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| Volume XIV, Summer 2007, Number 1 |
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BOOK REVIEW
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Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, by Ray Takeyh, Times Books, 2006. 250 pages, including endnotes and index. $25, hardcover.
Thomas R. Mattair
Independent author and consultant
This is an excellent study of how Iran’s complex domestic politics shape the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. Ray Takeyh’s basic argument is that the United States has consistently misunderstood Iran since the revolution of 1979 and that the United States could moderate Iran’s behavior through intelligent diplomacy.
Takeyh begins by reviewing the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leading figure in the revolution: Iran should be ruled by Islamic religious autocracy, with a supreme leader at its apex, through which unelected bodies ensure that elected bodies are controlled. Moreover, Islamic Iran should confront Western imperialism and Israeli Zionism and their regional agents by exporting its revolution. He then explains the differences that emerged after Khomeini’s death among conservative hard-liners, pragmatists and reformers within the governing clerical elite. The hard-liners, led by current supreme leader Ali Khamenei, have sought to maintain the primacy of the unelected institutions. The pragmatists, led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, have tried to build a rational bureaucracy and a modern industrial economy integrated into the global economy. The reformists, led by Mohammed Khatami, have tried to stress the primacy of elected representative institutions.
In its foreign policy, Takeyh argues, Iran has shifted from pursuing revolutionary goals to pursuing national interests under the influence of pragmatists and reformers and with the consent of Khamenei. This shift is most applicable in the Persian Gulf, he argues, but least applicable in Iran’s Arab-Israeli policies. Reviewing some of the crises that have influenced mutual perceptions, he argues that in some cases U.S. behavior has strengthened the hard-liners against the pragmatists and reformers who would compromise with the United States. In particular, he asserts, the Bush administration discredited the pragmatists and reformers by treating Iran as part of an “axis of evil” soon after its reformist government cooperated with the United States in stabilizing Afghanistan following September 11, 2001.
Takeyh then examines the issues that must be resolved if conflict is to be averted — namely Iran’s nuclear programs and its roles in Iraq and Arab-Israeli affairs — and argues that there is still time to influence the internal debates among the hard-liners, pragmatists and reformers within the clerical elite.
“Why does Iran want the bomb?” Takeyh asks. He proposes that Iran is not motivated by irrational ideology, but by rational calculations of a perceived need to deter threats from the United States, Iraq and Pakistan. He asserts that Iran does not think it needs nuclear weapons to deter Israel, although he argues that this would change should Israel launch military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. It seems possible, however, that a rational Iran might want the capability to deter Israel just for the sake of changing the regional balance of power, forcing Israel to be cautious, and allowing Iran more latitude.
Takeyh argues that “the nature of Iran’s relations with the United States and what type of security architecture emerges in the Persian Gulf are likely to determine Iran’s decisions” about its nuclear programs. He believes that threats and sanctions do not work but actually strengthen hard-liners, whereas offers of security assurances and sanctions relief in return for Iran’s suspension of the most sensitive elements of its nuclear program “may succeed in peeling away important clerical power brokers from the cause of nuclear arms.”
Takeyh may be right, and it would be worth some diplomatic engagement to find out. It would be a complex negotiation. For example, the United States and some GCC states think that Iran aspires to hegemony in the Gulf, and therefore Iran is not likely to be able to obtain the security architecture it wants, including the virtual withdrawal of U.S. military forces, unless it modifies its behavior in ways that even pragmatists and reformers have resisted. Modification of behavior by agreeing to negotiate the question of sovereignty over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, or restraining its military modernization and exercises in the Gulf, for example, could make a reduction of U.S. forces in the Gulf possible.
Takeyh next asks, “What are Iran’s priorities and objectives in Iraq?” This has a significant bearing on Iran’s relations with the United States and any future Gulf security architecture. His answer is that Iran does not expect Iraq’s newly empowered Shiites to be Iran’s pawns, but it does expect them to be friendly and certainly not the threat Iran saw in Sunni Baathist Iraq. He argues that Iran favors democratic processes that produce strong provinces and a weak central government as the best means of promoting Shiite power, dampening Kurdish aspirations for full independence, marginalizing but not excluding Sunnis, and preventing civil war from spilling into Iran and neighboring states. Thus, he sees possibilities for convergence of interests with the United States.
Takeyh disagrees that Iran is fueling “the insurgency” as a way of deterring the United States from attacking its nuclear facilities, arguing that Iran views a stable Iraq as the best means of ending the American occupation. He acknowledges Iran’s funding of Shiite political parties and its training and arming of Shiite militias in Iraq. He argues, however, that U.S. expectations of Iranian retaliation in Iraq for strikes against its military facilities serve to strengthen Iran’s deterrence against such strikes. “Should the Islamic Republic’s implied deterrence fail and the United States does strike its nuclear installations, then Iran’s extensive influence in Iraq will give it a credible retaliatory capability.” He seems to be arguing that Iran is developing the capability to hit U.S. forces in Iraq but is not yet doing so. The Bush administration claims that Iran is behind attacks against U.S. forces. True or not, this is already being cited as justification for detaining and expelling Iranian agents and may eventually be used to justify U.S. strikes against Iran. If the United States strikes Iran, Iran also has retaliatory capabilities throughout the Gulf region, where its military forces could attack shipping, oil and gas fields, and military installations.
Similarly, Takeyh dismisses the argument that Iran fuels “the insurgency” as a way of compelling an American withdrawal, arguing that this is not necessary: “The natural trajectory of events makes a reduced American presence in the Gulf nearly inevitable.” A reduced American presence in Iraq may be coming at some point, but it is likely that a formidable U.S. presence will remain in and near the Gulf region. He argues, “Much of the tension and instability that has afflicted the critical Persian Gulf region in the past three decades has stemmed from animosity between Iran and Iraq…. The new Iraq emerging from the shadow of the American invasion will not just be a more humane society than the tyrannical Saddam Hussein regime, it will also be a more peaceful state willing to coexist easily with its Persian neighbor.” This seems too hopeful, but even if it occurs, the Gulf Cooperation Council states have other concerns about Iran.
On Israel, Takeyh maintains that ideology, along with national interest, has continued to guide Iran’s policy. Iran has viewed the Jewish state as an illegitimate entity usurping sacred Islamic land, while regarding its opposition to the Israel-Palestinian peace process and its support for rejectionist organizations as having contained Israel’s regional influence and enhanced Iran’s Islamic credentials and influence in the Arab world. But he also notes, correctly, that “…part of the reason for the imposition of U.S. sanctions and international censure has been Iran’s dogmatic rejection of Israel….” He writes that Iran’s pragmatists and reformers have understood this, that Khatami forged a quiet consensus that Iran would accept peace agreements acceptable to the Palestinians and the Arab states, that this could not have been achieved had Khamenei not approved, and that Ahmadinejad’s opposition to this consensus cannot overturn it. But, as he notes, Iran continues to support terrorism by Palestinian rejectionists and Hizbollah.
In fact, on the subject of Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, he notes that the hard-liners seemed to be ascendant but argues that they have no solutions. Because of this, he speculates, the reformers and pragmatists could stage a comeback. The elections in late 2006 for municipal councils and the Assembly of Experts, which occurred after the publication of his book, seem to support his speculation. But Takeyh argues that, to consolidate any such gain, they will need a constitutional revision circumscribing the supreme leader’s powers.
Takeyh’s advocacy of security assurances and an easing of sanctions as the best way of eliciting Iranian cooperation makes sense. His case would be even more convincing had he cited additional evidence that this is what Iran has expressly proposed. Instead, he writes that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003 “was not viewed by Iranian officials as an opportunity to forge new ties with the United States.” He acknowledges that “the early success of the invasion deeply concerned the clerical elite — an emboldened America might decide to turn its sights on Iran next,” although Iran’s “unease soon evaporated as the United States became entangled in a bloody quagmire….” He also writes that “Washington’s harsh rhetoric and its aversion to diplomacy had already closed off the opening that had appeared in the aftermath of September 11.” But there had been periodic meetings of American and Iranian diplomats in Geneva even after the “axis of evil” speech, although the United States called them off after accusing Iran of involvement in al-Qaeda’s attack in Riyadh on May 12, 2003. Even more important, the Iranians had, in the spring of 2003, sent a proposal to the Bush administration to negotiate on Iran’s nuclear programs, stability in Iraq, and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, i.e., for a “grand bargain.” It was presented as having the support of all power centers in Iran. The Iranian proposal asked for the kinds of security assurances and easing of sanctions that Takeyh advocates. The proposal was made at a time when Iran was worried about a U.S. threat, but it does support his argument that this approach should be tried. The Bush administration rejected the proposal.
Indeed, the administration is again refusing to offer security assurances and issuing threats, offering incentives but increasing sanctions. And there are some indications that Iran is concerned enough about measures such as the UN Security Council sanctions, the deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers to the Gulf, and the withdrawal of European banks from Iran, to want talks again. If the Bush administration is practicing coercive diplomacy, and if Iran is motivated to moderate its behavior, the administration should be prepared to take yes for an answer. This would mean negotiating. If the administration is more interested in regime change than behavioral change, however, and rejects negotiations again, it might snatch war from the jaws of peace.
Takeyh has tackled an immensely difficult subject, painted a rich and detailed picture of Iranian politics, and developed very informed and sensible arguments that are worthy of careful consideration and debate. Even if one differs slightly with Takeyh on various points, his arguments for why diplomacy is worthwhile should be heeded.
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