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| Volume XIII, Winter 2006, Number 4 |
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BOOK REVIEW
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Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions, by Ellen Lust-Okar. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 296 pages. $75, hardcover.
Sarah Salwen
Ph.D. candidate in political science, University of Pennsylvania
The stunning victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections has brought unprecedented international attention to the electoral politics of not only the Palestinians but the entire Middle East region. Debate continues regarding what brought Hamas, an Islamic movement considered by most Western governments to be a “terrorist” organization, to power. Do the majority of Palestinians support Hamas’s intransigent opposition to Israel’s existence, or were they simply disillusioned by the corruption, cronyism and disorder of the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority? Major uncertainty remains concerning what the promotion of democracy and free elections might produce in this volatile region and whether political Islam and liberal democracy are compatible. In what manner does religion shape politics and political action in Islamic countries? What are the strategies and objectives of particular Islamic political movements? At the moment, answers to these questions remain speculative, and there is little extant theoretical scholarship to provide a framework for understanding these phenomena.
Ellen Lust-Okar’s Structuring Conflict in the Arab World is a timely contribution to the study of the domestic politics of the modern Middle East, as well as the literature on contentious politics and political parties. In this comparative study of Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, Lust-Okar inquires into what conditions lead political opponents to take advantage of increased popular dissatisfaction to press their political objectives. She undermines the conventional wisdom that opponents generally are more willing to mobilize during periods of domestic unrest such as economic crises. Even more important, she identifies several large but overlooked lacunae in the existing literature: first, the relationships between opposition groups and the state; second, the relationships among competing opposition groups; and third, the state’s ability to manipulate these relationships. In addressing these deficiencies, Lust-Okar develops an institutional theory and formal model of “structures of contestation” (SoCs) to explain the varying dynamics of opposition in the three cases she examines.
Although this book introduces a useful new strategy for conceptualizing government-opposition relations in semi-authoritarian states during periods of crisis, the categories of SoCs that Lust-Okar develops are rigid and seem difficult to apply without making certain potentially questionable subjective decisions. Furthermore, the logic of her argument appears to conflict with the logic of regime-based arguments she has made regarding institutional development in previous work. Finally, her insistence on the non-historicity of the argument in this book leaves open major questions about why and when incumbents choose the SoCs that they do.
Lust-Okar sets forth her theory of SoCs in the second chapter of the book. She argues that, in semi-authoritarian states, incumbent elites can create three different ideal types of SoCs as strategies of rule: inclusive, unified SoCs are those in which incumbent elites permit all political opponents to participate in the formal political system; exclusive, unified SoCs are those in which incumbents allow no political opponents to participate in the formal sphere; and divided SoCs are those in which incumbents allow selected political opponents to participate in the political system, while excluding others (p. 40). Lust-Okar emphasizes that these SoCs are independent of historical experience, leadership characteristics and regime type, and that they affect not only the relationships between opponents and the state, but also relationships among opponents, as well as the informal tactics that incumbents choose to deal with opponents. For example, Lust-Okar argues that in unified SoCs (such as Jordan, and Egypt under Nasser and Sadat), political opponents increase their demands for change as popular discontent increases, whereas in divided SoCs (such as Morocco, and Egypt under Mubarak), legal, moderate opponents become less likely to mobilize and demand reforms, and radical, illegal opponents become more likely to do so as crises and associated dissatisfaction escalate (p. 170-3). These differences occur, she emphasizes, because of the difference between opponents’ ability and their willingness to mount sustained political challenges under crisis conditions.
How Lust-Okar determines which political systems are to be categorized as which of the three types of SoC is not entirely clear. Indeed, she even admits that “the borders between these ideal types [of SoC] are fuzzy” because, although there are groups that are not allowed to participate in the formal political system in all states, the presence of excluded groups does not in itself signify a divided SoC (p. 66). Her decision to categorize Jordan and Egypt under Nasser as unified, exclusive SoCs is understandable because political parties were entirely illegal under both rulers. However, although Sadat introduced reforms apparently aimed at liberalization and actually legalized political parties, Lust-Okar considers Egypt under his rule to have continued as a unified, exclusive SoC. She argues that under Sadat, there was a multiparty system “in appearance only” because he remained “the most powerful actor” (p. 64). In contrast, Mubarak’s inclusion of opposition groups was somehow more genuine or valid than Sadat’s, and, therefore, she categorizes Egypt as a divided SoC under his rule. Her attempt to clarify the terms only serves to further obscure their meanings when she writes: “A divided SoC is defined as one in which there are multiple, relatively strong included and excluded opposition groups” (p. 66-7). Unfortunately, for the reader trying to understand the argument, the phrase “relatively strong” is relatively vague.
Lust-Okar’s categorizations are not necessarily incorrect; political participation by opposition groups in Egypt under Sadat was undoubtedly highly restricted, but the same case might be made for Egypt under Mubarak, who is still Egypt’s most powerful actor. This fuzziness in coding states as unified or divided SoCs underscores the fact that, in reality, political systems may exist on a continuum of organization rather than in neatly separated categories. It also calls attention to the subjectivity inherent in such an exercise and lays her conclusions open to criticism. Furthermore, it makes a generalization of this framework to other countries problematic for scholars attempting to apply her theory and appropriately code their cases.
In addition to this weakness, the logic of Lust-Okar’s argument in Structuring Conflict differs markedly from and seems even to contradict her argument in a 2002 coauthored article in Comparative Political Studies. In “Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation,” Lust-Okar and Amaney Ahmad Jamal argue that regime type largely explains the development of electoral institutions in newly democratizing Middle Eastern states. They criticize the extant literature on political liberalization for having overlooked the influence of regime type and contend that their findings can be generalized to other forms of institutional development in liberalizing states as well as to cases outside the region. They argue that presidents in formerly single-party regimes prefer electoral laws that favor their dominant political party, whereas monarchs prefer laws that disperse power among a range of competing parties. Thus, differences in authoritarian regimes explain differences in the choice of electoral institutions. Examining seven Middle Eastern countries and the changes in their electoral laws, Lust-Okar and Jamal reject competing explanations of institutional development such as colonial history, social heterogeneity, and uncertainty in negotiation of liberalizing reforms, finding instead that, as expected, regime type does determine incumbent-elite preferences, which in turn determine electoral institutions. (However, this conclusion might be criticized for its foundation on a relatively small sample coupled with two cases that do not appear to conform to the authors’ expectations, Jordan and Algeria).
The specific foci of Lust-Okar’s article and book differ, the earlier concentrating on structurally produced institutional outcomes and the latter centering on outcomes produced by extant institutions. They do not appear to be wholly compatible and may even contradict each other. If regime type determines electoral laws, and electoral laws determine which groups can and cannot participate in the political system (i.e., they determine the SoC), then regime type should, at least indirectly, determine the differing dynamics of opposition in each of the cases examined in the book. However, Lust-Okar dismisses regime-type arguments throughout the book, emphasizing that Jordan and Morocco are both monarchies, but adopted different SoCs, and that Egypt’s regime type remained constant over the years, but changed its SoCs. Differences in the strength and organization of state institutions do not explain differences in the dynamics of opposition; instead, “SoCs are the outcome of elite choices, independent of regime type” (p. 170). This inconsistency is not necessarily a problem; indeed, it may simply reflect greater experience and empirical knowledge and the consequent evolution of Lust-Okar’s understanding of the politics of the region. However, those familiar with her earlier work might appreciate a discussion of the relationship between these two arguments. Has she simply revised her previous thinking or completely reversed it, and why?
Finally, Lust-Okar’s insistence on the fact that SoCs explain differences in government-opposition dynamics independently of historical context seems unnecessary, limiting, and founded in a desire to make a purely structural argument, where a historical institutionalist account might provide even more explanatory leverage. Indeed, her own exposition of the argument, which involves fairly extensive discussion of historical context in each of the three country cases, belies its purely structural nature. Lust-Okar never really addresses why incumbent elites choose any particular SoC as a strategy of rule over other possible SoCs. As she puts it, “Understanding the creation of political institutions is much more difficult than examining how these institutions affect political behavior” (p. 174). Yet, a closer examination of the historical context in which such decisions are made would likely yield useful insights into the strategic reasoning of incumbent elites and provide answers to a key remaining question.
Despite these minor shortcomings, Lust-Okar’s book is an original and thought-provoking foray into the under-studied aspects of government-opposition relationships that will very likely generate much more scholarship on the topic. Furthermore, her rigorous use of both formal modeling and qualitative case studies to validate her conclusions demonstrates thoughtful hypothesis generation and testing
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