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Volume VIII, March 2001, Number 1  
 
ABSTRACT: Israel’s Retreat from South Lebanon: Internal and External Implications
 
Fawaz A. Gerges
 
Dr. Gerges, who holds the Christian A. Johnson Chair in international ffairs and Middle East studies at Sarah Lawrence College, New York, is a MacArthur fellow and a visiting scholar at the American universities in Beirut and Cairo. His most recent book is entitled America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures Or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

This article examines Israel's forced decision to retreat from southern Lebanon and its implications on Arab-Israeli peace making, the Arab political order, and internal politics in Lebanon. A new attitude has emerged within the ranks of the Israeli military-civilian elite regarding the inherent limits of militarism. In the wake of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Israelis have begun openly to discuss the unwarranted display and efficacy of their country's armed power that has so informed its strategic raison d'etre for the last fifty years.

In the eyes of many Arabs, however, many Israeli myths were shattered as a result of the liberation of south Lebanon; this dramatic development has convinced many Arabs that Israel can be deterred and its ambitions contained when the appropriate conditions for resistance exist. The most important of these conditions is the presence of sociopolitical groups, such as Hizballah, that have the will and inclination to confront the powerful Israeli army.

More than anywhere else, the Lebanese example has had a direct effect not only on the Palestinian negotiating strategy but also on Palestinian public opinion. On the one hand, President Yasser Arafat's refusal to make further concessions on the negotiating table is one very important result of the Israeli army's forced retreat from southern Lebanon. Hizballah's achievement and its aftermath appear to have changed the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Arafat knows full well that tampering with legitimate Palestinian rights, as they are preceived by the general Palestinian and Arab public, given what happened in Lebanon, would lead to a further polarization of relations between the Palestinian Authority and its powerful opposition.

On the other hand, in their current intifada, Palestinian youths have tried to imitate the symbols and methods of Hizballah fighters, notwithstabding Israel's brutal crackdown and heavy Palestinian casualties. Hizballah's resistance has influenced Palestinians' thinking and action.

Despite the structural weakness of the Arab political order, Israel's withdrawal appears neither to weaken its legitimacy nor to endanger its stability. The Arab state system has proved to be resilient and durable, notwithstanding its frequent crises.  In the case of Lebanon, the challenge of political-economic development facing the country is at least as daunting as the military confrontation with Israel. Can, for example, Hizballah's rank and file be fully integrated into Lebanese civil society, and through what means and institutions? Will Hizballah devote its energy to politics and gradually shed its paramilitary character? Furthermore, Israel's retreat from southern Lebanon complicated Syrian-Lebanese relations and brought about many calls in Lebanon for restructuring these relations along lines based on respect for one another's sovereignty and indepedence. A consensus is gradually emerging in Lebanon regarding the need to reduce and even eliminate Syria's intervention in its domestic politics.

All in all, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon has had a multiplicity of effects on the Arab-Israeli peace process and regional politics as well.
 
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