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| Volume XIII, Spring 2006, Number 1 |
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BOOK REVIEW
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The Road Ahead: Middle East Policy in the Bush Adminstration's Second Term , edited by Flynt Leverett. The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC 2005. 107 pp. $17.95, paperback.
John W. Sutherlin
professor, University of Louisiana
Rarely does one find such clarity and focused reasoning as that displayed throughout this collection of policy papers edited by Flynt Leverett, a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution (with contributions from Martin Indyk, Kenneth Pollack, James Steinberg, Shibley Telhami, and Tamara Cofman Wittes, all of whom are connected with the center). Leverett asks, “Would the United States be able to persuade a fully democratized Egypt or Saudi Arabia to extend the necessary degree of counterterrorism and security cooperation for Washington to prosecute an effective war on terror” (p. 7)? The larger question that underlies much of this work is even more pointed: Can the United States have close ties to democratically elected Islamic governments and still pursue its agenda in the Middle East (i.e., support for Israel, occupation of Iraq)? Over the course of the rest of this work, Leverett et al. attempt to address aspects of how the Bush Administration should alter its current course of action.
One of the contributors poses a suggestion: better, expansive and strategic engagement (p. 23). This should not be interpreted as support for revolutions or toppling other regimes. Further, it is suggested that if the United States encourages the liberalization and “opening up” of these societies, the backlash from the extremists and counterreformists could be severe. Instead, this contributor suggests more “carrots” and fewer “sticks.” For example, assisting with economic reform and supporting regional cooperation would pave the way for more political liberalization and (at least it’s hoped) better relations with the United States.
The chapter on U.S. policy toward Syria was particularly astute, claiming that Bush inherited inherited “no operational framework for policy toward Syria” (p. 82). Despite the Israeli pullout from southern Lebanon, the second intifada and the death of Hafiz al-Asad, it’s rare that Bush mentions Syria at all, and then only in a context outside of its relationship with Lebanon or in support of terrorist activity in Iraq. The trouble, according to this work, is that this leaves little room for a shaky Bashar al-Asad to reach out to the United States (even if he were inclined to do so). Thus, the contributors here suggest a modified Bush policy that acknowledges Syria’s need to gain something significant from Israel in the Golan Heights while not putting Israel in a corner, knowing that negotiations would be fruitless. At first glance this may seem straightforward, but contradictory. Yet this is one of the fascinating aspects to this work: candidness followed by multiple-track policy.
This work argues that, by engaging Bashar, terrorist support in Iraq would diminish and more concrete results would be seen coming from Baghdad. Such results could spark additional reforms in the region and engender better support for the United States in the wider Middle East (p. 93). There may be something to this notion. When one considers that the “invasion” dividend has already been spent (Libya coming to the table), garnering support (or at least neutrality) from Syria would be a bold move from this administration.
No broad-based peace plan for the Middle East would be complete without mentioning the Palestinian-Israeli process. Many had hoped that the passing of Yasser Arafat would open the door for new leadership to engage Israel and bring in a flood of Western investment in Gaza’s infrastructure. Mahmoud Abbas achieved a mandate from the Palestinian people, but as the contributor in this chapter points out, he is on a short leash. Average Palestinians just want a better life for themselves and their children (p. 38). To some this may mean no occupation in Gaza and the West Bank. To others, it may mean an end to violence from both sides. Again, and this is one of the reoccurring themes in this work, Syria must be brought to the table. The contributors here argue that Syria, “the beating heart of pan-Arabism” (p. 44), could provide cover for an all-encompassing peace plan, whether with the so-called “Quartet” or another negotiating nexus. This may be asking too much too soon, particularly now that Hamas has won an election mandate.
Leverett’s experience in government (e.g., as senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council, on the State Department’s policy planning staff, and as a senior Middle East analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency) as well as that of the other contributors give this work an air of authority and insight often lacking in many similar works that attempt to second guess the Bush administration.
Not that I agree with every point, but the arguments are often so sound that countering them necessitates considerable effort. There is clarity of thought and intent throughout. The book would be excellent for use in seminars and conferences as a means to prompt discussion about the future, of not just the current U.S. administration, but the next one. After all, when was the last American president that did not have trouble in the Middle East?
The question about democracy posed at the beginning of this work remains open, though voting has brought to power in Iraq and Palestine groups hostile to U.S. policies. The pursuit of a definitive answer will no doubt continue throughout Bush’s second term.
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