The Middle East regional grouping with which the United States has developed its most extensive and multifaceted relationship is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The GCC region's prodigious oil reserves have long figured prominently in any public discussion of the area.1 However, the nature of U.S. involvement in the GCC countries in reality is much more diverse and complex than a focus on their energy resources alone would suggest. Although the United States has deployed armed forces to the region on several occasions, most Americans still seem unaware of U.S. interests there other than oil.
The GCC countries have played and will play a major role in regional and world affairs. Broad agreement on this factual premise notwithstanding, the number of scholarly assessments of what the United States gains from its relationships with the GCC countries, and what it is unable to obtain, remains very limited. This article provides such an assessment, albeit mainly from only one part of the equation, i.e., what the GCC as a non-supranational organization and its member countries do and do not contribute to their relationship with the United States.
The sources for this essay are predominantly first-hand observations permitted the author in the course of his having been invited to attend, as an observer, each of the GCC Heads of State Summits since the organization's inception in 1981. They are supplemented by information and insight obtained from more than 200 interviews with GCC Secretariat and GCC member countries' officials and private-sector leaders and from an almost equal number of background briefings, interviews and other sessions with American officials responsible for pursuing U.S. goals in and among the GCC countries.2
THE NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT
I. I. U.S. Strategic Interests
Negativists and positivists alike agree that the United States, for at least half a century, has had several strategic interests related to the Gulf. The four most important have been: (1) to prevent the region's Hormuz Strait and its hydrocarbon resources from falling under the control of a power hostile to the United States; (2) to ensure access for the United States and its allies to the region's markets and especially its energy reserves on manageable terms; (3) to preserve the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all the Gulf states, since local conflicts could invite intervention by a hostile power and/or interfere with the region's production and transportation of oil; and (4) to foster support for U.S. efforts to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Those who view negatively the extent to which GCC states have contributed to the achievement of these goals make the following points in support of their assessment. Looking back to the 1950s before any of the other GCC members were independent, the negativists argue that the largest, most populous and most powerful GCC country, Saudi Arabia, refused to join forces with Western efforts to create and sustain regional defense systems, such as the Baghdad Pact and its successor, the Central Treaty Organization, despite the fact that Riyadh was avowedly anti-communist and opposed to Soviet encroachment in the region.
Further, the negativists argue that even after being directly threatened by Iran in the 1980s and then Iraq in the early 1990s, the GCC governments have not been able to develop the defense cooperation arrangements among themselves into an effective military deterrent to their neighbors. Nor, as a group, have they made much progress in working out the terms for ongoing regional defense coordination with other major Arab countries, such as Egypt and Syria.
Likewise, despite the fact that there are bilateral defense cooperation agreements between the United States and all of the GCC countries except Saudi Arabia, neither have the GCC states been able to reach formal collective agreement with the United States on deployment of forces, pre-positioning of weapons and related material, multilateral military exercises, and other measures that would help to maximize their deterrence and defense capabilities.
The negative assessment holds that, even after being physically threatened and attacked by Iran and Iraq, the GCC remained unable to adopt and follow a unified policy toward Tehran and Baghdad. To be sure, of the six GCC members, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia remained the most opposed to normalization of relations with Baghdad in the absence of its complete compliance with all the UN Security Council resolutions resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
By contrast, other GCC member states, although insisting that Iraq implement the resolutions, have retained ties with Saddam Hussein's government and periodically called for finding a way to ease the effect of the sanctions on the Iraqi populace. In addition, there have been, and remain, differences among the GCC members over how best to deal with Iran. These points only reinforce the negativist view of the entire Gulf region as an unpredictable if not also unstable area.
Other concerns include the expense entailed in ensuring protection of U.S. access to the region's oil, which, the negativists believe, is likely to remain a heavy drain on scarce U.S. military and financial resources. In this regard, many are quick to recall that in 1967 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and in 1973 these two GCC states plus Qatar and the UAE, used their oil as a political weapon against the United States. "These countries also cooperated with other OPEC members in rapidly raising the price of their oil to consumers, setting off worldwide economic dislocations."3
Thus, the negativists ask, "What assurance can there be that, if the United States continues to rely heavily upon imports of Gulf oil, GCC governments, perhaps under less friendly regimes, might not do the same thing again?" Such considerations, they posit, offer a persuasive rationale for diversifying U.S. oil imports away from all the Gulf producers, i.e., not just the GCC countries, but Iran and Iraq as well. Some argue further that such considerations constitute a compelling reason to work toward the ultimate reduction of American dependence on imported oil entirely. The negativists also argue that the GCC states have not contributed as much as they could to political stability and development within their region. The support by some GCC states for a breakaway movement in southern Yemen in 1994 is cited as an example. Such support, they claim, merely prolonged the civil war there and raised questions about the GCC countries' ability to develop a consistent and supportive policy toward Yemen. The negativists also note that the GCC member states have been unable to resolve border disputes to the extent that individual countries have boycotted not only GCC ministerial-level meetings but, as Bahrain did in 1996, a GCC heads-of-state summit. Even worse, Bahrain and Qatar and Saudi Arabia and Qatar have engaged in armed clashes.
Lastly, in terms of major U.S. strategic interests, the negativists complain that the GCC countries persist in enforcing their primary economic boycott of Israel. On such questions as the future status of Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements on expropriated Palestinian land in the Occupied Territories, and other highly controversial issues in the Middle East peace process, the negativists believe that the attitudes and viewpoints of most GCC countries' leaders are at odds with those of many in the United States. They also fault the GCC members for not pressing Syria and Lebanon to reach a peace agreement with Israel and for having manifested a less than overwhelming endorsement of U.S. efforts to move the parties toward a just, durable and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
II. II. U.S. Economic Interests
In faulting the GCC countries for their impact on U.S. economic interests, the negativists highlight several areas of concern in addition to the Arab oil embargo. First, almost all GCC states continue to suffer annual budget deficits caused by oil prices depressed since 1983, lowered return on some foreign investments, and the tremendous expense of paying for Desert Shield/Storm. Kuwait has had the added costs of the reconstruction of its war-ravaged economy, environment and infrastructure. Another concern is "the high percentage of GCC states' GNP spent on security, defense, public enterprises, subsidies and public welfare benefits, not to mention funds consumed by waste, conspicuous consumption and the support of large ruling families." 4
As a consequence of such economic shortcomings, the United States can no longer look to the GCC countries for help with America's own budget deficit through the purchase of U.S. Treasury notes. Neither can the United States any longer count on GCC countries to invest in American securities and real estate or make sizable contributions to international banks and development funds.
Yet another concern is that, in the mid-1990s, GCC governments reduced considerably the level of their direct bilateral foreign economic assistance. Many negativists maintain that continued deficit financing by the GCC states could bring them into competition with the U.S. government and American businesses for loans in international money markets.
Some argue further that the long-term economic viability of the GCC states is questionable. Indeed, how could it be otherwise, given their overall dependence upon a single depletable natural resource? In addition, they believe that technological trends - for example, electric-powered automobiles or nuclear-powered utilities - may result in these countries becoming less important to the United States in the next century.
GCC economic prospects are clouded further by three other phenomena: (1) agricultural production is expensive, heavily subsidized, and relies largely on rapidly depleting, non-renewable groundwater resources; (2) small populations whose training for work in high-tech industries is limited; and (3) the consequent dependence on large numbers of foreign workers, many of whom are not encouraged or allowed to emigrate to the GCC countries for the purpose of becoming citizens or otherwise developing a long-term stake in the GCC states' societies.
Lastly, the negativists are quick to believe that the GCC's efforts at promoting economic integration and rationalization among its members have not gone very far. They correctly note that the reason is twofold: (1) these states still compete more than cooperate in developing infrastructures, utilities and hydrocarbon-based industries; and (2) the volume and value of their trade with each other, in comparison with their economic partners further afield, remains very small.
As in most other regional organizations' efforts to establish customs unions and a common market, GCC visionaries and leaders alike are frequently stymied. Scarcely a day passes when the enthusiasm of even the most proactive and optimistic among them is not subdued as they confront a region-wide reluctance rooted in conservative and parochial interests. In short, the negativist viewpoint holds that in the GCC region economic nationalism remains far more deeply entrenched and vibrant than the will to endorse, let alone implement, notions of supranational authority or shared sovereignty.
III. III. U.S. Political Interests
Many American negativists find considerable fault with the GCC countries' domestic political systems. The force of domestic political opinion has frequently made it difficult for their leaders to pursue pan-GCC foreign-policy objectives toward the United States openly and effectively. For example, all GCC states' economic strategists and planners want to increase the extent of their countries' trade, investment and technology cooperation with the Western world in general, and with the United States in particular. Yet they are keen to avoid granting the American corporate sector the maximum advantages possible or proceeding on a business-as-usual basis until the United States has exercised maximum leadership and influence in bringing about a satisfactory end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some say that the United States must work harder at diminishing the inconsistency in its application of various moral principles and international legal norms on matters of importance to Arabs and Muslims.5
These political difficulties aside, the U.S. and GCC governments have unofficially excluded from their bilateral discourse significant areas of difference and disagreement over their respective internal political systems. Indeed, each would regard any negative commentary by the other as unacceptable intrusion into its internal affairs and would react accordingly. However, although the U.S. and GCC governments have declared their respective domestic political systems off limits to the other, this restraint does not extend to their foreign policies.
In this regard, many negativists maintain that the GCC countries have insufficiently taken into consideration American political interests in inter-Arab and inter-Islamic councils. The extraordinary role of several GCC countries in hosting Israelis involved in the multilateral dimensions of the Arab-Israeli peace talks notwithstanding, they cite the GCC states' inability or unwillingness to take a leading role informally recognizing Israel by name, by concluding peace treaties, and by normalizing relations with the Jewish state to the maximum extent possible without regard to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Negativists also fault (1) the support that some of the GCC countries' citizens give to radical elements in various Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries; (2) their reluctance to stand with the United States and Israel on certain U.N. resolutions, such as the one rescinding the 1975 U.N. General Assembly's "Zionism- is-a-form-of-Racism" Resolution and other U.S. positions protective or exonerative of Israel; and (3) their unwillingness to enter into serious discussions about regional nonproliferation of nuclear weapons until or unless the United States insists that Israel, a nuclear state within their midst, be held accountable to the same criterion, i.e., that it be required to become a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which all the GCC countries have signed but Israel has not.
On balance, however, U.S. criticism of the political component of GCC countries' foreign policies, positions, actions and attitudes vis-a-vis international issues has never been as sharp as that which U.S. officials direct toward numerous other Arab countries. Indeed, as shown below, the benefits the United States derives from the GCC countries' foreign policies far outweigh the few negative attributes alluded to here and elsewhere.
IV. U.S. Commercial Interests
U.S. commercial interests, which have steadily increased in the GCC since the mid-1970s, encompass a growing U.S. need to export American goods and services to the GCC countries, in part, to pay for increasing U.S. imports of oil and petrochemicals from these producers. However, the negativists claim that the GCC governments have made it unnecessarily difficult for Americans to trade, invest and engage in mutually profitable joint ventures in these countries. They charge that if America is the trading partner of choice for these countries, then the GCC states could not be more self-defeating in pursuing that choice.
Among the more consistently articulated points of contention cited by the negativists have been (1) prohibitions in most GCC countries on foreign ownership of real estate and companies; (2) the prohibition on equity participation in petroleum, electricity, and communications companies; (3) the lack of effective Western norms-based dispute-resolution mechanisms; (4) the improving but still insufficiently effective enforcement of laws against copyright, trademark and patent violations; (5) the absence of a common external tariff or a customs union; (6) difficult entry and residency procedures; (7) the limitation of capital markets; (8) the tardy move toward privatization of state-owned industries and services; and (9) the high percentage of GNP spent on security, defense and other non-productive sectors of their societies.
Additional complaints include a legal and bureaucratic system that appears to give unfair advantage to GCC host-country nationals over foreign partners and employees; stringent labeling or quality standards that often keep out American products while admitting those from Europe or Japan; and the uncertain extent to which the GCC countries are truly committed to interstate competition in light of various de facto member-country limitations on cross-border banking, trade and labor movement.
The GCC countries are increasingly aware that many potential American investors have a jaded, pessimistic and, in many cases, erroneous view of the prospects for mutually beneficial trade, investment and joint ventures. Although virtually all of the GCC countries have mounted campaigns to counter this less than positive image, the gap between the problems and their potential solutions remains substantial.
U.S. Defense Interests
Of all the negativists' criticisms, one of the most frequently heard is the GCC's inability thus far to develop greater self-reliance in the area of military preparedness. Many focus on the absence of a more effective pan-GCC system of deterrence and defense against threats to the member countries from within their own neighborhood.
In particular, the negativists fault the GCC countries for (1) their unwillingness to consider granting the United States military bases to defend these countries more effectively; (2) their reluctance to accommodate U.S. logistical and operational needs to the extent U.S. military planners would like (most U.S. military planners believe that a future armed conflict in the GCC region will likely be quite different from the last one, in which the Iraqi invader, in effect, allowed the United States and the allied coalition six months to mobilize and deploy); and (3) their unwillingness to agree on a more unified approach to procurement that would enhance the effectiveness of the GCC armed forces' military equipment and defense systems via specifications standardization and interoperability.
Additional shortcomings include (1) the GCC countries' lukewarm commitment to building a pan-GCC force of sufficient size and strength to enhance the credibility of their collective defense capabilities and their combined national force structures; (2) their reluctance to adopt a unified command-and-control structure and a system for mobilization and deployment that are familiar to the Western forces required to come to their defense; (3) the continuation of border disputes that tend to vitiate political trust and confidence among member countries; and (4) the failure of these states thus far to create fully professional armed forces with promotions and assignments based solely on merit and experience.6
Based on these arguments and perceptions, the negativists declare that the GCC countries cannot (1) hold their own in the strategic context; (2) ensure unhindered U.S. and other foreign access to the region's energy resources; (3) manifest the kind of political commitment their critics consider befitting an ally or partner; (4) muster the will to extend the benefits of a level playing field for America's commercial interests; and (5) bear a greater financial or soldierly share of the burden of defending the region. They therefore conclude that the GCC collectively, and its member countries either singly or jointly, should not be taken seriously in any U.S. calculus of protecting and enhancing American interests within the region.
THE POSITIVE ASSESSMENT
I. U.S. Strategic Interests
In marked contrast, the positivist school of thought argues that, whether strong or weak, proactive or reactive, dynamic or passive, Cold War or no Cold War, the GCC and its member countries have made numerous important contributions to global strategic interests in general and to U.S. and other Western strategic interests in particular. It maintains further that this is likely to continue far into the future. Moreover, the positivists feel strongly that the GCC countries have consistently brought a far greater number of assets to the strategic equation than the negativists are willing to acknowledge. With respect to strategic issues, the positivists do not deny the degree to which the GCC member countries are weak, vulnerable and exposed to the threat of stronger powers bent on subverting their independence, threatening the region's vital maritime arteries and/or sabotaging their energy production facilities. They acknowledge, moreover, that the failure of these countries' governments to resolve intra-GCC border and other disputes impinges negatively on their prospects for more rapid progress in defense cooperation. They also concede the point that such failures do not rule out the interference, in support of one of the disputants, of a power hostile to GCC and/or American interests.
At the same time, however, the positivists appreciate how the GCC countries are compensating for these shortcomings. The words of a former high-ranking GCC official are instructive: "We are under no illusion as to our lack of effective power to dissuade our adversaries. The lack of such power has forced us to adopt a strategy, however, that, on balance, is almost as effective. That is, not having the requisite credible power of our own, we have had no choice but to borrow it from our friends."7
He continued: "We're well aware that the means may not have pleased everyone. However, the end result has been, and continues to be, compatible with our strategic interests and those of our friends. With two important exceptions - the eruptions of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the Kuwait crisis in 1990 - this strategy has been successful. Given the circumstances in which we are placed, it has been our strategy every bit as much as our friends may like to claim that it is their strategy."8
In this light, the positivists fault the negativists for disregarding the fact that a significant number of the strategic constants and more than a few of the variables vis-a-vis the GCC region are not in America's or any other outside country's hands. For example, the globally vital Hormuz Strait that the United States and other nations seek to keep open straddles sea lanes that pass into, through, and out of waters that are not in America's sovereign reach, but in the riparian GCC countries. Their cooperation is absolutely critical for success in any U.S. or other allied country's efforts to protect these waterways.
The same is true of the GCC countries' oil fields, gas-gathering systems, desalination plants, refineries and transportation fleets, harbors and airports, pipelines, military bases and supply depots, armed forces academies, and defense-procurement agencies. Without exception, actual day-today control of virtually every one of these strategic networks and assets is under the effective sovereign, administrative, financial, logistical and operational control of the GCC people themselves.
In taking further exception to the negativists' faulting of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for not joining Western-sponsored defense pacts against the Soviet Union, the positivists argue that Riyadh, often supported by Kuwait, played an important role in rallying the world's broad and critically located Muslim populations against Soviet expansion. This strategic role extended into the long southern frontier of the USSR; across the northern half of Africa, where Moscow repeatedly sought footholds in the last several decades; into those parts of Southeast Asia where communist influence was blunted in the last quarter of a century - Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines; and, more recently, into the leadership and tangible assistance that Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries provided against the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.
The positivists make no claims that the net effect of enhancing the geo-political deterrence and economic well-being of nearly one billion inhabitants of the Islamic world was as crucial as that of their counterparts in Western Europe and Asia in blocking Soviet and mainland Chinese expansion. Rather, they argue that the quite different nature and extent of the grants, concessional financing and in-kind material assistance that the GCC countries provided their Arab and Islamic kinfolk was not without merit and its own success. In combination with other forms of help, it enabled many developing nations' people and their governments to elude Moscow's influence.
The GCC countries' past contributions, insist the positivists, have been in broad accord with U.S. global strategic interests. As to present and future U.S. strategic needs, they argue that the GCC countries' pivotal role in several issues is even more significant. For example, within U.S. planning circles, a broad consensus exists on the GCC countries' central link to U.S. strategic imperatives for arriving at 2020 A.O. with its superpower status and the concomitant benefits intact. In short, these states are viewed as essential to the U.S. ability to defend itself and its interests abroad against would-be adversaries and - the other half of the equation - to steadily improve its standard of living.
The positivists contend they are on solid ground in pointing out that there is little disagreement over the strategy's three underlying assumptions. In order to achieve these twin objectives, it is a firmly held tenet among strategic planners that, for the foreseeable future, the United States has no option but to remain financially, industrially and technologically strong. Economic, and especially financial, strength across the board is, of course, central to the prospects for success.
In 1992 a popular U.S. presidential election bumper sticker proclaimed, "It's the economy, stupid." However, that catchy cliché missed the more important point. Energy, both raw and refined, is far more fundamental than the ill-defined and disputed concept of "economics" and undeniably essential to all three of the strategy's key components. At the root of the energy factor is the GCC region, because it contains and controls more than half of the world's hydrocarbon resources - the key to the strategy's prospects.
Among the world's nearly 200 nation states that are dependent upon oil and gas for their economic growth and development, the United States dwarfs all the others in terms of its privileged and strategic position in relation to the owners of these prodigious energy supplies. As the world's single largest importer and consumer of the GCC region's finite hydrocarbon resources, the United States is more engaged than any other country in the production, refining and marketing of the GCC countries' energy supplies.
II. II. U.S. Economic Interests
U.S. and other countries' economic interests in the GCC region are defined as, first and foremost, assured access to energy resources without regard to price or levels of production. Throughout this century, it has been overwhelmingly Western, and mostly American, oil companies that not only have enjoyed such access but have also occupied the most envied and lucrative positions in the development of the GCC states' oil and gas reserves.9
Despite these powerful U.S. economic advantages, the negativists cannot forgive or forget the 1967 and 1973 Arab oil embargoes and the frequent and sharp OPEC price hikes of the 1970s. They express fear that OPEC (read the GCC and other Arab oil-producing countries) might once again take advantage of a world energy shortage to manipulate oil prices for political or economic ends.
In response, positivists point out that the first of these very damaging blows to U.S. and other Western interests occurred more than a quarter century ago; the latter took place more than two decades ago. Both preceded the GCC's founding. The positivists thus argue that to limit one's focus to those two events and to fail to note that they have not been repeated is worse than having one's line of sight focused solely in the rear view mirror; it is to be held hostage to a past that has been overtaken by a new and profoundly different set of realities.
These realities include the GCC countries' roles and positions during Israel's air attack in the summer of 1981 on the Osirak nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad; during the 1982 Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon; in their response to Israel's and America's surreptitiously providing arms to Iran (the Iran-Contra affair) in the midst of the Iran Iraq war; and in their reaction to Israel's effort to forcibly repress the Palestinian intifada and flout international law, consensus and the long-standing policies of the United States and virtually all other countries regarding the need to determine through negotiations the ultimate status of sovereignty over Jerusalem. What is especially significant about these crises, laced as they were with numerous anti-Arab and anti-Muslim provocations, is that the GCC countries did not proclaim another oil embargo against the United States or other Western countries in spite of the latter's continuing strong support for Israel.
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.N. resolution barring purchases of either Kuwaiti or Iraqi oil as long as Iraq occupied Kuwait, the GCC member countries' actions had a positive impact globally. Their decisiveness and boldness achieved not only the GCC countries' own economic goals, but also those of their allies and partners, including the United States. The specifics are worth recalling because what several GCC governments did enabled the United States, other members of the allied coalition, and the GCC members themselves to achieve their common strategic and economic objectives.
The GCC countries met with one another, and the four who are members of OPEC - Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - called for an emergency meeting of OPEC to obtain, through consultation and consensus, the necessary support to legitimize increased oil production to compensate for the U.N. embargo. In calling the meeting, the GCC members risked further alienation from fellow OPEC members - Iraq, Libya and other Arab countries - who only days earlier had voted against the resolution in the Arab League sponsored by the GCC governments that called for the mobilization and deployment of Arab forces in the GCC countries' defense.
Despite being outnumbered and outgunned by their opponents, the four GCC OPEC members obtained authorization to raise production levels commensurate with the embargo-induced shortfall, thereby bringing demand for oil back into balance with supply and ensuring a steady flow at manageable prices. By moving quickly to compensate for the deficit in oil production, the GCC countries had a profound and salutary influence on the manner in which the world responded to the energy dimension of the conflict.
The positivists also point out the beneficial role that the GCC oil-producing countries have played, and continue to play, inside OPEC. They note that the four GCC members of OPEC have repeatedly exercised a restraining influence within OPEC councils and have been a consistently moderate force for two decades, working to keep prices in tandem with, or lower than, rates of inflation.
Unlike the negativists, the positivists recognize that the benefits the United States derives from an economic relationship with the GCC countries extend beyond oil. They point out that the GCC countries have provided substantial investment capital to both the public and private sectors of the United States and other industrial economies for most of the past 20 years.
Such investment has played a significant role in the overall well-being of millions of Americans, contributed to American corporate vitality, indirectly augmented federal and state tax revenues, constituted employment for several million Americans, and provided funds which enable research and development and lower overall production and per-unit costs for the defense, civil-aviation, telecommunications and power-generating industries - all of which are fundamental components of U.S. strategic objectives. No remotely comparable contribution can be attributed to any, let alone six, of the more than 120 other countries that, together with the GCC states, comprise the developing world.
Moreover, for most of the GCC's existence, its member countries as a group have been second only to Japan as the greatest underwriters of the American national deficit. A corollary benefit from their having invested billions of dollars in U.S. Treasury securities is that U.S. interest rates have remained relatively low and stable.
The positivists also appreciate that the GCC countries remain key to continued international support for the dollar, the currency in which the GCC countries' oil and gas exports are denominated. Such support, even when the dollar has been weak, has given the United States a privileged and much-envied advantage over all other oil-importing countries. The positivists highlight the fact that this support has been, and continues to be, essential to the ongoing stability of the dollar in monetary transactions and to the strength of the American financial system worldwide.
In addition, U.S. strategic, economic, political, commercial and military interests have all benefited from the extent to which the GCC countries have been major providers of economic and other forms of development assistance to the world's poorer nations. As a percentage of their gross national products and their per capita incomes, the GCC member states have long ranked second to none in their philanthropy to the less fortunate, as their grants, concessional assistance, and in-kind aid to more than 80 developing countries attests.
To be sure, for much of the period since 1991, fluctuating oil prices, the costs of Desert Shield/ Storm and Kuwaiti reconstruction, inter alia, have resulted in major cutbacks in the GCC countries' foreign aid. Also, some former aid recipients, notably Jordan and Yemen, were dropped for political reasons. However, the GCC states' charitable and international development agencies have continued to operate, with beneficial results for such economically needy and strategically important countries as Egypt and Syria as well as for numerous institutions serving the humanitarian and development needs of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation.
On the economic side of the GCC-U.S. relationship, one of the GCC countries' greatest contributions is in the area of financial burden-sharing. For example, the GCC countries' defrayal of U.S. and other allied costs during Desert Shield/Storm was, a major contribution to the reversal of Iraq's aggression, the liberation of Kuwait and the defense of the GCC countries.
Indeed, with the possible exception of the NATO alliance and the Organization of American States, no other regional grouping of countries was as well positioned as the GCC states to cover most of the costs associated with their defense in the Iran-Iraq war, in the 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis, and in the October 1994 and Fall 1995 renewals of Iraq's threat to Kuwait. Had the GCC countries been unable to contribute in this manner, the international coalition of forces might not have been as forthcoming or comprised nearly 34 nations.
Certainly, in debating the extent to which the United States should become involved in reversing Iraq's aggression against Kuwait in 1990, the negativists were quick to complain that the United States had no business mounting an operation so massive and of such uncertain duration in the absence of guarantees that Americans would not bear the costs alone. The need to deal with the American national debt, the perennial U.S. budgetary deficit, the hope of many for a "peace dividend" for the then-forthcoming troop reductions in Europe - these and other causes and campaigns were backed by powerful U.S. domestic interest groups that weighed into the debate, mainly on the negative side, about whether the United States was right to respond to the Kuwait crisis in the way and to the extent that it did.
In rebuttal, the positivists say that their opposing arguments in favor of the massive U.S. mobilization and deployment have been vindicated. They insist that one should not lose sight or make light of what the GCC countries contributed during the crisis. They argue that had the international coalition not been able to deal quickly and effectively with this unfolding monetary dynamic of the crisis in its earliest days, there is little doubt that Iraq would have calculated differently and probably acted much more adventurously than it did following its invasion of Kuwait. In meeting this challenge, the GCC countries and their supporters demonstrated that the financial component of mounting a credible deterrence and defense can be as important as the military component. The GCC countries' cooperation on oil supplies and policies during the Kuwait crisis was a major factor in bringing the conflict to an end.
In addition to providing free fuel, water, utilities and other provisions for aircraft, ships and land-based vehicles, the GCC countries contributed billions of dollars in cash to cover a substantial portion of other costs incurred in responding to these conflicts and crises, including the deployments themselves, weapons and equipment maintenance, and aircraft leasing. They also spared no effort, along with the United States, in persuading· Japan, Germany and other European Community countries to assume a significant part of the expense entailed in assisting the countries most hurt as a result of enforcing the U.N.-mandated embargo in the Kuwait crisis. In so doing, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen - the four hardest hit by the enforcement of the sanctions - plus Bangladesh, Eastern Europe, India, Morocco and the Philippines, had their plight eased significantly.
Lastly, the positivists emphasize the important and very costly logistical and operational decisions that the GCC countries and their allies took to deny Iraq any economic benefits from its actions. Pursuant to the U.N.-sanctioned embargo against oil sales from Iraq or occupied Kuwait, Saudi Arabia shut two pipelines that had previously carried Iraqi oil through the Kingdom to export terminals on the Red Sea. Turkey, which sided with the GCC countries throughout the crisis and beyond, also closed two pipelines that had carried Iraqi oil to a terminal on the Mediterranean. Ships carrying Iraqi oil were denied entry to any of the GCC countries' ports. The multinational naval forces, powered by free GCC countries' fuel, followed up on these decisive actions and effectively prevented tankers from delivering Iraqi or Kuwaiti oil or oil products.
Returning to their initial economic premise, the positivists rest their case by asking: What might have happened had the GCC countries not acted to limit the impact of Iraq’s aggression on world access to petroleum supplies, important as such access is to petroleum prices and to world economic and political stability?
III. U.S. Political Interests
The domestic political structures, systems and dynamics of the GCC countries and the United States are but half of any equation that seeks to evaluate the political component of the GCC-U.S. relationship. The other half, which both parties agree is more legitimately debatable, is external and rooted in their respective foreign policies.
The positivists argue that, except for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the plight of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya and elsewhere, the GCC countries' foreign policies have more often than not paralleled or complemented U.S. and other Western objectives in the international arena. Moreover, the nature and orientation of these countries' international relations since the establishment of the GCC have been moderate, conventional and predictable, as well as broadly compatible with most of the categories of the U.S. and other Western interests examined herein.
Examples of the GCC's moderating behavior abound - in the outcomes of GCC summit meetings and the summits and other meetings of the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), OPEC, and the U.N., the four most important international organizations in which GCC countries' foreign policies are manifested. In support of this view, positivists advance the following arguments:
(1) Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the GCC's and the GCC countries' contributions to a peaceful settlement have been far greater over a far longer period of time than is generally known. For example, at pan-Arab summits in Fez in 1982, in Algiers in 1988, and in Casablanca in 1989, the GCC countries had a profound impact on Arab League deliberations on how best to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their proactive and forceful support of a peaceful settlement ultimately contributed to the PLO's recognition of Israel, its renunciation of terrorism, and its acceptance of a two-state solution - a strategic shift in policy from armed confrontation to a political and diplomatic resolution.
The Madrid Conference in September 1991, at which the GCC countries were represented, launched the most sustained Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace talks to date. Subsequently, the GCC representatives have been first and foremost among all other non-disputant Arab parties in signaling support for the peace process. With minimal fanfare and in keeping with their traditional political values of moderation, balance and low-key style, GCC representatives have been present at each meeting of Arabs and Israelis engaged in the multilateral tracks of the peace process on issues of arms control, water, the environment, regional economic development and refugees.
The GCC itself has been instrumental in arranging in Bahrain, Oman and Qatar the first-ever official meetings of Israeli delegations with GCC countries' and other Arab states' delegations. In the fall of 1994, all six GCC governments announced their formal rescission of the secondary and tertiary categories of the Arab League's fifty-year economic boycott of American and other foreign firms that do business with Israel. They also participated with Israelis in a major international business conference in Morocco shortly afterwards and, subsequently, in Jordan and Egypt, with Qatar scheduled to be the venue in 1997. In addition, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have surpassed all Arab, Middle Eastern, Islamic, and other developing nations in the amount of economic assistance they have pledged in support of the Palestinian Authority, the principal Palestinian governmental body engaged in the transfer of Israeli colonial domination and control to Palestinian self-rule.
(2) In the interplay of other subregional political dynamics at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, the GCC countries have been similarly effective as a moderating and mediating force. For example, they have been consistently supportive of the 1989 Saudi Arabia mediated Taif Accord to amend the Lebanese constitution. They and many others, including the United States, reason that in no other way will Lebanon's legitimate government be able to consolidate its authority. They also worked diligently with the international community to facilitate the successful release of their own and other hostages, including Americans, in Lebanon.
Regarding Syria, the GCC states have been more proactive than any other countries in pursuing policies of "constructive engagement" with the Damascus regime. Within days of the liberation of Kuwait in March 1991, the six GCC foreign ministers, together with their counterparts from Egypt and Syria, convened in Damascus to begin forging what they insist must be the basis for a new Arab order better than the one that broke down at the time of the Kuwait crisis.
To be sure, many negativists have dismissed the resulting Damascus Declaration as inconsequential, mainly because its envisioned cooperation in matters pertaining to defense has yet to come to fruition. However, the declaration is mainly concerned with matters of a political nature, especially those which, in the absence of consensus, could become contentious and, unresolved, might lead to intra-regional acrimony and even armed confrontation. In pursuit of these components of the Damascus Declaration and subsequent communiques pertaining to issues of economic reform, development and enhanced regional trade and investment, the eight foreign ministers - the GCC plus two- continue to meet biannually. In the process, the GCC countries have helped to forge a significant degree of political balance among their key allies within the League of Arab States. At the same time, they have added important geostrategic and geopolitical depth and balance to their relationships with Iran and Iraq.10
(3) Further afield, in I 987 the GCC heads of state and foreign ministers worked harder than any other Arab leaders to bring about a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco, previously at odds with one another for I 3 years over the former Spanish ("Western") Sahara territory. The rapprochement and growing North African admiration for the GCC countries' achievements in economic and political cooperation paved the way for the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union - a grouping of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
(4) With regard to Egypt, the most populous Arab country, a major center of Arab and Islamic culture and one of the region's strongest military powers, the constructive political role that the GCC and its member countries have played has been no less significant. In the aftermath of the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, which caused Egypt's expulsion from the Arab League and the OIC, the GCC countries (albeit not until nearly a decade later) were among the leading forces for politically reintegrating Egypt into the Arab world, resuscitating Egypt's regional position and prestige, and paving the way for its readmission into the OIC and the Arab League. Here, again, much broader international interests than those of the GCC and the U.S. were served.
(5) In the Gulf itself, the GCC countries have played a series of critical roles that have contributed directly to their own and others' strategic objectives with regard to enhancing regional security. For example, their collective role in providing continuous logistical, operational and financial support for the 1987-88 Gulf ship-protection ("reflagging") scheme helped to bring about the 1988 cease fire in the Iran-Iraq War and to ensure freedom of navigation in the region.
Overlooked by many in the process was a pan-Arab political and diplomatic milestone: this security action, which the GCC countries persuaded their Arab colleagues to accept at the 1987 pan-Arab summit in Jordan, represented the first Arab consensus in history in support of an American or any other foreign military presence in the region. Subsequently, this consensus was extended and enhanced through the five bilateral defense cooperation agreements noted earlier, which individual GCC states have signed with the United States.
IV. U.S. Commercial Interests
While the positivists acknowledge that most of the limitations and shortcomings noted by the negativists are valid, they argue that equally valid, but much less widely known and understood, is the premier position of the United States as the trading partner of choice for most of the GCC countries. Even where the United States is not in first place - in Oman and the UAE, for example - it frequently occupies a niche among these countries' major trading partners.
Moreover, although the United States has experienced overseas trade deficits overall in recent years, trade with the GCC countries has frequently yielded a surplus. In the mid-1990s, U.S. annual exports in commercial goods and services to the GCC region averaged $12 billion and imports approximately $13 billion. Based on U.S. Department of Commerce figures that one billion dollars of exports equals 20,000 American jobs, such exports supported more than 260,000 U.S.jobs and were the primary source of livelihood for nearly 1.2 million Americans (based on four in a family). In 1995 alone, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, AT&T, and General Electric signed agreements with Saudi Arabia valued at $11 billion. Annual U.S. defense sales to the GCC countries constituted additional billions of dollars in income to the American defense industry and were the source of primary, high-paying jobs for tens of thousands more Americans.
Additionally, the positivists point out that the more than 700 U.S.-affiliated companies operating in the GCC states employ 16,000 Americans and are the direct means of support for more than 50,000 American dependents in the GCC region. Here perspective is important: the value of U.S. private-sector investments in the GCC economies represents half the world's investment in the GCC region.
These investments pay more than dividends; they are critical to the economic growth and standard of living in the United States. Again, context is essential: the number of U.S.-GCC joint-venture commercial arrangements exceeds by far those of any other country. The positivists suggest that one should not lose sight of the fact that, cumulatively, these commercial features have made, and continue to make, their mark on a much broader American national interest: U.S. trade with the GCC states helps substantially to reduce the overall U.S. trade deficit.
The positivists note that, since the GCC countries promote free-market economies and private ownership and their merchants have long manifested an enviable commercial acumen, many U.S. companies have a competitive edge in GCC markets. They are also keen to point out that, as thousands of GCC citizens are graduates of American institutions of higher education, there is also a broad-based preference for U.S. technology, standards, specifications and management techniques.
In support of their argument, the positivists emphasize that the array of incentives and benefits for U.S. and other foreign firms to do business in the GCC remains extensive. They include: (1) free or heavily subsidized fuel, utilities and water; (2) substantial financial assistance; (3) full repatriation of profits; (4) extended tax holidays; (5) tariff exemptions for capital imports; (6) no personal taxation; (7) free land use in specialized industrial zones; (8) offshore banking arrangements; and (9) free-trade zones.
Finally, it is increasingly apparent to American corporate leaders that the GCC is becoming one market instead of six. Although initially considered a limited market in terms of consumer goods and services, the GCC region is rapidly becoming a hub for trade, services and investment opportunities in the eastern Mediterranean, the Indian subcontinent, East Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia - a mega market that embraces more than one billion people.
V. U.S. Defense Interests
To ensure that they are never again vulnerable to an external threat, the GCC countries have done what no other Arab nations or any other developing countries have ever done - forged a series of Defense Cooperation Agreements with the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia. Negotiated over a three-year period in the aftermath of the 1990-91 Kuwait crisis, the agreements have in common a commitment by the respective GCC countries to (a) pre-position vital military equipment to be used in defending the GCC country signatory to the agreement; (b) conduct regular exercises and maneuvers with the non-GCC country partner; and (c) to extend such other assistance as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
The positivists unabashedly defend the value of these U.S.-GCC defense arrangements for the region. They argue forcefully that the agreements' contribution toward enhancing GCC and broader Gulf security cannot be overestimated.11
Although the agreements fall short of formal basing arrangements and are considerably less than formal treaty commitments, they constitute an unambiguous signal, particularly to Baghdad and Tehran, of U.S. and allied coalition determination to support the GCC ember countries' defense.12 They further denote the GCC countries' determination to do whatever is necessary to uphold their inalienable right to self-preservation. More than drawing lines in the sand, they demarcate no-trespassing points in the sky and sea as well.13
Since the signings, these agreements have worked. Joint military exercises between members of the Allied coalition and the GCC countries have increased to an all-time high; military training programs in the GCC states of the United States and other countries have expanded at an unprecedented rate; and U.S.-GCC military cooperation has intensified to a degree that ten years ago virtually no one thought possible.14
The most dramatic manifestation of the efficacy of these agreements' has already occurred twice - once in response to Iraq's movement of troops in a threatening manner toward Kuwait in October 1994, and again in reaction to a possible similar threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in August 1995. The rapid integration of the brigade-level pre-positioned equipment in Kuwait and other defense materiel stored elsewhere in the GCC region in combination with the other benefits attributed to these agreements was decisive in ending these episodes.15
If such agreements succeed in ushering in an era of regional peace and stability in the Gulf, it will not be because of the United States or the other great powers by themselves. It will also be because of what the GCC countries brought to the table in the form of military, financial, logistical and other infrastructural assets. Not least, it will be because of the low-key, behind-the-scenes contributions of the GCC itself as a forum within which regional perceptions and priorities can gain consensus and other forms of support.
Even without allowing the United States formal military bases in the region, the positivists insist that the GCC countries' contributions to their own and allied countries' defense requirements are considerable. Compared to what any other grouping of developing countries might contribute to confront similarly daunting challenges to their defense, they are immense. Moreover, in 1987, the GCC states, in concert with the United States, followed by Great Britain and France, helped to line up additional support in the U.N. Security Council, Europe and the rest of the international community to pressure Iran to accept Resolution 598. This unanimously adopted U.N. peacekeeping resolution, the first since the Korean War, accommodated collective pressure for a cease fire in one of this century's longest international conflicts.
The positivists argue further that throughout the Iran-Iraq war and Desert Storm, the GCC countries' assistance to the armed forces of friendly foreign powers and their quiet cooperation with the multinational coalition were critical. Saudi Arabia used its AWACS to monitor and help protect Kuwait's U.S.-reflagged tankers, flew its F-15 aircraft to protect the Kingdom's and America's AWACS, and, within its territorial waters, kept mines out of the path of vessels from countries all over the world. Such assistance and cooperation protected the interests not only of the kingdom, but of more than 100 other countries whose individuals, investments, and interests in the region were also threatened.
The positivists cite additional facts that remain little known to most Americans. For example, when the USS Stark was attacked by Iraq in May 1987, Bahrain's navy rescued American sailors who would otherwise have drowned. Further afield, at the southernmost end of the GCC region, Oman allowed U.S. aircraft emergency landings, thereby saving the lives of37 American pilots. In the face of security threats from Iran, which had thousands of nationals working in the seven emirates, the UAE allowed Iran-damaged U.S. naval vessels to be repaired in its shipyards.
Looking to the future, the GCC and its member countries are attempting to construct a credible regional defense structure based on deterrence which acknowledges that responsibility for the security of the member countries - as opposed to the main shipping lanes, lying in international waters - resides with the countries themselves. The GCC's modest, 10,000-man joint force consists of units from all six countries and is stationed at Hafr al-Batin, a settlement near the Saudi Arabian border with Kuwait. The force is being expanded to 25,000.
True, such a number is likely to remain inadequate to deter a menacing power with an army 20 times its size, such as Iraq's or Iran's. It is also correct that the U.S.-GCC countries' defense-cooperation agreements obligate the United States to intervene on behalf of the GCC states against external threats, especially with the Clinton administration's emphasis on the "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran, which by default or design strategically attaches the United States to the GCC countries.
The positivists counter, however, that the mere existence and readiness of the GCC's joint force telegraphs an important message to Baghdad, Tehran and all others in the international community: an attack on any one of the GCC countries will be considered by the other five as an attack upon them all. As such, the force underscores the GCC countries' commitment to collective security. Moreover, the fact that the force is being strengthened and expanded is likely to facilitate the highly political task of reestablishing another allied coalition in support of the GCC countries' right to self-defense.
Demographic, industrial and technological constraints notwithstanding, since 1983 all six GCC countries have participated in several joint military exercises and bilateral maneuvers. Recognizing the constraints of their limited populations for building and sustaining large land forces, all six have focused on augmenting, improving, and effectively coordinating their air-defense network.
The positivists also appreciate the extent to which the GCC and its member countries played major geopolitical and politico-military roles with other Arab and Islamic nations in the effort to free Kuwait from Iraqi aggression. In addition to turning to their U.S. and European partners for help, the GCC countries' leaders successfully enlisted the military participation of Egypt and Syria in Desert Shield/Storm. This broadened the base of the allied coalition, demonstrated that other key Arab states opposed Iraq's aggression, and made Desert Storm more palatable to the international community.
Lastly, the positivists find it reassuring that GCC military leaders acknowledge the crucial necessity of enhancing the allied coalition's capabilities for rapidly deploying to the area. As the United States is farthest away from the GCC region, the challenge of being rapidly deployable is daunting. Effective military strategy requires that as much as possible of the needed materiel be in place before intervention.16 Defense equipment and systems not in place have never deterred anyone.
In evaluating the U.S.-GCC relationship in terms of its overall value to stated U.S. strategic, economic, political, commercial and defense interests, it is clear that assessments differ widely. If the viewpoints of the negativists and positivists are given equal weight, the conclusion is obvious: the GCC and its members can be likened to a glass that is both filling and leaking. However, a more nuanced conclusion is necessary. First, it is important to understand that underpinning the negativists' and positivists' disagreement, are their differences in perception and interpretation. They differ not only in their consideration of different facts and in their utilization of different frames of reference and analysis, but, also, in their postulation of different priorities within the categories of interests examined.
A net assessment of the GCC and its members in terms of U.S. interests does not differ fundamentally from the net assessments that one might make of NATO, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Analysts do not have a unified opinion about the impact on American interests of those organizations either. Individual biases and preoccupations vary; realities are ever-changing; relationships among states are dynamic and even volatile. One need only consider the difficulties that some of the aforementioned associations and their members have encountered in dealing with the former Yugoslavia, with Cuba and Haiti, with Rwanda and Somalia, and with the international drug traffic to appreciate that the GCC and its member countries are not unique in their limitations.
From the practical perspective of the U.S. national interest, the GCC glass is more half-full and filling than half-empty and leaking. The strategic and economic strengths are simply undeniable. The combination of geological realities, energy economics and the exercise of national sovereignty - always a potentially volatile mixture - is likely to ensure the GCC countries' importance in regional and global affairs for quite some time to come. They have an abundant supply of vital energy; they lie astride a crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa; and they are critical not only to the Western alliance, but too much of the rest of the world as well.
* A version of this essay appears in David W. Lesch (ed.), The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Westview Press, 1996). The author would like to thank Jean Abi Nader, Lucius D. Battle, Harold J. Bernsen, David Mack, Malcolm C. Peck and especially Brooks Wrampelmeier for helpful comments in response to earlier drafts.
1 See, for example, the author's "Energy: The Gulf Region's Engine of Development," in Special Supplement on Saudi Arabia, The Wall Street Journal, July 28, 1989, p. 1.
2 A condition insisted upon by virtually all of these officials, Arab as well as American, is that they not be quoted or otherwise mentioned as a source by name or position.
3 Author's interview in December 1994 with a retired, former career U.S. Foreign Service Officer posted for a total of eight years to U.S. Embassies in three GCC countries during the period examined in this paper.
5 See Robert G. Lawrence, U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia: A Failure in Perspective, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), National Security Essay, Series 84-1. Former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball has written that during the period 1970-1991 in the UN Security Council, the United States "cast 69 vetoes, of which 39 were devoted to avoiding even mild censure of Israel. In practically all cases where it has used its veto to protect Israel. America has acted alone. Even such friendly nations as Great Britain and France have refused to join in our Israeli-inspired vetoes, and have either voted for the relevant resolution or abstained." George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, /947 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992) p. 307.
6 For an account of different schools of thought within the GCC counties on these matters, see John Duke Anthony, The Dynamics of GCC Summitry Since the Kuwait Crisis (Washington, D.C.: U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee, Occasional Paper Series, No. 2, 1993), pp. 2-9.
7 Author's interview with Abdalla Y. Bishara, GCC Secretary-General (1981-1992), September 1987.
9 See Joseph C. Story, U.S.-Arab Relations: The Economic Dimension (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Policy Association and the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, 1985).
10 See the official Arabic text and English translation in Damascus Declaration/or Coordination and Cooperation Among the Arab States, Secretariat General, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf(Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), Articles One and Two (1) A-C, pp. 5-9. See also John Duke Anthony, "Betwixt War and Peace: The 12th GCC Heads of State Summit," in Middle East Insight, Vol. VIII, No. 6 (July-October, 1992), pp. 54-61.
11 See U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, "U.S. Security Policy in the Gulf," remarks to the Middle East Policy Council, Washington, D.C., December 7, 1994. For an early analysis of a U.S., GCC, and other allied coalition countries' system of deterrence backed by credible defense capabilities, see Michael Collins Dunn, Anthony Cordesman, John Duke Anthony, et al., A Postwar Gulf Defense System (Washington, D. C.: Coalition for Postwar U.S. Policy in the Middle East, 1991).
12 See the author's "After the Gulf War: The GCC and the World," in Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed., The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992), pp. 121-140; also, the author's "If Our Friends Are Weak, So Are We" in President's Report, National Council on U.S. Arab Relations (Washington, D.C.), Vol., VIII, No. 1 (Winter-Spring, 1993), pp. 1-3, and 16.
14 Author's interviews in October 1994 with U.S. armed forces commanders whose units responded to the threat; also, Perry, op. cit.