.37 The extent of ideological and political support notwithstanding, diverse social and political forces must be incorporated into the processes of institution building and economic development. The latter is a critical condition that must be satisfied for a viable civil society to exist in the occupied territories.
THE IMPERATIVE OF AN ECONOMIC DIVIDEND
Progress in the peace process is contingent upon whether sustainable economic development can take place. Discernable and immediate economic benefits are indeed the backbone of the peace process. In the short run, increasing the living standards of the Palestinians in the territories and holding out to them the prospects of economic prosperity is an imperative that can, to a great extent, defuse the tensions caused by Hamas. The Gaza Strip, which has a weak and under-developed economy, unique and complex political and legal systems, and a weak political culture, must become the prime target of the peace dividend.38
Reports from the occupied territories portray a dismal economic picture. About 74 percent of Gazans (something more than 600,000 people) are refugees of the 1948 war or their descendants. The majority of refugees still live in wretchedly poor and overflowing camps. Gaza's annual population growth rate is 4 percent and its population density exceeds 12,000 people per square mile.39 The West Bank does not fare any better. Its estimated population is 1.6 million; projections for the year 2010 place it at 2.3 million people, making both the West Bank and Gaza among the fastest growing areas in the world. Fifty percent of the people of the West Bank and 60 percent of Gazans are under age 15.40 Approximately 225,000 Israeli settlers live in at least 158 settlements in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. The settlements are subject to Israeli municipal laws and exempt from other local laws and legal proceedings. These settlers are armed and constitute a powerful bloc, influencing the process of decision making in Israel and threatening the foundation of Palestinian socioeconomic life.41
The Palestinian economy, dependent on the economy of Israel, its only trading partner, has remained stagnant. Agriculture, the most critical sector of the Palestinian economy, accounts for more than 20 percent of GDP, absorbs approximately one-fourth of the labor force, and generates 60 percent of the exports from the West Bank and Gaza.42 The agricultural sector faces many constraints imposed by the Israeli occupation authorities. Muhammad Muslih enumerates them: "land expropriation, restrictions on water use, a tight regulatory regime for exports, a lack of government agricultural research stations and extension programs, and regulations that require Palestinian farmers to sell their produce only through Israeli marketing monopolies."43 The industrial sector, which accounts for 7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is far out of sync with the Palestinian level of income. The growth of industry, experts write, can be a major source of future growth in the territories.44
Furthermore, public infrastructure continues to be woefully inadequate. Many Palestinian villages lack reliable power supplies; schools and other educational facilities remain in the doldrums.45 Those who have argued in favor of an "economy of peace," economic interdependence, and integration between Israel and the Palestinians have yet to provide a sound explanation of how mutual dependency is possible in the face of the vast economic inequalities between Israelis and Palestinians. Some have cautioned against an unhealthy dependency.46
The rapidly eroding living conditions and overarching insecurity in the occupied territories have provided fertile ground for radical Islamic tendencies. Islamic groups are noticeably stronger in Gaza than in the West Bank and continue to offer attractive alternatives to secular nationalist groups such as Fatah. Gaza is fast approaching disintegration. The deteriorating economic conditions, deepening political fragmentation and escalating violence have hastened the unraveling of civil society. The continuing perilous situation there, coupled with the escalating power struggle between the PLO and Hamas, amounts to a serious challenge to the troubled peace accord. Michael Kelly aptly summarizes the situation in Gaza by noting that peace meets social pathology: romanticized violence, subversion of authority and law, generational crisis, political tribalism and factionalism, and general disillusionment. Prior to the January 20, 1996, general election in the occupied territories, the Palestinian Authority was increasingly looked upon as "a military authority," and Arafat's administration was regarded as an occupying force.47 This had many dire consequences, not the least of which is rendering the practice of self-rule far-fetched. Sara Roy is cogent on this point: "The unmaking of Gazan civil society poses a difficulty for the creation of a viable autonomous entity in the Gaza Strip that should not be underestimated."48
The World Bank has estimated the basic development needs of the West Bank and Gaza at $2.4 billion over five years. Under the Emergency Assistance Program (EAP), a relief project has been set up to channel aid to the occupied territories. EAP projects also involve increasing the capacity of Palestinian communities at many levels. These will include infrastructural development and institution building. The World Bank has also been instrumental in creating the Palestine Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) to give the new Palestinian entity an opportunity to work with donors at some point in the future.49 The Palestine Development Program (PDP) estimates investment needs of about $12 billion for the years 1994-2000.50 Some experts have recommended that a fiscal system be developed in the occupied territories in the short run to create some degree of economic sovereignty for the Palestinians.51 Given the prevailing reluctance among donors to provide massive funds, the widespread consensus is that the private sector is the key to Palestinians' future economic growth, especially if one goal is to avoid creating an aid dependent economy.52
According to World Bank officials, one of the biggest problems facing the Palestinian economy at this stage is its capacity to apply aid effectively. At the donors meeting held in Washington in September 1993, donors pledged $2 billion to assist Palestinian self-rule. The chief concern, however, remains how to put foreign assistance and advice into effective use and how to create the institutions needed to translate aid into viable projects. In some areas, the efforts of U.S. officials and World Bank development workers in the region have been thwarted by a Palestinian National Authority (PNA) unable to process and channel economic aid.53 Furthermore, Arafat's refusal to create a credible system of accounting for this foreign aid is said to have kept many foreign donors at arm's length. Some use this to explain why Arafat has attracted only a small portion of the $1 billion pledged for Palestinian support this year.54 However, there are some reports that Arafat has agreed to such outside monitoring. In late November 1994, foreign donors agreed to free $125 million in aid for the Palestinian self-rule authority. This occurred as donors were contemplating setting up an international committee to monitor the distribution of funds by Arafat's administration.55
THE NECESSITY OF POLITICAL REFORMS
Political reform is also an essential part of the development of a stable polity. The most critical political reforms must begin with the PLO institutions, where autocratic decision-making processes have promoted factional interests and the exclusion of many Palestinians from these institutions. It will be imperative to restructure the Palestine National Council (PNC) as a national assembly or a parliament with clear legislative functions and periodic elections. Factional quotas in political representation, which have long characterized the PLO leadership, must be modified to better reflect a system of proportional representation.56 Both George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Nayaf Hawatmeh, the leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), have called, albeit from different perspectives, for pluralism and democratic reforms in the PLO as a precondition for the building of the state infrastructure.57 Yasser Arafat, however, appears unlikely to accommodate democratic pressures unless he has to. This is true even though he and his cohorts have acknowledged that democratic reforms are the surest way not only to guarantee security for Israel but also to effectively meet the challenge posed by radical Islamic groups.
The PLO's fear that an alternative leadership may emerge within the occupied territories has been a major hurdle to the development of Palestinian democracy. The actions of the PLO leaders, primarily aimed at averting the emergence of competition, attest to this reality. Given their apprehensions, the PLO leadership has been selective in pursuing democratic means.58 Nevertheless, two compelling reasons made fair and free elections indispensable. Living in a diaspora and under military rule for many years has made the Palestinians politically conscious and readily mobilizable. They are the most literate Arab population for the same reason that Jews were literate: lacking land, they invested in education, the key to their political effectiveness. Activism is a political way of life for many Palestinians. In the occupied territories, Palestinians have participated in municipal elections and played a significant part in electing representatives to civil organizations.
Palestinian youth have learned to hold their authorities accountable, despite the fact that they have had no experience with accountability through the rotation of office holders: witness the longevity of the PLO and Islamic leaders outside and inside of the occupied territories. The Palestinian political system of the past, which has been controlled by a single nationalist force outside the occupied territories, has come to an end. The PLO leadership has now found new sources of legitimacy-such as open elections-and has boosted its legitimacy by allowing free and fair elections.
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE ROLE OF HAMAS
The first general elections ever held among Palestinians took place on January 20, 1996. The voter turnout was huge in the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank, but it was poor in two areas controlled by the Israelis-East Jerusalem and Hebron. Only 40 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in East Jerusalem, where Israel has 4,000 policemen deployed. An estimated 85 percent of registered voters in Gaza cast their ballots despite the refusal of Hamas to run. Arafat and his Fatah movement emerged as victors in the balloting, with Arafat receiving 88 percent of the votes and becoming the first president-elect of the new Palestinian government and Fatab winning a majority (three-quarters of the seats) in the new 88-seat legislative council. The generally peaceful and large turnout was proclaimed by many international observers as a success. Israeli officials interpreted the election results as solid support for the Oslo agreement and a strong endorsement of Arafat.59
In general, elections meant an active role for the Palestinians in the process of attaining authentic self-rule, regardless of their secular or religious ideologies. Some observers argue that Arafat must incorporate Hamas in the Palestinian National Authority, for this will lead to the stability of the self-rule areas: "There is ample room for their inclusion....Once included, once recognized as legitimate players, they will develop a vested interest in stabilizing the situation in the West Bank and Gaza....[This] will make them Arafat's partners in the self-rule government and in Arafat's deal with Is- rael."60
The role of Hamas in democratization is uncertain. It is difficult to identify a single political framework for Hamas that would define its future role in and approach toward the political process. As a religious movement, it has rejected secular democratic ideals and voiced its opposition to the PLO's secular orientation and programs. Some analysts insist that many aspects of political reforms that are pertinent to Islamic movements in the Arab world are inapplicable to the Islamic groups in the occupied territories. Palestinians in the occupied territories, Ziad Abu-Amr maintains, see Islamization as a way to terminate the Israeli occupation and seize power. Although they fight in the name of religion, they are, in reality, seeking empowerment.61 "Palestinian Islamists," adds Abu-Amr, "are only marginally preoccupied with the issues of pluralism and democracy. These issues are discussed in a limited way, particularly pluralism's effect on inter-Palestinian relations."62
The leadership of Hamas, however, needs to establish itself as an opposing force on the Palestinian scene within a democratic framework acceptable to all relevant players. This is only valid if Hamas wishes to participate and play by the rules of the game. Hamas leaders have been able to find ways to keep their political channels to Fatah open, despite their uncompromisingly rejectionist public posture toward the peace accord. Their position regarding an interim solution has remained ambiguous and largely subject to strategic and tactical exigencies.63 Hamas's Islamic positions do not appear as important as its political concerns, so inclusion of Hamas in the democratic process may be possible [although it chose to sit out the January 1996 elections]. Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, the founder and leader of Hamas, has stressed the possibility of Hamas's participation in the future elections on the grounds that legislative rule reflects people's choice.64 Hamas members have no choice but to participate in the democratic process, and the PLO leadership will be wrong if it denies them a role in open elections. It is prudent to incorporate Hamas within a democratic framework rather than to have it outside as a revolutionary force bent on toppling the government.65 The continued exclusion of Hamas will result not only in further spreading violence but also in weakening the moderating factions within Hamas.66
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY
There are three different views concerning whether Palestinians can establish democracy. First there are those who argue that Palestinian movements, which have grown out of more or less tolerant nationalistic tendencies, are accustomed to democratic experiences and do not have to start from scratch. As an umbrella organization, the PLO has embraced various political forces. Since 1987, most experts concur, the authoritarian drifts of Palestinian politics have been largely superseded by the intifada.67
Having insisted on their rights of expression and participation under the harsh conditions of Israeli military occupation, Palestinians have shown that they view elections and popular consent as the main sources of legitimacy.68 Some even argue that the Palestinians' experiences are unique in the Arab world, making them likely candidates to undertake democratic reforms. The consequences of these experiences include the high percentage of educated Palestinians, their wider acceptance of the principles of negotiation and compromise, their high percentage of democratically oriented professional and political elites, their respect for decentralized and grassroots level decision-making, their familiarity with new patterns of collective behavior as demonstrated through intifada, and the centrality of relatively emancipated women in the community.69
In contrast, some have suggested that the Gaza Strip and, to a lesser extent, the West Bank have no political, administrative and physical structure with which to fulfill the demands of a population that has a long history of living under occupation. Gaza, writes Amos Perlmutter, "will likely join the ranks of other secular-praetorian Arab states that are continuously losing support to more aggressive and traditional radical forces. True democratic elections in Gaza will only bring the Islamic fundamentalists to power."70 Perlmutter argues that the territories lack socioeconomic development and a national consensus, both of which are basic structural conditions for the process of democratization.
Contrary to Perlmutter, however, I am inclined to underscore the significance of the Palestinians' national liberation experiences in producing a form of political pluralism that has seldom, if ever, existed in the Arab world. The political bargaining among different factions that has traditionally prevailed in the PNC has become an acceptable practice among Palestinian leaders. If continued in the future state, such a practice may serve as a buffer against authoritarianism.71 This type of political pluralism, which has emerged in the absence of a central authority, is apt to survive the transition to a new authority in the territories.72 Hence there exist grounds for a guardedly optimistic outlook.
Moreover, the January 1996 election results, which showed a large turnout in Gaza and the West Bank resulting in a strong endorsement for Arafat and the Fatah, weaken Perlmutter's claim that Islamic radicals will be the sole winners of the open elections. The election results were also consistent with the recent poll based on a sample of 1,273 respondents from the West Bank and Gaza, conducted between October 6 and 7, 1995. When asked which political or religious faction they trust most, 41 percent chose Fatah, 11 percent chose Hamas, 21 percent chose no faction, 9 percent trusted various other groups, and 8 percent did not respond.73
Finally, there are those who have maintained that authoritarian rulers can more easily make peace with Israel than can those incipient democracies that have expanded political participation. This is so because authoritarian leaders face fewer restraints on agreement with Israel. Jonathan Paris points out that Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad represents one of Israel's better prospects for peace.74 Political polarization and conflicting views among Palestinians make it difficult to deal effectively with them in a fluid, democratic context. Too much "democracy," Paris adds, will inhibit the emergence of a Palestinian consensus, one that is authoritative and coherent enough to lead to an agreement with the Israelis. It is thus hard to imagine that elections in the occupied territories will generate such a consensus and give Palestinian negotiators more room to reach a compromise with Israel.75
Such arguments sidestep a crucial issue. In the absence of sustainable democratic institutions with which to pursue peaceful transition, a sudden change in the Palestinian leadership could trigger authoritarian tendencies, vastly complicating the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the interim period. Israelis have indeed a vested interest in dealing with Palestinian leaders who enjoy widespread support and political legitimacy. Fragmentation of Arafat's own faction, Fatah, continues to grow in the face of the Hamas challenge. The Oslo I agreement appeared shaky and Arafat's influence with Fatah progressively dwindled.76 A redeployment of Israeli soldiers as well as Palestinian elections in the occupied territories as a result of the Oslo II agreement is likely to bolster Arafat's political standing among the Palestinians.
The latest suicide bombings, some observers point out, have convinced Israelis that the best way to achieve a reasonable degree of coexistence with Palestinians is through the two-state solution. Given the difficulties of the transitional phase for both sides and security issues for Israel, the idea of separation resonates now more than ever with the Israeli people and politicians. Thomas L. Friedman echoes such a sentiment: "Only when there is separation into two states with some measure of equality, with each enjoying its own space and with each having something to lose from abusing it, will Israelis and Palestinians begin a real transition toward coexistence."77
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL INTER-CONNECTEDNESS OF DEMOCRACY
Democratization has always been a complicated process in the Third World. It is unreasonable to reduce this process to a simple formula and suggest that Palestinian traditions or political culture are antithetical to democracy. While the debates regarding the plausibility and consequences of a democratic state in the occupied territories are relevant, one should not overlook the role of regional and global forces in promoting Palestinian self-determination during the interim period.
The end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War have had profound impacts on the slow progress of democratization in the area. A sustainable peace process is bound to put an end to the massive infusions of military aid into the region. New regional and international considerations can facilitate, rather than complicate, the spread of democratic movements in the territories. The Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit, held in Casablanca, Morocco, in the fall of 1994 and in Amman, Jordan, a year later, which brought together the politicians and business people of 50 countries, could have significant consequences for curbing extremism, furthering peace and promoting regional development.78 The fate of democracy in the occupied territories, like anywhere else, will ultimately be determined by internal forces. A strong case, however, can be made for the crucial role that external forces play in the genesis of democracy.
David Held argues that today the rise of democracy must be viewed within the context of the regional and global relations of states and societies. This means that "democracy has to become a transnational affair if it is to be possible both within a restricted geographic domain and within the wider international community."79 Today, such an international democratic framework is either nascent (as in the case of the United Nations) or nonexistent and, at least for now, it is far removed from the reality of the Israeli Palestinian political scene. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the development of democracy in the occupied territories is intermeshed with the critical role played by the United States, Israel, many other regional players, the European Union and international financial institutions.
Although the political legitimacy of the PLO leadership and its institutions is an internal matter to be decided by the Palestinians themselves, the Israeli government is responsible for the absence of democracy in the occupied territories in numerous ways. First, thousands of Palestinians are being held in army or civilian-run prisons. In the past, many detainees have been held in facilities in- side Israel, in violation of Article 76 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Chronic closures of the occupied territories by the Israelis have horrendous costs for the families of the most economically and socially vulnerable Palestinian laborers who work in Israel. Human-rights advocates argue that such practices create moral and legal obligations for the Israelis to attend to the families of these people. Since 1967, the Israelis have transformed the West Bank and Gaza economies into dependencies of Israel's economy. The government of Israel therefore has a duty to assist families deprived of income and for whom no other employment is available.80 Israel's poor human-rights record continues to be a major obstacle to progress toward democracy in the occupied territories.
Second, the Israelis must trust the Palestinians' ability to effectively rule themselves and to enjoy more than a limited administrative autonomy. To exclude from the peace talks the Palestinians who live in Jerusalem and to prohibit participation in elections by the Palestinian diaspora will have adverse effects on any future elections. Such exclusionary measures defy the democratic premises underlying elections. Historically, elections without a broad-based consensus have presented colossal difficulties for both the stability of the political order and its leaders. The political, social and cultural relevance of Hamas to any process of democratization cannot be denied. Likewise, the peace process has thus far failed to deal with the issue of refugees according to international moral and legal standards; the future of Palestinian refugees remains at the mercy of Israeli discretion and political considerations. Israel's agreement to negotiate the return of refugees sooner than later can accelerate the protection and promotion of refugee rights.81
The most important global player in inducing democratic practices in the occupied territories is the United States. This is due in part to U.S. leverage with other key players, namely Israel and international financial institutions, and in part to its direct support for democracy. To the extent that international financial institutions can play a major role in alleviating the most serious economic problems of the Palestinians, U.S. clout is undeniable.
The U.S. influence on Israel, however, is less consistent and more subject to Washington's varying conceptions of Middle Eastern politics at any particular time. There is a broad consensus among Middle East specialists that direct U.S. support for democracy is perhaps the most effective way to help reduce and deradicalize Islamic extremism.82 While the Clinton administration has been quick to organize international development assistance for the nascent Palestinian national authority, its refusal to support the annual U.N. General Assembly resolution affirming the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes will seriously undermine the confidence of the diaspora in Arafat's ability to deliver.83
The PLO-Hamas relationship has both antagonistic and symbiotic forms. Precisely how the tension between them will be resolved is difficult to foretell. If the PLO and Hamas remain antagonists, then national consensus will break down and interfactional strife will occur. This could lead to a possible civil war with grave consequences for state-building and democratization in the occupied territories. If, on the other hand, the rivalry becomes symbiotic, it could lead to good governance, checks on the authoritarian tendencies of the PLO's ruling elites, and a broader consensus not only on democratic means but also on democratic outcomes. This type of rivalry is most likely to lead to a sustainable transition toward democracy.
Insofar as democratization is concerned, the challenge from Hamas is both necessary and problematical. It is necessary to provide a second party for Palestinian democracy as well as to curb Arafat's authoritarian tendencies. It is problematical because Hamas has neither experience with democratization nor sufficient support to challenge the Palestinian secular forces that are directing a move toward statehood. The 1996 open elections and a strong voter showing, especially in Gaza, where Hamas organizations are well entrenched, demonstrated that Arafat and his faction, Fatah, enjoy considerable support among a majority of the Palestinians. Hamas is now faced with a fait accompli: the political legitimacy of Chairman Arafat and the National Council is verified, at least for the time being. There is no other alternative than to recognize and concede such a legitimacy. Furthermore, Hamas cannot fundamentally alter the economic realities of the territories. The small Palestinian economy, with a gross national product of $3 billion, a shrinking agricultural sector and almost negligible industry, desperately needs foreign aid, regional trade blocs and a global search for capital and foreign investment.
Free trade and access to Israeli markets are indispensable for the maintenance of Palestinian economic development, vital for stemming the tide of violence and promoting democratic measures inside the territories. Any realistic assessment of this situation must take into account the fact that regional economic and political realities are deep-rooted. Hamas leaders have no choice but to come to grips with such realities and adopt a more pragmatic approach toward the principle of land for peace. While resisting the terrorism perpetrated by Hamas, both Israel and the PLO must accept the relevance of Hamas to Palestinian politics and grant it an effective right to take part in the political process.84 Given that the PLO-Hamas rivalry is primarily about empowerment and only secondarily about ideology, it is critical that Islamic groups be allowed to participate in the creation of civil society. The surest way to guarantee security for Israel as well as to defuse tensions caused by Islamic radicalism is democratic reform.
The real challenge facing the PLO resides in the task of incorporating Islamic and secular visions into a shared blueprint for the creation of a workable civil society. It is doubtful that Yasser Arafat will succeed in creating one without a viable economy and much-needed reforms in PLO institutions. Building a civil society depends on transforming Hamas into a loyal opposition. In light of the prevailing economic decay in the occupied territories and the past authoritarian style of PLO leadership, the prospect for an easy transformation is not promising.
An abrupt and sweeping democratization at the early stage of state building, in the absence of a broad-based consensus and effective civil society, could prove to be disruptive. The experience of many fledgling democracies in the Third World points to the preconditions for genuine pluralism. In cases where favorable underlying socioeconomic conditions have been absent, relapse into outright authoritarianism after only a brief period of democratization has proven all but inevitable. It is unreasonable to expect that political autonomy and elections alone will trigger democratization.
Properly implemented, the second phase of the interim agreement addresses issues central to Palestinian discontent and crucial to reducing the sense of crisis among the Israeli public. The implementation of this new accord must move toward the creation of an effective statehood for the Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza. The transition from administrative self-rule to statehood hinges, among other things, upon a slow but steady building of the institutions and consensus of a civil society. Only time will tell whether the Israelis will be willing to make necessary adjustments and whether Arafat and Fatah will be up to the task.
1 The PLO is not a monolithic bloc of secular nationalist leaders. There exist divisions among Fatah, PFLP, DFLP and the communists. Within Fatah itself there are several divisions as well. For all practical purposes, this study focuses primarily on the secular-Islamic divisions. The PLO is used in the generic sense, referring to secular nationalist leaders of the Palestinians.
2 The Islamic Jihad group claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing which killed 21 persons in central Israel at the Beit Lid junction on January 22, 1995. For further analysis of this incident and its ramifications, see Lisa Beyer, "Can Peace Survive?" Time, February 6, 1995, pp. 32-34. Beyer writes that this last terrorist act has considerably narrowed the maneuvering room for both Rabin and Arafat and has led to closing off Israel to Arab workers as well as pushing the idea of physical "separation" of Israelis and Palestinians. Israelis now seem less in favor of moving their soldiers out of areas of the West Bank to allow Arafat's administration to begin its rule. The Palestinians argue that this would be against the principles agreed upon in the interim phase. One solution, Beyer notes, is to move straight to negotiations on a final solution, which are scheduled to begin in the near future.
3 The Israeli-Jordanian agreement calls for Israel to return most of the 152 square miles of desert and farmland that Israel seized after the 1948 Middle East war. Jordan has agreed to lease certain lands that include Israeli settlements or farms back to Israel. One provision of the agreement gives Jordan a "special role" in the disputed city of Jerusalem. The Palestinians do not recognize Jordan's jurisdiction of the holy sites on the grounds that they are on Palestinian land in East Jerusalem. Following the announcement of this agreement, Arafat appointed Akroma Sabri as the mufti of Jerusalem and Jordanians appointed a leading Muslim jurist, Sheik Abdul Qader Abdeen, as chief cleric of Jerusalem. For more information, see Christian Science Monitor, October 8, 1994, p. 6.
4 See Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1994, p 7.
5 See Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1994, pp. 1 and 4.
6 Mahmood Monshipouri and W. L. Rigsbee, "Intifadah: Prospects and Obstacles in the Aftermath of the Gulf Crisis," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. XV, no. 2, Winter, 1991, pp. 46-67.
7 Joshua Teitelbaum, "The Palestine Liberation Organization, in Ami Ayalon, ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 211-243. See p. 214.
8 Monshipouri and Rigsbee, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
9 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 182-183.
10 Financial Times, December 31/January 1, 1995, Weekend Ff., p. III.
11 Ali Al Jarbawi, "The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel Accord," Muslim World, vol. XXXIII, no. 1-2, January April, 1994, pp. 127-154. See pp. 135-136.
12 See Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 104. Also see Economist, April 23, 1994, p. 43 and The New York Times, October 23, 1994, p. 3E.
13 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the ArabIsraeli Conflict, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 299.
14 Don Peretz, op. cit., pp. 104-105.
15 Ibid., p. 106.
17 See Hanan Awwad, "Gender Issues in Democracy: The Palestinian Women and the Revolution," in Elise Boulding, ed., Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp. 91-97.
18 For the reaction of many secular women against the religious coercion of Hamas, see Joost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 204-205. For a different perspective, see Isiah Abdul Jawwad, "The Evolution of the Political Role of the Palestinian Women's Movement in the Uprising," in Michael C. Hudson, ed., The Palestinians: New Directions, (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), pp. 63-76. Isiah Abdul Jawwad argues that the position of the Palestinian feminist movement is that women's liberation can be obtained by the future leadership of the Palestinian state in response to the role that women have played in the national struggle. However, Abdul Jawwad adds, "It is ironic that the movement aspired to this objective while feminist consciousness is very weak and while the vast majority of women prefer a division of labor between genders, as a result of an education and upbringing which makes it seem normal" (p. 75). For a perspective on the PLO's women's movement, see Economist, September 17, 1994, p. 41.
19 Nadia Hijab, "Palestinian Women: The Key to a Secular, Democratic State," Palestinian Self Government: An Early Assessment, (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, April 1994), pp. 10-14. See p. 12.
20 Sara Roy, "The Seed of Chaos, and of Night: The Gaza Strip after the Agreement," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXIII, no. 3, Spring 1994, pp. 85-90. See p. 87.
21 Muhammad Muslih, "Jericho and Its Meaning: A New Strategy for the Palestinians," Current History, vol. 93, no. 580, February 1994, pp. 72-77. See p. 72.
22 Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), p. 405.
23 Rashid Khalidi, "A Palestinian View of the Accord with Israel," Current History, vol. 93, no. 580, February 1994, pp. 62-66. See p. 62.
24 With 450 Israeli settlers surrounded by more than 100,000 Arabs in a city with sites sacred to both, Hebron presents the toughest challenge and test to the future of negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. See Newsweek, October 2, 1995, p. 48 and The New York Times, October 1, 1995, p. 4E.
25 For more information, see Time, October 9, 1995, pp. 57-58.
26 Christian Science Monitor, September 26, 1995, p. 6.
27 See Ian S. Lustick's comments in David Satterfield, James Zogby and Ian S. Lustick, "Symposium Reexamining the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," Middle East Policy, vol. IV, no. 1 & 2, September 1995, pp. 87-109; see pp. 98-99.
28 Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 1995, p. 6.
29 See Jerome Segal's 20-points proposal in "Roundtable Discussion of an Interim Proposal: A Palestinian State with Sovereignty over Gaza/Jericho and Administrative Autonomy over the West Bank," Middle East Policy, vol. N, nos. 1 & 2, September 1995, pp. 87-109; see also pp. 110-139.
30 See Ahmad S. Khalidi, "Security in a Final Middle East Settlement: Some Components of Palestine National Security," International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, January 1995, pp. 1-18; See p. 13.
31 For further information on the Palestinians in Israeli jails and the torture of detained militant Islamic groups, see Christian Science Monitor, November 22, 1994, p. 7.
32See Alon Ben-Meir's views entitled, "Hamas's Real Agenda: Power Sharing," on the opinion/essays page of the Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1994, p. 19.
33 Ali Al Jarbawi, op. cit., p. 136.
34 Muhammad Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," Middle East Journal., vol. 47, no. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 259-274. See p. 268-269.
35 Ziad Abu-Amr, "Palestinian Political Parties: Between Democracy and Pluralism," in Whither Palestine? The Future of Democracy in Palestine, (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, August 1994), pp. 29-37. See p. 31.
36 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
37 Muhammad Muslih, op. cit., p. 270.
38 Sara Roy, "The Gaza Strip: Past, Present and Future," Current History, vol. 93, no. 580, February 1994, pp. 67-71. See p. 67.
39 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
40 Muhammad Muslih, February 1994, op. cit., p. 73.
41 Ibid., p. 74.
42 Stanley Fischer, "Building Palestinian Prosperity," Foreign Policy, no. 93, Winter 1993- 94, pp. 60-75. See p. 62.
43 Muhammad Muslih, February 1994, op. cit., p. 75.
44 Stanley Fischer, op. cit., p. 62.
45 Muhammad Muslih, February 1994, op. cit., p. 75.
46 Shlomo Avineri, "Sidestepping Dependency, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4, July-August 1994, pp. 12-15.
47 Michael Kelly, "In Gaza, Peace Meets Pathology," The New York 'Times Magazine, November 27, 1994, pp. 56-72, 74, 76, 78-79 and 96-97.
48 Sara Roy, February 1994, op. cit., p. 71.
49 See the interview with Abdallah Bouhabib, "The World Bank and International Aid to Palestine," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXII, no. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 64-74. See pp. 64-68.
50 Stanley Fischer, op. cit., p. 72.
51 See especially the interview with Stanley Fischer, "Economic Transition in the Occupied Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXII, no. 4, Summer 1994, pp. 52-61. See p. 56.
52 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
53 See Christian Science Monitor, September 8, 1994, pp. 1 and 4.
54 For further information on this, see The New York Times, November 27, 1994, p. E3.
55 See Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 1994, p. 20.
56 Jamil Hilal, "PLO Institutions: The Challenge Ahead," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXIII, no. 1, Autumn 1993, pp. 40-60. See pp. 55-58. Hilal writes that according to the "quota" system, each faction had a given number of seats in the PLO leadership institutions and a set representation in the mass organizations, regardless of its size, ideology, influence or appeal among Palestinians. But because positions in the leading public institutions are not filled by elections, it was impossible to determine objectively the degree of support enjoyed by the various political organizations and to implement a system of proportional representation (see p. 53).
57 See Manuel Hassassian, "The Democratization Process in the PLO Ideology, Structure and Strategy," in Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed and Robert L. Rothstein, eds., Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 257-285. See p. 278.
58 Ziad Abu-Amr, op. cit., p. 35.
59 The New York Times, January 21, 1996, pp. 1 and 6.
60 Muhammad Muslih, "Arafat's Dilemma," Current History, vol. 94, no. 588, January 1995, pp. 23-27; see especially p. 27.
61 F or an interesting analysis, see The New York Times, October 23, 1994, p. 3E.
62 Ziad Abu-Amr, "Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism and Democracy," in Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed and Robert L. Rothstein, eds., Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 245-255. See p. 246.
63 Ali Al Jarbawi, op. cit., p. 148.
64 Ibid., p. 151.
65 Adrien Wing, "Palestinian Democracy: Prospects and Impediments," in Palestinian Statehood, (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, March 1994), pp. 13-18. See p. 17.
66 For a brief but an illuminating discussion on this subject, see Sara Roy, "Israelis and Palestinians: No Peace to Thwart," Christian Science Monitor, November 9, 1994, p. 19.
67 William B. Quandt, "The Urge for Democracy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4, July/August 1994, pp. 2-7. See p. 3.
68 Jamal Nassar, "Elections and Popular Participation," Palestinian Self-Government: An Early Assessment, (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, April 1994), pp. 7-9.
69 Edy Kaufman and Shukri B. Abed, "The Relevance of Democracy to Israeli-Palestinian Peace," in Edy Kaufman et al., pp. 41-56. See pp. 46-48.
70 Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4, July-August, 1994, pp. 8-11. See p. 11.
71 Laurie A. Brand, "The Shape of Things to Come: Policy and Politics in the Palestinian State," in Michael C. Hudson, ed., The Palestinians: New Directions, (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), pp. 227-255. See p. 236.
72 See specifically Ziad Abu-Amr, August 1994, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
73 "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll IV," Newsletter, The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, vol. IV, no. 1, January/February 1996, p. 5.
74 Jonathan S. Paris, "When to Worry in the Middle East," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, vol. 37, no. 4, Fall 1993, pp. 533-565. See p. 564.
76 See Christian Science Monitor, December 7, 1994, p. 9.
77 The New York Times, January 29, 1995, p. E-15.
78 Christian Science Monitor, October 31, 1994, p. 2.
79 David Held, "Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?" in David Held, ed., Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 13-53. See p. 40.
80 Human Rights Watch: World Report 1994, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), pp. 304-311.
81 Muhammad Hallaj, "The Refugee Question and the Peace Process," in Palestinian Refugees: Their Problem and Future, (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, October 1994), pp. 9-14.
82 See Graham E. Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism," in Richard K. Betts, ed., Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 49-54. See p. 54.
83 On the U.S. role in the Middle East peace talks, see Michael C. Hudson, "The Clinton Administration and the Middle East: Squandering the Inheritance?" Current History, vol. 93, no. 580, February 1994, pp. 49-54. See p. 54.
84 A growing number of Israeli politicians now concur that neutralizing Hamas requires a political solution. The full resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the inclusion of Hamas in any settlement appear imperative. Yossi Beilin, former Israeli deputy foreign minister, is quoted as saying that Israel "should not rule out negotiating with members of Hamas who disavow violence." (Time, November 7, 1994, p. 43) Some sources have also reported that Sheik Jamil Hamami and Sheik Hussein Abu Kwaki, two clerical leaders of Hamas, have said that they were prepared to open a dialogue with Israel. See Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1994, p. 2.