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| Volume XV, Spring 2008, Number 1 |
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EXCERPT
Iran and the United States: The Nuclear Issue
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| Anthony H. Cordesman |
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Dr. Cordesman holds the Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is also a national-security analyst for ABC News. (See full article at www.mepc.org/journal_vol15/keyissues.asp.)
It is easy to call for a dialogue between the United States and Iran.
Few, other than ideological hardliners
on both sides, are likely to oppose the need to talk at some level. The last few years of needless war scares have also shown how important a mix of informal diplomacy and formal policy-level statements can be. One has to wonder what would have happened if the United States and Iran had not continued to communicate through second-track diplomacy by various unofficial groups, informal contacts between officials on both sides, and the efforts of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and various senior U.S. commanders to make it clear that the United States continued to pursue diplomatic options and was not preparing for war.
If nothing else, any form of dialogue helps avoid needless misunderstandings and tensions. Informal talks by private citizens and "experts" can address issues that officials cannot openly deal with, and at least clarify the most contentious and controversial issues on both sides. Informal or "unofficial" official contacts can deal with many lower-level issues and incidents. Limited official talks — like the tripartite talks between Iran, Iraq and the United States — can go further, often defusing potential sources of conflict or easing the situation in high-risk areas like Iraq and Afghanistan.
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