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| Volume VII, October 2000, Number 4 |
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| Hemmed
in by Circumstances: Turkey and Iraq since the Gulf War |
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| Henri J. Barkey |
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Dr. Barkey is the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen professor
of International Relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania. For a printable pdf version of this article, click here.
Ankara's approach to Iraq is influenced entirely by the
Kurdish question in northern Iraq and its ramifications for the Kurds in
Turkey. All other geopolitical or
strategic considerations pale in comparison.
Ankara has viewed the reemergence of Kurdish ethnic nationalist
stirrings starting in Turkey with the PKK-led insurrection in 1984 and
subsequently with the Iraqi Kurdish upheavals of 1988 and 1991 as an
existential issue. For Ankara, Kurdish
nationalism has the potential to lead to the dismemberment of the country.
At the very least, in Ankara's mindset, the
continued festering of the Kurdish issue creates opportunities for foreign
powers, ranging from Middle Eastern to Western ones, to make mischief in
Turkey. Even if the unrealistic fears
of Turkish leaders were to be discarded, the fact remains that for a country that
since its inception has perpetuated a myth of a homogenous ethnicity the
Kurdish question is a deeply troubling one.
Turkey's first priority, therefore, has been to ensure the
existence of a stable government in Baghdad, which will put an end to the
Kurdish dreams of independence or federation in northern Iraq.
Moreover, it would want a regime that would
cooperate with Ankara regionally to curb Kurdish cross-border activities, be
they political or military. From this
point of view, Ankara has not had much reason to criticize the current regime
in Baghdad. It has a long history of
cooperation dating back to the 1980s, when Turkish troops routinely and with
the permission of Saddam Hussein entered Iraqi territory in hot-pursuit
operations. In essence, given its
current unhappiness with the power vacuum in northern Iraq, Turkey would not
oppose, would perhaps even welcome, the consolidation of Iraq under Saddam's
rule.
Complicating matters for Turkey, however, is its relationship
with the United States and the presence on Turkish soil of the U.S. aircraft of
Operation Northern Watch (ONW) enforcing the northern no-fly zone over
Iraq. The irony, of course, is that ONW
and its predecessor, Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), are primarily responsible
for the de facto autonomy the Kurds in northern Iraq currently enjoy.
OPC, in turn, was devised to help Turkey out
of the Kurdish refugee crisis it faced at the end of the Gulf War in 1991.
But ONW is a sword that cuts both ways.
On the one hand, it undermines the Turkish
position in Iraq and encourages Kurdish aspirations for autonomy.
On the other hand, it is the one card Ankara
possesses that binds Washington to its priorities and needs because ONW (with
its southern equivalent) has come to represent the primary leg on which U.S.
Iraq policy is based. Finally, Turkey
has had to establish close links with one of the two Kurdish groups in northern
Iraq, Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP), in order to combat
the Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK).
Will the end of the PKK-led insurrection change Turkish
policy? There are indications that
Ankara will harden its attitude to the KDP and its rival, the PUK, to thwart
their ambitions to establish a federation in Iraq in the event of Saddam's
demise. In large measure, however, its
attitude to the Kurds in Iraq will also be determined by the course of internal
developments in Turkey, especially as the European Union accession process
eventually affects them.
From the Iraqi regime's perspective, Turkey's support for
existing sanctions, close cooperation with the KDP, repeated interventions
across the border and continued harboring of ONW are causes for occasional
diatribes in the Iraqi press. Saddam
and his regime have had many occasions when they could have kindled the
anti-Turkish fires in the region but declined to do so.
Whereas Turgut Özal, first as prime minister
and then later as president, was willing to tamper at least rhetorically with
the regional status quo, the Iraqi regime knows that the current Turkish
leadership is anxious to preserve it and that Ankara's support for ONW is the
result of "U.S. pressure."
ANTECEDENTS
The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 could not have started at a more
opportune moment for Turkey. Reeling
from an economic crisis that brought about its worst balance-of-payments crisis
and a concurrent political one, Turkey had just experienced its third military
coup since 1960 when the Iraqis decided to take advantage of Iranian weakness
in late September 1980. 1980 also
marked the beginning of a new export-oriented economic reform program in
Turkey. The Iran-Iraq War enabled
Turkey to act as a primary transportation route for both combatants and also
export its own wares to them. As the
war sapped both Iran's and Iraq's precious foreign-exchange resources, cheaper
Turkish goods appeared increasingly attractive. By 1985, Turkish exports to Iraq had reached $961 million or 12
percent of all Turkish exports. The
respective figures at the onset of the war in 1980 were $135 million and 4.6
percent.1 This
seven-fold increase in exports to Iraq (together with the increase to Iran)
helped anchor the Turkish economic reform effort. These numbers would decline considerably as the war began to wind
down. During the war, a second pipeline
connecting the oil-rich region of Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean port of
Yumurtalik was completed, and the Turks often warned Iran not to attack these
pipelines as they were part of Turkey's vital economic zone.
After the conclusion of the war, the Saddam
Hussein regime, bitter at what it perceived to be price gouging and Turkey's
reluctance to extend credit to Baghdad, sharply curtailed Iraq's purchases from
Turkey. As a result, on the eve of the
second Gulf war, Turkish exports had decreased to a trickle.
But the war also entailed costs for Turkey.
The diminution of Iraqi government control
in its northern provinces allowed the PKK in the late 1980s to establish bases
there and use the area as its strategic depth while increasingly challenging
Turkish forces on the other side of the border. Turkey negotiated permission to conduct limited hot-pursuit
operations against the PKK. The absence
of Iraqi authority in the north also increased the self-confidence of Iraqi
Kurds, who expected that the war would allow them to negotiate better terms
with the central government. The Anfal
campaign and the use of chemical weapons against the residents of the Kurdish
town of Halabja, of course, ended these expectations. These two Iraqi operations caused, almost as a prelude to the
massive influx of fleeing refugees at the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the
first of the Kurdish refugee problems Turkey would encounter.2
Turkey, despite deteriorating relations with Baghdad, had high
expectations from the war's end in 1988.
The devastation visited on the combatants meant that massive
reconstruction projects would be up for bids, and Turkish construction
companies, which after 1980 had proven themselves in Middle Eastern markets,
had a good shot at winning many. This
was not to be; Saddam, feeling the pinch of his extravagant wartime spending,
decided to make up for his losses with another foreign adventure by invading
Kuwait. The coalition efforts against
Iraq were met with mixed emotions in Turkey.
There was little sympathy for Kuwait and its ruling family and even less
for a massive military operation. But
for President Özal, this event represented a watershed in Middle East
relations. He correctly bet on the
winning side and pushed his government to anticipate events and take action
ahead of time. For instance, Turkey
closed down the main export pipelines to the Mediterranean forseeing the
imposition of sanctions by the international community.
Özal, always the risk taker, was also
willing to take a more active role in the anti-Saddam coalition despite
opposition from parliament, his own party, public opinion and, most important,
the military brass. In fact, the chief
of the general staff, Necip Torumtay, in an unprecedented move in Turkish
history, resigned his post to demonstrate his opposition to Özal's plans.
Allied planes based at the Incirlik base
near Adana participated in the bombing campaign; even though Turkish troops
were not involved directly in the action, for the first time an Arab country
was bombed from Turkish soil.3
More significant, Özal had also calculated that the allied
onslaught on Iraq would dislodge Saddam's regime. Therefore, it was paramount for Turkey to be at the "post-war
settlement table" and not just as a spectator.4 For Özal,
though clearly not for most of Turkey's elite, the allied response to Saddam's
invasion was the opening salvo of a new international regime to be constructed
from the ashes of the Soviet Empire. In
moves reminiscent of the public musings during the Iran-Iraq War, when Iranian
forces were on the offensive and Baghdad's regime seemed on the ropes, Özal
appeared willing to once again challenge the regional status quo.
If Özal correctly foresaw the outcome of the
war, he, with almost everyone else, clearly erred in underestimating Saddam's
will and ability to remain in power.
There was not to be a "post-war settlement table"; President Bush's
unwillingness to extend the conflict and challenge Iraqi helicopters raining
death on Kurdish and Shia rebels ended any hope that Saddam would be overthrown
quickly.
As Saddam, with the help of the helicopters, managed to get the
upper hand, some 500,000 refugees streamed toward the Turkish border with
another million heading for Iran.
Embarrassed by the outflow and the daily misery of these Iraqi Kurds
dying in the austere mountains that constitute the border between Iraq and its
two neighbors, the United States decided to act. Operation Provide Comfort was equally designed to come to the
relief of Turkey, which was also looking for a way to turn back the flow of
refugees. Not only was the outflow
straining its resources; these refugees were Kurds, whose presence in the
primarily Kurdish-inhabited southeastern provinces threatened to further
polarize the situation there. With the
support of Özal, OPC was initially established and included ground troops.
Iraqi forces soon pulled back, and the
Kurdish refugees returned to their homes.
The combination of a token allied presence in the north, in the town of
Zakho, with the air cover, allowed for the creation of the autonomous Kurdish
zone. The Kurds, much to the distress
of Ankara, quickly organized themselves.
By 1992, they had had elections and a functioning administration, even
if the two faction leaders, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, continued to
call the shots.
Turkey had reluctantly agreed to the establishment of OPC.
The refugees had not been allowed into
Turkey for fear of the creation of a permanent, Gaza-type refugee implantation,
the linkage of the two Kurdish communities, and the economic burden of caring
for so many people.5 OPC was the
only way to convince the refugees to leave Turkish soil and return.
More important, the plight of these refugees
had attracted worldwide attention to the Kurds in general, and Turkish Kurds
mobilized to help their ethnic cousins.
Towns in the southeast, despite their own impoverishment, raised funds,
bought necessary supplies and organized relief convoys.
Such overt cross-border solidarity when
combined with a still-growing insurgency clearly worried Turkish authorities
and assisted the setting up of OPC. For
constitutional reasons, OPC had to be approved by the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, a fact which would later become a major source of contention between
governments willing to extend its mandate and opposition parties intent on
undermining it.
Turkish misgivings aside about the presence of the
multinational force in Turkey and Iraq, collaboration between the United
States, in particular, and Turkey under the umbrella of OPC enabled the Turkish
military to conduct wide-scale operations in northern Iraq.
These were not hot pursuit, but rather large
sweeps designed to eradicate PKK bases.
Ankara corralled the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq to support such
anti-PKK operations, the largest of which was conducted before the onset of
winter in October-November 1992.
Eventually such operations would become routine, with some entailing
tens of thousands of troops.
With the insurgency in Turkey worsening and disenchantment with
the conduct of the anti-insurgency campaign increasing, Özal decided to change
tactics. He sought the assistance of
Turkish Kurds, but more important, of Iraqi Kurdish leaders and Talabani, in
particular, to get the PKK to declare a cease-fire in 1993.
He openly cultivated the Iraqi Kurdish
leaders and sought to win the hearts and minds of Turkish Kurds by attempting
to be seen as the friend of their Iraqi brethren. This was a risky strategy that once again contradicted Turkey's
traditional approach to the Kurdish issue.
The experiment was cut short by Özal's death in April 1993; the
cease-fire with the PKK collapsed soon thereafter. Özal had pushed these changes in spite of the fact that as
president of the republic his job was largely ceremonial; Süleyman Demirel, who
had become prime minister in 1991 and succeeded him as president, made sure
that these policies were abandoned.
With weaker leadership, epitomized by Demirel and Tansu Çiller as the
new prime minister, the military managed to reassert its influence and steer
Turkey back to its traditional policy options.
The Iraqi regime's approach to Turkish policy after the Gulf
War was surprisingly accommodating.
Baghdad saw in Turkey a country that had been pushed around by its
superpower ally and also one that was sympathetic to Iraq.
Özal's travails in many ways demonstrated
the difficulties involved in reaching a consensus on Iraq that was antithetical
to Baghdad's interests. Moreover, for
Iraq under blockade, Turkey was, with Jordan, one of the few remaining exits
and smuggling routes. Also, in the
early years after the war, Turkey assiduously met with Iran and Syria to
reiterate its commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq.
This is not to say that Iraq was pleased
with the deepening relationship between Ankara and the Kurds, nor was it
completely acquiescent in Turkish incursions into its territory, because they
reminded everyone that Baghdad no longer controlled the north.
Finally, there were longstanding issues
between Iraq and Turkey. Just as with
Syria, water loomed large, since both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have
their origins in the Anatolian land mass.
TURKEY AND IRAQ: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
In 1991, Philip Robins wrote, "of the three Middle Eastern
neighbors it is Iraq with which Ankara has the best potential for balanced
relations."6 He cited
Iraq's dependence on Turkey for access to Europe, the trade relationship, the
common desire to subdue Kurdish ethnic consciousness, and even the similarity
in regime types as far as the approach to religion was concerned.
Phebe Marr wrote, "Turkey's geostrategic and
economic interests point to a gradual, if reluctant, normalization of relations
with Iraq, even while Saddam is in power. Were he to be replaced, this process
would be speeded up."7 Although much
may have changed on the ground since these assessments were made, the fact
remains that they both are still correct.
The View from Ankara
Post-Gulf War Turkish policy on Iraq can be characterized as a
tight balancing act involving the following issues:
(1) Relations with the United States,
(2) The territorial integrity of Iraq and the institutionalization of
the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq,
(3) The struggle against the PKK and its presence in the north,
(4) The economic costs to Turkey of continued sanctions.
Relations with the United States
The Kurdish question aside, the United States and Turkey share
a basic approach to Iraq. They both
adhere to the principle of Iraq's territorial unity and fear, perhaps for
different reasons, the consequences of the instability that would ensue were
Iraq to break up. Also, they see in
Saddam a potential regional hegemon likely to disrupt the established order
with his zeal to acquire large quantities of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Moreover, for both, a humbled and somewhat
weakened Iraq serves as a balance to Iranian regional aspirations.
But with Özal's demise, existing differences between U.S. and
Turkish interests became more pronounced.
The Turkish establishment's unease with OPC and the sanctions on Iraq
grew with time. Even after allowing for
opposition antics, parliamentary debates on the renewal of OPC accordingly
became more contentious. OPC was
accused of all kinds of mischief, from dropping ammunition for the PKK to
stopping and picking up wounded PKK fighters.
Even former president Kenan Evren argued in favor of OPC's removal.
Evren crystallized Turkish thinking when he
suggested that "a force that is protecting the Kurds of northern Iraq today,
one day can turn around and say that it is protecting those in the southeast."8 It is
precisely this fear that terrified the Turkish establishment even though it
knew fully well that the United States had no such intention.
In fact, while supporting the right to have
a life free of Saddam's repression, Washington provided complete support
certainly at the rhetorical level for Ankara's struggle against the PKK.
Misgivings at the elite level can be
attributed primarily to how uncomfortable this elite was in the mid 1990s with
the emerging notion of Kurds and Kurdishness; after all, until some five years
earlier, to all intents and purposes, Kurds were not part of the lexicon.
The fact remains that Iraq's neighbors and
the Western countries have over the years, despite their clear desire to keep Iraq
unified, contributed in different ways and indirectly to its dismemberment.9 This is
perhaps the inevitable result of current policies, to which there are no good
alternatives.
Leading the fight against the renewal of OPC's mandate were two
political parties that seemingly came from opposite sides of the political
spectrum: the center-left nationalist Democratic Left party (DLP) of Bülent
Ecevit and veteran Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare party.
Both had traditionally espoused anti-U.S.
positions. Ecevit's opposition to U.S. Iraq
policy was motivated primarily from a fear that this would lead to the
emergence of Kurdish nationalist demands in Iraq as well as Turkey.
He had always viewed the Kurdish issue as an
economic rather than an ethnic one; he dismissed the very formulation of
Kurdish demands by arguing that the inhabitants of those parts of Turkey and
Iraq were nothing more than feudal clans led by incompetents.
As late as 1996, Ecevit was praising the
putative agreements signed at the end of the Gulf War (after the mass exodus of
refugees) between Saddam and the two Kurdish leaders, arguing, "Although the
project was not up to Western standards, it could have paved the way for
internal peace and accord in that country.
In any case, the anachronistic feudal structure of Northern Iraq was not
yet ready for a fuller form of democracy."10 The reason for the failure of this pact was
crystal clear to him as well: "But the United States immediately intervened to
cut off the Kurdish dialogue with Baghdad.
Instead the United States chose to virtually partition Iraq and try to
establish a superficial Kurdish state in the North under its own mandate."11
Ecevit had good personal relations with Saddam Hussein and
during the prelude to the Gulf War visited him in Baghdad, one of the few
Western leaders to have done so. This
visit was followed by others in 1991 and 1992.
He had been a long-standing foe of sanctions on Iraq, suggesting in 1994
that Turkey pierce the U.N.-imposed embargo on Iraq, which he dismissed as an
American whim. Furthermore, he saw the
United States as demanding unreasonable concessions on Cyprus and the domestic
Kurdish issue in return for economic aid.12
Erbakan and his Welfare party's objections were even more
strident. OPC in their view was an
occupation force. Erbakan claimed that
OPC supported the PKK, transported equipment to Armenia's nuclear power plant,
and survived despite the concerted opposition of the population, parliament and
military because the United States was imposing it.13 The December
1995 elections did not augur well for OPC; the Welfare party emerged as the
largest political group in Parliament; Ecevit's DLP also scored significant
gains. At victory celebrations on
December 25, 1995, Erbakan wished OPC a speedy "good-bye."
Once in power, Erbakan sent two of his
ministers, including Justice Minister Sevket Kazan, one of his most trusted and
longstanding colleagues, to Baghdad in pursuit of improved relations.14 Six months
later, Erbakan as prime minister had to preside over another extension of OPC.15 This would be
its last. By January 1, 1997, following
the debacle in northern Iraq in fall 1996, when Barzani's KDP fighters retook
the city of Irbil from his adversary Talabani with the help of the Iraqi army,
OPC was replaced by a much downsized force, Operation Northern Watch
(ONW). By the time Ecevit became prime
minister in 1999 and his party subsequently emerged as the largest from
elections that year, the renewal of ONW had ceased to be as controversial an
issue as its predecessor.
Although Erbakan claimed to have received concessions from the
United States in June 1996, which allowed him to claim credit for the
transformation of OPC into ONW and thus fulfill his election promise, this
change did not significantly alter U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The fact of the matter is that Erbakan and
Ecevit were not the only ones perturbed by the presence of OPC.
The list included the military as well, which
had been very uneasy about the whole enterprise.16 Ironically,
in order to justify its own recommendation for the renewal of OPC's mandate,
the government in every instance had to fall back upon the advice of the
National Security Council (NSC), the powerful military-civilian body that
serves as the institutional and primary conduit for the military leadership's
preferences. In this game, the military through the NSC played a critical role;
on the one hand, it fanned the flames of discontent while, on the other, it
presented itself as a reliable intermediary between the United States and the
Turkish Parliament.
The Turkish elites' deep suspicions of the U.S.-led
multinational operation notwithstanding, OPC's mandate was routinely renewed
primarily because it came to symbolize the mutual dependence relationship
between Ankara and Washington. The
need to both contain Saddam and protect the Kurdish enclave elevated OPC/ONW to
a critical component of Washington's policy.
In effect, the United States became dependent on the forces based at
Incirlik to sustain its anti-Saddam policy. This, in turn, provided Ankara with significant bargaining chips
even though OPC had been established just as much to protect the Kurds as it
had to enable the Turkish government to remove the Kurdish refugees from the
border areas. In this sense, Turkey's
Iraq policy cannot be dissociated from its relationship with the United
States. OPC/ONW bought a certain degree
of immunity from U.S. criticism of its cross-border raids into Iraq as well as
its human-rights violations in the Kurdish areas, insurance against the
repetition of the 1991 events and goodwill in the U.S. Congress.
As a minister in the Erbakan-led government,
Necati Çelik stated in defense of its decision to renew OPC, "not only did the
NSC argue against a denial, but, when your defense industries' dependence on
the United States is about 75 percent, you cannot conduct a policy despite the
United States."17 The United
States did not just need Turkey for OPC/ONW, but also for putting pressure on
Saddam during periods of acute tension between Baghdad and the international
community. During the February 1998
crisis between Baghdad and Washington, an initially ambivalent Ankara began to
side with the United States on the presence of WMD in Iraq, as Washington
promised it support with international financial institutions, arms sales,
incursions into Iraq and Patriot deployments.18 The request
for Patriots, however, revealed that despite their aversion to OPC/ONW, the
Turkish elites were also bothered by Saddam's drive to acquire WMD capabilities.
History had demonstrated that this was not
the most reliable of neighbors.
Moreover, almost from the beginning of the creation of OPC,
Ankara deftly used the U.S. need for it to extract concessions from Washington
regarding Iraq. At first, it demanded
the opening of the pipeline from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean.
Washington successfully argued at the U.N.
Security Council for mandating that Iraq export at least 50 percent of its oil
through Turkey as part of the oil-for-food Resolution, UNSCR 986.
Despite its fervent wish to tighten the
noose around Saddam, the United States also sided with Ankara, most recently
during the discussions relating to UNSCR 1284, the latest iteration of UNSCR
986, to exclude Turkey's trade with Iraq through the Kurdish areas from the
sanctions regime.19 When the two
Iraqi Kurdish factions fought each other, U.S. efforts to mediate included the
Turks and, in fact, the process that began in Drogheda (Ireland) was concluded
in Ankara, earning it the title of the Ankara Process.
Still, the Turks were unhappy not to be in
the room when U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright negotiated a final
agreement between the two leaders in Washington in fall 1998.20 Moreover,
they were disturbed by references to federalism in the final document signed by
all the parties. Ever suspicious of
NGO-type activities in the north, which many Turks assumed were designed to
prepare for the establishment of an independent state, Ankara, soon after
Mümtaz Soysal became foreign minister in July 1994, drastically curtailed
access to the north.
Just as Erbakan discovered that he could not substantially
shift Turkish Iraqi policy, Ecevit was faced with a similar situation soon
after assuming power in 1999. He
invited Tarik Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister, to Ankara, much to the
consternation of Washington, which had stepped up its efforts to unseat the
regime in Baghdad. Unfortunately for
Aziz, his visit coincided with the capture and return to Turkey of Abdullah
Öcalan, the PKK leader. In view of the
presumed U.S. help in Öcalan's capture, Aziz received a cold shoulder from
Turkish authorities.21 Ecevit, in
fact, even agreed to an expansion of the rules of engagement for ONW aircraft
patrolling Iraqi territory above the 36th parallel,
enabling pilots to retaliate against Iraqi radar and missile tracking and
firing incidents by choosing among a wider range of targets.
In the end, Ecevit, notwithstanding his
previous uncompromising rhetoric on the inadvisability of following the United
States on Iraq, chose to do just that.22
In sum, the mutual dependence of Turkey and the United States
on each other enabled each to make certain concessions to the other.
The United States was careful not to
criticize Turkish cross-border operations, gave full support to the anti-PKK
struggle, was somewhat subdued in its criticism of Turkish human-rights
violations, and supported Turkish demands for exceptions from the sanctions
regime. In exchange, Turkey made the
best of what it perceived as an unfavorable set of conditions in northern Iraq
to satisfy U.S. preferences. At a
fundamental level, however, Turkish and American preferences are
incompatible. While the United States
will accept nothing less than a new regime in Baghdad, the Turks are wary that
a new regime will be weak and beholden to the northern Kurdish groups.
Territorial Integrity and the Kurdish Entity
In Ankara's view, the dismemberment of Iraq as a consequence of
current international policy is a very real possibility.
Therefore, Turkey's first priority is to
ensure Iraq's territorial integrity and prevent the Iraqi Kurds from creating
an independent state of their own. Even
though relations with Iran and Syria have deteriorated over the last few years
(in the case of Syria there was an improvement following Öcalan's expulsion),
the three countries are agreed on checking the ambitions of Kurds in northern
Iraq lest the demonstration effect further politicize their own Kurdish
populations. Turkish Foreign Minister
Ismail Cem strongly stated Turkey's view when he argued, "We are against
judging the situation in Iraq along religious or ethnic lines. We cannot
imagine an independent entity in southern Iraq based on religion, or in the
north based on ethnicity with the centre of the country staying only Arab."23 Although much
of Turkish concern has focused on the possible emergence of a Kurdish state in
northern Iraq, the possibility, however unlikely, of a Shia-dominated state in
the south is also a worrisome possibility.
Such an eventuality could provide Iran with another regional ally with
which to influence events in the Middle East.
From the beginning of the Kurdish "problem," the Turkish
government tried to enlist the help of both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) to help it control the PKK.
In 1992, both groups cooperated with the Turkish military in a sweep of
the area. As relations between the two
factions worsened, Turkey had to rely increasingly on its forces to fight the
PKK in Iraq. In 1995, for instance,
Ankara conducted a six-week operation entailing some 35,000 troops.24 Still,
geography the KDP's territory abutted Turkey's and Massoud Barzani's more
traditional and less nationalistic outlook allowed Ankara to work more closely
with the KDP. Most PKK fighters tended
to be holed up in the mountains controlled by the KDP, which also meant that
during cross-border incursions, Turkey needed the KDP more than the PUK, whose
territory bordered Iran. Because PUK
leader Jalal Talabani refused for a very long time to unequivocally denounce
the PKK, Ankara mistrusted the PUK. It
suspected the PUK of providing safe passage and even basing rights on its
territory. As relations between the two
Kurdish factions worsened, it became increasingly difficult for the PUK to
access Turkish territory, and it found a natural ally in Tehran.
In 1996, following the initial KDP and Iraqi
attacks that dislodged the PUK from its traditional strongholds, including
Suleymaniyah, it counterattacked. Over
the ensuing year, both sides fought sporadically; in November 1997, retreating
KDP forces, however, had to rely on Turkish assistance to halt the PUK's
advance and stabilize the front.
As there has been no return to the pre-Gulf War status quo,
Ankara's second-best option in northern Iraq has been to weaken and keep in
check signs of consolidation of the northern autonomous government.
From this respect, the Kurdish elections of
1992 were an unwelcome event. On the
other hand, the division of northern Iraq between the two factions has clearly
set back the ambitions of these Kurds.
Following the Drogheda and Ankara accords, Turkey has also assumed a
critical role in monitoring the cease-fire.
Ankara, however, will not be satisfied with a post-Saddam arrangement
that ends up creating a federal state in Iraq, as the Kurds have been
demanding. Although Turkey benefits
from continued divisions among the Kurds, a unified Kurdish leadership beholden
to Ankara would probably provide it with a greater say in future Iraqi
developments.
Even Ankara's relationship with the KDP has shown signs of
strain, especially since Öcalan's arrest and the end of the PKK-led insurgency.25 With the
violence abating in the southeast and subsequent decline in the need to
cooperate with Barzani's forces, the Turkish leadership has tried to
demonstrate the limits of its tolerance for Kurdish activity.
In March 2000, at the instigation of the
military high command, a furor erupted over the KDP Ankara representative's
Nevruz (Kurdish New Year) reception, which European Union representatives
attended. In July 2000, the Turkish
establishment viewed the KDP representative's invitation as a ruse to pass
itself off as a diplomatic mission.26 The Turkish government, in an
uncharacteristic move interpreted by many as another slap at the KDP, after an
18-month absence, invited Talabani to visit Ankara and accorded him a warm
reception.27
To blunt arguments about Kurdish exceptionalism, Ankara has
also trumpeted the rights of Turcomans in northern Iraq.
The number of Turcomans, many of whom do not
live in the Kurdish-controlled territories, has been subject to wild
exaggerations although no real count exists.
Ironically, it is Ecevit who has been at the forefront of the quest for
recognition of the Turcomans as a separate ethnic group in Iraq, even though he
does not envisage a separate area for them. In
Ankara, as a result of attempts to interfere in the politics of the Turcomans
in Iraq, more than one "representative" organization exists today.
Turcomans were employed by the international
community as cease-fire observers. The
Iraqi regime has historically been antagonistic to the Turcomans, and they have
been subject to the same human-rights violations that all other Iraqis have
experienced. Still, for Turkey, the
Turcomans represent a card which, if well played, can give Ankara some say in
post-Saddam arrangements, especially should the Kurds decide to ignore them.28
While both Kurdish
factions have maintained contact with the regime in Baghdad for good measure,
it is Barzani who has had the closest links.
Ironically, as much as the Turks would like to see the two Kurdish
factions cooperate with Saddam, the very existence of a Turkish-KDP tie has
enabled the latter to keep Baghdad at arm's length and keep its options
somewhat open. Iran plays a not
dissimilar role with the PUK.
Turkey's greatest challenge is the fact that after almost ten
years of not living under Saddam's tutelage, the Kurdish population in northern
Iraq is likely to resist strongly any effort aimed at bringing back total Iraqi
control. Despite the hardships caused
by intra-group fighting, Kurds in
northern Iraq have not previously experienced as long a period of
"independence" as this one. It has
served to strengthen their consciousness and deepen their ethnic ties.
Moreover, the oil-for-food resolutions
(favored by Turkey), by allocating 13 percent of all Iraqi income to the north,
have given rise to an unprecedented level of prosperity there.
The Iraqi regime had always been stingy with
non-oil investments in the north.
Perhaps the greatest irony is that the separation of the north has even
injected an element of competition between the two Kurdish parties, each trying
to show its residents that it is better at providing vital services.
Even if Iraq does not end up becoming a federated state, as a
result of autonomy arrangements signed in the 1970s, the Kurds have nominally
received rights even under Baathi leadership that far exceed those of their
brethren in Turkey.29 Hence, any
accommodation for Iraqi Kurds within the territorial limits of Iraq is likely
to include meaningful acknowledgement of their separate status and
identity. How then will Turkey react if
it has not managed to come to terms with its own Kurdish problem?
The Struggle against the PKK
Until Öcalan's capture and the unilateral cease-fire
declaration by the PKK, Turkey was primarily concerned with limiting the
ability of the PKK to use the north of Iraq as a staging ground for
attacks. The mountainous and generally
difficult terrain was ideal for the Kurdish insurrection, providing a strategic
depth of sorts. This was especially
true of the tri-border area between Iran, Iraq and Turkey.
The north will remain an area of concern to
Turkey because the PKK can always try to rebound from its crisis situation,
especially if Öcalan is executed or dies in prison. It is also possible that another organization could emerge in the
not-so-distant future to replace the PKK.
The Turks have invested heavily in northern Iraq, and after numerous
cross-border operations, have come to know the terrain. Northern Iraq's unsettled
status provides ideal opportunities for mischief. What is, of course, not clear to Ankara is whether a
rehabilitated Saddam-led regime in Baghdad might encourage such activities as a
means of exacting revenge.
Former President Demirel had suggested that changes in the
Iraqi-Turkish boundary might become necessary.
He was, he claimed, reflecting on the difficulties created by the
terrain in preventing incursions from northern Iraq.30 His comments
elicited wide-ranging criticism from the Arab world, including Iraq and
Egypt. Although this was not the first
time Demirel had made that argument, he dropped the matter.
It nevertheless created anxiety that Turkey
might want to use its preeminent position in the area to modify the border.
Costs of Continued Sanctions
One of Turkey's most important concerns with respect to Iraq
has been the loss of their economic relationship following the imposition of
the U.N. sanctions. In fact, Turkey
has claimed that it has suffered the most from the Gulf War's economic impact
and, therefore, is deserving of special consideration under U.N. rules.
Ankara's estimate of the direct cost to its
economy is well over $35 billion.
Although this figure is inordinately high considering that Turkish
exports to Iraq had dwindled to a trickle before the invasion of Kuwait, the
border areas have suffered considerably from the embargo. The twin forces of
the embargo and the 16-year civil-war-like conflict have devastated the economy
of the southeast. The insurgency was
close to its peak when the Kuwait invasion occurred and disrupted trade flows
in the region. The conflict in the
southeast also led to the depopulation of thousands of villages, most of them
by Turkish security forces.
The oil-for-food resolutions may not have completely satisfied
Turkey's needs, but they have provided it with an important degree of
relief. Trucks cross into Iraq either
to deliver goods purchased by the government in Baghdad as part of the
resolutions or for purposes of smuggling.
The smuggling is a two-way street; in addition to commodities such as
cigarettes and tea, cheap oil purchased on the Iraqi side of the border makes
its way back into Turkey. Iraq has
spread its contracts for purchases as widely as possible, and Turkey has been
disappointed in its share. Following
the acceptance of UNSCR 1284, a 140-member Turkish trade delegation led by the
foreign trade undersecretary went to Iraq to seek new opportunities.31 Turkey had
also demanded to be accorded the identical rights Jordan had, such as the right
to purchase oil in Iraq for domestic consumption (this is in addition to the
oil exported through the pipelines) and to export its wares.32 Ankara,
therefore, is anxious to see the end of the U.N. economic sanctions on Baghdad.
THE PERSPECTIVE FROM BAGHDAD
The regime in Baghdad is just as preoccupied as Turkey with the
evolution of the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. The realization of Kurdish ambitions in the north could easily
lead to the dismemberment of Iraq. So
far Iraq has not demonstrated undo worry about Turkey's role.
Given its limited capabilities to influence
events in the north, Baghdad probably sees Turkey's involvement, as Ahmed
Chalabi, the head of the oppositionist Iraqi National Congress, has argued, as
a counterbalance to Iran's ambitions in northern Iraq and elsewhere.33 Baghdad,
especially after the Gulf War, had limited means to pressure Turkey, and, with
the end of the PKK-led insurrection, it lost another possible point of
leverage. Turks have often accused Iraq
of providing support, although not in the same magnitude as Syria and Iran, to
the PKK.
More important, however, from Iraq's perspective is Phebe
Marr's observation of the changing strategic situation in the region and the
resulting weakened position of Iraq.
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Iraq was left without a
patron, especially when compared with Turkey, which enjoys U.S. support.34 The regional
imbalance is made all the more difficult for Iraq as long as the Arab-Israeli
peace process continues to proceed, even if at a snail's pace.
With ONW, Turkey represents the forward line
of U.S. power. Baghdad has seen that
even with the most friendly of Turkish governments, policies have not changed
much. On the other hand, if Ankara has
not deserted the United States, it has not gone out of its way to help
Washington pursue its other goals, namely the "overthrow" strategy put in place
with the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. Baghdad can be satisfied with the fact that Ankara has had a
measured approach to Iraq. In fact,
unlike the United States, it has continuously encouraged the Kurdish factions
to make their peace with the regime.
Turkey is still an important outlet for Iraqi exports and a
source of imports (legal and illegal) and will remain so no matter what happens
to the regime in Baghdad. Saddam is
unlikely to do anything at this stage which would enrage the authorities in
Ankara, pushing them further into the U.S. embrace and denying himself the
profits of illegal trades. As for
Turkish incursions into Iraq, Baghdad has criticized them, but, as Ghassan
al-Atiyah has argued, "Given the isolation and embargo to which it is subjected,
Baghdad can do no more than try to exert political pressure.
That includes threatening, without
necessarily carrying out the threat, to align itself with Syria or even Iran."35
Iraqi concerns about Turkey extend beyond northern Iraq to
water security. Both the Euphrates and
Tigris rivers originate in Turkey and flow through Syria into Iraq.
The ambitious 22-dam Southeastern Anatolia
Project (known by its Turkish acronym GAP) has already led to serious
differences with Syria. Although Syria
is anxious, following Turkish threats in the fall of 1998 that led to Öcalan's
expulsion from Damascus, to patch up its relations with Ankara, water will
remain a serious problem for the region.
It remains to be seen how Syria in the post Hafiz Asad era will deal
with the water issue, but clearly a weakened Iraq does not serve Damascus's
interests at this time. Similarly, Iraq
cannot take on Turkey alone and would need Syria's help.
Before the Gulf War, Saddam had assumed a
more aggressive tone with Turkey on this issue. In May 1990, during a visit to Baghdad, then Turkish Prime
Minister Yildirim Akbulut found Saddam insistent in his demand that Turkey
increase its allocation of the Euphrates waters. When the Turks declined, he refused to renew the 1984 security
protocol that allowed Turkish hot-pursuit incursions into northern Iraq.36
Öcalan's expulsion and the general perception of the
"Turkish-Israeli alliance" as an attempt at a possible hegemonic arrangement
blessed by the United States will continue to worry the Arab states.
The Turkish-Israeli relationship has been
the focus of much speculation. Whether
this is an alliance or just a relationship is, at some level, immaterial if the
regional powers perceive it to be a new power constellation. While there are
obvious strategic, commercial and psychological benefits that each side derives
from closer cooperation with the other, three aspects have eluded many
observers.37 First, this
relationship's sudden surge is, in part, the result of its artificial
containment by the Turkish side for political purposes.
Second, while it is true that the military
opened the way for the improved atmosphere, it was also the military regime
that, in November 1980, had reduced bilateral ties to the lowest possible level
of second secretary. Finally, although
Israel as far back as the days when David Ben-Gurion was prime minister had
been interested in developing a robust relationship with Turkey, it is Ankara
that took the initiative this time. But
there is no question that the Jerusalem-Ankara link can be a convenient
distraction to explain away Hafiz Asad's retreat on Öcalan.
Similarly, because Turkey's increased
self-confidence is (incorrectly) perceived to be the result of this "alliance,"
future policies of states neighboring Turkey will continue to include it in
their calculations.
Strategically speaking, Iraq, as a neighbor of Turkey, has to
take into account the possibility that Turkey, despite protestations to the
contrary, may one day assume a more aggressive posture.
The recent reopening, even in passing, of
Turkish discussions regarding Mosoul and Kirkuk reminds Iraq of the potential
security dilemma it may face in the future.38 But perhaps closer to home is the future
prospect of a regional water-related stalemate, which is quite likely to materialize
not only because of the GAP but because of the burgeoning population's
increased demand for water. Hence, if
sanctions are ever lifted, Baghdad may actively court other countries to
balance Turkey.
Looking at Turkey from the Iraqi Kurds' perspective, it is
clear that they, like the regime in Baghdad, have limited choices.
The PUK's past flirting with the PKK
notwithstanding, Ankara has called the shots precisely because it controls the
Habur crossing and access to the United States. Ankara has correctly calculated that, irrespective of
Washington's efforts with regards to the PUK and the KDP, these two factions
will in the end have to pay a great deal of attention to Turkish wishes.
Although the current situation is tenuous,
the Kurds would rather live with the status quo as long as possible.
With every passing day, their institutional
hold increases while the memory of Iraq recedes in the minds of the
people. On the other hand, their own
rivalries have not helped win greater international support.
CONCLUSION
One way to look at Turkey's careful policy on Iraq is as a
no-lose one: it has not alienated the regime in Baghdad unnecessarily, but
neither has it upset would-be successors to Saddam, should he be replaced by a
non-Baathist regime. However, Turkey
has not won the admiration of either set of protagonists.
Should sanctions end and Saddam be
rehabilitated, Baghdad will continue to rely on Turkey to export its oil, to
purchase goods and to provide a commercial outlet to Europe.
But Turkey is unlikely to win large
contracts from Saddam compared to other countries that have "stood with him
throughout the ordeal." Similarly, an
oppositionist leadership will worry about Turkey's past links to Saddam and be
more inclined to solidify its relations with those who supported Saddam's
demise. On the other hand, if Iraq
remains unified, Turkey can legitimately claim to have survived a regional
storm of monumental proportions without undermining its primary relationship,
that with the United States.
Iraq too has played its cards carefully with Turkey and can be
expected to continue to do so. Taha
Yassin Ramadan's outburst in February 1999 threatening to bomb Incirlik was
probably nothing more than an ill-advised expression of frustration.
How the regime if it survives may
recalculate its future course of action with Turkey after the sanctions regime
is ended remains to be seen. Saddam is
not a leader likely to stay still, and he continues to harbor ambitions for a
greater role in the Arab world; after all this is what propelled him into two
dangerous foreign wars. It may be that
the next crisis will be triggered by a combination of his unbridled ambitions
and a thirst for revenge and water.
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1 Turkish exports to Iran benefited
from an even more spectacular gain; they increased from $85 million in 1980 to
$1,079 million in 1985. For additional
information on this period, please see Henri J. Barkey, "The Silent Victor: Turkey's Role in the Iran-Iraq War,"
in The Iran Iraq War: Strategic and Political Implications, ed. Efraim
Karsh (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 133-153.
2 Some 60,000 refugees crossed into
Turkey by August 1988. Some were
forcibly repatriated after the Iraqi regime declared an amnesty even though no
one believed in its sincerity. See
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris,
1996), pp.360-61.
3 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey:
The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000), p. 119.
4 Necip Torumtay in his memoirs tells
of Özal's preoccupation with northern Iraq and its possible benefits for
Turkey. See his Orgeneral
Torumtay'in Anilari (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1993), pp. 115-16. Özal, in effect, was challenging the
traditional cautious modus operandi of Turkish foreign policy.
See Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in
Turkish Foreign policy," Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, Winter
1998, pp. 48-9.
5 Baskin Oran, Kalkik Horoz: Çekic
Güc ve Kürt Devleti (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1996), pp. 50-53.
6 Philip Robins, Turkey and the
Middle East (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1991), p.
58.
7 Phebe Marr, "Turkey and Iraq," in Reluctant
Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 67.
8 Quoted in Oran, op. cit., p. 115.
9 Ofra Bengio, "The Challenge to the
Territorial Integrity of Iraq," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 91-92.
10 Bülent Ecevit, "The Middle East and
the Mediterranean," address to the 45th IPI World Congress in Jerusalem
(Ankara: Democratic Left Party, mimeograph, March 25, 1996), p.6.
11 Ibid.
12 Hürriyet, April 19, 1994,
quoted in Mideast Mirror, April 19, 1994.
13 Milli Gazete, June 29, 1995.
14 Amatzia Baram, Building Toward
Crisis: Saddam Husayn's Strategy for Survival (Washington DC: Washington
Institute for Near East Studies, Policy Paper #47, 1998), p. 112.
15 This was a very contentious debate
because even the social democrats of the Republican People's party had
announced they would vote against it despite their numerous affirmative votes
when they were part of a governing coalition.
Moreover, there was tremendous pressure on Erbakan to show that he was
capable of standing up to the United States.
Ironically, Erbakan's Welfare party was also the party most violently
divided over the renewal because many of its Kurdish-origin deputies from the
southeast were strongly in favor of maintaining OPC for fear that Saddam would quickly
overrun the north.
16 See, for instance, Mehmet Kocaoglu, Uluslararasi
Iliskiler Isiginda Ortadogu (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 1995).
Kocaoglu expresses his suspicions regarding
the true motives and behavior of OPC forces by repeating the various
allegations against the operation.
17 Yeni Yüzyil, August 8, 1996.
18 Metehan Demir, "Washington pressures
Ankara on Iraqi crisis," Turkish Daily News, February 5, 1998.
During the same crisis, then-Deputy Prime
Minister Ecevit strongly opposed the possibility of U.S. military action to get
Sadam to comply with UNSC resolutions and Foreign Minister Cem took a trip to
Baghdad to convince the Iraqis to obey the United Nations.
19 Mehmet Ali Birand, the veteran
columnist, argued in 1996 that it was wrong for Turkey to think that it could
use OPC to bargain on a whole slew of issues, including Turkish-Greek
relations, Cyprus and arms sales. In
fact, U.S. and European silence on the continuous cross-border operations is a
sufficient payback, "Hem Çekic Güc'ü kov, hem harekat yap. . ." Sabah,
June 15, 1996.
20 Turkey decided in retaliation to
"upgrade" its diplomatic relations with Baghdad to full ambassadorial level.
Deputy Premier Bulent Ecevit said the dramatic move was in response to the
agreement between the two Kurdish factions which had "accelerated a process
aimed at perpetuating the de facto partition of Iraq," Mideast Mirror,
October 1, 1998.
21 Demirel refused to see him and what
was perceived as a visit to create a wedge in Turkish-American relations ended
up as a major setback for Iraq. Aziz
was not helped by Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan's statement to the
effect that Iraq might target the Incirlik base should ONW operations continue,
Turkish Daily News, February 17, 1999.
22 This does not mean that the issue is
free of controversies. Ankara's
decision to raise the level of its representation in Baghdad not only caused
consternation in Washington, but also got mired in the controversy on the U.S. House
of Representatives attempt to pass a non-binding resolution on the Armenian
genocide. As the proposal made progress
through the first committee, the process of appointing a new ambassador to
Baghdad was speeded up (Radikal, September 26, 2000).
23 Agence France Press, August 25, 1999.
24 Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey and the
Kurdish Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq," Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1996.
25 After Öcalan's conviction, the PKK
declared that it not only was going to adhere to a cease-fire, but would also
pull its rebels out of Turkish territory, thereby ending a 16-year
insurrection.
26 Radikal, March 23, 2000.
27 Al-Hayah, July 28, 2000, FBIS
translated text. "Turkey's high-level
reception of Talabani also signals Ankara's growing style="mso-spacerun:
yes"> unease over the [I]KDP's activities. Ankara has been particularly
disturbed by the [I]KDP's using titles which give the impression of an
independent state," Turkish Daily News, July style="mso-spacerun:
yes"> 27, 2000.
28 Ferai Tinc,"Kurt devleti mi?" Hürriyet,
December 24, 1999. When Barzani
included a Turcoman representative in his regional government, other Turcoman
groups, on the basis of proportional representation, argued that they deserved
half of the seats.
29 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller,
Turkey's Kurdish Question (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998),
pp. 168-171.
30 Quoted in Mideast Mirror, May
10, 1995.
31 Milliyet, February 26, 2000.
32 Sükrü Elekdag, "Irak ambargosu," Milliyet,
February 7, 2000.
33 Orya Sultan Halisdemir, "INC
President Chalabi: Turkey should end its mediatory role," Turkish Daily News,
November 7, 1997.
34 Marr, "Turkey and Iraq," op. cit., p.
64.
35 Ghassan al-Atiyah in al-Malaf
al-Iraqi, June 1997, quoted in Mideast Mirror, June 2, 1997.
36 Süha Bölükbasi, "Turkey Challenges
Iraq and Syria: the Euphrates Dispute," Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, Summer 1993, p. 25.
37 Space considerations do not allow for
a comprehensive analysis of the Turkish-Israeli connection, but numerous
articles have been penned on this subject which highlight the complexity of the
relationship, including the domestic ramifications especially in Turkey.
For further analysis please see Hakan Yavuz,
"Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Turkish Identity Debate," Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, Autumn 1997, pp. 22-37; Amikam Nachmani,
"The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie," Middle East Quarterly, June 1998,
pp. 19-29; and Alan Makovsky, "Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish Periphery
Strategy?'" in Reluctant Neighbor, pp. 147-174.
38 For an excellent discussion on this issue, see
Francois Georgeon, "De Mossoul a Kirkouk," Maghreb-Marchek, No. 132, April-June
1991, pp. 38-49. Georgeon makes the point
that at the height of these discussions in the mid 1980s, the issue did not
catch the imagination of the Turkish public, which was more focused on economic
concerns.
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