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| Volume VIII, September 2001, Number 3 |
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| ABSTRACT: American-Turkish Relations Since the End of the Cold War |
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| Ekavi Athanassopoulou |
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Dr. Athanassopoulou is visiting research fellow at the Center for
Mediterranean Studies, Bristol University, and senior research fellow at
ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy).
In the 1990s the security environment around Turkey's borders, particularly in the Middle East, has called for the continuation of military cooperation and a close strategic relationship between the United States and Turkey. Nonetheless, the relationship has been neither ideal nor linear. On the one hand, this is the result of the emergence of the United States as the only superpower after the end of the Cold War. The liberation of American defense policy from the fear of expansion of Soviet influence had a quantitative (declining defense budgets and foreign-security-assistance cuts), as well as a qualitative effect (more readiness to criticize allies like Turkey). On the other hand, the bilateral relationship has suffered due to the failure of the Turkish leadership to show considerable progress concerning such thorny issues as democratization, respect for human rights and the Kurdish question.
From the perspective of the past 53 years it is clear that Turkish-American relations have never been devoid of problems. It is reasonable to expect that difficulties will continue particularly given that some interests of the two countries differ. However, the close strategic relationship seems that it is there to stay.
For one, U.S. foreign and security policy towards Turkey is not going to be pegged on the resolution of the Kurdish problem and Turkey's democratization. Ankara, for its part, will continue to value strong security links with the United States. Undoubtedly, Turkish political leaders will drive a hard bargain so as to trade off support for U.S. security initiatives -- outside the traditional security parameters of NATO -- with an enhanced, institutionalized and (ideally) not an ad hoc role within the U.S./NATO strategic planning. Furthermore, they will constantly attempt to recast the bilateral relationship on a basis of interdependency. Such interaction may prove challenging and often highly frustrating for both Washington and Ankara, but it is unlikely that it will cause serious fractures as both sides share a fundamental interest in cooperation.
In the future, the course of American-Turkish relations will be influenced by: (1) the evolution of American defense policy in general and security strategy towards the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans in particular; (2) the extent to which Ankara's autonomous regional policies may seriously clash with American interests or wishes; (3) the economic and political stability of Turkey.
So far, it seems that American security strategy in the Middle East and the Caucasus will not drastically change under the new Republican administration. Therefore, the U.S. interest in security cooperation with Turkey in these regions will continue. Nor is it likely that Turkey's autonomous policies will collide with fundamental American interests. The existence of an independent streak in Turkish policy is not news in the context of Turkish-American relations. Against a weak and inconsistent American leadership Turkey will still act within the broad confines of U.S. policies though its tendency to play hard for the promotion of its national interests may be reinforced.
One issue that appears to have, in the medium-to-long run, the potential to seriously affect the bilateral relationship is the question over the Turks' ability to respond successfully to the crisis their economic and political system is faced with. The country's current combination of a highly unmanaged, unstable economy and a badly fractioning and profoundly corrupt political landscape has raised, perhaps for the first time, concerns in Washington as to the ability of the Turkish establishment to ensure the economic, political and, by extension, social order that will guarantee Turkey's long-term stability and its value as a U.S. ally.
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