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| Volume VI, June 1999, Number 4 |
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| Book Review |
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For a printable version of this book review, click here.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by David E. Long. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida 1997. 154 pages, with appendix, notes, bibliography, index, maps, tables and illustrations. $49.95, hardcover.
Brooks Wrampelmeier
U.S. foreign service officer (ret .); member, Society for Gulf Arab Studies
Many Westerners, even those who have visited Saudi Arabia on business or with the military, find the kingdom puzzling. The country is renowned in the West for its vast oil resources but also for having an anachronistic form of government and for being a closed society unwelcoming to non-Muslims, upon whom it relies for help in developing its resources or assuring its national security. David Long believes that misleading stereotypes have made it difficult for Westerners to see Saudis as they really are -- a deeply religious, traditionally conservative, proud people who have been forced to make the transition from the pre-industrial to the modern age in less than two generations. His objective in writing this slim volume is to help Western readers understand the kingdom by communicating how Saudis see themselves and their place in the world. He seeks to do so not only by presenting facts about Saudi Arabia but also by trying to get across the "feel" of the kingdom, "probably the most elusive task for foreign resident and reader alike" (p. xi).
In undertaking such a challenging task, Dr. Long draws on some 30 years of experience as an observer of things Saudi, beginning with his assignment as a foreign service officer to Jidda in the 1960s (where he replaced me in the American embassy). His career since has alternated between the Department of State and academic appointments in Middle Eastern studies, during which he has written frequently about Saudi Arabia. Among his published works are The Hajj Today: A Survey of the Contemporary Pilgrimage to Makkah (1979) and The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies (1985). He is a frequent visitor to the kingdom.
Dr. Long has divided his book into eight chapters covering the land and its people, the historical background, the political system, oil, economic development and modernization, the hajj, foreign and national-security policies, and some concluding thoughts on Saudi Arabia in the twenty-first century. Most of the factual information will be familiar to serious students of Saudi Arabia, but for the non-expert or the reader contemplating a first visit to the kingdom, this book is an excellently concise introduction to a fascinating country. Even readers familiar with the kingdom will find of interest Long s observations on Saudi society and the cultural context in which decision making takes place.
Long underscores the overwhelmingly Islamic and traditional character of Saudi culture. For Saudis, "Islam is more than a religion: it is a totally self-contained cosmic system" (p. 42). The norms of Saudi Arabia s Islamic cultural values have survived despite the rapid pace of modernization over the last 50 years. Moreover, Saudis -- who did not undergo the Western occupation or tutelage experienced by other Arabs -- see themselves not merely as equals of the West, but in fact believe their Islamic cultural values to be vastly superior to Western secular ones. The identity crises sometimes common among Western-educated elites from other traditional societies are rare in Saudi Arabia (p. 108).
A second major cultural factor is the tribal nature of Saudi society. By "tribal," Long means genealogical ties -- the extended family, a sense of deep roots -- rather than occupational or political connections. The extended family is the most important social institution in Saudi Arabia, loyalty to it probably exceeding even loyalty to the state (p. 16). "The miracle is not how much Saudi society has changed, . . . [i]t is how resilient the society has been in the face of change. The family system is still intact and indeed is probably the most stabilizing force in the country. Whatever Saudi Arabia s political or economic future, it is difficult to visualize without the paramount importance of family ties" (p. 21).
These same two strains of religion and family are seen throughout the past 250 years of Saudi history, beginning with the alliance between the petty ruler of Daraiyya, Muhammad ibn Saud, and the Central Arabian religious reformer, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Today, these two families -- the Al Saud and the Al al-Sheikh -- still provide the preeminent religious and political leadership of the kingdom. Both King Abd al-Aziz ("lbn Saud"), founder of the modern Saudi state, and the sons who succeeded him have been committed to preserving an Islamic society in Saudi Arabia and to maintaining an Islamic political order. According to Long, the most notable aspect of King Faisal s reign (1964-75) "was his ability to gauge just how far and how fast he could nudge his people toward modernity without exceeding a pace they could assimilate" (p. 36). It was often remarked by Western observers that Faisal figuratively took two steps forward and one step backward in his bid to introduce new bureaucratic and educational institutions into a conservative, traditional Islamic social order.
Saudi politics revolve around consultation (shura) and consensus (ijmaa). Even a Saudi king, despite all the powers vested in him, cannot act without consensus. "With a consensus, the government can move with astonishing speed; without it, years can go by with no decision made" (p. 46). One of the chief tasks of the king, and by extension his subordinate decision makers, is to create a consensus for action and then to implement it. "The king is both chief consensus maker and chief executive" (p. 48). The consequences of ignoring consultation and consensus were demonstrated in the 1953-62 period, when King Saud attempted to monopolize power within the royal family at the expense of his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, and other important family members. Eventually the senior princes, having obtained a fatwa, or religious opinion, from the religious leadership (ulema) deposed Saud in October 1964 and gave their allegiance instead to Faisal.
Here I must disagree with Long, who states that Saud was deposed because he was unable to cope with the growing complexities that oil wealth and rapid modernization created and that his reign was characterized by palace intrigue, corruption and waste (p. 34). The real issue was Saud s failure to consult with all the royal family members concerned and to achieve a consensus, not only on budgetary priorities and development policies, but also on foreign affairs and control of the armed forces. I believe that Long is also mistaken when he states that the ulema issued a fatwa "proclaiming Faisal king." The fatwa stated that it was permissible for those who had given their allegiance (bayaa) to Saud to withdraw that allegiance and give it to another if Saud were no longer ruling in conformance with Islamic law and Saudi custom. It was the senior princes who proclaimed Faisal king by formally transferring their allegiance to him from Saud. The ulema were not "king-makers" but acted more like legal advisors to the royal family.
Long traces the evolution of Saudi national political institutions beyond the personalized system run directly by the king, noting that the 1952 creation of the Council of Ministers and other government agencies has led to a more bureaucratic structure and more standardized procedures. As the government has expanded over the years and become engaged in increasingly complex and technical matters, the king has become less involved personally in all but the most pressing national issues requiring a decision. National political issues are still largely decided by the traditional, personalized methods of the past, but increasingly the consultation process has come to involve qualified experts rather than royal retainers. This is in part because cabinet ministers, except for the top national-security positions, are chosen from individuals with technical skills or expertise rather than persons with an independent political base or personal ties to the ruler. These technocrats are usually involved along with royal family members in virtually all major decisions, but they function as professionals in the policy-making process rather than as politicians.
Turning to the Consultative Council (majlis al-shura), first proposed by King Faisal in 1962 but not formed until 1992 by King Fahd, Long notes that it represents the institutionalization of the traditional Islamic concept of consultation with "people of knowledge and expertise" and its adaptation to modern government. Fahd, he believes, saw the need to expand public participation in the political system but rejected a Western-style democratic legislative body. In part, Long says, this was because of initially strong opposition from the ulema, who held that creation of an institution that could create statutory law was contrary to the Sharia, or Islamic law based on the Quran and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith), and which is formally acknowledged to be the "constitution" of Saudi Arabia. Together with the Council of Ministers, the real test for the Consultative Council will be the degree to which its members actually participate in the decision-making process or whether they merely rubber-stamp palace policies.
Long states that King Faisal also placed Islam at the center of his economic and social-development philosophy, which could be summed up as "modernization without secularization." "Essentially, Faisal wanted to preserve the pre-industrial Islamic social system molded by his Al Saud and Al al-Sheikh forebears while seeking to offer his people the fruits of the industrial age that oil revenues put within their grasp" (p. 85). Because most of the kingdom s wealth is derived from oil sales and accrues to the public sector, the government has become the principal source of public-welfare programs, not in emulation of Western social welfare but as a civic and religious obligation (p. 77).
In the areas of foreign policy and national security, Long considers the Saudi perception of the world to be influenced by two strong if somewhat contradictory themes: a cultural self-assurance based on a clear sense of Islamic heritage and tribally based self-identity and a heightened sense of insecurity based on the historical perception of being surrounded by perceived enemies. Because they were never occupied or controlled by Western powers, Saudis never developed the political xenophobia toward the West that other Arab and Muslim states did. When xenophobia does appear, it is generally focused on the threat of Western secularism to Islamic society, not on the threat of political domination (p. 108). From the days of King Abd al-Aziz, the principal threats to Saudi national security have been hostile neighbors who either covet Saudi territory and oil resources or wish to overthrow the regime. Perceived enemies included first the Hashemites; later radical Arab-nationalist regimes, especially those supported by the Soviet Union; Israel; republican Yemen; revolutionary Iran; and now Iraq.
Faisal articulated Saudi foreign policy in terms of classical Islamic theory, which divided the world into the Muslim nation (Dar al-Salaam) and the non-believers (Dar al-Harb). As Faisal saw it, the Dar al-Salaam now included the United States and other Western powers -- but not Israel -- while the Dar al-Harb included atheistic Communism, Zionism and imperialism. Based on this model, Long suggests that Saudi foreign policy has long been more concerned with the distinction between God-fearing and godless societies than it has been with Third World political theories like distinctions between haves and have-nots. With the end of the Cold War, the world is no longer bipolar but highly fragmented. The external threat is now less from the secular left than from militant Islamic forces, which have attacked the Al Sauds for their political and military ties to the United States. Long thinks that Saudi foreign policy will therefore need to search for a new way to balance an accommodation with the West for the technology and security and the fundamental Islamic principles on which the Saudi state is based.
Meanwhile, the internal threat to the Saudi regime from the religious right has grown, in part because of the social dislocations of rapid modernization and of runaway population growth. Domestically, militant Islamists are already blaming the regime for introducing "secularism," including especially the presence of Western troops, into the kingdom. Currently, the most vocal critics of the regime are those calling for a return to a strict, inflexible application of Islamic law. The more puritanical ulema are gaining popular support, particularly among young under- or unemployed Saudis with few skills that are marketable in the modern economy. Long considers that this movement so far has neither the mass support nor the organizational skills to mount a serious challenge to the regime.
But the long-term demographic problem may constitute the most serious challenge to Saudi society, its economy and its political system in the twenty-first century (p. 126). With an annual population growth of about 3.7 percent, the population could double every 20 years. Demands on the government for additional social and physical infrastructure as well as for jobs will continue to grow, probably much faster than oil revenues will rise. Ironically, Saudization of the labor force, replacing relatively lower-paid foreign workers with Saudis, would be a mixed blessing because the absence of a strong Saudi work ethic and relatively high Saudi salary expectations would mean higher labor costs, thus reducing competitive advantage. Privatization of public-sector enterprises and the growth of the private-sector economy might help relieve these pressures on the government budget, but a strong private sector might also demand a greater voice in policy decisions affecting the economy.
In his conclusion, Long sees no immediate threat to Al Saud rule, barring a crisis of really gigantic proportions that might undermine its legitimacy. In the event the Al Saud were replaced, he thinks the more likely successor regime would be one based on militant Islam dominated by the military; less likely would be the creation of a secular, democratic state along Western-style constitutional lines. Most likely, in his view, is a change in style as a new generation of Al Sauds, the grandsons of King Abd al-Aziz, replaces the older one. Long believes this generation of Saudi rulers will be even more self-assured and independent of Western and even of other Arab pressures than the current leadership, although it would still proceed cautiously and from consensus. "This would likely produce even more frustration in Western capitals but not so great as to undermine basically sound relationships. It is doubtful that Western capitals would be able to ignore the kingdom or take it for granted to the degree they have in the past" (p. 131).
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