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| Volume VII, February 2000, Number 2 |
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| Qadhafi's Libya and the Prospect of Islamic Succession |
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| Ray Takeyh |
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Dr. Takeyh, a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, is a visiting fellow at the University of California,
Berkeley, 1999-2000. For a printable pdf version of this article, click here.
During the past three decades, the Middle East has
witnessed a remarkable resurgence of Islamic identity. From Algeria to Yemen,
traditional institutions, long supplanted by ideological imports from the West,
have risen to reclaim the society from failed secular leaders. Increasingly,
the disillusioned public is resting its faith on the most encompassing of all
universal religions. Islam, with its holistic ideals, offers the politically
disaffected masses a revolutionary vision and a vocabulary of dissent.
Although long viewed as the least susceptible of all North
African rulers to an Islamist challenge, Muamar Qadhafi's revolution appears to
be rapidly disintegrating. Libya's economic ossification has led to the rise of
an Islamic opposition movement claiming that only a return to religious values
can fulfill the masses' demands for economic and political regeneration. As
everything around them is collapsing, Libyans are turning to a belief system
that promises solace, but, more important, offers a path to defiance.
Increasingly, the Islamists are forging a pragmatic alliance with the one
institution that still holds the key to Libya's evolving future: the armed
forces. An alliance between the Islamists and the military will spell the end
of Qadhafi's 30-year reign.
ISLAM AND LIBYA'S POLITICAL EVOLUTION
In 1969, Qadhafi
overthrew the government of King Idris, whose power derived from the religious
legitimacy of the Sanusi order. The Algerian activist Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali
al-Sanusi founded the order in the nineteenth century with the aim of purifying
and reinvigorating Islam in the face of European penetration of the Arab realm.
Evicted from Egypt and unable to return to Algeria during the French
occupation, Sanusi settled in Libya.1
Libya proved to be an ideal location for Sanusi Islam, as its
relative isolation from imperial machinations and lack of Ottoman scrutiny
allowed the order to flourish. By the late nineteenth century, the Sanusi order
acquired paramount political influence as it provided cohesion to the
once-amorphous tribal structure in Libya. Islam, filtered through Sanusi holy
men, mediated intertribal disputes and fostered a degree of political
integration among disparate provinces. Once the Italian colonizers arrived in
1911, it was inevitable that Libya's resistance would be spearheaded by the
Sanusi national network, further enhancing the role of Islam as the prevailing
political ideology.2
The prolonged European occupation served to buttress the
traditional sectors, as the Italians hoping to resettle Libya did not develop a
local elite. Consequently, the judicial and educational spheres remained the
domain of religious leaders. By the end of World War II, Libya's
college-educated population was estimated to be less than ten people. Thus, the
evolving concept of secular Arab nationalism based on European models of
integration, which was being debated in the Arab east, had a more limited
impact on Libya. Religion continued to define Libya's political culture.3
Given its legitimization through Islam, its pre-colonial
political influence and its critical role in resisting colonialism, the Sanusi
order had a strong claim to the leadership of
independent Libya. The new monarchy of King Idris relied on religious
symbols for its legitimacy and a loose federal structure for the administration
of the state. Ironically, the discovery of oil created tensions and aspirations
that could not be contained in the Sanusi framework. The emerging urban middle
class was simply not integrated into the political process, as Libya did not
develop democratic institutions. Moreover, the absence of a coherent
development program, tolerance of official corruption, and failure to equitably
distribute the oil wealth compounded the monarchy's difficulties. Although its
legitimacy was based on Islam, the monarchy's mismanagement of resources
undermined its authority. By 1969, the Idris monarchy collapsed under the
weight of its own stagnation.4
This brief historical sketch reveals some of Libya's unique
characteristics. First, the relationship between religion and politics is
extremely intimate, as most forms of political activity have been authenticated
through an Islamic appeal. Second, the long colonial struggle affected Libya
differently than Algeria since a strong nationalist movement similar to the
National Liberation Front (FLN) did not develop. Libya's traditional sectors
spearheaded the anticolonial struggle and survived the Italian challenge.
Finally, despite the postwar development of a parliament and constitution,
Libya did not foster strong political parties or national institutions. Islam
kept the otherwise fragmented tribal society intact. The state that Colonel
Qadhafi inherited was predicated on a religious foundation and featured Islam
as its central political ideology.
THE QURAN AND THE GREEN BOOK
The new regime confronted a precarious situation, as it had
overthrown a monarchy that had a legitimate claim on Islam. Qadhafi appreciated
that if the revolution was going to survive, much less flourish, he required a
conservative base. In forging an alliance with the ulama (Islamic
clergy), Qadhafi was drawing on Libya's tradition. Above all, Islam offered the
colonel, who did not have the social prestige of the previous elite, a
vocabulary for connecting with his new, skeptical constituency.
During the first few
years of the revolution, the regime went beyond rhetorical gestures and
initiated substantive Islamic reforms. Qadhafi often spoke in mosques and
consulted the clerics regarding public-policy initiatives. The ulama were given
prominent positions in the legal and educational spheres and oversaw the
National Guidance Council, designed to reform Libya's legal system along
Islamic lines. It appeared that in Libya, Qadhafi was seeking to construct a
socioeconomic and political system rooted firmly in Sharia (Islamic
law). Far from propagating a new vision of Islam, Qadhafi conformed to that
defined by the orthodox Muslim establishment, and sought to legitimize the
revolution by associating it with traditional Libyan values. All this began to
change once Qadhafi sensed the need to reconfigure Libyan society along new
ideological lines.5
By 1973, the regime had consolidated its power and was ready to
embark on the reconstruction of the society. Qadhafi's Third Universal Theory,
elaborated in the three volumes of his Green Book, proclaimed
egalitarianism, socialism, Arabism and anti-imperialism as the pillars of the
new Libyan state.6 The colonel sought to eradicate the influence of the
traditional institutions that could prevent the imposition of the new
revolutionary creed. Ominously, during this period Qadhafi embraced the Chinese
Cultural Revolution as a model and the Maoist view that legal safeguards and
civil liberties could only obstruct revolutionary progress.
The Third Universal Theory came under sustained criticism from
the clerical establishment. Given Libya's conservative cultural milieu, Qadhafi
stressed that his ideas were inspired by Islam and continued to seek Islamic
approbation for his evolving ideological posture.7 The ulama refuted this claim, critically evaluating
the content of the Green Book and declaring it to be incompatible with
Islamic law. The Green Book's socialist prescriptions conflicted
particularly with Islamic legal principles dealing with commerce and property
rights. Qadhafi's vision simply defied the limits and restraints of traditional
Islam.8
Having been rebuffed by the clerics, Qadhafi undertook a
precarious assault on the religious establishment. The colonel declared that
the "Green Book is the gospel. The new gospel. The gospel of the new
era, the era of the masses."9
Qadhafi went beyond exploiting religious symbols and sought to reformulate
Islamic tenets as a component of his new radical ideology. Populism, Arab nationalism
and socialism were all presented as deriving from a progressive
reinterpretation of Islam.10 The dichotomy between state and religion would end as
the state sought to expropriate the religious sphere. Under the banner of a
cultural revolution, popular committees were ordered to assault the mosques and
"purify" them of the influence of retrogressive clerics while the state
expropriated the religious endowments (awafq).11 To further erode the influence of the clerical
estate, Qadhafi declared that Islam did not recognize a priestly class and that
the relationship between God and man required no intermediaries.12 The colonel even challenged the foundation of Islam
as he dismissed the hadiths (pronouncements attributed to Prophet
Muhammad) as clerical innovations designed to sustain their social influence.13 This was a concerted attempt to undermined the
authority of the ulama as a corporate body by negating the sources they needed
for perpetuating their influence. In Qahdafi's Libya, the state denied the
ulama a political role and sought to usurp their religious monopoly.
The launching of the cultural revolution and the publication of
the Green Book reflected Qadhafi's risky strategy of liberating his
vision from the restrictions of the religious establishment. The problem for
the colonel was that traditional Islam had a more durable foundation than the
eccentric Green Book and its manipulation of Islamic principles. The
Libyan populace found Qadhafi's mistreatment of the respected clerical class
and the idiosyncratic reevaluation of Islam disturbing. Thus, in essence,
Qadhafi forfeited the legitimacy of Islam, ensuring that religion would be the
ideology of the opposition.
At the core, for Qadhafi's political experiment to succeed, the
Libyans had to discard their existing norms and mores and embrace the new
revolutionary identity. However, the obdurate traditionalism spearheaded by
Islam survived, and the best that the colonel could obtain from the population
was an economically purchased passivity. Qadhafi simply failed to
institutionalize his revolution or create a social base that could perpetuate
his vision. Increasingly, the only justification that the colonel could provide
for his absolute control of power was the economic balance sheet of the revolution.
THE FAILURE OF QADHAFI'S ECONOMICS
The economic policies
are even more disappointing than the political experiment of Qadhafi's
revolution. The colonel's monopoly of oil revenues implies that the operation
of the state does not rely on domestic production and taxation.14 The political ramifications of this economy are
profound: the regime could develop its economic policies without obtaining
popular endorsement. In the absence of political restrictions, Qadhafi embarked
on a quixotic crusade of proscribing "exploitation" and ensuring financial
equity for all citizens. This led to the elimination of retail trade, wages and
rents, the seizure of bank accounts and the destruction of the commercial
bourgeoisie. The private sector was effectively nationalized, with worker
self-management committees overseeing the operation of the economy. The effects
of these initiatives have been predictably disastrous, as inefficiency and
mismanagement have led to a massive waste of precious resources. A close
examination of the agricultural and industrial sectors will illuminate the
structural deficiencies of Qadhafi's economic approach.
The agricultural sector has absorbed approximately $35 billion
in government expenditures since 1970. One of the first problems that all
Libyan rulers encounter is natural limits: rainfall in 90 percent of the
country is not sufficient to sustain agriculture. Qadhafi's regime compounded
this problem by concentrating on ostentatious projects in resource-poor
provinces to demonstrate the ability of the revolutionary elite to transcend
the elements. The regime's most ambitious effort has been the ongoing
$27-billion Man-Made River, designed to use a network of underground pumps to
transport water for 4,000 miles. The project's cost outweighs any potential
benefit it could yield. Most Libyan
cities now lack water; rations have been imposed even in the hot summer months.
The quest to make the desert bloom through costly irrigation projects and
subsidization of unprofitable state farms has raised prices of basic foodstuffs
dramatically. A better course would have been to concentrate agricultural
investment on eastern Libya, which enjoys relatively sufficient precipitation.
After more than a quarter of a century of planning and investment, Libya today
is capable of meeting less than half its food requirements.15
A similar misplacement of priorities and expenditures is
evident in the industrial sector. The revolutionary regime was determined to
develop an industrial infrastructure with particular emphasis on
capital-intensive heavy industry. With ample wealth at his disposal, Qadhafi
purchased every type of factory, along with international experts. Libya has
lacked the technologically-trained indigenous work force that is the basis of
any successful import-substitution program. The regime's suppression of the
industrial elite and its purging of the small technocratic class for political
unreliability eroded the long-term prospects of the industrial sector.
Accordingly, a lack of maintenance, a paucity of spare parts and a high degree
of revolutionary chaos have left the many petrochemical and steel factories
underutilized. Libya has many industrial plants, yet every commodity is in
short supply.16
For a long time, Qadhafi deflected criticism of his economic
mismanagement by distributing petrodollars and crafting a generous welfare
state. The policy of purchasing the population's acquiescence has reached its
limit, given the virtual collapse of the petroleum market since the late 1980s.
The changes in world consumption patterns and the lack of solidarity among
petroleum-producing countries suggest that oil prices are unlikely to rise
significantly over the long term. This is a particularly ominous development
for a regime that lacks ideological legitimacy and maintains its survival by
buying popular consent.
Recognizing the political problems that can accompany a
crumbling economy, Qadhafi has been trying since the early 1990s to liberalize.17 As part of the new program there have been drastic
reductions in the size and expenditures of the state. The regime's 1999
austerity budget reduced spending on investment projects by 80 percent, even
instituting drastic cuts in the health and education sectors.18 Agricultural policy has undergone revision, with some
land-redistribution schemes being reversed. The industrial sphere has also been
affected, as the policy of vesting managerial decisions in workers committees
has been selectively rescinded. The state has also accepted the partial
reemergence of retail trade and private banks and has attempted to lure foreign
investment, particularly in those areas requiring advanced technology.
Both institutional and political factors have obstructed the
attempt to liberalize the economy. In any liberalization drive there is an
effort to move from a state-dominated to a market economy. However, since 1969
Libya's internal markets have been proscribed; the state absorbed all economic
functions and dismantled the institutions needed for the successful
resurrection of a private economy. A market-oriented economy can only operate
if the state provides consistent regulation and reliable data, while enforcing
clearly defined legal procedures and contract rights. The Green Book's
eradication of civil society, the constantly changing legal system, and the
chaos induced by the popular committees have deprived Libya of the
administrative structure and institutional framework necessary for the
implementation of reforms.
There are also several political factors that hamper viable
liberalization measures. The creation of large public enterprises directed by
regime loyalists has led to the growing importance of a narrow circle of elites.
A determined liberalization plan would disrupt the complacent and stagnant
public sector, causing the demise of the regime's clients, who are accustomed
to risk-free, lucrative lives. A program that would alienate Qadhafi's
remaining supporters is increasingly unacceptable to the politically
beleaguered regime.
Finally, the broader problem with liberalization and the
dislocations that it would cause is the reaction of the populace. In a
distributive economy, the primary source of the state's legitimacy is its
commitment to the allocation of wealth and its ability to carry it out.
Social-welfare provisions are the basis of Qadhafi's connection with the
populace, a connection unmediated by political parties. Accordingly, wages and
prices have been subsidized heavily to ensure an artificially high standard of
living. A dependency syndrome has evolved, with every citizen expecting the
state to provide for his needs. As the size and resources of the state shrink,
its legitimacy will diminish proportionally.
Paradoxically, widespread reforms are critical to the survival
of the regime but remain on hold, for both political and institutional reasons.
The state continues to establish agricultural production quotas. Industrial
reforms have concentrated on light manufacturing, with the more significant
heavy industry remaining under central control. The liberalization of trade has
been similarly qualified, as the crucial foreign-trade sector is still the
domain of the state. Moveover, the stable banking and credit system necessary
for sustained growth is missing.
Qadhafi's limited liberalization drive did not lead to the
anticipated economic revival. The reduction of state subsidies and a weakened
currency have produced an estimated 30-percent unemployment rate and a
50-percent inflation rate, further eviscerating the average Libyan's already
meager purchasing power.19 The relaxation of state controls has led to the
emergence of a significant black market often guided by corrupt high-ranking
officials. In the meantime, the regime's austerity program has resulted in
reductions and delay of salaries, forcing many to take second jobs to maintain
basic subsistence.20 The long-term prospects for reviving the economy seem
quite slim, as the population explosion continues to outpace state resources
(70 percent of Libyans are under the age of 20).21 The inability of the regime to accommodate the
aspirations of its youth and integrate them into a growing economy presents an
explosive political problem.
Libya's economic disarray finally propelled Qadhafi to seek a
resolution to the Lockerbie impasse. The colonel and his senior advisers seem
to perceive that the removal of international sanctions may rekindle investors'
confidence in Libya and rejuvenate the economy. It is important to note that
Libya's economic decline predated the imposition of the Lockerbie sanctions.
Although the suspension of the sanctions could lead to further development of
the oil and gas industry, it is unlikely to ameliorate Libya's structural economic
problems.
Twenty-nine years after coming to power pledging a new dawn in
Libya's history, Qadhafi's political and economic experiments have been less
than a stellar success. The colonel's failure to institutionalize his ideology
and seeming inability to end the prolonged recession plaguing Libya have eroded
his legitimacy. In the absence of viable alternatives, Qadhafi has come to rely
on coercion to perpetuate his rule. Although violence has always been part of
Qadhafi's arsenal, it is now his sole instrument of self-preservation. A
political leader cannot survive long without a broad-based constituency, a
convincing ideology and economic prosperity.
OPPOSITION AND THE NATURE OF THE POST-QADHAFI STATE
In the 1990s, there has been an upsurge of opposition to
Qadhafi. The disenfranchised members of the middle class, disaffected
revolutionaries and, most significantly, a new generation of Libyans born since
the revolution have joined the ranks of those who question the efficacy of
Qadhafi's policies. Despite the wide range of opposition, the post-Qadhafi
period is likely to be defined by an alliance between the Islamists and the
military.
The noted historian
Carl Brown once stated that "as a symbol of unity and identity, Islam is to
North Africa what Arab nationalism is to the Arab East."22 While most Middle Eastern rulers have professed
various types of secular nationalism, Libyan leaders have largely relied on
Islam. Libya's resistance to colonialism, the Idris monarchy and even the
initial stages of Qadhafi's revolution have all relied on traditional Islam.
Religion has defined Libya's political culture, inspiring collective action and
legitimating governmental authority. The power of Islam as a source of temporal
activism reflects the historical development of a nation that has thwarted the
development of alternative secular philosophies.
To be sure, the Islamic opposition is fragmented and has suffered
at the hands of the regime's security organs. Nevertheless, certain Islamic
entities are appealing to an ever-expanding audience. The ulama have always
been disturbed by Qadhafi's quest to revise Islamic principles along radical
lines and have been among the most vociferous critics of the Green Book.
Steeped in the Islamic revivalist tradition of North Africa, the clerics are
hardly the fossilized creatures that Qadhafi contends, as they are actively
seeking Islamic solutions to the problems of a modern state. Despite the
regime's sanctions, the mosque remains what it has been throughout history -- a
venue for social and political commentary. The power of the clerical
establishment largely derives from the attraction it holds for the young, who
increasingly reject Qadhafi's revolution and its diminishing economic
foundation.
The Islamic Liberation party and the Muslim Brotherhood are
among the other important organizations causing anxiety for the regime. The
Islamic Liberation party's platform criticizes the paralysis and corruption of
the state and advocates a progressive agenda of equitable redistribution of
wealth. The party's endorsement of armed resistance and its successful
recruitment of students from the universities and military academies makes it
an important source of opposition. Although long prosecuted by the regime, the
Muslim Brotherhood has been experiencing a revival. Through the establishment
of extensive social-welfare projects, the Brotherhood is creating social
cohesion in urban centers fragmented by economic distress and demographic
pressure.
The Islamic Martyrs' Movement and the Libyan Islamic Group are
two recent arrivals on the political scene. Although both organizations are
shrouded in mystery, it appears that their memberships largely consist of
Libyan veterans of the Afghan war who are disenchanted with their limited
economic prospects. Both organizations are committed and proficient
practitioners of violence.
The level of Islamist violence has reached a new degree of
ferocity in the last few years, particularly in central and eastern Libya where
there are reports of daily clashes between the regime's security forces and the
Islamists. The Islamists' activities are not limited to the countryside; urban
centers, particularly Benghazi, have witnessed intense confrontations between
the fundamentalists and the police. Given Qadhafi's centrality to the survival
of the regime, he is the obvious target of assassination. In June 1996, an
attempt was made on the colonel's life resulting in the killing one of his
bodyguards. An even more spectacular attempt is reported to have taken place
during June1998, when the members of the Islamic Martyrs' Movement assaulted
Qadhafi's convoy near Benghazi. The colonel himself was reported to have been
injured, forcing him to cancel a rally and a planned visit to Egypt. Given the
crumbling nature of Libya's economy and mass disillusionment with an
oppressive, inefficient state, the level of violence is likely to grow.23
Despite the emergence of significant Islamist organizations,
the military remains the one institution that can determine the future of
Qadhafi's revolution. This is hardly reassuring for the colonel, since the
disloyalty of the armed forces has been manifested through numerous coup attempts.24 Qadhafi's foreign adventurism has always exposed the
military to risks that are difficult to bear in an era of budget reductions and
salary delays. The officer corps has long blamed the progenitor of the Green
Book for the disastrous and humiliating defeat in Chad. Qadhafi's attempt
to end the military's monopoly on coercive power by building up alternative
popular militias and staffing key security posts with expatriate East Germans
and Cubans has further estranged the armed forces. Moreover, most enlisted men
and young officers are recent rural migrants to the many impoverished and
peripheral urban neighborhoods that have proven fertile ground for the
Islamists' message. The efficiency of the regime's security forces has not
prevented attempted coups, the most recent of which took place in September and
November 1996.25
Although the military has the power to end Qadhafi's reign, it
lacks an ideology that would legitimize its rule. By contrast, the Islamists
lack sufficient strength to ensure the colonel's demise but do possess an
ideology and the promise of cultural authenticity. An alliance between these
two groups implies an association between power and a viable ideological vision
confronting a state that seemingly lacks both. Any military planner seeking to
oust the colonel will require the legitimacy that only Islam can ordain.
Recent events in Libya testify to the evolution of such an
alliance. The purges that followed the 1993 rebellion of military units in
Misrate indicate that the armed forces are heavily infiltrated by the
Islamists. Both the September and November 1996, military coups similarly
suggest much contact between the Islamists and the disaffected members of the
military, particularly the ground forces. The most recent assassination attempt
against Qadhafi could not have taken place in the absence of complicity by
influential military personnel. The attackers' knowledge of the route of the
colonel's convoy and the car he would be in reflects the Islamists penetration
of the core of the regime. As Libya's economic recession continues unabated,
there are likely to be further attempts to end Qadhafi's life and his political
experiment.26
Colonel Qadhafi has remained in power by dispensing
petrodollars and destabilizing the society to prevent the emergence of
independent centers of power. After three decades of mismanagement and
declining oil revenues, the efficacy of this strategy is at a low ebb. The
regime can neither satisfy the demands of the society nor provide a cohesive blueprint
for the uncertain future. There is a discerniable shift in the mood of the
population from reticence to opposition, from passivity to resistance. If
Qadhafi is to be replaced, it will be the armed forces that cause the colonel's
eccentric political experiment to disappear. The long-term beneficiaries of
Qadhafi's demise will be the Islamists, who are the guardians of a dynamic
ideology and have survived the regime's repression. Post-Qadhafi Libya is
likely to be a state governed by military officers who retain a close
association with the orthodox Islamic establishment.
The demise of Qadhafi's
regime is likely to have important ramifications for the international
community. The colonel's Islamist successors are likely to be a more formidable
influence on the Maghreb's Islamist groups than the idiosyncratic and isolated
Qadhafi. However, while Qadhafi's crusade against "American imperialism" has
led him to support anti-Western movements wherever they appeared, his
successors will remain focused on internal and regional challenges.
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1 Nicola Ziadeh, Sanusiyah: A Study
of a Revivalist Movement in Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1958); B.G. Martin. Muslim
Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976).
2 Enzo Santarelli, Giorgio Rochat,
Romain Rainero and Luigi Goglia, Omar al-Mukhtar: The Italian Reconquest of
Libya Translated by John Gilbert (London: Darf Publishers, 1986); E.E.
Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1949); Geoff Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 110-137; Jonathan Berman, Qadhafi's Libya
(London: Zed Books, 1986), pp. 10-16.
3 Lisa Anderson, "Religion and State in
Libya: The Politics of Identity," The
Annals of American Academy of Politics and Social Sciences 483 (January
1986), p. 67; The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya,
1830-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 179-203.
4 Ruth First, Libya: The Elusive
Revolution (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1974), pp. 31-87; John Wright,
Libya: A Modern History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1982), pp. 60-132; Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, Political Development
and Social Change in Libya (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980), pp.
15-37.
5 Ann Elizabeth Meyer, "Le droit
musulman a l'age du livre Vert," Maghreb Machrek, No. 93, (July 1981):
p. 197; Borham Attallah, "Le droit penal musulman ressucite," Annuaire de
l'Afrique du Nord (1975), p. 227; Raymond Habiby, "Qadhafi's Thoughts on
True Democracy," Middle East Review (Summer 1978) and "Mu'ammar
Qadhafi's New Islamic Scientific Socialist Society," Middle East Review
(Summer 1979).
6 Mu'ammar Al-Qaddafi, The Green
Book (Tripoli: The Green Book World Center, 1980); The Libyan Arab
Republic, Ministry of Information and Culture, The Fundamentals of the Third
Universal International Theory, 1973; Sami Hajjar, "The Jamahiriya
Experiment in Libya: Qadhafi and Rousseau," Journal of Modern African
Studies 18 (1980); and "Qadhafi's Social Theory as the Basis of the Third
Universal Theory," Journal of Asian and African Studies, 17, 3-4 (1982);
John Davis, "Qadhafi's Theory and Practice of Non-Representative Government," Government
and Opposition 17 (1982), pp. 61-66.
7 Francois Burgat, "Qadhafi's
Ideological Framework," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed. Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Daily Reports- Middle East and Africa (FBIS-MEA), July 2, 1984; Simons, Libya:
The Struggle for Survival, p. 244; Josef Muzikar Praha, "Islam and the
Ideology of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's Green Book," Part I and II, Archiv
Orientalni, 50-51 (1982).
8 Berman, Qadhafi's Libya, p.
162.
9 Qriana Fallaci, "An Interview with
Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya," New York Times Magazine, (December
16, 1979).
10 Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, The Green
Book Part III: The Social Base of the Third Universal Theory (Tripoli:
Green Book World Center, 1980); A.A. Mezoughi, Mafhum al-Idara ash-sha'biya (Tripoli: Green Book World Center, 1984);
FBIS MEA, July 2, 1984, Q1.
11 Mu'ammar al-Qaddhafi, As-Sijil
al-qawmi bayanat wa ahadith al-aqid Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, Vol. VI,
1974-1975 (Tripoli: Green Book World Center, 1975), p. 469; John Davis, Libyan
Politics: Tribe and Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1987), pp. 56-57; Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Ideology of Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice," International
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 15 (1983), p. 477.
12 Al-Fajr al-Jadid, February 21,
1978, p. 4; Al-Mustaqbil, July 22, 1978, pp. 17-18; Marius Deeb, "Islam
and Arab Nationalism in Al-Qaddhafi's Ideology," Journal of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies Vol. II, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), p. 16; Bruce St.
John, "The Ideology of Mu'ammar Al-Qadhdafi: Theory and Practice," International
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, p. 476.
13 Al-Fajar al-Jadid, February
20, 1978, p. 3.
14 Dirk Vandewalle, "The Libyan
Revolution After Twenty Years, Part I: Evaluating the Jamahiriyah," Universities
Field Staff International, Africa/Middle East no. 2 (1990-1991) and "The
Libyan Jamahiriyya since 1969," in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.) Qadhafi's Libya,
1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 20-41.
15 Al-Zahaf Al-Akhdar 255 (March
9, 1984), pp. 11-12; Dirk Vandewalle, "The Libyan Jamahiriyya since 1969," in
Dirk Vandewalle, Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin,
1995), p. 29.
16 Congressional Research Service
Issue Brief: Libya, September 10, 1998, p. 13-14; "Gadaffi's Purification
Committees' Wreak Havoc," The Middle East (November 1996), p. 11-12;
Economist Intelligence Unit, Libya: Quarterly Report (1981-1996).
17 Dirk Vandewalle, "Qadhafi's
‘Perestroika:' Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya," Middle East
Journal 45 (Spring, 1991) and "The Libyan Revolution After Twenty Years,
Part II: A Libyan ‘Perestroika?' Universities Field Staff International
Middle East/North Africa no. 8 (1990-1991); "Qadhafi's Failed Economic Reforms:
Markets, Institutions and Development in a Rentier State," in Dirk Vandewalle
(ed.) North Africa: Development and Reform in a Changing Global Economy
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Meliha Altunisik, "A Rentier State's
Response to Oil Crisis: Economic Reform Policies in Libya," Arab Studies
Quarterly 18 (Fall 1996);FBIS-NES, March 24, 1993, pp. 11-12; FBIS-NES,
February 2, 1994, p. 21.
18 "Libya's Congress Passes 4.9 Billion
Dinars Budget," Reuters December 16, 1998.
19 Middle East International,
December 6, 1996, p. 14; "Qadhafi Acknowledges the Deepening Economic Crisis,"
FBIS-NES, December 12, 1994, p. 25.
20 François Burgat, "Qadhafi's
Ideological Framework," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed. Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994 (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 59. Middle East International,
December 6, 1996, p. 14; "Mystery of the Vanishing Oil Money," Economist
February 7, 1998, p. 48.
21 Lisa Anderson, "Qadhafi's Legacy: An
Evaluation of a Political Experiment," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed., Qadhafi's
Libya, 1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 228; Dennis
Sammut, "Libya and the Islamic Challenge," World Today 50 (October,
1994), p. 200.
22 L. Carl Brown, "Islam's Role in North
Africa," in William Zartman ed., Man, State and Society in Contemporary
North Africa (New York: Prager, 1973), p. 32.
23 Middle East International, October 6, 1995, p.
10; Middle East International, July 19, 1996, pp. 12-13; Middle East
International, May 16, 1997, p. 21; Middle East International, July
3, 1998, p. 12; "Rumors and Secrecy Cloud Issues: Is Qaddafi O.K.?" New York
Times, October 18, 1998; According to State Department sources during June,
1988, there was a second assassination attempt against Qadhafi, Author's
conversation with a State Department official.
24 Francois Burgat, "Qadhafi's
Ideological Framework," in Dirk Vandewalle, ed. Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994,
p. 60.
25 Al-Watan al-Arabi, December 1,
1986, p. 28; Al-Watan al-Arabi, May 30, 1986, p. 40; Al-Zahf
al-Akhdar, December 24, 1982, p. 5.
26 Middle East International, May 16, 1997, p. 21;
Deborah Pugh, "Qadhafi's Call for Brutal Campaign Against Opposition," Christian
Science Monitor, January 6, 1994; "Gaddafy Dismisses Reports of Uprising," The
Guardian, October 30, 1993, p. 14.
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