Dr. Bahgat is a professor of national security at the National Defense University.
The Middle East has never failed to amaze observers who follow it closely. In the last several months, news about the Iranian-Saudi cold war, the rift between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Washington's support to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has dominated the headlines. At the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in New York, April 27-May 22, these parties all took significantly different positions.
Since the first and only use of atomic bombs in 1945, the fear of nuclear-weapons proliferation has intensified. Many policy makers and scholars have argued that, without global efforts to stop or slow the process, dozens of countries will acquire a nuclear arsenal. After lengthy and complicated negotiations, a majority of countries signed the NPT in 1968; the treaty entered into force two years later. Article VII states, "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."1 This is particularly relevant to the Middle East. Israel, which has never signed the NPT, is believed to be the only nuclear power in the region. Arab countries, led by Egypt, have never accepted this Israeli nuclear monopoly, nor has Iran. Since the mid-1970s, they have sought, unsuccessfully, to pressure Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, join the NPT and establish a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone (MENWFZ).
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Five NWFZs have been created by regional agreements: in Latin America and the Caribbean (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (1992 Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korea), Central Asia (1995 Treaty of Bangkok) and Africa (1996 Pelindaba Treaty). Mongolia has a special internationally recognized nuclear-weapons-free status, and the Treaty of Antarctica prohibits all military use of the continent. In addition, there are treaties that ban nuclear weapons on the seabed and in outer space. Thus, in the last few decades, NWFZs have become an essential part of the global nuclear-nonproliferation regime.
Different dynamics created the appropriate conditions for the establishment of each of these NWFZs. As Mohamed ElBaradei, former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), argues, "Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues and NWFZs are so beneficial."2
The idea of NWFZs arose in the mid-1950s in response to growing tension between major global powers and threats of escalating conflicts, particularly in Europe. The Soviet Union introduced the idea of a NWFZ in Central Europe at the UN General Assembly in 1956. Two years later, Poland made a similar proposal, the Rapacki Plan, named after the country's foreign minister, Adam Rapacki. The Polish government was mainly concerned about the deployment of American nuclear weapons in West Germany and Soviet nuclear weapons on Polish territory. Given the intense strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Rapacki Plan was rejected. Still, several of its principles have served as guidelines for later NWFZ negotiations.3
Efforts to establish NWFZs in the Mediterranean and northern Europe in the 1960s failed for similar reasons. The breakthrough came in February 1967, when the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed at a regional meeting of Latin American countries in a neighborhood of Mexico City. The treaty came into force in April 1969 and has since been signed and ratified by all 33 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. The parties agreed not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries.4
In August 1985, the South Pacific Forum, comprising the 13 independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific region, endorsed the testing of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga) and opened it for signature. The treaty bans the manufacture, possession, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device in the parties' territories. It also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea.
In the mid-1980s, Indonesia and Malaysia proposed the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). However, opposition from some members in the Association of South East Asian Nations slowed the drafting and signing of a treaty. In December 1995, 10 Southeast Asian states signed the SEANWFZ Treaty (the Treaty of Bangkok). Under the treaty, the state parties are committed not to conduct, receive or give assistance in the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession or control over any nuclear explosive device by any means. They also agreed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other or within the zone.
The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) was approved in June 1995 at a meeting of the heads of African states and governments (held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) and was subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly. The treaty is largely based on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Summit of the Organization of African Unity held in Cairo in 1964. The treaty prohibits the stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device in the territories of its parties, which are committed to applying the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment in order to prevent theft and unauthorized use. The treaty also prohibits armed attack against nuclear installations in the zone and the dumping of any radioactive waste. Finally, the treaty promotes the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development.
Since 1997, the leaders of five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have negotiated a treaty on a NWFZ in their region (CANWFZ). At a summit of the leaders of the five states, the Almaty Declaration was issued endorsing the creation of CANWFZ. This was followed by the formation of working groups that began drafting a treaty establishing the zone. In September 2006, the leaders of the five states officially signed the treaty. They accepted IAEA safeguards on their nuclear material that require meeting international recommendations regarding security of nuclear facilities. This is particularly important, given the concern that nuclear materials could be smuggled from the region. They also agreed to forbid the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of any nuclear explosive device. A major purpose of the zone is to address environmental issues, since various stages of the nuclear-weapons production process took place in the region during the Soviet era.
To sum up, the experience of these five NWFZs suggests two crucial criteria for the successful establishment of a NWFZ: a common historical understanding among regional states and a manageable relationship with the five recognized nuclear-weapons states. Stated differently, deeply rooted hostility among regional states and conflict with one or more of the nuclear-weapons states are likely to complicate the creation of NWFZs. These conclusions largely explain the failure to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East.
EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Middle East has experienced numerous military conflicts in the last several decades: wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003). These major confrontations as well as others of smaller scale are both symptoms and causes of deeply rooted insecurity and political instability, aggravating a general sense of internal and external security. In response, several major Middle Eastern powers have engaged in arms races, both conventional and unconventional. This militarization, particularly the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has further increased military and political tensions and the risks of catastrophic wars. A NWFZ in the Middle East has been sought in order to prevent such a nightmare.
It is widely believed that Israel built its first nuclear devices in the late 1960s. Despite serious efforts to compete, other regional powers have failed to achieve nuclear parity with the Jewish state. A proposal to establish a MENWFZ was meant to close this asymmetrical military balance. Thus, since 1974, Egypt and Iran have called for the denuclearization of the entire Middle East. This proposal was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 3263 in 1974. Initially, Israel opposed the resolution, but in 1980 it produced its own version. The resolution has since been adopted unanimously each year without a vote. The thrust of these resolutions can be summarized as follows: The UN General Assembly invited Middle Eastern states to adhere to the NPT and to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards; pending the establishment of a NWFZ, the UN called on Middle Eastern states to not develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories of nuclear devices.5
Frustrated with the lack of progress on the creation of a MENWFZ and the continuing military imbalance in the region, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1990 introduced a new initiative to broaden the concept of NWFZ to a zone free of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ). Besides the call for the prohibition of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, the initiative urged the implementation of verification measures to ensure full compliance by all parties.6
The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War had further underscored the danger of stockpiling WMD in the Persian Gulf region and the potential of a spillover to the entire Middle East. To counter these challenges, UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) noted that the disarmament of Iraq should be a step toward "the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from WMD and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons."7
In order to enlist Arab cooperation in the war against Iraq, President George H.W. Bush promised that once Kuwait was liberated and the Gulf crisis was resolved, the United States would focus on a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Accordingly, the Madrid peace process was initiated in late 1991. The process brought Israel, the Palestinians and 13 Arab states to the negotiating table for the first time under the auspices of the United States and Russia. One outcome of the multilateral discussions was the formation of a working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS). ACRS, along with four other multilateral working groups, was created to complement the bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Between 1992 and 1995, ACRS held six sessions. The parties focused on confidence-building measures including "creating a communication network across the region, coordinating search and rescue operations, and establishing regional security centers."8 Such measures were expected to establish and enhance cooperation and common interests among all involved parties and eventually reduce tensions, laying the foundation for a lasting peace.
At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia introduced a resolution, agreed upon by all NPT parties, endorsing a MENWFZ. The resolution sets forth the following objectives: (1) the creation of a MENWFZ; (2) the accession to the NPT by any state in the region that has not yet done so; and (3) the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East. Still, despite this broad global consensus, no progress was made.9
The 2010 Review Conference regretted that little progress had been achieved towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution. It underscored the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It called on all states in the Middle East to accede to the treaty. Specifically, the 2010 Review Conference stated that the secretary-general of the United Nations and the cosponsors of the 1995 resolution (the United States, the UK and Russia), in consultation with the states of the region, would convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a MENWFZ. The conference also called for the appointment of a facilitator to aid in the implementation of the 1995 resolution and to prepare for the 2012 conference.10 The under secretary of state of Finland, Jaakko Laajava, was appointed as the facilitator. Between October 2013 and June 2014, Laajava held five consultations with the countries in the region aimed at reaching consensus on an agenda for the conference.11 Arab countries and Iran agreed to attend the conference, though there were some uncertainties regarding the Israeli position.12
In late November 2012, the Department of State issued some bad news: the United States "regrets to announce that the conference cannot be convened because of present conditions in the Middle East and the fact that states in the region have not reached agreement on acceptable conditions for a conference."13 The statement also underscored Washington's belief that a deep conceptual gap persists on approaches toward security and arms-control arrangements among the states in the region. These differences, the Department of State suggested, can only be bridged through direct engagement and agreement among the regional powers.
2015 REVIEW CONFERENCE
The 191 state parties attending the 2015 conference disagreed on a number of topics. The main focus, however, was on the creation of a MENWFZ. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a MENWFZ and demanded that Israel renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without preconditions and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. Zarif expressed serious concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 resolution and urged the three cosponsors "to take all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay."14 The Saudi ambassador to the United Nations, Abdullah Al-Mouallimi, echoed the same sentiments: "It is really unfortunate that international consensus and a region's urgent desire to make the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons have been thwarted by Israel."15 Egypt drafted a resolution calling on UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to convene a regional conference on banning nuclear weapons and other WMD by March 2016, as called for at the 2010 meeting. The conference would take place with or without Israel's participation, without agreement on an agenda and without a discussion of regional security issues.16 Israel, which attended as an observer, objected strenuously to the Egyptian proposal. The Israeli position holds that such a conference should deal with all regional security problems, including missiles and terrorism, rather than the nuclear issue alone. Israel also demanded that any such conference be conditioned on all participating countries' agreeing on the agenda.17 After consulting with Egypt, Spain presented a compromise proposal that essentially rejected the Israeli conditions, stating that if no consensus were reached on the agenda before December 2015, the UN secretary-general would be empowered to decide whether to convene the conference and on what terms.
Meanwhile, the United States and Israel held intensive consultations in which the Obama administration promised that there would be no change in American policy on Israel's nuclear program and that Washington would not seek to undermine Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity.18 In the end, the United States, supported by the United Kingdom and Canada, objected to Egypt's draft resolution. Since decisions have to be accepted by consensus and approved by all participants, the Review Conference ended without adopting a final document. Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries charged Washington with protecting Israel and undercutting efforts to rid their region of WMD. In a statement, Egypt expressed disappointment in the U.S. move: "This will have consequences in front of the Arab world and public opinion."19 Rose Gottemoeller, U.S. under secretary for arms control and international security, strongly condemned Egypt: "We attempted to work with other delegations — in particular Egypt and other Arab League states — to improve the text; but a number of these states, and in particular Egypt, were not willing to let go of these unrealistic and unworkable conditions included in the draft text."20 Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called Secretary of State Kerry and thanked the Obama administration for blocking the Egyptian-drafted resolution: "The United States kept its commitment to Israel by preventing the resolution that would have singled out Israel and ignored its security interests and the threats posed to it by an increasingly turbulent Middle East."21
The disappointing outcome of the 2015 Review Conference was hardly a surprise, given the conflicting stances adopted by regional powers. Iran and the Arab countries strongly reject Israel's nuclear monopoly. The widely accepted presumption that these nuclear weapons exist, the argument goes, gives Israel military and strategic advantages over its neighbors. Israel's nuclear disarmament and accession to the NPT would pave the way for a genuine and comprehensive peace in the region. On the other side, Israel, which has never acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons, has insisted that a real peace and full normalization with all its neighbors is a prerequisite for the establishment of a MENWFZ.
The Israeli Approach
Israel has always held a skeptical view of global arms-control and disarmament treaties.22 Instead, Israeli leaders have stressed that the proliferation of WMD in the Middle East will have to be dealt with in a regional framework.23 Five characteristics of the Israeli stand on the issue of a MENWFZ can be identified.
First, the state of Israel was created following the Holocaust, when millions of Jews were killed by the Nazis. This dramatic experience shaped the Israeli collective psyche, particularly in the first few decades after the formation of the state. Israeli leaders believe that nuclear weapons will shield them from a future Holocaust; they see nuclear weapons as the last line of defense or as an "insurance policy" to guarantee their survival. The refusal of some regional states to recognize Israel feeds this belief and the need to maintain the "nuclear option."
Second, Israeli leaders believe that their country's nuclear deterrent should be seen as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. They argue that Israel's presumed nuclear capability has forced the nation's adversaries to accept that it is there to stay. Given Israel's conventional military superiority and its nuclear arsenal, the Jewish state has become an indispensable part of the Middle East landscape. This conventional and unconventional strength, the argument goes, has forced the Arabs to come to the negotiating table and reduced incentives for an all-out war.
Third, Israeli policy has been able to maintain a monopoly over the "nuclear option," to deny its adversaries such capabilities (the so-called Begin Doctrine). To achieve this, Israel has employed diplomatic and military pressure against potential nuclear proliferators. This pressure culminated in the attacks that destroyed Iraqi nuclear facilities in 1981 and Syria's nuclear reactor in 2007. Despite Iran's claims that its nuclear program is for civilian energy production, Israel is widely believed to be behind the assassination of a number of Iranian nuclear scientists.
Fourth, Israel has been hesitant to fully endorse the global nonproliferation regime. It has "never placed its Dimona nuclear facility under the IAEA safeguards, nor has it since 1970 allowed any other type of inspection visits to that site."24 Israel has not signed the NPT or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and although it did sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it has not ratified either. Despite this hesitancy, Israeli analysts argue that the nation has abided by the norms and rules of the global nonproliferation regime.
Fifth, Israeli leaders have repeatedly confirmed that a comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab states and Iran is a prerequisite to joining a NWFZ. Israel, they insist, will not give up its "nuclear option" unless all its neighbors recognize and establish diplomatic and commercial ties with the Jewish state. Peace treaties would not be sufficient; rather, complete normalization of relations is a necessity to assure the Israelis that they have been fully accepted by their neighbors.
These characteristics of the Israeli stance on nuclear proliferation suggest that the country is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and join the NPT and the nonproliferation regime any time soon. The few statements made by Israeli leaders regarding nuclear weapons indicate a strong perceived connection between their nation's survival and the maintenance of a nuclear-weapons capability.
The Arab/Iranian Approach
While there is no united Arab/Iranian approach on the creation of a MENWFZ, Iran and most Arab states share the following sentiments.
First, the Arabs and Iranians do not see the Israeli nuclear arsenal as a "weapon of last resort" or an "insurance policy" to ensure the survival of the Jewish state. Rather, military asymmetry and Tel Aviv's nuclear capability are seen in Tehran and most of the Arab capitals as enforcing the occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories.
Second, Iran and many Arab governments view the Israeli nuclear arsenal as a primary threat to the region's security and a key factor in its instability. The fact that Israel is the only (presumed) nuclear power in the region underscores and feeds a sense of Arab and Iranian technological and military inferiority.
Third, Iran and many Arab governments accuse Western powers of applying a double standard in regard to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In Arab and Iranian eyes, the United States and major European powers have allowed, and even helped, Israel to acquire nuclear weapons but have strongly resisted any attempt by Iran or Arab states to develop a similar capability.25 Many Arab officials have argued that, as long as Israel maintains its "nuclear option," Iran and other regional powers will have incentives to seek one. The most effective way to deal with Iran's nuclear ambition, some Arabs argue, is to "pressure" Israel to dismantle its nuclear weapons and join the NPT.
Fourth, several Arab countries have unsuccessfully sought to buy or build nuclear weapons. In order to maximize international pressure on Israel, Iran and all Arab states signed and ratified the NPT, leaving Israel as the only nonsignatory in the region. Furthermore, Egypt, a leading Arab state and a close ally of the United States, has championed Arab efforts to resist an Israeli nuclear monopoly. For several years, Egyptian leaders called upon other Arab states not to sign the CWC until Israel joined the NPT. These efforts have largely failed. Most Arab states and Iran have signed and ratified both the CWC and the BTWC.
Fifth, Iran and most Arab states believe that the creation of a NWFZ is a necessary first step toward a comprehensive peace. The denuclearization of the Middle East would eliminate what the Iranians and Arabs see as nuclear intimidation by Israel and would lead to broad regional arms-control measures and lay the foundations for lasting peace.
THE WAY FORWARD
The failure to reach a consensus at the 2015 NPT Review Conference was not a surprise; it was expected, given the conflicting stances adopted by regional powers. Intense diplomatic efforts can go only so far in achieving final goals. Eventually, the outcome of any negotiation reflects the underlying geopolitical and geoeconomic facts on the ground and the broad balance of power between the negotiating parties. The prevailing strategic landscape in the Middle East leaves little room for optimism about the establishment of a NWFZ.
The disagreements between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu should not be exaggerated. Israel is still considered the closest U.S. ally in the Middle East. For decades, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, the security of Israel has been a major U.S. foreign-policy priority. This strong support is likely to persist into the foreseeable future, particularly with regard to an issue considered by Israeli leaders as a matter of national survival. Expecting the United States to pressure Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and join the NPT is unrealistic. Furthermore, Israeli leaders do not take orders from Washington, particularly when it comes to national security.
From an Israeli perspective, the recent broad regional instability does not provide an appropriate strategic environment in which to negotiate arms control or nuclear disarmament. Looking at the instability in neighboring countries, Israeli leaders seem convinced they should keep all their options available to face the growing regional uncertainties. In the last few years, Egypt has experienced two "revolutions." One can argue that the Muslim Brotherhood is down but not out. Meanwhile, the outcome of the Syrian civil war is highly unpredictable. Iraq, Libya and Yemen face similar prospects.
Political and security upheavals since 2011 (the so-called Arab Spring) have left Arab countries with little leverage with which to pressure Israel to change its nuclear policy. The uprisings in several Arab countries were driven by a lack of economic opportunity and political transparency. The sharp fall in oil prices has further complicated the region's economic and political outlook. Oil prices are not projected to recover in the near future. Most Arab countries are overwhelmed by these severe and growing crises.
Finally, some analysts question the military value of nuclear weapons. Israel's nuclear arsenal did not deter the Egyptian and Syrian attacks in the 1973 war or those of Hezbollah in recent years. Similarly, nuclear weapons did not help the Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan in the 1980s or the United States in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s — not to mention the ongoing involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Still, Israel's nuclear-weapons monopoly will continue to foster regional strategic instability. The notion of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other WMD is a noble idea, but progress, if any, is likely to be very slow.
1 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Test of the Treaty, http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt.shtml.
2 Mohamed ElBaradei, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zones: Pursuing Security, Region by Region," http://www.iaea.org/newsCenter/statements/2005/ebsp2005n005.html.
3 Christina Kucia, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zone at a Glance," Arms Control Today 33, no.3 (July 2003): 4-8.
4 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Treaty of Tlatelolco, http://www.opanal.org/opanal/Tlatelolco/P.Tlatelolco-i.htm.
5 Federation of American Scientists, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/52, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/menwfz/docs/res52-34.htm.
6 Muhammad I. Shaker, "The Middle East Issue: Possibilities of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone," http://www.opanal.org/articles/aniv-30/shaker.htm.
7 Federation of American Scientists, Resolution 687 (1991), http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm.
8 Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, "Issue Brief: Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," February 2003, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_24a.html.
9 Federation of American Scientists, Resolution on the Middle East, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/resoluti.htm.
10 Patricia Lewis and William C. Potter, "The Long Journey toward a WMD-Free Middle East," http://www.armscontrol.org.
11 Arms Control Association, "WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance," http://www.armscontrol.org.
12 Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein, "Israel and the WMD-Free Zone: Has Israel Closed the Door?" http://www.thebulletin.org.
13 U.S. Department of State, "Press Statement on the 2012 Conference on a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ)," http://www.state.gov.
14 Javad Zarif, Statement by H.E. Dr. Javad Zarif before the 2015 NPT Review Conference, http://namiran.org.
15 H.E. Ambassador Abdallah Y. Al-Mouallimi, Statement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before the 2015 NPT Review Conference, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015.
16 Egyptian Voices, "Egypt, U.S. Clash over Nuclear Free Middle East at the United Nations," http://egyptianstreets.com.
17 "Concern in Jerusalem over International Decision against Israeli Nuclear Program," http://www.haaretz.com.
18 Jay Solomon, "Nuclear Move Stands to Lift U.S.-Israel Ties," Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2015.
19 Louis Charbonneau, "Dispute over Mideast Nuclear Arms Ban Torpedoes U.N. Conference," http://www.reuters.com.
20 U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Conclusion of the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference," http://www.state.gov.
21 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister Netanyahu Speaks with U.S. Secretary Kerry," http://mfa.gov.il.
22 Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," Survival 36, no.1 (Spring 1994): 126-141.
23 Emily B. Landau and Tamar Malz, "Israel's Arms Control Agenda," http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/v2n42.htm.
24 Avner Cohen, "The Nuclear Issue in the Middle East in a New World Order," Contemporary Security Policy 16, no.1 (April 1995): 49-69.
25 Turki Al-Faisal, "A Political Plan for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East," http://belfercenter.org.