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| Volume XIV, Summer 2007, Number 1 |
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BOOK REVIEW
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The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, by Vali Nasr. WW Norton, 2006. 287 pages. $25.95, hardcover.
John W. Sutherlin
University of Louisiana, Monroe
The notion that U.S. military action and post-Saddam state-building in Iraq have unleashed ancient sectarian and blood feuds previously suppressed is hardly news. That U.S. efforts to expand democracy in the Persian Gulf could facilitate the toppling of Sunni-backed governments that are friendly to the United States and unify Shia resistance — thereby remaking the region — is news. It is also the thesis for an important book by Vali Nasr.
The first half of his work provides an excellent briefing on the differences between the Sunni and the Shia. The second part analyzes various contemporary forces (Arab nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Khomeinism) within the context of the pan-Islamic dispute for control of states from Lebanon to Pakistan. The haunting core message of the book is found toward the end: “When the dust settles, the center of gravity will no longer lie with the Arab Sunni countries but will be held by Shia ones” (p. 252). The rest of the book lays a foundation for that conclusion.
Vali Nasr, professor and associate chair of research at the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, and the author of numerous other works, unveils the premise that “in the coming years, Shias and Sunnis will compete over power, first in Iraq but ultimately across the entire region. The overall conflict will play a large role in defining the Middle East” (p. 24). This translates into much more violence for Iraqis and probably a longer presence for the U.S. military. Is it possible much of this could have been prevented by a better understanding of the Islamic schism and its relation to power politics?
For most outsiders, the Shia remain “the other Islam,” as Nasr claims, because they narrowly focus their attention on the Sunnis. The reason is obvious: Sunnis represent the overwhelming majority of Muslims throughout the world. However, “in the Islamic heartland, from Lebanon to Pakistan,…there are roughly as many Shias as there are Sunnis, and around the economically and geostrategically sensitive rim of the Persian Gulf, Shias constitute 80 percent of the population” (p. 34).
Nasr makes an interesting point when discussing the political flexibility of the Shia with respect to democratic (or any other) expansion in the crescent countries. During the time of intense Arab nationalism, brutality directed at Shia communities was commonplace. Then, “the Shia learned the harsh lesson that secular regimes and ideologies may come and go, but Sunni biases endure” (p. 90). Arab nationalism does not represent a high-water mark in the political and economic progress of the Shia, as it does for many of the Sunni. They do not have fond memories of Nasser and dreams of pan-Arab unity. Further, the same can be said for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s. In fact, “fundamentalism over the years has ‘Sunnified’ the political climate in the Arab world and Pakistan” (p. 107). Nasr goes on to add that this “Sunnification” process was just another in a long list of grievances.
One would assume that the Shia might have benefited from one or the other type of system. But the question becomes why neither of these movements could have ever benefited the Shia. Again, Nasr asserts, “Neither atheistic materialism nor schemes of radical social change hold much charm for the majority of Shias, who remain at heart devout and fairly conservative” (p. 116). Yet this did not mean that all Shia were ready to fall in behind Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s religious leadership either. Nor did it mean that Iran would necessarily lead the way politically. Once the shah was deposed, the resulting Shia state evolved quickly into what Nasr calls a “populist theocracy” (p. 134). As Iran fashioned its foreign policy to include Hizbollah, the changing landscape of the Persian Gulf was already visible. Iran’s desire to export its revolution would send tremors throughout the Middle East.
Unfortunately for the greater Shia community, “the state that Khomeini built would be an intolerant theocracy in which Islamic law was narrowly interpreted and implemented to limit individual and minority rights and erase all Western influences on society and culture” (p. 134). Due to such intolerance, the chasm between Islam’s two major sects only widened. Nasr certainly is not longing for a return to a Western-influenced peacock throne, nor does he speak in reverent tones about Arab nationalism. For Nasr, Khomeini simply took the fight to the Wahhabists and even claimed to be a protector of the holy sites in Saudi Arabia. The Sunnis, however, reacted very negatively toward their Shia counterparts. They much preferred to have a “king…than a Shia ayatollah” (p. 152).
If the Shia could not erode Sunni dominance what were they to do? Nasr answers very succinctly: let the Americans to do it. In the chapter “The Tide Turns” Nasr makes the case (and a convincing one) that the grand ayatollah of Iraq, Sayyid Ali al-Husayni al-Sistanti, told his community not to resist the invading American-led armies in 2003 so that the Sunni oppositional forces would be destroyed, leaving the Shia in place to govern. On the surface, it may appear that the Shia are embracing modernization and democratic reform. However, as Nasr reiterates many times, the Shia will simply use the government system to promote their religious-social agenda.
Simply stated, the Shia use “one man, one vote” and other democratic rhetoric as token support for the American presence. Meanwhile, the Sunni forces are harboring insurgents and supporting violence to push the Americans out. Neighboring states like Saudi Arabia and Jordan are being further drawn into the conflict. Iraq may have been “the first Arab Shia state” (p. 185), but the implication is that it will not be the last. The potential result is a worst-case scenario for the United States: popularly supported democratic Shia governments that are hostile to American interests and control a major share in the world’s proven oil reserves. Add to this nightmare a nuclear-armed Pakistan sympathetic to the Shia cause or, even worse, a nuclear-armed Iran. Nasr refers to Iran’s program as potentially producing the first Shia nuclear weapon (p. 223). For the Sunni states of the region, this would be a worst-case scenario.
For many in the United States who are convinced that the Iraqi invasion was not based on sound intelligence regarding WMD or particularly helpful in the fight against global terrorism, this book will only give them further cause to reject the Bush doctrine. Others will find Nasr’s work to be a call for a reassessment of policy based on a better understanding of the unintended consequences of poorly designed and marginally implemented policies.
Nasr’s rendering of this 1400-year dispute is an edifying reminder of the vast sweep of history in the old world. U.S. politicians might well heed its implied warning against partisan political “solutions.” The book is a remarkably accessible treatment of a subject that is obviously misunderstood by so many Americans in important positions.
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