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| Volume XVI, Fall 2009, Number 3 |
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EXCERPT
Saudi Arabia after U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch?
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| Paul Aarts / Joris van Duijne |
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Mr. Aarts teaches international relations at the University of Amsterdam. Mr.
Van Duijne, the author of several articles on Gulf politics, works at Free Voice.
The recent thawing of relations
between Washington and Tehran
has fueled Arab apprehension
about Iran’s growing influence
in the region, in Iraq in particular. In this
context, Arab regimes sometimes attempt
to exploit the Shiite and Persian nature
of Tehran’s policies, portraying them
as threatening Sunni Arabs all over the
Middle East. Examples of where sectarian
sentiments in the arab media, in particular
via newspapers like Asharq al-Awsat and
the satellite TV network al-Arabiya. The
most (in)famous examples were delivered
by the Jordanian monarch (warning of a
“Shiite crescent”) and the Egyptian president
(declaring that the “loyalty of Arab
Shiites is always to Iran”).
Notwithstanding the remarkable resilience
of U.S.-Saudi relations, there are
also worries in the kingdom about President
Obama’s cozying up to the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The new U.S. administration
has indicated its willingness to follow
a fundamentally different policy vis-à-vis
Iran, abandoning the Bush administration’s
policy of confrontation and isolation. Ironically,
however, it sometimes seems that the
more American officials offer assurance
that “nothing will harm historical and strategic
ties between the United States and its
Arab partners and allies in the region,” the
greater the sense of insecurity. The Arab
states, Saudi Arabia included, do realize
that the United States needs Iran to play a
constructive role in Iraq, Afghanistan and
the Arab-Israeli arena; hence, they fear an
eventual U.S.-Iranian strategic collusion.
This has led to the belief, widely held in
some circles at least, that a rapprochement
between the United States and Iran will
negatively influence Saudi Arabia (and the
smaller Arab states of the peninsula). Thus,
any overture from Washington to Tehran is
seen as coming at the expense of the Arabs.
Such a zero-sum notion of Gulf politics
can be challenged on many different
levels. Our starting point is a meaningful
improvement in U.S.-Iranian affairs.
We do not intend to be prophetic about
such events, but this is a natural point
of departure, given our argument. We
will break our analysis down into three
different fields: security, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the economy. In all three,
it is important to focus on two different
relationships. On the one hand, we
need to understand what these changes in
U.S.-Iranian relations might mean for the
special relationship between Saudi Arabia
and the United States. On the other hand,
changes in U.S.-Iranian relations necessarily
entail changes in the Saudi-Iranian
relationship as well.
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