 |
| Volume VIII, December 2001, Number 4 |
| |
| EXCERPT: The New Global Threat:Transnational Salafis and Jihad |
| |
| Quintan Wiktorowicz |
| |
Dr. Wiktorowicz is assistant professor in the Department of International Studies, Rhodes College.
As the United States engages the new global threat of the twenty-first century, it is important to contextualize Bin Laden and his followers as a movement operating within a broader transnational community of Islamic activists. While it is tempting to dismiss Bin Laden and other radicals as outside the boundaries of Islam, such assertions underestimate the spiritual, ideological and human relationships that connect those who espouse a violent jihad against the United States with more moderate elements within particular segments of the Muslim community. Charges that Bin Laden is not behaving as a "real Muslim" might provide a sense of psychological relief for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, but such charges fail to comprehend the roots of radical ideologies within less violent worldviews and value systems.
Rather than acting as an isolated cluster of deviant religious usurpers, the new global threat to U.S. security is dominated by a tendency within a broad transnational "Salafi movement." Salafis believe that over centuries of religious practice, errant Muslims introduced new practices and innovations that corrupted the pure message of Islam. To rectify this condition, they advocate a strict return to the fundamentals of the religion and reject any behavior that was not specifically supported or enjoined by the Prophet Muhammed. The radicals responsible for the "jihad" against the United States are inextricably linked to this worldview and share religious understandings with a broad consortium of non-violent groups within the Salafi community, even while disagreeing about the permissibility of jihad and specific tactics in warfare, such as the use of terrorism.
This relationship makes the Salafi movement a significant, albeit largely unrecognized, actor in any war on Bin Laden and other Islamic terrorists. If the United States is to avoid radicalizing the Salafis and creating a legion of new supporters for Bin Laden, it must understand the ideology and dynamics of the movement and how Salafis might respond to U.S. action. The ideological affinity between violent tendencies and others in the Salafi community is qualitatively different from broader Muslim sympathies toward Bin Laden's cause. This creates one of the deepest potential recruitment pools for violent activists. Security policies should therefore evaluate the impact of policies on the balance between violent and non-violent elements within the Salafi community to avoid a "jihadization" of the movement.
|
| |
|
