Middle East Policy, Volume VI, Number 3, February 1999

Editor's Note

Change, whether reform or revolution, is hard for governments to manage. When times are good, it is most unwelcome, as those who benefit from the old ways insist that they continue. Change is accepted only when absolutely necessary, and not always even then; for no matter how bad things are, they could always get worse, the law of unintended consequences being everywhere applicable. Chaos is much more feared than tyranny, even by the cruelly tyrannized. Thus, Saddam Hussein remains in power and the Iraqi people suffer on. Next door in Iran the twentieth anniversary of the birth of the Islamic Republic is being celebrated as an end to the chaos of the oil boom, not the beginning of a whirlwind that led to the death of a generation.

Perhaps surprisingly, there is controversy inside the U.S. government over the value of rapid change in Iraq. General Anthony Zinni, the U.S. CENTCOM commander, in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee last month expressed reservations about the prospects for an opposition-based effort to destabilize the regime of Saddam Hussein, despite the fact that this is now administration policy. Fear of chaos is apparently one of the major factors that led to the U.S. decision in 1991 to leave the Iraqi strongman standing, and it remains a major sticking point (see the symposium on Iraq in the following pages).

If cataclysmic change is to be averted, reform is necessary. But reforming the way business and the business of government are transacted in the Middle East, where patronage of tribe and clan has always been standard operating procedure, has met with limited success. Critics, particularly in the West, have rendered harsh judgments on governments that have been unable to fulfill the economic and political potential expected of them by the World Bank and the IMF. Some of the critiques have been published in this journal, for example, "Economic Origins of Instability in the Middle East," by Alan Richards, in Volume IV, Number 1-2, September 1995, and "Hariri's Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant?" by Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg, in Volume VI, Number 2, October 1998 (To appreciate the intensity of feeling this issue generates, see the rebuttal letter from former Lebanese finance minister Fuad Siniora in this issue.)

No one has a lock on truth, of course, not even the reform advocates. In the following pages, Alan Richards, for example, revisits self-critically some of the issues he analyzed back in 1995, since which time the world has taken a few sharp turns: "As the economic difficulties spread from Bangkok to Seoul to Jakarta and then to Moscow (and then on to Brasilia?), a worldwide 'liquidity crunch' is developing in which investors display that famous 'herd behavior,' individually rational ('don't be the last one to the exit') but profoundly destructive socially." When Middle Easterners see that "the domestic consequences for Asian countries have been very severe, with output declines of up to 25 percent, unemployment rates doubling, and very marked increases in poverty, most dramatically in Indonesia," they draw certain conclusions about the danger of losing control over their societies. Governments cannot stand against the will of their people, particularly the elites. So reform goes forward slowly, when it goes at all. As Richards points out, the timetable has to be demarcated in decades, not months.

Political stability is essential, particularly in a region where the threat of war and domestic unrest are palpable. For the sake of job creation and investment growth the United States urges change ‚ privatization, transparency, accountability ‚ on governments in the Middle East while at the same time pursuing policies that are inherently destabilizing to the area. The U.S. military is conducting a low-level war in the Gulf to harry Saddam Hussein; Israel, by national consensus apparently, refuses to offer a deal to the Palestinians that would enhance their sense of self-respect and dampen their resentment.

Ironically, indigenous forces for change are usually anti-American, the United States being the status-quo power par excellence, its rhetoric aside. If democracy reigned in the Greater Middle East, there would be more Islamist political success and more thwarting of U.S. policies. American administrations have always preferred to deal with a strong leader than with his unpredictable "people."

The U.S. relationship with the late King Hussein is revealing of this dichotomy. The Jordanian people were most united in support of his policies in 1991, when he was, for good Macchiavelian economic and political reasons, defying the United States on Iraq. He was, therefore, less self-protective and more willing to try democratic reforms during that period. Hard times forced the king back into the U.S. fold and ultimately into a treaty with Israel that his people support only grudgingly. But he set in motion the process toward modern constitutional democracy that might have a chance to develop during the reign of his son, King Abdullah, unless economic woes overwhelm his good intentions.

Jordanians were loyal to their king, despite his occasional disastrous choices. The public outpouring of grief following Hussein's death was a reminder of the importance of personality/character in overcoming political odds. Press commentators have often noted that Israeli public affection for King Hussein dates from a personal gesture of grief: He fell to his knees in abject apology before the families of Israeli girls who had been machine-gunned on a school trip by a Jordanian. The sympathy shown by heads of state and erstwhile enemies at the king's funeral was tribute he had earned through a lifetime of playing a difficult political hand gracefully, managing to stay on his feet after major bouts with Iraq, Israel, Syria, the Palestinians, and the United States while maintaining domestic stability.

What the death of King Hussein will mean for Jordan and the region is not clear. If this journal had gone to press a month earlier, the assumption would have been that his brother Hassan was about to succeed him. Whether due to family pressure or political calculation or a combination of forces, the accession of Hussein's oldest son, Abdullah, puts the younger generation in charge of a strategically important country for the United States and Israel. New ways are perhaps open to him. If he were able to expand democratic institutions, would his powerful patrons favor such boldness? If King Abdullah followed the will of his people, he would be very cool to the peace process. But Jordan has an $8 billion debt to reschedule, and its bills are being paid by allies with their own interests in mind. The young king will need a great deal of courage to stand against the will of either group. The good news is, the young king may be more democracy-oriented; that may also be bad news for some.

Anne Joyce
February 1999