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| Volume XIII, Winter 2006, Number 4 |
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BOOK REVIEW
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The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria , by David W. Lesch, Yale University Press, 2005. 288 pages. $30, hardcover.
John W. Sutherlin
International relations, University of Louisiana-Monroe
In 1988, Patrick Seale wrote Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, the book that defined Syria’s enigmatic President Hafiz al-Asad. Since Hafiz’s death in June 2000 and the subsequent ascendancy of his son Bashar as leader of the Baath party and Bashar’s nearly unanimous election as president of Syria, there have been a number of attempts to portray the new leader, such as Flynt Leverett’s Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire (2005). The work that comes closest to matching Seale’s feat is The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria, by David W. Lesch. Using personal interviews conducted over a period of years, he gives the reader a feeling for Bashar as a whole person: the son of a dictator, a student in Europe wanting to fit in, a young ophthalmologist, a family man and now the president of a run-down state. The author’s familiar tone and the choice of black-and-white photographs evoke an image of Bashar as something more than the cartoon dictator of a “rogue state.”
The first three chapters set the scene and provide family history. Asad’s grandfather was able to distinguish himself enough that the leading families renamed him Asad, or “lion” in Arabic (p. 5). Lesch describes the attention and education Bashar received from his parents and even takes time to compare the Asads with Saddam Hussein and his children, especially Uday and Qusay (pp. 13-15). He lays a foundation with these anecdotes to make a larger point later: Syria and Iraq are very different countries, thus U.S. policy toward them should be different.
Next, Lesch analyzes Syria in the context of the broader Middle East. Since this is not a military history, he spends no time recounting the Six-Day War of 1967. Instead, he succinctly outlines six major effects of that conflagration (pp. 23-24). The most important for Syria (and, by extension, Bashar) is the involvement of the United States and the eventual dismantling of Arab nationalism. It could be argued that these two factors have worked against Syria for the past 40 years.
By the time Lesch gets to Bashar, almost a quarter of the way into the book, the reader should have a solid understanding of the major issues facing the young doctor-turned-president. One of the most apt quotes about Bashar’s frustrations is found in Chapter 4 (“From Eye Doctor to Heir Apparent”):
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The results of his training and steady hands became manifest in a distinct and open fashion. If only the positive results of his presidency to date were as easily identifiable. …This is probably one of the most frustrating aspects of his presidency: the absence of immediacy in terms of outcome and the inability to manipulate results directly with his own hands in a kind of societal surgery (p. 57).
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The next three chapters consist of excerpts from interviews conducted by the author with Bashar, as well as additional documentation about Syria and its new leader. These middle and later chapters stand out because of the wealth of supporting material. Chapter 6, for example, has almost as many notes as the previous five combined, in which there is perhaps too much reliance upon Seale. As Lesch had the opportunity to engage Bashar and clarify points raised by others, it seems a missed opportunity.
One of the more illuminating statements made by Bashar reflects a commitment to a peace process with Israel very much along the same lines as his father’s: “If you want peace, we have a criterion, and you start by saying the Golan should be returned to Syria and you start negotiating” (p. 169). But most analysts believe that something more is going on in Syria. The author quotes many top officials from Israel and the United States who want to see a settlement of Israeli-Syrian disputes.
Lesch then inserts a chapter, “Syria Is Not Iraq,” that seems a bit forced. In it, he tries to make the point that Syria and Iraq have never been all that close (p. 178), but that Syria wants an independent and sovereign state next door (pp. 189-90) as a viable trading partner and a buffer against Shia radicalism (p. 196). Fair enough. But Lesch does not seem to challenge the new leader at any point about Syrian support for terrorism or insurgency in Iraq. Further, Lesch could have solicited more commentary from Bashar about the impact of the U.S. presence next door on Syria and his hold on power.
In the final two chapters, Lesch is back to the main subject matter of the book: understanding Bashar. Here, the author raises some of the most vexing questions, not only for the young leader, but for Syria itself. When and how will the Alawite hegemony in Syria end? Could it happen as in Iraq, with an invasion or sudden and violent collapse? Could there be a transitional phase for competition in the political arena? As Lesch says, “The solution may ultimately be not a tune up of the old, broken-down car….Bashar may well have to get a new car” (p. 228). For U.S. policy makers, this creates quite a conundrum: should the United States (and now with the help of France and the United Nations) continue putting pressure on Bashar or find ways to guide him and provide mechanisms for reform (i.e., peace with Israel, assistance with the banking sector, encouragement to foreign investment)? Unfortunately for Bashar, neither of these likely paths will prove favorable for his tenure in office. He could very well see a more modern, economically vibrant and politically engaged Syria, but without himself as president.
In the final chapter, Lesch returns to the analogy of the lion, but then slides into a comparison with Michael Corleone from the movie The Godfather (p. 240). Lesch concludes that, if Bashar did become the “new lion of Damascus,” he would be even more sinister and violent than his father. That is something that Lesch does not see happening. He is more generous to Bashar. On the personal side, he states that Bashar often impresses others with his “politeness, his humility and his simplicity” (p. 230). On the political side, Lesch sees Bashar trying to “play catch-up in a domestic and regional environment that habitually inhibits one’s ability to do so” (p. 243).
Lesch seems to believe that Bashar, if given the chance, can lead Syria into a better future. The big “if” is whether he will get that chance. Bashar need not be a lion like his father. Still, to hold the pinnacle of power in Damascus, he cannot remain a cub either, even a smart one.
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