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| Volume XIV, Summer 2007, Number 1 |
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BOOK REVIEW
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Oman: The Islamic Democratic Tradition,by Hussein Ghubash. Translated from the French by Mary Turton. Routledge, 2006. 252 pages. $112.70, hardcover.
Joseph Kechichian
Author of Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (1995) and Political Participation and Stability in the Sultanate of Oman (2005)
When Omani security forces arrested more than 300 suspects and seized a cargo of arms in late December 2004/early January 2005, few contemplated the repercussions of internal opposition that called for the reestablishment of the Imamate. At the end of a widely publicized trial on May 2, 2005, the State Security Court delivered final verdicts to 31 defendants accused of plotting to overthrow the government and holding membership in a banned organization. Thirty men were convicted of plotting to “overthrow the regime by force of arms and replace it by an Imamate, by setting up a banned underground organization.” Sultan Qaboos bin Said ratified all 31 sentences, but commuted them on June 9, 2005, just as he did for those convicted in a similar 1994 plot.
Among those arrested were professors at the Sultan Qaboos University, religious officials affiliated with the Theology College, several lecturers, staff members of the ministries of health and education, Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) engineers, consultants to the ministry of religious affairs and managers at the Diwan of the Royal Court. All of these Omani citizens were Ibadhis, mostly from the Nizwah region. The city of Nizwah, historically a major center of learning, was also the seat of the Imamate rebellion in the 1950s. As such, it continued to be an acknowledged stronghold of Ibadhis, whose beliefs were deeply ingrained in Omani society. The accused confessed that they joined the “secret organization” in the 1990s to activate and strengthen Ibadhi jurisprudence, ostensibly threatened with extinction.
Hussein Ghubash, the UAE ambassador to UNESCO, has written an exceptionally useful book on the history of the Imamate in which he argues that Ibadhism plays a central role in the formation of the state and democratization. This is a well thought-out effort that demonstrates how foreign interferences destroyed Omani democracy. Still, the author persuasively discusses how successive foreign invasions — starting with the Portuguese and ending with the British — failed to obliterate the Imamate. No outsider could eradicate what was embedded in Ibadhi norms, and Ghubash relies on ample documentation to make his case, often with incisive analysis from a regional perspective. There are a few technical problems in the book that can be easily corrected in a future edition. Because it was originally written in French, many spellings are left in the original, and several tables in the annexes are also in French. These may confuse the English reader. Finally, although Ghubash relies on a very rich bibliography, most of his sources are pre-1990. A revised and updated future edition that would assess post-1970 Oman could incorporate the wealth of available materials that would improve his excellent study.
The book is divided into two parts. Part One provides a brilliant analysis of the Imamate, Ibadhi doctrine, the establishment of the Ibadhi state, and the creation of the Sultanate system under the Al Bu Said. Part Two delves into the colonial challenge to the Imamate, the establishment and destruction of Oman’s African Empire, the revolution of Azzan bin Qays, and the British destruction of the Nation. Inasmuch as this millennial history is rich in events that shaped Oman and forged the Omani identity, the volume is a superb initiation for those who wish to avail themselves of this critical background. This legacy is essential to explaining why Oman was divided and conquered, perhaps even cautionary to avoid similar outcomes in the future.
Ghubash lays out a sophisticated analysis of Ibadhism, tracing its origins within the Khariji movement that emerged after various convulsions in early Shia doctrine. He rejects the term Khariji as the work of opponents, preferring to identify those that refused Imam Ali’s arbitration efforts with the secular ruler Muawiyah. Ghubash thus calls early Ibadhis muhakimum (arbitrators) because Ali himself realized — too late — that he was deceived (pp. 19, 24-26). What is relevant in this early episode, and that survived over 1000 years, was the theory of genuine independence of thought as specified in the Holy Scriptures. This never left the Omani psyche, and it is eminently discernable today; few, if any, Omanis engage in religious proselytizing. Most hold on to their cherished perceptions of what the Creator, through the Prophet, demanded of believers. It is equally important to note that Ibadhism appeared “as a doctrine that evolved entirely apart from” Sunni and Shia dogma (p. 27). Ibadhi theologians developed a council of the ulama as well as a Majlis al-Am (akin to a senate) and a Majlis Hamalat al-Ilm (bearers of knowledge), all of which necessitated organization, discipline and consensus. These erudite men quickly adopted the basic principles of tolerance and the authority of a just ruler (pp. 28-29). Yet, because Ibadhi theologians concluded that the office of the Imam was temporal and not divine, they allowed believers to oppose him and even to overthrow an Imam if he was not pious or if he was unjust (pp. 32-33).
Ghubash further identifies how the principles of consultation and free elections for leaders — which would be akin to consensus and contract in contemporary traditions — are practices of democracy, positing that the Ibadhi Imamate “may be held to be the longest democratic experience in the history of mankind” (p. 6). What distinguished this concept was the fact that the system was “moderate, constitutional, capable, through the constitution of ensuring the continuation of democracy and seeing it gradually take root in Omani culture” (p. 9). In fact, Ghubash validates how Ibadhi norms united the many tribal fiefdoms scattered throughout the southern parts of the Arabian Peninsula under the Yarubis (1624-1741), a truly “exceptional example for the Islamic State” (p. 14). Indeed, depending on his qualifications, an Imam could not rule without regular and open consultations, certainly a harbinger of future institution building (p. 40). Still, by the end of the third century, the Imamate was gone, followed by tribal decay, anarchy and occupation. Sadly, these conditions lasted for over 500 years, the result of internecine conflicts.
After this most useful background analysis, Ghubash jumps into foreign interventions, starting with the Portuguese invasion and occupation of Hormuz in 1508 AD. The 150 years of Portuguese ascendancy and rule over the coastal regions deserve more detailed attention than is provided here, although Ghubash’s main interest is to set the background for the Yarubi State. (For a definitive study of this subject, see Faleh Handhal, Al-Arab wal-Burtughal fil-Tarikh, 93 to 1134 H, 771 to1720 AD — Akhtar min Alf Sanat min al-Ahdath baynal-Ummatayn [Arabs and Portugal through History, 93 to 1134 H, 711 to 1720 AD — Proceedings Lasting More Than One Thousand Years Between The Two Nations] (Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: Cultural Foundation, 1997).)
The legacy of the Yarubi dynasty was the restoration of the Imamate under a “climate of freedom” (p. 60). Ironically, if freedoms, consultations and elections of successive imams stood as sources of strength, nepotism and avarice became their weaknesses. What finally ended this period was the illegitimacy of Imam Sayf bin Sultan II, who acceded to rulership on three separate occasions, relying on Persians to help him consolidate power (pp. 60-61). A particularly ugly civil war (1718-37), followed by a bona fide Persian invasion (1737-41), pressed ambitious leaders finally to empower Omanis with nationalism. It fell on the governor of the coastal city of Sohar, Ahmad bin Said Al Bu Said, to fulfill the quest for independence. Ahmad bin Said was that rare man with vision who liberated Oman from Persia. He was probably the first Omani nationalist (pp. 66-67), and, although he would in turn fall to foreign machinations — between France and Britain — his long rule (1741- 83) ushered in the sultanate system.
To save the country from further bloodshed, Ahmad bin Said accepted an appointment as Imam, even though he lacked full consensus. His election “was deemed to be a special case” because, as a statesman, he succeeded in making “tradition obey policy and not the reverse” (p. 70). Remarkably, Ibadhi leaders concluded that Ahmad deserved their full backing because he rejected colonial hegemony and rallied the majority around a nationalist mindset. This was an act of merit and an exceptional one at that. According to Ghubash, “to train his sons for accession to power, Ahmad conferred on them the title of ‘sayyids,’ which had nothing whatever to do with the surname ‘al-Sadah,’ given to descendants of the Prophet; it simply meant ‘the masters.’ There again, the succession question was a central stake in the game of the durability of the regime. Whether Ahmad bin Said was justified in conferring such titles, when his own accession was cloaked in political designs, is difficult to know. In the event, Ghubash unsympathetically concludes that Said bin Ahmad was an illegitimate successor, and his “Imama was unconstitutional because it was obtained without the required consensus of the ulama and without approval” (p. 73). In other words, this Imam lacked a bayah (oath) and, even worse, empowered a son by the name of Hamad to rule in the coastal region as a governor. It was not totally surprising that Said’s brothers, Qays and Sultan, would rise against Hamad, forcing the latter to abdicate. These palace intrigues occurred as some Omanis committed a cardinal sin: Sultan bin Ahmad foolishly agreed to British mediation and, even worse, signed on October 12, 1798, a “friendship” treaty. Sultan failed to note that foreign powers harbored no friendships and that his rule in Muscat was ephemeral since he lacked the legitimacy of the Imamate. With this discussion, and until the end of the book, Ghubash expounds on how successive British officers threatened and intimidated Omani (and other) Arabs.
Sultan bin Ahmad died in 1804 and left no clear successor. For the next two years, a series of struggles among several Omani contenders ended when Said bin Sultan, then barely 17, won. This ruler held power for half a century (1806-56), becoming the country’s first recognized Sayyid. He “was then given the title of Sultan, and later he was called ‘the Great’” (p. 84).
After his rule, however, both the Imamate in the interior as well as the Sultanate in the coastal regions experienced steady declines. Although the Imamate forged Omani democracy, hereditary rule became the norm, especially in Muscat. Periodic confrontations between Imamate forces and successive sultans drained scarce resources, as the British slowly dismembered the mighty Omani empire in East Africa. It was under Said bin Ahmad’s rule that Oman had developed this empire in Zanzibar, engaged in impressive trade with various countries, and regularly sent heavily laden vessels to various ports on good will missions. It was within this context that the Sultana arrived in New York harbor on April 30,1840, as Oman and the United States established official ties. In short, Oman was a growing political and economic entity, capable of looking after the interests of its own people and ensuring their relative prosperity. Naturally, such prospects attracted predators, principally Britain and France, that had growing designs on the Arabian Peninsula. Tragically, and for all his prowess, the Great Said committed an egregious error when he called on London to secure two thrones for his sons, Khalid and Thuwayni: one in Zanzibar and the other in Muscat. Ghubash painstakingly explains that this was a gift to those who contemplated a division of Oman into two separate entities (pp. 110-17).
For Ghubash, London achieved its long-term objectives until the rise of Azzan bin Qays (1869-71), who led a new revolution to retake lost territory (pp. 122-27). Surprisingly, Azzan’s rise meant the collapse of the sultanate system after 90 years of semi-independent rule. If the then-Sultan lacked legitimacy as well as popular support, Azzan bin Qays made up for both with a solid four-point program that energized Omani society. He quickly abolished separate tribal allegiances and unified most under Ibadhi norms. This was followed by a forceful removal of Saudi troops from the disputed Buraimi Oasis. Although the British would probably have learned to live with these two initiatives, they balked when Azzan insisted that British influence and domination end and they recognized his Imamate and accepted Omani sovereignty. What tipped the scales against Azzan was his insistence that Zanzibar, as well as Gwadar (in Pakistan) and Bandar Abbas (in Iran), all revert back to Oman. At first, Azzan succeeded in reunifying Omani society and liberating Buraimi. But, then, the British raised the fictional notion of “minority” rights, which were presumably unprotected, to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. In time, London would line up an official, in this instance, Sayyid Turki bin Said, to oppose Azzan. Even worse than the “minorities” situation, a pure yet effective invention by London, was the condition imposed on Turki to allow his accession-a complete renunciation of unification with Zanzibar. For Ghubash, “Great Britain’s aim was to disrupt Omani history and destroy the country’s civilisation” (p. 134).
Oman was quickly transformed into an “unofficial colony” (p. 137) and, after 1891, a vassal of the British Crown. Ghubash considers the 1891 agreement to never transfer any Omani territory to foreign powers other than Britain “one of the most compromising and perilous documents Oman has signed in her history” (p. 142). Along the way, Ghubash provides extensive quotes from Lord Nathaniel Curzon, an avowed racist who despised Arabs (pp. 145-48). The way the sultan and his successors were treated would be almost comical, were it not so contemptible. A hapless Faysal bin Turki (1888-1913) was not even allowed to abdicate. No wonder another revolution started in 1913 as the Imamate launched a seven-year war to defend the nation against foreign usurpers. At the time, Imam Salim bin Rashid Al Kharusi (1913-19) sought to end the system of the Sultanate, terminate British occupation of the political establishment, and restore its authority over a unified country. It was, perhaps, too late for these steps, as London was determined to hold on to its gains. In fact, Ghubash documents how far London was willing to go — “outright war and even the possibility of starving the population” — to “bring the Imama to its knees” (p. 166).
Against overwhelming force, Imamate forces capitulated and were required to sign the 1920 Seeb Treaty. A new Sultan came to power in Muscat, although Taymur bin Faysal (1913-31) was a largely compromised ruler, exercising authority over a capital city emptied of its Omani inhabitants. The treaty divided Oman into two parts: an Imama in the interior under the rule of Muhammad bin Abdallah Al Khalili (1919-54), and a Sultanate of Muscat on the coast under Taymur. Like his two predecessors, Taymur was not allowed to abdicate (p. 175) when he wished to do so. The situation continued satisfactorily for the British, who had managed to isolate the Imamate in the interior of the country. They concentrated their efforts on a “recovery” of the Sultanate and blamed Said bin Taymur (1931-70) for opposing “any kind of progress” (p. 178). While it may be correct to blame Sayyid Said for many of the prohibitions he imposed on Omanis living under his rule, an equal share of the blame must be placed on those who wished Oman to slide into oblivion. The situation remained tense until Western companies rekindled the Buraimi crisis to delineate borders before exploring for oil. It was then that Imam Ghalib bin Ali Al Hinai (1954-64) initiated a new uprising. This was the long awaited excuse to retaliate: in 1954, British troops seconded by Sultani levies attacked the city of Ibri. A long war followed, draining Sayyid Said of his meager resources until the coup that brought Sultan Qaboos to power in 1970.
Ghubash concludes his amply documented book by illustrating various British stratagems during the war and afterwards at the United Nations when the “Question of Oman” was discussed. He courageously concludes that Britain considered the Ibadhi movement its “natural adversary” (p. 198), and that its various decisions were akin to “simply remov[ing] Oman from history altogether” (p. 199). Yet Ghubash also claims that, “although the Ibadhite movement is not present on the political stage today, it remains very much present and active in religious and social life. It has a place in the Omani consciousness. And as a doctrine, it still represents the ultimate point of reference for Oman and the Omanis” (p. 203). Indeed, Ghubash’s study explains why Sultan Qaboos rejected the rise of a new Imamate in 2005, as such an outcome could have translated into a renewed division, and over time, a new civil war. Yet, like the impressive nationalists Ahmad bin Said and Azzan bin Qays, Qaboos was potentially more than just a Sultan.
In early 2005, Qaboos chose to liberally extend his stay near Nizwah, during his annual tour of the Sultanate. He remained there for several months and, although the monarch was relieved that no connection existed with al-Qaeda, he was deeply saddened that fellow Ibadhis were associated with the attempted disturbances. Nevertheless, while the latest challenge to authority did not amount to a fundamental threat to the sociopolitical stability of the Sultanate, it illustrated the existence of indigenous opposition forces. Muscat tried culprits without undue panic and, once it secured convictions, exercised the privilege of full pardons. Given the Sultanate’s well-established Imamate traditions, and in light of Muscat’s three decades of institutionalization initiatives, what was one to make of religious contenders to power in Oman?
It is now clear that Ibadhi leaders, from the grand mufti to local shaykhs, are fully enmeshed in the nation-building fabric of Omani society. Without eliminating the risk of a revival, it may be possible to contemplate the creation of an Imamate monarchy, headed by an Al Said. Such a system may allow the head of state to dispense political justice while retaining the title of religious leader. In Ibadhi custom, this Omani monarch would be backed by legitimate judicial fixtures, cementing harmony at the highest levels of the state. Not all Omanis would accept this alternative, but the possibility cannot be ruled out, given Qaboos’s record for innovation. Such an outcome would probably receive popular endorsements because it would introduce fundamental reforms within the Sultanate’s narrative. It would also fulfill Ghubash’s basic requirement for any Omani ruler: to govern on the principles of consultation and free elections for leaders — to restore the practices of established democracy.
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