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| Volume VII, February 2000, Number 2 |
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| Saudi Arabia's Will to Power |
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| Joseph A. Kechichian |
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Joseph A. Kechichian is the CEO of Kechichian Associates, LLC, and a fellow at the Gustav E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern
Studies, University of California, Los Angeles.The author is indebted to the Smith Richardson Foundation for
supporting his research activities between September 1998 and November 1999. For a printable pdf version of this article, click here.
Since 1932, when various tribes on the Arabian
peninsula were united by Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman, the Al Saud have ruled
over their kingdom with skill and perseverance. The guardianship of the holy mosques at Makkah and Madinah has
conferred on all Saudi rulers an unparalleled degree of legitimacy since they
retained, in addition to their temporal posts, the title of supreme religious
leader. Indeed, not only were they
successful in creating a modern state, where only tribal politics had
dominated; they also developed a unique legitimizing framework for their
rule.
To be sure,
Abdul Aziz and senior members of the family aimed to preserve their power base
and, towards that end, sealed the 1744 alliance with Al Shaykh religious
figures. They also understood what
their interests were and how to fend off threats.
Earlier, the Al Saud had operated in a national-security vacuum,
as the country lacked a coherent political framework that shielded the family
from internal jolts as well as external challenges.
What mattered then were policies that ensured the family's
continued dominion. The quest to
rectify this lacuna led Abdul Aziz and his successors to create a unique
political framework with a clear ideological basis that, ultimately,
legitimized Al Saud rule. In the end,
Riyadh developed a will to power that benefited from the family's strict
adherence to Islamic values and, with oil wealth, transformed the desert into a
modern country. This will to power has evolved and adapted to changing
circumstances.
Although an ailing King Fahd continues to rule Saudi Arabia,
the kingdom's day-to-day responsibilities have been assumed since late 1996 by
Heir Apparent Abdallah, who, by all accounts, has exercised the family's will
to power with devotion. In fact, Prince
Abdallah awakened Riyadh from a nearly decade-long slumber in the shadow of a
significant American presence in and around the peninsula. By rekindling intrinsic family desires to
retain custody of its domestic and foreign policies, the heir apparent shook
the status quo. During the past few
years, the kingdom has flexed its muscles, built an ever-stronger base of
support, and moved toward consolidation of its regional power base.
Riyadh cajoled Iran, confronted Iraq and
cornered the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies.
Although Prince Abdallah did not redefine basic Saudi policies,
he nevertheless adopted far more assertive steps to ensure Al Saud rule and
promote the kingdom's long-term domestic and foreign policies.
The heir apparent exercised a distinct will to
power, the like of which was last displayed by the country's founder.
He is determined that Saudi Arabia will
remain at the center of the Islamic world and, reminding family members of his
father's desires, provide spiritual, economic and political leadership
throughout the region.
THE SAUDI RAISON D'ETAT
Despite the unique access senior Western decision makers
enjoyed in Riyadh in the aftermath of the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
and subsequent war to liberate that shaykhdom, few conceive how Saudi Arabia
functions internally. More important,
few outsiders have a clear idea of the way security policy is formulated in the
kingdom and how it is exercised. Not
only does the Saudi security-policy formulation process remain a black box, the
general public as well as policy makers are at best poorly acquainted with the
ideological, doctrinal, economic and military challenges to the kingdom.
To better understand how the kingdom's security policy is
formed, an analytical construct is necessary.
The natural starting point is the assumption that a will to
power exists among members of the ruling family.
Without it, Saudi rule would
surely cease and new actors take over, although it is difficult to imagine that
this could occur simultaneously to the extensive cohort of Saudi princes.
This analytical framework also posits that
the natural end point is a series of conditions specifying the prerequisites
for the continued stable rule of the Al Saud.
The Kingdom's Ideology
Besides the will to power, Al Saud leaders have articulated an
ideological justification with which to explain why they should govern.1 Indeed, this
ideological justification has served as a prime source of their legitimacy and
claim to power. Since 1932, successive
Saudi rulers have ensured their survival through visions of order and the
triumph of their ideology. Still, for
the Al Saud, ideology is more than this.
It is a logically constructed view of social and political life
containing elements of myth and symbolism that are used to communicate their
message in simplified form. Ideology is
a lens through which the world is viewed as normative, and positive judgments
are used to form subjective assessments.
The kingdom's ideology thus identifies and criticizes what it considers
to be deleterious behavior. It also
identifies values and outcomes worth striving for.
Ideology, in its normative role as applied by the Al Saud, is the
guide to the proper allocation of resources in society, the desirable qualities
of rulership and authority and, by implication, the source of the regime's
legitimacy.2
Because there is no palpable distinction between Saudi Arabia
and the ruling Al Saud family, it is clear that the 1744 alliance between the
Al Saud and the Al Shaykh families is the locus of all pressure points.3
Today that
alliance, which forms the principal pillar of the Saudi raison d'etat,
is being challenged by radical elements who are calling on the religious
authorities to distance themselves from allegedly incompetent and unworthy
leaders.4
Indeed, both
religious and secular opposition forces in Saudi Arabia are questioning the
ideological principles of the Al Saud regime by offering religious
justifications allegedly neglected by Riyadh.
Even Mohammed Abdallah al-Khilewi, the former first secretary at Saudi
Arabia's U.N. mission in New York, sought reforms that did not contradict
intrinsic bedouin norms.5
Moreover,
most opposition leaders add puritanical requirements to their myriad calls for
action.6
Against this
challenge, the Al Saud strive to buttress their ideological principles and
defend themselves from ideologically capable forces by relying on Hanbali
Islam.7
The Kingdom's Doctrine
As Saudi values and norms arise from a particular ideological
view of the world, they are transformed into more rigid principles specifying
concrete political goals. This is the
kingdom's doctrine, which arguably is less flexible than its ideology.
The two serve different purposes:
ideology to attract supporters and provide
legitimacy and doctrine to accomplish clear political and organizational
objectives. Officials who know Heir
Apparent Abdallah often describe him as ideological but not
doctrinaire. As a concrete
embodiment of ideology, political doctrine involves elements of strategy,
policy and constitutional structure, all of which Riyadh seems to have espoused
with vigor since 1996.8
Whereas in the United States the ideals of democracy, a
free-market system and individual rights find expression in two binding
statements of political doctrine (the Constitution and the Bill of Rights), in
the Saudi case, Hanbali writings have sanctioned the emergence of the monarchy
in exchange for the monarch's vow to uphold the tenets of Hanbali Islam.9
In addition
to forming an institutional embodiment of ideology, Saudi doctrine permits it
to be reaffirmed by spelling out concrete political goals.
In the United States, for example, the
Truman Doctrine served as an example of a political goal driven by ideology
that subsequently shaped U.S. military and diplomatic strategy towards much of
the developing world. Likewise, the
Brezhnev Doctrine served as an obvious counterpoint in the Soviet Union, calling
for the establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Indian Ocean.
The clear doctrinal imperative for the Saudi
monarchy is to defend Islam.10
Still, this imperative remains subordinate
to the more important need to use doctrine as a means by which to stay in
power, remove external ideological or doctrinal threats, and maintain internal
legitimacy. Anyone questioning the
constitutional status quo becomes by definition, a doctrinal liability.
When a person/group is equipped with the
influence or capability to overturn the reigning order, it becomes a
national-security risk and sometimes a military hazard.11
To implement their doctrinal imperatives, the Al Saud do not
shy away from firm measures; demonstrations with strong political rhetoric were
dealt swift blows in the past. In 1979,
Riyadh did not hesitate to put down a religious uprising in Makkah, when the
Holy Mosque was taken over by an extremist group led by Juhayman al-Utaybi
after making sure that senior ulama (scholars) were squarely on board.12
More
recently, Saudi authorities rendered an almost instantaneous decision in
banning the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), when the
latter sought to draw attention to individual human-rights violations.13
Furthermore,
and largely to placate any doctrinal opposition, King Fahd accelerated the
establishment of the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) in 1993, a body
first envisioned in 1927! By appointing
a large number of well-qualified individuals to advise him, the monarch aimed
to neutralize doctrinal opposition and perhaps ensure that the people of Saudi
Arabia would accept an eventual constitutional monarchy.
Although the latter concept was not on
Riyadh's agenda, it was nevertheless a powerful tool at the monarch's
disposal. Still, the establishment of
the Majlis placated some and answered many pressing doctrinal questions.
The experiment proved so successful that
Riyadh increased the number of Majlis members, from 60 to 90 in July 1997.14
The Kingdom's Alternative Strategies
Saudi Arabia's strategy materialized as events
progressed to the point where senior leaders considered implementing or trying
to attain their doctrinal goals.
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Strategy may be defined as the art and science of developing and using political,
economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war,
to afford maximum support to policies in order to increase the probability and
favorable consequences of victory and lessen the chances of defeat.15 |
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For the United States, in
addition to protecting the national territory, doctrinal goals have included
the defense of Western European democracies within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). A mixture of diplomatic
and military strategies was used to pursue that goal, including deterrence and
arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and, at the
end of the Cold War, by redefining as well as enlarging NATO's original mandate
to cover a wide range of issues, including opposition to ethnic
cleansing.16
In Saudi Arabia a number of strategies have been used to defend
the monarchy against internal or external ideological or doctrinal
challenges. To remove external threats,
Riyadh has systematically engaged in a game of nations strategy,
playing one set of countries off against another.17
In a strategy
of Riyalpolitik, potential regional troublemakers have been bought off
with financial aid, and in a strategy of media domination, dozens of Arab news
organizations have been brought under control.
Moreover, to maintain the regime's internal legitimacy, strategies were
designed to co-opt elites and wayward
royal family members as well as build domestic credibility (and foreign
influence) by means of Awqaf (religious endowments) and Dawa
(propagation of the faith) donations.
Still, because specific military, political and economic
capabilities and influences are required to turn a strategy into concrete and
effective action, Saudi Arabia relied on its intrinsic capabilities:
oil production and purchasing power.
In fact, it is this latter strategy that
Prince Abdallah adopted starting in mid-1998, when he restored -- through a
series of bold and relatively radical economic moves including privatization,
foreign investment and oil-production cuts -- the country's moribund economic
health.18
The elements of this construct describe neither a mutually
exclusive nor a mutually exhaustive paradigm.
Rather, they capture the essence of security-policy formulation, a task
which, under Heir Apparent Abdallah's custodianship, will be exercised with
ardor. Of course, there are
interactions between the various elements of the construct that are
obvious. The legitimacy of the
kingdom's ideology enhances its influence.
In turn, that influence improves the types of doctrinal goals that
Riyadh is readily capable of setting and achieving.
Indeed, Saudi Arabia's influence throughout the vast and growing
Muslim world is augmented by its impressive economic, political and religious
instruments. Finally, the various
threats the kingdom faces affect its doctrinal goals and strategies.
These, in turn, require it to maximize
whatever capabilities are available. To
succeed in this realm, therefore, Saudi Arabia must rely on a firm internal
base of support: the ruling Al Saud family.
THE RULING FAMILY
In addition to the will to power, there is a host of
ideological justifications advanced to legitimize uninterrupted Al Saud
rule. As stated above, these
ideological claims generate a set of preconditions that must be met to maintain
regime stability. Certain institutional
arrangements and political goals naturally arise out of the need to meet
ideological preconditions. Most of
these goals are a blend of political, military, economic and religious
elements. For example, to attain doctrinal
goals vis-à-vis the kingdom's traditional competitor in the region, Iran, a set
of military, political and economic strategies is devised.
The purpose of these strategies is to
minimize the threats to, and maximize the interests of, the ruling elite.
Consequently, strategies must be both
feasible and credible when compared with the limitations upon the country's
capabilities and influence. In the case
of the kingdom's current rapprochement with Tehran, the strategy is to court
the Khatami government, as the latter is relatively weak.19
This policy
is credible because Riyadh's other regional foe, Iraq, is temporarily in a
U.N.-imposed bind. Moreover, Heir
Apparent Abdallah is also eager to advance intrinsic Saudi interests, even if
his policies diverge from those of the United States and other Western
allies. Clearly, in any country,
including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the context within which elites operate
is one of general competition for power and influence over policy making.
Taken together, the competition among elites
and the process of security-policy formulation constitute decision making.
Although the monarch is the ultimate
decision maker, all Saudi rulers have displayed a knack for consultation that
has enhanced the Al Sauds' legitimacy.
This characteristic was effectively applied by the kingdom's founder,
King Abdul Aziz, as well as every monarch since, and there is no reason to
believe that it will change under Heir Apparent Abdallah.
Still, the primary challenge to the Saudi elite
is the succession crisis that looms over the horizon and that will probably be
most evident after Prince Abdallah accedes to the throne.
THE SUCCESSION ISSUE
Since the death of King Abdul Aziz, succession in Saudi Arabia
has, with minor exceptions, passed to his sons in order of seniority.20
In a break
with long-standing tradition, the ruling family published an explicit order of
succession for the first time in 1992.21
In addition to understandings
regarding the identity of the heir apparent, a royal decree now explicitly
states that Prince Abdallah is first in line for the throne, while Prince
Sultan stands second (both are sons of the kingdom's founder).
Needless to say, in addition to the king,
these two princes are key present and future decision makers in Saudi Arabia.
The Three Senior Princes
Heir Apparent Abdallah's connection to internal political
affairs comes by virtue of his leadership of the kingdom's internal security
force, the National Guard. Unlike the
regular army, which is stationed on the kingdom's periphery, this force is
situated at key facilities. It is
raised from tribal levies and is thus key, both as an instrument for ensuring
tribal loyalty to the ruling family and as a tool for maintaining internal
security. The National Guard could
eventually also be used to enforce Prince Abdallah's claim to succession once
King Fahd relinquishes the throne.
Yet, despite the fact that Prince Abdallah controls the
National Guard, the heir apparent's direct lineage within the ruling family is
comparatively inadequate. Prince
Abdallah is the son of a prominent Shammar bride whom King Abdul Aziz married
in order to assure the support of the rival Al Rashid dynasty of Hail after he
defeated them in battle.22
As such,
Abdallah does not have the fellowship of full brothers that other princes
enjoy. Furthermore, Prince Abdallah has
only four well-situated male progeny of adult age.
Prince Mitaab (his eldest son) is the deputy commander of the
National Guard for Military Affairs. He
is considered competent and enjoys a wide following in the large tribes of
central Arabia. Princes Faysal and
Abdul Aziz are advisers in the office of their father and can be characterized
as hard-working and determined to prove themselves.
As for Prince Turki, an F-15 pilot in the Royal Saudi Air Force,
he is young but apparently gifted.
Although they are a relatively small group, all four are extremely
popular with the general Saudi public.
Perhaps because of Prince Abdallah's lack of full brothers (Foreign
Minister Prince Saud Al Faysal is related to the heir apparent through
marriage) these four sons are his first line of defense within the ruling
family.
Nevertheless, until recently, Heir Apparent Abdallah maintained
a rather reserved attitude on all domestic and foreign matters, including the
so-called special relationship with the United States.23
This outlook
underwent considerable change once the prince saw Washington make good on its promise
to support the monarchy by intervening successfully after Baghdad's invasion of
Kuwait. His understanding and
appreciation of the United States underwent a further reassessment after a 1998
visit to Washington when he briefed senior American officials on Riyadh's
views. This was an epoch-making
development because the heir apparent was not well known in the United States
and, more important, was not trusted by Washington.
Espousing clear views on political and economic concerns,
including the need to lead the Arab and Muslim worlds as well as invite Western
investment into the kingdom, which would require heretofore unthinkable
reforms, Abdallah charmed his audiences and established confidence in his
ability to rule.24
Today his
influence is slowly beginning to be felt throughout the kingdom and
international centers of power.
The second in line for the throne, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz,
enjoys strong family ties because he shares a mother, Princess Hassa bint Ahmad
Al Sudayri, with six other full princes.
Much has been made of the influence of the Sudayri Seven
within the house of Saud, and with good reason.
Fahd is the monarch, Sultan is minister of defense and civil
aviation and inspector general, Abdul Rahman is vice minister of defense and civil
aviation, Naif is minister of interior, Salman governs Riyadh and Ahmad is vice
minister of the interior. Prince
Sultan's sons are also well-positioned within the government to act as
proponents of his eventual candidacy for the highest office in the land.
Until recently the eldest son, Prince Khaled
(formerly the commander of the missile defense forces), was well known as the
Saudi army commander of the Arab Coalition Forces in Operations Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.25
In fact,
Prince Khaled's success generated so much political capital and commercial
opportunity for him that he resigned his army commission prematurely.
Nonetheless, he is still a political force
within the kingdom by virtue of the platform that his ownership of two
London-based periodicals grants him and his father.26
The Saudi defense minister's second son, Prince Bandar, is
better known than his elder brother. He
has been ambassador to the United States since 1983.
Prince Bandar has vigorously implemented the kingdom's political
and military strategy of co-dependency with the United States, designed to
ensure that Washington has a continuing vital stake in maintaining its
protective umbrella over the kingdom.
The success of this policy is an integral part of Saudi national security.
For this reason, any political capital that
Prince Bandar builds because of his close ties with U.S. political and business
elites is as much a credit to his own standing within the royal family as it is
a bonus to Saudi Arabia's long-term security requirements.
Although not serious contenders to major decision-making
positions, the other senior sons of Prince Sultan can be found in the upper
echelons of the vast governmental bureaucracy.
Prince Turki is the deputy minister of information for foreign
information affairs, while Prince Fahd is the governor of Tabuk province, near
the Jordanian border.
While he remains alive and secure on the throne, King Fahd is
not only the senior member of the ruling house, but also the ranking male
member of the Sudayri faction within the Al Saud family.
The king too has positioned his male
offspring in key decision-making positions.
This was best characterized with the appointment of his second eldest
son, Prince Muhammad, to the governorship of the oil-rich Eastern Province of
Al Hasa, from which Saudi Arabia derives its massive wealth.
The Eastern Province is also where most of
the kingdom's Shia minority live.
Prince Muhammad bin Fahd's appointment meant that the king had placed
someone of unquestionable loyalty to him in a strategically sensitive
region. Equally important, it offered
the young prince an unparalleled opportunity to prove himself in a position
requiring the utmost judgment and political acumen.
He will be well-positioned to claim even greater responsibilities
further down the road.
Other notable sons of King Fahd who may have prominent roles in
the future are Prince Sultan, who has maintained a close relationship with the
merchant community, and the young Prince Abdul Aziz, who has been elevated from
adviser in the Royal Court to minister of state without portfolio.
In addition to this set of principal actors, three other
princes from a branch of the family that is no longer in line for the throne
deserve mention as key players: Princes
Khaled, Saud and Turki, the sons of the late King Faysal.
By giving Khaled bin Faysal the governorship
of Asir, the senior members of the ruling family clearly trusted him to develop
and fully integrate this strategic province with the other regions of the kingdom.
Princes Saud bin Faysal and Turki bin
Faysal, the minister of foreign affairs and the director of general
intelligence, respectively, have gained enormous influence under the regency of
the heir apparent, testimony to their reputations and professional
Western-style managerial techniques.
Principles of Succession
The fact that the principle of succession in the kingdom is
under scrutiny is a matter of some concern to observers of Saudi Arabia.
To be sure, succession is not under attack
by any one individual or group, but rather by time.
The sons of King Abdul Aziz are advancing in age.
Indeed, the passage of time will inexorably
exhaust the kingdom's supply of qualified successors and may produce a rate of
turnover that could become destabilizing in and of itself.27
While the
number of senior princes declines, several thousand hopefuls from the second
and third generations wait in the wings with no agreed-upon criteria for
choosing among them. This family-wide competition
is crucial and healthy, even if fewer than ten princes have any chance of
acceding to the throne over the next few decades.
Undoubtedly, certain family factions will negotiate better than
others the winnowing that must take place among the second and third
generations. If history is a guide, one
may expect the family to present the outside world with a solution to the
succession question in a manner that appears sensible and expeditious.
Such a move would remove uncertainty and end
opportunities for speculation on intra-family contention.
Nevertheless, the prospect that a solution
may not come quickly, or for that matter felicitously, should be carefully
assessed.
While the family will always try to avoid allowing events to
reach the scale of an unseemly public dispute, differences of view among its
senior members are not unprecedented in Saudi history.
A repetition of past questioning of the
monarchy's ideological or doctrinal legitimacy would be particularly
destabilizing. It is for this reason
that the topic of succession bears careful assessment at a time when Heir
Apparent Abdallah is embarked on a dramatic redirection of the kingdom's
foreign policy.
A NEW FOREIGN-POLICY DIRECTION
The Gulf Region
In the past year, the heir apparent has steered the kingdom's
ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran from an attitude of benign neglect to
one of active engagement. In fact,
improved relations with Iran have emerged as the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia's
objective of regional supremacy.28
While relations have been warming for nearly
a year, the first results of this rapprochement appeared at the March 1999 OPEC
meeting, when the Saudis stunned observers by agreeing to a new set of production
quotas that were highly favorable to Iran.
In response, petroleum prices rose, as did hopes for more breakthroughs
between the two traditional competitors.
While these moves may seem to indicate a clear gain for Iranian foreign
policy in general and for President Mohammed Khatami in particular, as he
successfully ends his country's political isolation, in reality, Riyadh gained
more. Saudi Arabia extended its welcome
mat to visiting Iranian President Khatami in May 1999 and drew concessions from
him on key regional issues, including a pledge to help reduce tensions
throughout the area. That the Saudis
have effectively won the support of Iranians for various other concerns,
ranging from a commitment to coordinate policy towards Afghanistan to joint
investment policies, was a further indication of the progress underway.29
Even
sensitive defense questions were discussed, following Defense Minister Prince
Sultan's visit to Tehran in early May 1999.
At that time, Ali Shamkani, the Iranian defense minister, told his Saudi
counterpart that he saw no limit to ties with the kingdom and went
so far as to proclaim that Iran's entire defense capability will be put at the
disposal of its Saudi brothers.30
The hyperbole aside, and although no formal
defense accord was initialed during Khatami's visit to Saudi Arabia, these
high-level discussions reduced the overall military tension in the Gulf region.
As the kingdom pulls closer to Iran, the gulf separating it
from Iraq widens, with serious consequences for all concerned.
Recent public statements uttered by senior
Saudi officials indicate more assertive pronouncements.
For much of the 1990s, Saudi strategy
towards Iraq was based on a defensive, static policy of containment; today it
has grown much more dynamic and assertive.
Under the leadership of the heir apparent, the Saudis have gone beyond
their firm support of U.N. resolutions concerning Iraq to urging a change of
government in Baghdad.31
At the same
time, veering sharply from U.S. policy, the heir apparent has been vociferous
in his calls to abolish all U.N. restrictions on Iraqi oil exports, money from
which is used to purchase food, medicine and other desperately needed supplies.
To be sure, this more assertive policy towards Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein followed the latter's January 1999 call on Arabs to rise up
against their rulers.32
In an
unprecedented move, and in response to Saddam Hussein's exhortation, the Saudi
Press Agency, in a first such statement, called for the toppling of the
tyrant of Baghdad.33
Meanwhile, although Saudi support for the
Iraqi opposition movement has so far been lukewarm at best (especially toward
the Iraqi National Congress, INC), there are signs that this too is
changing. Apparently, Prince Abdallah
would provide both economic and military assistance to any viable non-INC Iraqi
opposition to help it topple the current regime.
If relations between Saudi Arabia and both Iran and Iraq seem
to have entered a new phase, ties with Yemen, strained for decades, have gone
from bad to worse. Given that the
balance of power has tilted decidedly in favor of the kingdom over the past few
months, Sanaa eagerly courted Washington to add whatever pressure on Saudi
Arabia it could muster. In fact, not
too long ago, Saudi wariness of Yemen was palpable; they constantly watched
troop movements and feared an insurrection across the border.
Today the situation may be reversed, as
Prince Abdallah has privately warned President Ali Abdallah Saleh of serious
repercussions. Sanaa took note of how
Riyadh under Prince Abdallah's specific instructions acted over the Hanish
Island dispute.34
The small
uninhabited island, part of a border dispute among Yemen, Eritrea and Saudi
Arabia for 50 years, was temporarily occupied by Yemeni soldiers in
1998. Riyadh cleared the
island in twelve hours and left an undisclosed number of Yemeni victims.
Since then, activity on the border between
the two countries has been quiet.
Saudi relations with fellow Arab Gulf monarchies are also
expected to experience substantial changes over the course of the next few
years. To be sure, Riyadh is infuriated
by Qatar's maverick foreign-policy initiatives and irreverent
broadcasts on the Doha-based Al-Jazirah television station, which
maintains a semi-open (certainly by Gulf standards) policy covering heretofore
taboo subjects. Saudi Arabia strongly
supports a unified GCC position on Israel and objects to Doha's solo initiatives
with the Jewish state. Heir Apparent
Abdallah has taken steps to check its tiny neighbor and has persuaded Doha to
refrain from free lancing.
Towards that end, Riyadh refused to attend the 1997 Middle East
Economic Conference (MENA) and, by not participating, forced it into
irrelevance.35
Moreover,
some members of the Saudi ruling family were offended by frequent references to
obtuse Saudi political, cultural and social views on Al-Jazirah's
airwaves. Saudi officials proved quite
persuasive; Al-Jazirah toned
down its rhetoric and canceled a planned live broadcast with the Saudi
political dissident Mohammed Al Masaari in 1997.
Relations with Abu Dhabi, almost always strained because of
unresolved border disputes, improved dramatically throughout the late 1980s and
early 1990s. In fact, Shaykh Zayed bin
Sultan Al Nahyan reportedly agreed to provide Riyadh sorely needed financial
assistance in late 1998 (officially denied by both sides) to further cement his
ties with the kingdom.36
Abu Dhabi
even looked the other way when a serious border clash over the disputed Shaybah
oil field erupted in early 1999.37
For Shaykh Zayed, such irritants were far
less important than the kingdom's overture towards Iran, which the emirati hoped
would be leveraged by the Al Saud. From
a UAE perspective, President Khatami's charm necessitated skillful Arab
persuasion to help settle the dispute over the occupied islands of Abu Musa and
the Tunbs. In the event, Riyadh
accepted Tehran's pledge to help solve the conflict but pressed for no more,
further disappointing Shaykh Zayed and distancing Saudi Arabia from one of its
staunch GCC allies.
The Arab Arena
Much as in the Gulf, Heir Apparent Abdallah opted to pursue
assertive policies in the larger Arab world, including the Kingdom of
Jordan. Although relations with Amman
worsened when the late King Hussein opted to remain neutral in the aftermath of
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, they have now improved considerably.
In fact, since the death of King Hussein,
the Saudi leadership has offered the new Jordanian monarch immense
support. Prince Abdallah promised to
open Saudi markets to Jordanian goods, provide generous grants from various
governmental development funds, foster job-incentive opportunities for
Jordanian skilled laborers to work in the kingdom, and above all, assure
Jordanians that the Saudi Central Bank would be ready to act as a guarantor to
any international borrowing that may be required.38
In late 1999,
the two countries were working out the cancellation of the majority of Jordan's
debt. This, without a doubt,
strengthened the young monarch's political hand.
From Riyadh's perspective, this support, among other things, was
meant to dissuade Amman from becoming too closely tied to the emerging
Turkish-Israeli alliance.39
By all
accounts, this strategy seems to be working, as Jordan has distanced itself
from that nascent bloc. Ironically,
whereas Riyadh refused to welcome the late King Hussein into the kingdom after
his stand on the 1990 Kuwait crisis, the new king's first official visit was to
Saudi Arabia, making the point that Riyadh saw its northern neighbor as an
important partner.
If Heir Apparent Abdallah wished to take King Abdallah bin
Hussein under his wing, his position towards Egypt was less charitable.
As Egypt relies on Saudi Arabia for
financial assistance, including economic investment, low-interest loans and
considerable employment opportunities (in 1998 an estimated one million
Egyptians were working in the kingdom, whose remittances helped Cairo
immeasurably), Riyadh expected a higher level of reciprocity.
Prince Abdallah hoped that President Husni
Mubarak would play a far more active role in the peace process and champion
Arab causes in world fora with gusto.
In fact, senior Saudi officials lament Egypt's marginalization, calling
upon the latter to lead, especially in the West.
At the same time, Riyadh sought Egyptian support for its own
agenda, including advocacy of the Saudi candidate for UNESCO's
directorship. As Egypt had promised to
join all Arab countries by backing the candidacy of the Saudi ambassador to
London, Ghazi al-Ghosaibi, Riyadh was irked when Cairo nominated its own
candidate, on the grounds that the Egyptian represented the African
bloc.40
Finally, the heir apparent has maintained his country's warm
relations with Syria, due to family ties and the fact that he has always been
close to the Syrian leadership. Saudi support
for Syria's position regarding the Golan, for example, is unyielding and not
limited to words. The heir apparent
personally committed the kingdom to providing Syria with substantial
interest-free loans, free shipments of oil, and assistance in paying some of
Syria's massive debt to world financial institutions.
To set the stage, the Saudi Central Bank forgave Syria's debt to
the Saudi government in the aftermath of the 1991 war for Kuwait, when Damascus
joined Saudi forces on the battlefield.
SAUDI-AMERICAN TIES
At the funeral of Jordan's King Hussein, a telling incident
occurred that sheds light on the heir apparent's relations with the United
States and further illustrates his will to power.
During a pause in the ceremonies, President Bill Clinton
approached Prince Abdallah and asked if he would like to meet senior Israeli
leaders. Before Mr. Clinton could
finish, he was sharply interrupted:
I believe, Your Excellency Mr. President, that there are limits to
friendship.41
This rebuff
illustrates the depth of the heir apparent's feeling for the plight of the
Palestinians and his increasing willingness to follow his own course when
American and Saudi interests diverge.
In other statements, the heir apparent has made it clear that before any
dialogue could begin, Israel must make peace with all its Arab neighbors and
return all occupied Arab land. This
incident, as with others between the two countries, indicates that, while Saudi
Arabia appreciates its special relationship with Washington, the heir apparent
is going to ensure that the relationship is built on equality and mutual
respect.
Although Washington no longer doubts Prince Abdallah's will to
power, his style perturbs and, in time, may be misinterpreted.
To be sure, the heir apparent is remaining
true to the kingdom's ideology, applying its doctrine with determination and
adopting alternative strategies as needed.
From Riyadh's perspective, this is quite pragmatic and a further example
of the needed flexibility in dealing with pressing internal and foreign-policy
concerns. To say that the heir apparent
is positioning Saudi Arabia for a leadership role in the region would indeed be
an understatement. His policies towards
Iraq and Yemen, the reconciliation with Iran, as well as continued support of
Syria and Jordan are all important steps in stabilizing the region and securing
the kingdom's preeminent position. By
pointedly standing up for Arab causes, including the perennial Palestinian
question, despite Washington's classic hesitancies, the heir apparent is
strengthening his rule at home and earning wider Arab backing.
That is his mantle for leadership as he
prepares to rule the kingdom.
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1 John S. Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: The
Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930
(Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill,
1978). See also Hassan Abdul-Hay
Gazzaz, Al-Amn Allazi Naishuha [The security we enjoy], 2 volumes, 3rd
edition (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Dar
Al-Ilm Printing and Publishing co, 1993).
A one-volume summary was published in English under the same title in
1992.
2 Fouad Al-Farsy, Modernity and
Tradition: The Saudi Equation (London and New York: Kegan Paul
International, 1990), pp. 16-22.
3 David Holden and Richard Johns, The
House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1981), pp. 19-25 and passim. See also
H. St. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1955),
pp. 33-59 and passim.
4 Said K. Aburish, The Rise,
Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (London: Bloomsbury,
1994). See also Declaration of
the Founding of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, CDLR
Year Book 94-95 (London: CDLR, 1995),
pp. 3-4.
5 Mohammed al-Khilewi, Saudi
Arabia is Trying to Kill Me, Middle East Quarterly 5:3, September
1998, pp. 66-79.
6 This is best illustrated in the
religious and secular letters that were addressed to the monarch in
the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
See Memorandum Presented to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia by Religious
Scholars, Judges, and University Professors (in Arabic, in author's
hands). A version of this letter,
although not identical, was published by the Egyptian daily Al-Shaab,
see Intellectuals Demand Reforms in Letter to King, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS-NES)
91-100, May 23, 1991, pp. 21-22. This
letter carried 52 signatures. See also
A Memorandum to the King, (in Arabic), n.p., September 1992, 4
pages, [in author's hands].
7 Hanbali Islam represents the smallest
Islamic school in Sunni theology. The
school, one of four, was substantially weakened under Ottoman rule when Qadis
(judges) loyal to the Ottoman Porte dominated the vast Islamic realm.
The Hanbali school was reinvigorated in the
eighteenth century, when Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, a pious cleric, rekindled
the teachings of one of Arabia's great religious scholars, Ibn Taymiyah, and
aligned himself with Muhammad bin Saud.
See Abdallah al-Salih al-Uthaymin, Al-Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul
Wahhab (Riyadh: Dar al-Ulum, n.d.).
8 An argument can also be made that
these steps were initiated around 1992 when Riyadh formally established the
Majlis al-Shura and adopted the country's Basic Laws.
See David E. Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), p. 129 and passim.
9 Muhammad Abdul Wahhab, Al-Usul
Al-Thalatha wa Adillatuha [The three principles and their proofs] (Cairo:
Dar Al-Tiba Al-Yusufiyah, n.d.).
10 Toward that objective, Riyadh
encouraged the creation of the Muslim World League in 1962 and, over the years,
provided moral and financial support to numerous Islamic causes.
To drive the point home, on October 26, 1986,
King Fahd changed his official title from majesty to the quot;Custodian of the
Two Holy Places (or Mosques). See
Fidei Defensor, The Economist 301:7471, November 8, 1986, p.
49.
11 The most notable such case was the
1979 takeover of the Makkah Holy Mosque by Juhayman Al-Utaybi and his
supporters. See Joseph A. Kechichian,
The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The case of
Saudi Arabia, International Journal of Middle East Studies 18:1,
February 1986, pp. 53-71; and idem, Islamic Revivalism and Change in
Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi's ‘letters' to the Saudi People, The
Muslim World 40:1, January 1990, pp. 1-16.
More recently, the case of the CDLR, as well as its off-shoot group, are
other examples of this phenomenon.
12
Kechichian, The Role of the Ulama,
Ibid., pp. 10-14.
13
The CDLR was established on May 3,
1993. Within days, an estimated 400 of
its supporters were arrested throughout the kingdom, even if most were
eventually released. The Committee was,
naturally, banned. See Geoff Simons, Saudi
Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1998), pp. 34-36.
14
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Saudi
Arabia's Consultative Council, The Middle East Journal 52:2,
Spring 1998, pp. 204-18.
15
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, January 1986), p.
346. In contrast to the U.S. view, the
Soviet Union understood and explained strategy in purely military terms that it
defined as the constituent part of and the highest form of military
art. [Strategy] encompasses the theory
and practice of preparing the country and armed forces for war, the planning
and conduct of strategic operations, and war as a whole.
See Voennyi Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar
[Soviet military encyclopedia], 2nd ed. (Moscow: Ministerstro Oborony, 1986),
p. 711.
16
John Lewis Gaddis, Toward the
Post-Cold War World, Foreign Affairs 70:2, Spring 1991, pp.
102-22; see also David C. Hendrickson, The Renovation of American Foreign
Policy, Foreign Affairs 71:2, Spring 1992, pp. 48-63.
17
Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The
Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1988), pp. 240-81 and passim.
18
For a brief introduction into these
recent changes, see Economic Policy and the Economy, Country
Report Saudi Arabia 4:98 [hereafter CR-Saudi Arabia] (London: The Economist
Intelligence Unit, 1998), pp. 13-17.
19
Crown Prince Abdullah Attends
the OIC Summit Reflecting Warmer Ties Between Riyadh and Tehran, CR-Saudi
Arabia 1:98, p. 10. See also
The Crown Prince's Influence on Foreign Policy Continues to Grow, CR-Saudi
Arabia 4:98, p. 12.
20
Simon Henderson, After King Fahd:
Succession in Saudi Arabia (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, 1994), 1995, pp. 25-30.
21
Ibid., pp. 31-37.
22
Madawi Al Rasheed, Politics in an
Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty, (London and New York:
I.B. Tauris Co. Limited, 1991).
See also A. Al Uthaymin, Nashat Imarat al
Rashid [Accomplishments of the Al Rashid emirate] (Riyadh: n.p.,
1981). Although the tribal composition
of the National Guard is not accurately known, the composition of the Guard's
predecessor, the Ikhwan, is fully documented and carefully analyzed in
Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Saudi
Arabia (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981),
pp. 127-50; and Habib, op. cit., pp. 63-78.
23
For one interpretation of Prince
Abdallah - albeit at the height of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
- see
Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon Schuster,
1991), pp. 261-73.
See also Joseph A. Kechichian,
Saudi/US Partnership: The Ties That Bind, Arabies Trends,
Number 14, November 1998, pp. 22-24 .
24
Kechichian, Ibid., p.
24.
25
Khaled bin Sultan, Desert Warrior:
A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995).
26
The two publications are the
London-based pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat and weekly Al-Wassat.
27
Henderson, op. cit., p. 25.
28
Saeed Barzin, Iran: Evolving
New Axis?, Middle East International, Number 600, May 21, 1999, pp. 13-14.
29
Jubin Goodarzi, Behind Iran's
Middle East Diplomacy, Middle East International, Number 608, September
17, 1999, pp. 21-23.
30
Harvey Morris, Saudi
Arabia/Iran: Partnership, Arabies Trends, Number 22, July-August
1999, pp. 14-15.
31
The Saudi Position Enrages
Saddam as the Saudis Call for the Iraqi People to Overthrow him, CR-Saudi
Arabia 1:99, p. 12.
32
As the Saudis Call for the
Iraqi People to Overthrow [Saddam Hussein], CR-Saudi Arabia 1:99,
p. 12.
33
Ibid.
34
Hanish Handed Over to
Yemen, The Middle East Observer, November 11, 1998.
35
America and the Arabs: Two Sides
of a Coin, The Economist 345:8044, November 22, 1997, pp. 48-49.
36
Technically, the Abu Dhabi
loan is a currency line of credit open to the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency (SAMA). Abu Dhabi will
buy riyals from SAMA whenever the Saudi Central Bank needs to sell riyals to
buy U.S. dollars. The actual agreement
is for Abu Dhabi to buy up to $5 billion worth of riyals from SAMA over an
unspecified period of time. The story
was first published in Oil Price Crash Forces Saudis to Seek Dollars 5
Billion Bail-Out, The Financial Times, December 4, 1998, p. 5.
37
Dispute Surfaces Between Saudi
Arabia and UAE, Mideast Mirror, March 10, 1999.
38
Pledges made by Heir Apparent
Abdallah to King Abdallah II of Jordan after King Hussein bin Talal's death.
39
The Scramble for Jordan, Mideast
Mirror, March 3, 1999.
40
Nawaf Essam Obaid, Into The
Ring, Arabies Trends, Number 24, October 1999, pp. 24-25.
In the event, Koichiro Matsuuro of Japan won
over both Ghazi Algosaibi (Saudi Arabia) and Ismail Serageldin (Egypt).
41
The news account was reported by the Saudi daily Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat and reproduced in Mideast Mirror.
See Saudi Crown Prince ‘Rebuffs' Clinton Over Meeting with
Israelis in Amman, Mideast Mirror, February 17, 1999.
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