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| Volume VIII, March 2001, Number 1 |
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| ABSTRACT: The Second Palestinian Uprising: Cause for Optimism? |
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| James Ron |
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Dr. Ron is an assistant professor of sociology and
political science at The Johns Hopkins University. The following is based on his remarks at the Center for Policy Analysis
on Palestine, November 17, 2000.
There is good reason to believe that the second Palestinian uprising may provide
better chances for a lasting Middle East peace. Although in the short run we
can expect mutual hatred and violence to escalate, there will be substantial
long-term benefits. Most important, the uprising will put an end to the notion,
common in both Israel and the United States during the 1990s, that the emerging
Palestinian entity can be managed, constrained, and shaped at will. Ever since
Oslo, Israeli leaders have told themselves and the public that Palestinians
could be forced to make do with a truncated and encircled state, no access to
Jerusalem, and a massive Jewish settler presence. Now, such arguments seem
increasingly unpersuasive. Once a substantial number of Israelis understand
that their power to dictate to Palestinians is limited, a more realistic peace
deal is achievable.
In promoting greater realism among Israelis, the second Intifada's accomplishments
resemble those of the first (1987-1993). That protest slowed the political
momentum of the Greater Israel movement, which had persuaded many Israelis
during the 1980s that military control over Palestinians could continue
indefinitely. The first uprising led to the 1993 Oslo agreement, in which
Israel finally recognized some Palestinian rights. Israeli left and centrist
parties shied away from mounting a sustained challenge to the Jewish political
right, however. Instead, they spent much of the 1990s expanding Jewish colonies
and ignoring mounting Palestinian frustration over their shrinking patrimony.
From 1993 to 2000, successive Israeli governments suggested that a peace deal
could be achieved on Israeli terms, without true consideration for Palestinian
claims. Although this discourse still exists, it now seems increasingly
unrealistic.
The second uprising has also shown that for the first time since the 1948 war,
Palestinians have a realistic, if limited, "military option" in confronting
Israel. Ever since the 1948 defeat, armed Palestinians have been unable to
secure a foothold in their own land, as first Jordan (1948-1967) then Israel
(1967-1993) kept armed Palestinians out of the West Bank and Gaza. Although
guerrilla groups mounted occasional attacks from within the occupied lands,
they did not effectively control territory or population. Today, as a result of
the 1993 Oslo deal, Palestinian fighters enjoy the de facto and de
jure monopoly over violence in Palestinian urban areas in the West Bank,
and in 70 percent of the Gaza Strip. Although the Israeli military could easily
crush those so called "A Zones," such a move would provoke regional tensions
and international condemnation. As a result, Palestinian guerrillas have access
to safe havens amidst their own population for the first time in 53 years. This
bolsters Palestinian morale and threatens Israeli occupation forces in the West
Bank and Gaza. As a result, both Israel and its main patron, the United States,
have been forced to seriously study Palestinian claims. Although U.S. and
Israeli proposals have yet to satisfy Palestinians' basic territorial needs,
recent iterations are more reflective of Palestinian rights than anything
offered before.
Sadly, the lesson of both the first and second Palestinian uprisings is that limited
bursts of violence accomplish more than years of non-violent negotiations.
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