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| Volume VIII, September 2001, Number 3 |
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| The Politics of Hegemony: The United States and Iran |
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| James A. Bill |
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Dr. Bill is professor of government and director emeritus
of the Reves Center for International Studies at the College of William and
Mary. He is the author of The Eagle
and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations and coauthor of
the forthcoming Roman Catholics and Shii
Muslims: Prayer, Passion and Politics. For a printable pdf version of this article, click here.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has survived for over two decades. Among other challenges, it has
had to overcome a punishing 95-month war with neighboring Iraq, the active
hostility of the world's unrivaled superpower, and an internal political and
economic situation that has sapped its strength and weakened its spirit. Because of its large population, geostrategic
location, vast deposits of hydrocarbons, ideological zeal and fierce
independence, Iran holds special interest for the United States. Washington has accused Iran of human-rights
violations, international terrorism and political intransigence. Policy makers from five administrations have sought to weaken Iran
and diminish its credibility in the international arena. These efforts have failed, and important
voices in the U.S. foreign-policy establishment have concluded that it is time
to attempt a fundamentally new approach. In this plan, the emphasis is upon creative diplomacy, constructive
engagement and calculated steps to rapprochement.
ATLANTIC COUNCIL REPORT
Among the more serious intellectual efforts to address the
problem of U.S.-Iran relations is the report prepared by the Atlantic Council's
three-year working group on Iran. The
Council gathered together a group of 60 policy makers (past and present),
academics, think-tank stalwarts and knowledgeable observers to develop "a
changed strategy" and "a new U.S. approach to Iran." The policy paper is thorough and creative.
It is based upon a detailed account of U.S. "national interests," interests that are divided into three major categories:
geostrategic, energy and economic. This
important study recognizes all the major issues and contains a number of
sensible recommendations.
The Atlantic Council report emphasizes, for example, the fact
that U.S. sanctions and embargoes have failed to alter Iranian political
behavior. In the view of the group, it
is time to remove the counterproductive sanctions. In particular, the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) must be
quietly allowed to lapse. According to
the report, the lifting of the embargo "would clearly serve U.S. interests . .
. because the world is now entering a period of global energy scarcity and Iran
accounts for 5 percent of worldwide oil production." The Atlantic Council report presents several other recommendations.
The United States, for example, would do
well to coordinate its Iran policy with actions taken by its European
allies. Countries such as France, Great
Britain and Germany maintain a sharply different perspective on Iran and its
revolution. Perhaps even more important
than U.S.-Europe coordination of Iran policy are the positions taken by China
and Russia. Both of these nation-states
have worked hard to develop close relations with the Islamic Republic.
RUSSIA AND IRAN
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and
Russia began to establish a new era of cooperation. Whereas the Soviet Union had enjoyed a position as
"co-superpower," its political and economic collapse diminished the USSR
significantly in the world's power rankings. The United States, now the sole global superpower, cautiously assisted
the various Russian governments that faced severe economic and political
crises. In return, the United States
expected a weakened Russia to comply with American wishes. In the Middle East, this compliance meant
overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, cooperating with the Western
world on oil production and pricing, harassing the Islamic government in Iran,
pursuing a benign policy in Central Asia, and abiding by U.S. wishes concerning
the explosive Palestinian-Israeli issue. Russia resisted such a policy but stood quietly by during the two Gulf
wars.
Then, as part of its internal need to build a post-communist
country and to establish an effective foreign policy, Russia began to take
independent actions that boosted its self-esteem and strengthened its
international reputation. This
political renewal centered to a large extent around issues concerning the
Persian Gulf and Central Asia. While
quietly maintaining ties with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Russia also sought to
rebuild and strengthen its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In pursuing this kind of policy, Russia
found itself clashing with the United States.
Despite U.S. preferences, Russia has entered into numerous political,
economic, military and cultural agreements with Iran. Russian cooperation with Iran in the fields of nuclear energy,
military weaponry, and trade and commerce has been roundly criticized by the
United States. In this instance,
Washington has failed to change either Iranian or Russian behavior. Instead, the opposite trend continues to
develop. The more pressure exerted by
the United States, the closer Russia moves toward Iran.
In March 2001, Iranian president Muhammad Khatami made a
landmark trip to Russia, where the two countries established an unprecedented
number of new bilateral agreements. Khatami was the first Iranian leader to visit Moscow since before the
revolution, and he did so at the express invitation of President Vladimir
Putin. President Khatami's visit
resulted in a Russian promise to complete the Bushire nuclear power plant and
to provide Iran with advanced conventional weapons. The United States complained sharply to Russia about the transfer
of military technology to Iran. Iran and Russia responded by pointing out that the agreements were in the best
interests of the region because they would help build stability in the Persian
Gulf.
Given the strengthening relations between Iran and important
world actors such as Russia and China, the United States has found itself
increasingly alone. It has become even
lonelier as Iran has reestablished and renewed relations with the other Persian
Gulf states. Every year since 1988, the
Islamic Republic has initiated high-profile conferences and meetings designed
to build a meaningful rapprochement with these monarchies.
The Council's report places special emphasis upon the methodology of breaking the
stalemate. In particular, it stresses
the importance of building a new relationship through the use of commerce and
trade. Once economic sanctions are
lifted and the internal situation in Iran indicates that the timing is right,
serious commercial engagement can begin. This in turn, supplemented by cultural and educational engagement, can
prepare the way for political engagement.
These recommendations represent a badly needed new approach to
Iran, but the the report would have been improved if the analysis were placed
in a more coherent and comprehensive context. Both Iran and the United States stand as important members of the global
community of nation-states, and their activities must be examined within this
universe.
THE POLITICS OF HEGEMONY
In this analysis, I seek to use the Atlantic Council report as
a springboard to a new understanding of U.S.-Iran relations. In so doing, I
examine these relations through the lens of hegemony theory. This theoretical approach focuses on the
rise and decline of global and regional superpowers or "hegemons," any
nation-state that wields a disproportionate amount of power in its particular
regional or global context (from the Greek "hegemonia" referring to the
predominant influence of one state over another).
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became
the unrivaled global hegemon. In the
absence of a clear powerful adversary, the hegemon lacked a mission and scanned
the world for new threats. Not surprisingly,
work was soon found. The United States
discovered a group of relatively independent regional hegemons whose influence
dominated particular regions of the world and who consistently resisted the
pressure of the global hegemon.
The United States has been quick to condemn these regional
powers partly because they were noncompliant with U.S. wishes, labeling them
"rogue," "renegade" or "outlaw" states. Already in 1985, President Ronald Reagan identified these stubbornly
independent actors when he referred to "a confederation of outlaw states –
Cuba, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua and North Korea." In the past two decades, the United States has consistently identified
these "outlaw states" (in descending order of offensiveness) as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Cuba. China, Russia, Syria and Sudan are alsooften considered for this roster of political infamy.
This article hypothesizes that the United States seeks to
prevent the rise of independent-minded regional hegemons. The more independent their behavior, the
more pressure the United States exerts upon them. Also, the greater the difference in worldviews of the global and
regional hegemons, the greater the political tension between them. Finally, the global hegemon especially seeks
to control the behavior of regional hegemons in regions rich in geostrategic
significance and natural resources. Iran is a regional hegemon of particular concern to the United States,
as is China.
As part of its policy of containment and control, the
United States enlists the support of regional allies. In the Middle East, this role is played by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries and Israel; in East Asia by states such as Taiwan and
Japan. Besides Iran, China and Russia
represent the most serious challenges to the global hegemon.
THE MIDDLE EASTERN AND EAST ASIAN SUBSYSTEMS
Iran and China stand at the center of Middle Eastern and East
Asian international subsystems where influence reverberates across the
globe. Figure 1 presents their
diagramatic representation, placing U.S.-Iran relations in the context of U.S.
relations with China and other East Asian actors. It helps explain the complex relationship between the global
hegemon and key regional hegemons such as Iran and China.1 These two
countries are locked in political tension with the United States. Similarly
positioned are the secondary Middle East hegemons Iraq, Syria and Libya. Important regional allies of the global
hegemon in the Middle East include Saudi Arabia, Egypt and, of course,
Israel. In East Asia, North Korea, a
secondary regional hegemon, stands in tension with the United States, while
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea represent strong regional U.S. allies.
The United States relies strongly upon cooperative and
compliant regional allies to protect its interests. Meanwhile, the global hegemon regularly condemns regional
superpowers China and Iran for their human-rights record, their independent
political demeanor, their drive to build strong military arsenals, and their
perceived threat to U.S. allies. The U.S. condemnation of Iran and China has resulted in both intraregional and
interregional alliances featuring Iran and China at the center of concentric
circles of countries that resent and resist U.S. hegemony, including Syria and
North Korea.
IRAN AND CHINA
Iran and China dominate their respective world spheres. Both countries have experienced
twentieth-century revolutions and have been the scenes of considerable political upheaval. Both have faced
severe economic challenges. Both have found themselves charged with human-rights violations. Both place a high value on political
independence and national autonomy. Both countries have captured the attention of the United States, which
seeks to influence their actions and policies.
The importance of China to Iran and of Iran to China was already recognized during the days of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. In August 1971, Iran recognized the People's
Republic of China, and the two countries soon exchanged ambassadors. A year later, Empress Farah made a two-week
visit to China. On the very eve of the revolution in December 1977, Chinese leader Teng Ying Chao was in Tehran
seeking economic agreements.
With the Iranian revolution and the enormous political and
economic pressure applied to Iran by the United States, Iran looked around in
some desperation for international support. In September 1992, President Rafsanjani traveled to China, and the two
countries signed an agreement whereby the Chinese promised to help Iran build
two nuclear reactors to provide power for peaceful purposes. The global hegemon protested loudly and
increased its pressure on China, accusing the country of massive human-rights
abuses. The incident at Tiananmen
Square had taken place on June 4, 1989, and over the next decade, the United
States regularly criticized the Chinese government for human-rights
transgressions.
It was during this time period that Iran and China
significantly expanded their relationship. This rapprochement, which was partly a result of U.S. pressure on both
countries, deepened in the mid-1990s. Between 1994 and 1996, Chinese-Iranian overtures increased to such an
extent that China ranked number eight in the world in terms of Iran's total diplomatic
overtures. The seven top-ranked
countries (with the sole exception of India) are all states that border on the
Islamic Republic.2
By the turn of the next millenium, Iran and China were on a
path of unprecedented political and economic cooperation. June 21-25, 2000, Iranian president Muhammad
Khatami, with a delegation of 170 officials, made a historic trip to
China. While there, he sought to
broaden Iran-China ties by signing five letters of agreement. Khatami stressed the long historic ties that
bound the Chinese and Persian empires and condemned what he termed the
"unipolar world" championed by the global hegemon.
During the 1990s, China sold missile technology to Iran. The United States pressured China to halt
such sales. China has effectively
resisted this pressure and has adopted an alternating policy, sometimes
acceding to the wishes of the global hegemon and sometimes simply ignoring
them. On November 21, 2000, for
example, China agreed to cease selling ballistic missile technology to Iran
after the United States campaigned against these sales. In return Washington promised to lift the
economic sanctions that had been imposed on Chinese entities providing the
technology. Meanwhile, China continued
to provide Iran with non-ballistic and anti-ship missiles.
Today Chinese leaders insist that their country have a presence
in the Persian Gulf. "Chinese leaders
have a respect for, but a residual mistrust of, the use of U.S. power. Arms sales provide a wedge for China into
the Gulf itself, where the United States is the preeminent power."3
Although the United States has applied diplomatic and economic
pressure on both Iran and China, it has used more care when challenging China
and has formulated a policy of "strategic engagement" with the Asian
power. With Iran, however, the global
hegemon has pursued a policy of confrontation built around trade embargoes. The
difference is explained by the power and sheer size of China. Also, the Islamic Republic has stridently
attacked the United States for opposing Iran's revolution and for siding with
Saddam Hussein when he invaded Iran in September of 1980. Finally, China, unlike Iran, has not been
burdened with the heavy baggage of the Palestinian-Israeli issue.
THE ISRAELI FACTOR
A major and seldom discussed reason for the antipathy that
permeates Iran-U.S. relations concerns the existence of two particularly
significant U.S. allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia's privileged status is easily explained
by its extraordinary oil wealth. Israel, on the other hand, maintains a most-favored-nation relationship
with the United States that runs much deeper than oil deposits. Israel's interests and policies are furthered
by its extraordinary political and economic support among American opinion
leaders and U.S. congressional representatives.
Israel's staunch supporters in the United States have taken
their cues from Israel with regard to Iran policy. Whereas Iran-Saudi relations have warmed considerably over the
past few years, serious rapprochement between Israel and Iran is unlikely to
occur any time soon. The Atlantic
Council's prudent recommendation that the sanctions be lifted from Iran in
order to begin a serious opening to the Islamic Republic has been stridently
opposed by powerful pro-Israeli lobbying groups in Washington. The global hegemon continues to view Iran
through lenses manufactured in Israel. While attempting to carry out an important reexamination of Iran policy,
the administration of George W. Bush found itself outmaneuvered by AIPAC (the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee), a highly effective pro-Israeli
lobbying organization. While the Bush
administration was seeking to examine the effectiveness of the sanctions-driven
policy towards Iran, AIPAC helped line up over 70 congressional
representatives, who signed a petition to continue the sanctions against
Iran. This effort was accompanied by a
flood of articles in the press reintroducing Iran as a rogue state that must be
subjected to continuing sanctions. The fact
that such policy had proven to be counterproductive and had in fact compromised
U.S. long-term interests made little difference to this influential group.4
Even the Atlantic Council Iran working group, a high-powered
contingent itself and one that ultimately recommended an end to the sanctions,
contained strong pro-Israeli voices that sought to formulate Iran policy on the
basis of Israeli interests. In one
draft of the report, for example, it is written that "the core security issue,
however, remains the opposing positions of the United States and Iran regarding
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." In
other words, the "core security issue" that shapes the policies of the global
hegemon in the Middle East focuses on the interests of the state of Israel. According to the report, "Iranian behavior
has been judged mainly on the basis of its opposition to the peace process and
its support for terrorist groups involved in the conflict against Israel."
In sum, the return to normalcy of U.S.-Iran relations has been
impeded by a special relationship between the global hegemon and a small but
powerful regional ally. In the process,
the United States has alienated Iran, a major regional hegemon and a country
that in the long term is critical to U.S. national interests.
THE CLASH OF HEGEMONIES
Despite some small positive steps in the later years of the
Clinton administration, the United States and Iran remain locked in a tense
relationship costly to both parties. The national interests of each are compromised by this continuing
conflict. The U.S. position rests on
four interrelated arguments. According
to the official American line, Iran supports international terrorism, seeks
weapons of mass destruction, has an abysmal human-rights record, and opposes
the Middle East peace process. These
arguments are presented in a context evocative of 1979-80, when U.S. diplomats
were taken hostage in Tehran.
The Islamic Republic forcefully presents its side of the story,
which also rests on a foundation of four arguments: the United States opposed
the Iranian revolution, supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in
September of 1980, instituted a system of sanctions that have helped cripple
the Iranian economy, and shot down a civilian Iranian airliner. (In July of 1988, a sophisticated American
Aegis-class cruiser, the USS Vincennes downed an Iranian plane, killing all 290 passengers.)
Despite Iran's complicity in acts of terrorism, especially in
Lebanon and Europe, Iran's foreign-policy record has in many ways been
constructive and correct. Iran, for
example, played a key role in obtaining the release of Western hostages in
Lebanon. Iran carefully remained
neutral during the Gulf War initiated by Saddam Hussein. In Central Asia, Iran
has been a significant arbitrator and mediator. In Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Armenia/Azerbaijan, the Islamic
Republic has worked hard to promote stability. In this context, one would note that it is Iran that is most engaged in
combatting the militant fundamentalism of the Taliban group. And President
Khatami has called for a dialogue between Iran and the United States.
Although there is an important element of authoritarianism in
Iran's internal political system, the Islamic Republic, unlike many of its
neighbors, has developed important mechanisms of participatory democracy. Iran's elections have been generally fair
and free. Robust debate takes place in
the Islamic Majlis. President Khatami
scored an overwhelming victory when he stood for his second term as president
in June of 2001. He and many of his
associates are leading a battle for reform in the country. The United States has paid little attention
to the drive for serious political development in Iran.
The Iranians have been upset and puzzled by the pettiness of
many of the actions taken by the global superpower. Individual Iranian citizens have been singled out by U.S.
officials for harassment and humiliation. Three examples will suffice. In
July 1993, Iran qualified four youngsters for the International Physics
Olympiad that was held in Williamsburg, Virginia.
Friends, family and teachers gathered at Mehrabad Airport to see
the bright youngsters off. The proud
and excited teenagers only made it as far as Rome. Here, officious U.S. government officials refused to provide the
students with visas, and they were forced to return to Tehran. When Iranian athletes such as wrestlers and
soccer players traveled to the United States, they were photographed and
fingerprinted as if they were common criminals. On one occasion, the Iranian wrestling team returned to Tehran
rather than submit to the fingerprinting. In April 2001, award-winning filmmaker Jafar Panahi was picked up by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service while in transit through JFK airport on
his way from Hong Kong to South America. When Panahi refused to be fingerprinted and photographed, he was
handcuffed and chained to a bench overnight in leg irons. After 18 hours, the filmmaker, an artist
whose work had been critical of government oppression in Iran, was unchained,
recuffed and escorted to a plane that took him back to Hong Kong. These kinds of mean-spirited actions have
not gone unnoticed by Iran and other actors in the international system.
Even its allies have begun to question U.S. methods. Samuel Huntington warns that the United
States is not only a lonely superpower, but is becoming a "rogue superpower." Many countries across the globe view the
United States as "intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist,
hegemonic, hypocritical and applying double standards, engaging in what they
label ‘financial imperialism' and ‘intellectual colonialism'. . . ."5
Despite the continuing antagonism between the United States and the Islamic Republic, they share many interests in the region. Both desire stability in the Persian Gulf
and in Central Asia. Both seek an end
to the runaway drug trade that contaminates the region. Both share an economic interest in the
exploration and production of oil and natural gas. Both have vested interests in opposing the regime of Saddam
Hussein in Iraq.
Given these shared interests and the relative importance of
both states on the international stage, a U.S.-Iran détente would seem to be a
natural development. For this to
happen, however, both parties to the feud must practice creative
diplomacy. The global hegemon, for
example, needs to engage the regional hegemon as a sovereign independent member
of the community of nations and treat the citizens of Iran with the respect and
dignity they deserve. The regional
hegemon, in turn, needs to eschew the use of extra-legal violence, soften its
harsh rhetoric, and introduce genuine participation into its political process.
POWER AND HEGEMONY
In its attempt to protect and expand its hegemonic power, the
United States has pursued policies designed to weaken regional powers such as
Iran and China. The pressures applied
by the global hegemon often have unintended, counterproductive consequences. U.S. pressure, for example, acts as a
catalyst strengthening and solidifying relations between and among dominant
regional hegemons. Figure 1 indicates
how two regional hegemons, Iran and China, have come to form a fundamental
cross-regional alliance. U.S.
condemnation has resulted in both intraregional and interregional alliances
featuring Iran and China at the center of concentric circles of countries that
resent and resist U.S. interventionary hegemony. In the Middle East and East Asia these nation-states include
Syria and North Korea respectively.
The global hegemon seeks to anchor its foreign policy in
military might. Despite a huge defense
budget and sophisticated armaments, however, the United States has discovered
that its power is not unlimited, as the confrontation with Iraq has
demonstrated. Billions of dollars in
U.S. military expenditures have not altered Saddam Hussein's behavior. Over the last decade, the United States has
unleashed more than 700 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a cost of nearly $1 billion
against Iraq and targets in Sudan and Afghanistan.
Washington is beginning to understand that delicate social and
political problems cannot be bombed out of existence. (Nonetheless, the George W. Bush administration has plans to pursue
the expensive missile defense system, a system that is strongly opposed by
Europe, Russia and China.)
The policy of the global hegemon differs with respect to the
particular region or regime. These
differences can be explained by the differing worldviews that mark other
cultures and civilizations. In this
context, leading regional hegemons such as Iran, North Korea and China
represent cultures that seem particularly alien to the United States. China is often viewed as a huge backward nation of inscrutable drones who live in poverty and ignorance. North Korea is accused of "capricious and
whimsical behavior" and, in the words of one observer: "There is enough that is weird about North
Korea to gobsmack you." Iran is
considered to be a nation of cats, caviar and carpets, where religious
fanaticism triumphs over rational discourse and where little value is placed on
human life. After a long article
analyzing Iranian politics and the elections of June 2001, an American
journalist inexplicably ends her analysis by claiming that President Muhammad
Khatami planned to conclude his electioneering at a breakfast "where he will
serve up an Iranian specialty -- stewed sheep brains."6
CONCLUSIONS
As global hegemon, the United States is in an excellent
position to take the initiative in pursuing a new Iran policy. The Atlantic Council report recommends that
the current stalemate be broken because it is in the U.S. national interest to
do so. Given Iran's regional power position and its great hydrocarbon wealth
and large population, the United States must one day soon develop relations
with the Islamic Republic. The Atlantic
Council study provides compelling reasons for this détente. It is also important, however, that any
rapprochement also be in the national interest of the Islamic Republic. Iran is interested but is unlikely to
approach the United States formally and publicly.
President Khatami has asked that the United States indicate its
good will through deeds and not only through words.
If the United States were to lift the embargo, for example, Iran
is likely to respond positively and constructively.
The heavy military presence of the global hegemon in the
Persian Gulf is a matter of grave concern to Iran, the dominant regional
hegemon. At the same time, U.S. activities in the Gulf are proving to be very costly to the United States –
both economically and politically. One
important consequence of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement would be for the Islamic
Republic to take on some of the local political responsibilities. Iran is the natural balance wheel against
Iraq. It would be in the interests of
the global hegemon to slowly disengage from its day to day confrontation with
Iraq and allow the dominant regional hegemon, Iran, to take on its historic
role.
As the global hegemon begins to rethink its policy and place in
the world, there are six recommendations that might be considered. First, allow regional powers to pursue their
goals while maintaining their own independence and dignity. Confronting them and referring to them as
rogues and renegades only drives them into one another's arms. The result is the establishment of alliances
between countries like Iran and China or Iran and Russia. From the very beginning, these alliances
take on an anti-American flavor.
Second, develop a strategic plan that will help guide it in a
world caught in the midst of fundamental transformation. Iran, for example, will have a population of
over 100 million in 25 years. Whether
the leader of Iran wears a turban, a military helmet or a baseball cap, Iran
will have a major presence and power in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabian leaders have come to recognize
this fact and, beginning in earnest in 1996, have established and strengthened
Saudi relations with the Islamic Republic.
Third, the United States as sole global hegemon carries moral
responsibilities along with its military and political responsibilities. It is in the American interest, for example,
to promote human rights and political development fairly across the world. It is not acceptable for the global hegemon
to single out regional hegemons such as Iran, Syria and Libya for special
condemnation while overlooking the transgressions of allies in the region such
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.
Fourth, the United States as global hegemon should do away with
its officiousness and bureaucratic harassment against individual citizens of
recalcitrant regional hegemons. It is
beneath the United States to punish individuals who have been sought out only
because they hail from countries such as Iran and Libya, for example. The United States has shown it can and will
work with countries like North Vietnam and North Korea. Why can't it communicate with countries like
the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Fifth, U.S. foreign-policy makers must not contaminate their
policies towards one problem area by formulating policies based on conditions
that dominate in other problem areas. This is especially true in the Middle East, where U.S. policy towards
Israel takes precedence over other major issues in the region. The global hegemon's close and uncritical
views of Israel run directly against the interpretations of other major
countries in the region. Iran, which
has been particularly outspoken about the situation of the Palestinians, has
been singled out for special condemnation by pro-Israeli voices in the United
States.
Sixth, the global
hegemon desperately needs to develop a serious understanding of other cultures
and civilizations. American leaders have
shown little sensitivity towards developments in Iran and are often extremely
illiterate concerning Shii Islam. Some
of this is due to ignorance; some is due to bias; some is due to politics. The global hegemon cannot afford to be
ignorant about its neighbors in this shaking and shrinking world.
The frozen state of U.S.-Iran relations is not only damaging to
the interests of both parties but it has a negative impact upon the global
system more generally. In the long
term, the global hegemon needs to communicate and cooperate with Persian Gulf
hegemon Iran. At the same time, a
rapprochement between Iran and the United States is in the interest of the
Islamic Republic. When the leaders in
both countries recognize this reality, then they must carefully and cautiously
begin to develop new diplomatic approaches.
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1 There are, of course, other hegemonic actors and
subsytems. One of the most important is
Russia, which we have discussed above. Because of the special role of China and because of the strong
Iran-China linkage, we have focused our analysis upon the Middle East and East
Asian regional subsystems.
2 An "overture" is defined as a diplomatic meeting
between two nation-states at the under-secretary level and above. Between 1994 and 1996, China and Iran
engaged in 26 different diplomatic overtures. The only countries that ranked above the China number are Russia,
Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, India, Turkey and Kazakhstan.
3 John Calabrese, "China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security," Middle East Journal, No. 52, Summer 1998, p. 365.
4 See, for example, Congressman Tom Lantos, "Let's Not
Reward Iran for Bad Behavior," The
Washington Post, May 28, 2001. For
a discussion of the role of AIPAC in support of renewing the Iran-Libya sanctions
act, see Alan Sipress, The Washington Post, June 9, 2001.
5 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999, pp.
35-49.
6 Molly Moore, The Washington Post, June 7, 2001.
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