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| Volume VI, June 1999, Number 4 |
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| Editor's Note |
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For a printable version of this editor's note, click here.
This issue contains the work of an unusually large number of talented analysts on an array of interrelated themes - democracy, leadership and sovereignty; Arabs, Israelis, Iranians and Turks; guns and butter and oil. The lead item comprises excerpts from the proceedings of a major Council conference, "A Century in Thirty Years: Sheikh Zayed and the United Arab Emirates." It features presentations by Fahim Al Qasimi, UAE minister of economy and commerce, and Robert L. Mallett, U.S. deputy secretary of commerce, who joined nine scholars from the Emirates and the United States to assess the UAE national project. Their detailed evaluations provide a nuanced picture of the economic and political culture of this Gulf state. Seldom in the news, the UAE makes a contribution far beyond its size to the well-being of several parts of the world, even the Balkans, where a UAE field hospital has been operating in the war zone.
A neighboring Gulf country, Qatar, has recently drawn positive attention to itself in the West for rather different political reasons: In municipal elections this spring, women were given the right to vote and even run for office. The effects of this bold move, by a young leader who was not democratically elected himself, have already been felt around the Arabian peninsula, particularly in Kuwait, where the Cabinet has recommended that women be given the franchise in 2003. Parliament has yet to vote on this expansion of civil rights (see Bahry, p. 118). Across the water to the north, Iran's recent municipal elections attracted attention because of the voters' endorsement of the relatively progressive policies of President Khatami (see Abdo's on-the-scene report from Tehran, p. 128). And in a similarly polarized state, Israel's election results indicate that peace was less of a concern to voters than the secular-religious divide (see Sandler, Friedman and Telhami, p. 137).
Non-democratic political systems have produced some very good leaders, just as democracies have occasionally elected incompetents and crooks. But rotating bad leaders out of office has much to recommend it; people have to stop complaining and act. Americans and Europeans tend to take this for granted, judging harshly those whose political systems fall short of Western standards. Turkey's democracy is one of those. The recent capture and trial of the head of the Kurdish Workers' party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, has underscored the difficulties of fitting into the Western paradigm. Two articles in this journal probe Turkey's political dilemma: While its secular elite wants to be European, its national-security interests lie in the Middle East (see Kubicek, p. 157). For Ankara, keeping Kurdish nationalism down is a high priority. Ceding its eastern region would mean giving up control of the water that flows into Syria and Iraq and with it a non-military means of pressuring Damascus and Baghdad (see Aykan, p. 174).
The issues raised by the recent Balkan war have given Middle East policy makers much to reconsider, and Turkey's problems will be part of that complex process. A more supple kind of national sovereignty that permits local autonomy is a "new" idea circulating right now (actually, it calls to mind the Ottoman Empire). Turkey, along with almost all other states, opposes such thinking; it is particularly nervous about the potential breakup of Iraq when Saddam Hussein's iron grip no longer holds its north, south and middle parts together. Turks sense a tolerant Western attitude toward the adjustment of state boundaries in the region.
Some borders are not sacrosanct, of course: Israel's have never officially been declared. Such flexibility leaves open the idea of appropriating more territory, an expansion that has been abetted by the United States. This epitomizes the fundamental flaw in the idea of soft sovereignty. One group's dynamism promotes another's decline, feeding the desire for revenge and even terrorist acts by some of the victims of the system. "New" Palestinians such as the Kurds or the Kosovars can all too easily and suddenly be created. The humanitarian cost is incalculable - but bearable for theoreticians far removed from the misery. For the West, the tariff is in large part financial, to limit political instability. There are, however, other costs of projecting force abroad. Two articles in this journal (Cordesman, p. 80; Venter, p. 104) focus on security and insecurity in the Middle East, revealing the intractable although different problems involved in the race for arms, both the conventional and the highly unusual.
Sovereignty is elusive in the absence of economic viability. Even rich and lucky countries eventually have to negotiate the ever-changing global marketplace, trying to strike a balance between control and chaos. The Gulf states are approaching the point of having to reform their systems, in order to qualify for membership in global institutions like the World Trade Organization, and to enlist the cooperation of the private sector in paying for state services (taxation). Such economic pressures tend to foster more representative government. The Council's oil-price symposium and John Page's related article offer current thinking on the need for reform and the hesitation to take the risks necessary for change.
The counsel of outsiders, whether from the World Bank or the G-7 or the White House, has not always made it easy for developing societies to move from traditional to modern forms of socio-political organization. Much of the advice is interpreted as driven by the interests of the adviser. Even when it is not, it is often resented. Western (mainly American) bias against Arabs and Muslims has fed this resentment, giving leaders like Muammar Qadhafi excuses for their own self-serving policies (see Anderson, p. 68). Paul Salem (p. 146) explores some ways for Arabs to start thinking about adjusting their political and economic structures, selecting what seems to have worked well elsewhere - democracy, the free-market - and tailoring it to the shape of the local culture. Reform is needed in the Arab world, not to please the U.S. hegemon, but to enhance economic independence. Fortunately, much can be learned from the mistakes of the past, and there is a rich mine to exploit.
Salem introduces his essay by reminding the reader of the difference between academic and policy-relevant thinking: the latter is always related to action. Now that action on behalf of Muslims has finally been taken by NATO in the Balkans, will there be any spillover into the Middle East? Has the concept of ethnic purity been repudiated to such an extent that the "old" Palestinians might hope to have more of their grievances redressed? It is too early to predict whether the Europeans will try to take a more assertive role in the remaining and very thorny peace-process issues, although the EU has officially endorsed statehood and Palestinian rights in Jerusalem (see the EU document on p. 214). And President Clinton just this week invoked a national-security waiver to postpone moving the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. An experiment in soft sovereignty appears to be the most the Palestinian Authority can expect in the West Bank, although a new Israeli government may bring some fresh ideas to the table.
So there you have it: something for everybody in the policy audience, all in one convenient package. Don't overlook the excellent review essays of some particularly notable books, three on Saudi Arabia. Serious reading, but not too heavy for summer.
Anne Joyce
June 1999
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