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| Volume VIII, September 2001, Number 3 |
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| ABSTRACT: "Round Up the Unusual Suspects": American Policy Toward Algeria and Its Islamists |
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| Bradford Dillman |
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Dr. Dillman is assistant professor
of International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul.
Although Algeria's civil conflict of the last decade has received limited coverage in the American media, Algeria is important to
U.S. national interests in the Arab world. Developments in the country pose an
important challenge to American policies to promote security, democracy and
economic reform in the Middle East. As many as 150,000 people may have died
since 1992, and destruction of the country's infrastructure has been quite
significant. Algeria's economy has suffered serious decline in the face of a
largely unsuccessful economic reform process. The United States has squandered
important opportunities to influence developments in the country. The Algerian
imbroglio has also spilled over to domestic politics via the recent arrest and
conviction of a number of Algerians in the U.S. on terrorism-related charges.
When the Algerian army staged a coup in 1992 to halt the Islamist Salvation Front from
decisively winning parliamentary elections, the Bush administration adopted a
wait-and-see policy that demonstrated to the Arab world the lack of sincerity
in Washington's global advocacy of democratization. From 1993 to 1995, the
Clinton administration's policy toward Algeria evolved significantly in the
face of fears that the junta was losing the battle against Islamists.
Washington opened a low-level dialogue with exiled FIS members like Anwar
Haddam and pressed the regime to open a dialogue with Islamists. Yet after
1995, as the regime regained ground against Islamists and staged several unfair
elections, the Clinton administration warmed up to the military leaders, even
as it continued to counsel political dialogue and more democratic reforms. Since
Abdelaziz Bouteflika's election as president in 1999, Washington has sent a
steady stream of officials to Algiers to bolster economic and military
relations. Nevertheless, the regime continues to have a shaky foundation in the
face of continued Islamist violence and mass, anti-regime political
mobilization by Berbers.
The United States remains one of Algeria's best economic partners. American oil and
gas companies have invested large amounts in the hydrocarbons sector. American
engineering, telecommunications, aerospace, and pharmaceutical companies have
expanded their role in the Algerian market. Washington has pressed hard for
greater American trade and investment through the U.S.-North African Economic
Partnership and expansion of credits from the Export-Import Bank. However,
investments by American corporations have done little to help reform a still
largely state-controlled economy. With a massive housing crisis, 30%
unemployment, burdensome debt, and almost no privatization, Algeria's economy
remains under the control of military officials and associated economic
mafiosos.
Since 1995 the U.S. has lost potential leverage over Algeria'a Islamists, especially through
its detention of Anwar Haddam for more than three years and its neglect of
important Islamist leaders like Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi and Mafoud Nahnah.
Instead, it has become the target of violent Islamists in its own back yard.
Despite the dangers, the U.S. should pursue a more forceful and principled
policy towards Algiers by insisting on a return to free and fair elections,
re-establishing a dialogue with moderate Algerian Islamists, and demanding
accountability for human-rights violations. Algeria's still-vibrant civil
society and mainstream opposition leaders who advocate political accountability,
a rule of law and economic fairness deserve much more American support.
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