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Volume XIV, Winter 2007, Number 4  
 
ABSTRACT

Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality
 
Yahia H. Zoubir
 
Dr. Zoubir is professor of international relations and management at Euromed Marseille.

Nearly two decades since the end of the Cold War, the conflict in the Western Sahara has yet to see its definitive resolution. In fact, this 32-year-old dispute belongs to the category of "forgotten" or "frozen" disputes. The Sahrawi refugees, their plight, the atrocious conditions under which they live, and their right to self-determination through a free and fair referendum, as stipulated in all UN resolutions, have been forgotten as well. The conflict attracts attention sporadically not because of Sahrawis' legitimate rights but mainly because of the national, geopolitical and economic interests of other actors inside and outside the region. Despite the misrepresentation of occupied Western Sahara as an empty desert, the territory does in fact boast rich resources and a 700-kilometer Atlantic coast of strategic importance. The territory also has among the richest fishing waters in the world, which today Morocco and members of the European Union exploit illegally. The Western Sahara possesses huge deposits of phosphates; these reserves could make it one of the largest exporters of phosphates in the world. Other valuable minerals such as iron ore, titanium oxide, vanadium, iron and, possibly, oil abound throughout the territory. Of course, the prospects of oil and natural-gas discoveries in recent years have further complicated the resolution of the conflict.

The case of Western Sahara highlights the UN failure – or, rather, the disinclination of its most powerful members in the Security Council – to implement what should have been a straightforward case of decolonization. The conflict emerged in 1975, at the height of the Cold War, when Morocco was unequivocally anchored in the Western camp and Algeria, though resolutely nonaligned, was perceived as an ally of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, Morocco, which played a proxy role for France and the United States in defeating nationalist and anticommunist forces in Africa, benefited from strong political, economic and military support from its allies, which also included the wealthy Gulf monarchies. In fact, the United States was instrumental in making it possible for Morocco to seize the Western Sahara.

 
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