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| Volume IX, September 2002, Number 3 |
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| EXCERPT: "Middle" Politics: Looking Again at the Peace Process |
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| John Lister |
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Mr. Lister is a U.S. Foreign Service officer who served in the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv 1997-2001, where he covered Palestinian affairs in the Gaza Strip. The views in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State. He completed work on this article while a Davis Fellow at Columbia University, and he wishes to express his gratitude to the School of International and Public Affairs for its support during this period.
In the subsequent debate over what went wrong, many argue that Arafat simply was not interested in making peace. Conversely, some say that Barak's offers were in fact not sufficiently generous and that he failed to prepare the diplomatic groundwork for Camp David properly by not implementing a large number of outstanding Israeli obligations remaining from the interim period. Still others point to what they see as clumsy American handling of the negotiations. In the author's view, none of these explanations gets to the heart of the problem. Rather, the expectation that Arafat would accept a final-status agreement that involved his making even "reasonable" concessions was itself unrealistic. This is not because Arafat did not necessarily want peace, nor is it because Barak's offers were not necessarily generous. The difficulty looms in the nature of Arafat's rule, the foundations of his legitimacy, and the complex relationship between Arafat (who has maintained almost complete authority despite decades spent in exile and nearly ruinous political miscalculations) and the Palestinian people. While the United States viewed Arafat as the man who could both make compromises and get Palestinians to accept them, in fact, Arafat's concerns for maintaining his rule and its legitimacy ironically made it less likely that he would do so.
This does not mean that a deal is impossible. War is no stranger to this region, and lasting peace initiatives have grown out of violence before. Despite the intensity of the present conflict and the enormous suffering endured by Israelis and Palestinians, a negotiated settlement still offers the best possible outcome for both sides. It is also the only way to end the present carnage quickly. The latter point has become the subject of debate as both Palestinians and Israelis argue that they lack a true partner for dialogue and peace. It is the author's view that each side's desire for peace depends in large part upon a consideration of the alternatives. If neither side believes that there is a credible political track toward peace, then fighting will be seen as the only possible alternative. Similarly, once on the political track, if neither side believes the other is serious about pursuing talks fairly, then it is likely that this track will break down and lead to renewed fighting.
I therefore conclude with a proposal for conducting a possible restarting of the negotiations on the basis of a path that would run between focusing on "high" politics, attempting to solve the highly symbolic and contentious issues associated with final status, and "low" politics, an approach that seeks simply to recreate the interim period. This path I have labeled "middle" politics.
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