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| Volume VIII, September 2001, Number 3 |
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| ABSTRACT: The Maronites and Syrian Withdrawal: From "Isolationists" to "Traitors"? |
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| Robert G. Rabil |
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Dr. Rabil is a senior lecturer in
the Department of History at Suffolk University in Boston, Massachusetts, and
project manager of the Iraq Research and Documentation Project (IRDP),
Washington, DC.
This article traces Maronite-Syrian relations since
the eruption of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975. It examines how Syria
achieved its hegemony and how it legally entrenched its presence in Lebanon,
making the country a sort of quasi-colony. Upon analysis, it becomes clear that
the Maronite community has emerged as the sole loser in the period following
the Taif accord, the constitutional compromise upon which the warring factions
agreed to end the civil war. At the same time, the Maronite community, led by
the Phalange party, has experienced a long and debilitating power struggle and
internal strife. This highlights a traditional and ill-founded Maronite belief
that blames outside intervention for Lebanon's deep-seated problems, as well as
the need to revise the Phalange party's mission.
True, Syria managed to fragment and/or co-opt most Christian opposition to its heavy
involvement in Lebanon; still, it failed to silence the Christian community in
general. As Christian grievances mounted, vocal opposition to Syria heightened.
Of all leaders in Lebanon, the Maronite patriarch emerged as the main
oppositional figure to Syria's ubiquitous presence in the country. His position
was set in sharp relief when Israel withdrew unilaterally from Lebanon in May
2000 without a peace deal with Syria, presumably pulling the rug of legitimacy
out from under Syrian feet in Lebanon. The Patriarch issued a statement calling
for the redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon in preparation for their
withdrawal. His statement not only emphasized Christian overall grievances but
also raised the sensitive issue of Christian political power, and by
implication the whole power arrangement in Lebanon.
Suddenly, a controversial debate erupted over the Syrian presence in Lebanon and
polarized the country along confessional/sectarian lines. Charges questioning
the Maronites' patriotism poignantly reemerged but were not limited to
Christians, an indication that the charges had been politically motivated to
discredit Syrian opposition. While this episode illustrated the scope and depth
of Syrian involvement in the country, it exposed more than anything else
Lebanon's weak national integration.
Syria has
put Lebanon in a double bind: Lebanon cannot forge a strong national identity
with Syria imposing its will on the country, yet Lebanon potentially faces the
specter of civil war if Syria withdraws from the country. For now, this is
Lebanon's harsh and sad reality. Until the Lebanese surmount this challenge and
faithfully celebrate their national integration, Lebanon must accept Syria's
presence mainly in the Bekaa valley to prevent civil war, although to many
Christians this presence is both alien and distasteful. Concomitantly, Syria
must assume a low profile and walk a thin line in order to maintain its
presence and at the same time prevent an insurrection against it.
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