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| Volume XII, Summer 2005, Number 2 |
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| EXCERPT: Israel-China Relations and the Phalcon Controversy |
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| P.R. Kumaraswamy |
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Dr. Kumaraswamy is an associate professor at the Centre for West Asian and African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.1
Since the early 1990s, Sino-Israeli
relations, especially the military-
security dimension, have become
a major irritant between the United States and Israel. Israel's relations with the United States and China have been dominated by its desire to accommodate the competing demands of these two players. It unsuccessfully sought a middle path whereby its relations with a strategic ally (the United States) would not impede its newly found friendship with its strategic customer (China). In the summer of 2000, however, under intense American pressure, Israel was forced to cancel the sale of the Phalcon advanced airborne early-warning system to China. When it was forced to choose, Israel settled for maintaining close ties with Washington.
A modest attempt is made here to examine the relevance of the entire controversy for Israeli foreign policy and its long-term implications. It is also essential to examine a more pertinent question: could the controversy have been avoided?
THE TROUBLED TRIANGLE
Long before diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, Israel had been exporting arms to China.2 The use of military sales as a means of achieving foreign-policy objectives was neither new nor unprecedented. In the absence of significant political, diplomatic or economic tools, Israel had successfully used arms trade and other forms of security assistance to promote its interests in the Third World.3 Its relations with a number of countries have a strong defense/security component.4
China was no exception to this general rule, as Israel sought to promote its political interests through arms sales. It is widely recognized that the arms exports began around 1980 and played a significant role in the eventual Sino-Israeli normalization.5 The Chinese drive for defense modernization complemented Israel's desire to subsidize its high-tech weapons program. Having failed in its political moves, it sought to mitigate the ideological rhetoric of China by providing valuable assistance in the defense and security arena.
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Association of Israel Studies in Jerusalem, June 14-16, 2004. The author is grateful to the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Jerusalem, for its support in preparation of this article, and to Sreeradha for her incisive comments.
2 For a broader discussion on the bilateral relations, see Jonathan Goldstein, ed., China and Israel, 1948-1999: A Fifty Year Retrospective (Praeger, 1999).
3 Aaron S. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1995). Such assistance included upgrading of weapons, military training, maintenance and assistance in setting up military units. In recent years, counterterrorism has emerged as another area of cooperation between Israel and a number of other countries that face similar threats.
4 Israel's new-found relations with countries such as India and Turkey could be cited as the latest examples.
5 P.R. Kumaraswamy, "The Star and the Dragon: An Overview of Israeli-PRC Military Relations," Issues and Studies (Taipei), Vol. 30, No. 4, April 1994, pp. 36-55; and "The Military Dimension of Israel-China Relations," China Report (New Delhi), Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 235-49.
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