

# POTENTIAL EGYPTIAN CONTRIBUTION TO A SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE GULF

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The purpose of this paper is to sketch out a potential Egyptian contribution to the security of the Persian Gulf, assuming that a multilateral, norm-based security framework can be established in the region. This assumption is made in light of the recent developments in the region: regime change in Iraq and the trend in Iranian foreign policy towards rapprochement and conciliation with its neighbors and the United States. Those changes have raised hopes for constructing a set of overlapping bilateral as well as multilateral relationships in the region with the help of external powers to fill the gaps in power levels between the states of the region and guarantee a stable environment in the Gulf area.

The majority of analysts view the United States as the only credible and acceptable stabilizing force for the Gulf, at least in the short and medium run. Under the suggested cooperative-security architecture, the United States is seen as an external balancer for a system in which the local forces are enhanced and active cooperation is encouraged among them. This could be coupled with continued improvements in the U.S. ability to deploy rapidly in times of crisis.

Other options include a security role for Europe in the Gulf alongside the United States as the dominant player. Europe in this scenario could help with free-market reforms, institution building, modernized education, an active media and the rule of law.<sup>1</sup> Arab and Islamic countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco are also invited to increase their potential contribution to Gulf security. Some American analysts don't foresee at present a major role for non-Gulf Arab countries in Gulf security on a contractual basis. However, according to these views, the United States could consider the option of restructuring the U.S.-Egyptian security-assistance program to emphasize the capability to deploy a significant Egyptian force using U.S. or allied lift in case of a regional crisis. This includes refocusing the biennial "Bright Star" joint exercise to serve this purpose.<sup>2</sup>

I will attempt to look at the Egyptian role in Gulf security in a wider framework encompassing the whole Middle East. However this approach doesn't necessarily exclude the existence of a subregional framework for the Gulf region, nor does it exclude a contribution by Egypt to the security of the Gulf. A wider framework in

which Egypt, the Gulf countries, the United States and the EU are members has the advantage of activating, redefining and enhancing security links already developed during the last decade between the area and the EU (the Barcelona Process), NATO (NATO Dialogue Initiative) and the United States, for the benefit of the security of the Gulf and of course other sub-regions. The EU and NATO expansion processes are now entering their second phase, and the Middle East should in its entirety be prepared to deal with the security implications of such transformations and to design ways to network with them.

A multilateral, norm-based framework for security assumes that all participating members accept the principle of seeking peaceful solutions. A code of behavior between members must stress the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention, and a respect for international law, U.N. resolutions and treaties previously concluded. It also adopts a broader view of security cooperation and cooperative actions for attaining mutual security and a balance of interests. Members should be ready to enter a long process of step-by-step interest-balancing and verifiable confidence-building measures. They must also be ready to extend their sphere of security far beyond the military and political one to areas like water, energy supply, environment, technology cooperation and civil society. In the case of the Gulf, some countries that do not lie within the geographical area of the region – like Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Russia and Japan – should be invited to share in the discussions either because of their potential role in the security of the Gulf or because they carry particular weight in the wider regional or international-security sphere.<sup>3</sup>

## **EGYPTIAN NATIONAL SECURITY**

Egyptian national security was defined during the 1950s and 1960s in terms of the fear of Western domination, expressed by different security schemes imposed on the Middle East, such as the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. The creation of the state of Israel with the support of the West added an additional threat dimension. Egypt and Israel have been at war four times: in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. Another important security dimension for Egypt has been the Nile River and its waters. This has always been expressed in terms of a firm Egyptian stance not to allow a hostile power to control the headwaters of the Nile or tamper with its flow into Egypt. In addition to these constants, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the rise of the Gulf region as a new national security dimension for Egypt. From the traditional Arab security perspective, Iraq and the Gulf states play the role of the Eastern gate to the Arab world. They form a confrontation line and a balancing bloc against Iran and the two nuclear countries of India and Pakistan. The growing human and economic interdependence between Egypt and the Gulf region has made the stability of the Gulf a pressing national-security interest for Egypt.<sup>4</sup> This economic dimension of Egyptian national security has become even more evident as Egypt faced a growing economic crisis.

Gulf oil states also contributed to Egyptian security when they used the oil embargo in support of Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Ever since the end of that war, they have supported Egypt with various types of economic assistance and investment. The economic well-being of the Gulf states has a direct, positive impact on the Egyptian economy. About

two million Egyptians work in the Arab states, the majority of them in the Gulf. About one million Egyptians are currently working in Saudi Arabia and 200,000 in Kuwait. The total number of bank transfers from Egyptians working abroad reached 3.77 billion EGP (about \$1 billion) during 1999. Remittances have represented a significant share of the hard-currency flows to Egypt, sometimes surpassing oil, tourism and Suez Canal revenues.

Remittances are not the only source of income transferred to Egypt because of its Arab connection. Egypt receives a significant amount of aid from different Gulf countries. However, wars in the Gulf and the fall of oil prices have had a negative impact on Egypt's economy. Egypt suffered during the first and second Gulf wars from the massive return of the Egyptian working force. This not only added to the already strained labor force in Egypt and stressed domestic services, but it also meant the loss of an important source of hard currency. According to official figures, two million Egyptians worked in Iraq before the Gulf War of 1991, but no more than 60,000 of them were still employed in Iraq when U.S. and British forces invaded the country in March 2003.<sup>5</sup> Suez Canal revenues are also very sensitive to the security environment in the Gulf. About 20 percent of the world trade in oil is transported through the Persian Gulf, and a great part of it finds its way to the world market through the Suez Canal. A war in the Gulf also impacts negatively on Gulf tourism in Egypt, with its share rising to more than 35 percent of the total number of tourists visiting Egypt. Finally, trade with Iraq before the war of March 2003 had reached \$1.7 billion in 2001 and \$2.5 billion in 2002.

The security and stability of the Gulf

region has become vital to Egyptian national interests. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and the Iraq-Iran War two years later, threatened these interests. Throughout the 1980s, Iran was considered the sole destabilizing power of the Gulf area, and, hence, as a threat to Egyptian national security. Consequently under President Sadat, Egypt did not hesitate to stand behind Iraq in the conflict, both militarily and economically. However, as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the scope of Egyptian security interests in the Gulf became much larger than simply attempting to curb Iran. Iraq, an Egyptian ally all through the 1980s, was now threatening an area critical to Egypt's economic well-being. Accordingly, Egypt did not hesitate to support Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states by both political and military means to repel Iraq.

Certain events during the last three decades indicate that Arab regimes have served and protected Western interests as well as order and stability in the region. The following are five examples characterized by their far-reaching regional and international implications:<sup>6</sup>

1) Gulf countries stood against Israeli expansionism and its potential negative consequences on the region's stability when they supported Egypt and Syria in the October War of 1973.

2) Egypt expelled the Soviets from the Middle East (1975). From that time on, the naval balance in the Mediterranean was skewed in favor of the United States, NATO and the West.

3) Sadat's visit to Israel began an era of peacemaking and conflict resolution in the area (1977).

4) The Arabs stemmed the Iranian revolutionary thrust and backed Iraq in the

first Gulf war until victory (1980-1988).

5) Arab allies joined with others to protect the Gulf from Saddam Hussein's expansionist policy, fighting with the United States and the Western countries in operation "Desert Storm" for order and common interests in the region (Israel was asked to remain out of the coalition and not to participate in the war).

### THE EGYPT CONTEXT

For the liberation of Kuwait and the protection of the Gulf States, Egypt allied itself with Western powers, the United States, the UK and France, among others. Egypt was the second-largest military contingent to the defense of the Gulf and provided the necessary political cover for hosting U.S. and other coalition troops on the territories of the Gulf countries during the war. In February 1991, an Egyptian reinforcement of 30,000 troops took part in Desert Storm, advancing into western Kuwait in a corridor between U.S. Marines to the east and U.S. Army forces to the west in Iraq. When Iraq threatened Kuwait again in October 1994, Egypt's expeditious approval of the deployment of a carrier battle group through the Suez Canal sent a critical signal to Baghdad. The United States relies on Egypt for quick transit of military assets to and from the Gulf region. The United States routinely conducts 500 military over-flights each month.

During the 1990s, military cooperation, commercial and trade ties, and close diplomatic coordination on regional issues remained cornerstones of the bilateral relations between the United States and Egypt. Egypt was described during the Clinton administration as "the most prominent player in the Arab world and a key U.S. ally in the Middle East." U.S. military

assistance to Egypt was considered part of the administration's strategy of maintaining continued availability of Persian Gulf energy resources and providing security to the Suez Canal, which serves both as an important international oil route and as a critical route for U.S. warships transiting to the Gulf.

In August 1983, the United States and Egypt conducted the first "Bright Star" joint military exercise for infantry, airborne, artillery and armored forces. They have continued to hold it periodically ever since. The Bright Star held in October-November 1997 included military contingents from the UAE, the United Kingdom, France, Kuwait and Italy. A total of 63,000 troops from 11 nations participated in the Bright Star exercise in 1999; 70,000 troops from 11 nations participated in Bright Star 2001, among them eight NATO countries and two members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In Bright Star 1997, Egypt and the United Kingdom had practiced a rescue operation for a large-scale earthquake disaster in the city of Alexandria, with losses assumed to reach 10,000 inhabitants. The experience gained was demonstrated during the earthquake in Turkey, where Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries provided help and solidarity.<sup>7</sup>

Egyptian and U.S. military officers have stated that Bright Star exercises facilitated U.S.-Egyptian cooperation and military compatibility in Desert Storm and served as a precedent for future U.S.-Egyptian cooperative ventures. An Egyptian contingent has also been designated to serve with the GCC armed forces.<sup>8</sup>

U.S. desire for a military base in Egypt followed the renewed interest in a rapid-deployment force mainly designed to protect the Gulf. In 1981, Egypt agreed to allow the United States use of Ras Banas

if an Arab state was threatened, but the negotiation collapsed because of disagreements over managing the facility. However, based on an unconfirmed understanding, Egypt will most likely allow the United States access to military facilities in times of crisis after mutual discussions.<sup>9</sup>

The issue of defending the Gulf region against the threat of ballistic missiles was high on the American-Egyptian agenda during the period 1997-2000. The Clinton administration had proposed to the GCC and Egypt to join the United States in developing an area-defense system against ballistic missiles. So far, the Gulf States and Egypt have shown little enthusiasm for such a project because of technical and financial problems. On March 11, 1999, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen announced an arms package for Egypt that included a Patriot missile battery.<sup>10</sup>

Egypt strongly backed the United States in its war against international terrorism, but in spite of that refused to send troops to Afghanistan, both during the war and after it. Despite Egyptian opposition to the American war on Iraq, Egypt allowed the United States to use the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. Concerning participation in peacekeeping operations in post-war Iraq, President Bush called at the Sharm-el-Sheikh summit in June 2003 for Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to send troops to Iraq as part of an international force to maintain security in Iraqi towns. Egypt, however, refused to comply with the American request, and President Mubarak declared that Egypt would not send troops to Iraq even under a United Nations umbrella.<sup>11</sup> The issue of participation in the post-war construction efforts in Iraq has been controversial in Egypt and in the Arab world as a whole. Opponents consider the

war illegal and believe it necessary to wait until Iraq has a legal representative government before dealing with it. Supporters argue that the principle of the “responsibility to protect Iraqis and to help them in time of crisis” should come first and guide Arab action in Iraq.<sup>12</sup>

More than \$50 billion in U.S. aid has flown into Egypt since 1978, contributing to a thorough modernization of the Egyptian armed forces, as well as supporting a vast array of programs ranging from agricultural improvements to industrialization and infrastructure construction. In addition to Foreign Military Financing purchases and excess defense articles, Egypt coproduces the U.S. M1A1 “Abrams” tanks. Egypt also repairs and overhauls different types of military equipment and contracting for depot-level maintenance and repairs for NATO and U.S. armored forces and some cargo aircraft.

In short, the Egyptian contribution to the security of the Gulf up to the end of the 1990s and beyond has been manifested in different approaches, including deploying forces in the area, supplying defense equipment and ammunition, protecting strategic sea lines, and organizing joint training and exercises.

## **REGION IN TRANSITION: THE '90s**

The Gulf War of 1991 raised great expectations for building a new Middle East. There were hopes that the victory over Iraq would ignite a process of regional conflict resolution, particularly on the Arab-Israeli track, and put a cap on the deadly conventional and unconventional arms race in the area. Following the end of the war, a new geopolitical agenda had been set for the Middle East. A long process of negotiations and political dialogue led to the

implementation of a series of peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt and Jordan. Mauritania became the third Arab country to have full diplomatic relations with Israel in October 1999. Israel and Syria practically crossed the most sensitive of issues between them, including settlements, security arrangements and water in their negotiations of December 1999.

Within the framework of this regional agenda, Arab countries became more convinced of the importance of seeking political solutions for disputes with their neighbors. Saudi Arabia signed a limited security treaty with Iran in April 2001 to cooperate in the prevention of drug trafficking and cross-border terrorism. Saudi Arabia and Qatar signed on March 21, 2001, an agreement ending a 35-year border dispute. In the same period, Qatar settled a 60-year-old dispute with Bahrain. In March 2000, the UAE and Oman fixed their common border. Saudi Arabia settled a sea-border dispute with Kuwait and also reached agreement with Yemen to define 850 miles of border between them that had seen frequent military clashes.<sup>13</sup>

Attempts to set up a security system in the Gulf based on Arab forces did not prove viable over time. Foreign ministers of the six GCC countries, in addition to Egypt and Syria (6+2), adopted the declaration agreeing to set up an Arab force in the Gulf based on Syrian and Egyptian contingents. However, GCC countries were not ready to station Arab troops on their soil and thought that it might limit their regional-security options in future. There was also the problem of different Egyptian and Syrian positions with respect to Iran and Iraq; this was expected to limit the effectiveness of these troops in case of real

danger in the area.

Such a regional agenda for peace and cooperation in the Middle East, based on dialogue, confidence building and negotiations, was severely undermined by new developments in the international arena, mainly the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in September 2000, the attacks of September 11 on Washington and New York and the subsequent Afghan war, and finally by the U.S.-led war on Iraq. Moreover, terrorism has now become a very dangerous factor in the region. Whether it is supported from within or from outside the region, it has a profound impact on stability in the Middle East. Terrorists now have the ability to cause enormous damage throughout the region, given the vulnerability of high-value economic targets. The Persian Gulf is especially vulnerable to such attacks due to the presence of a number of lucrative sites such as water-desalination plants, oil-production facilities, and oil pipelines. In addition, there is the growing fear of terrorist operations using WMD.

There is also an increasing tendency in the Gulf towards more accountable GCC governments. The public is now much more conscious of what is going on and is demanding greater levels of participation in decision making. The rise of national consciousness would inevitably make these societies immune to external attempts to destabilize their countries. Accordingly, Western governments will not be able to continue dealing with these countries in patron-client terms. Royal families will be much more constrained by their public opinion in the future than they have been in the past.

## **A NEW MIDDLE EAST**

From a security perspective, a new

Middle East is currently in the making. It is different from the old one of the 1990s in four main respects:

### **Geography**

Traditionally the Middle East has been defined as extending from Morocco and Mauritania on the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf countries on the Persian Gulf, including Arab members of the League of Arab States and three non-Arab countries: Turkey, Iran and Israel. This system is surrounded by three important security boundaries: the United States, the EU and NATO. These actors, while having no direct geographical boundaries with the countries of the region, are actively influencing the security of the Middle East. During the 1990s, security interactions between the system (the Middle East) and its security boundaries have been managed through several security mechanisms, such as bilateral cooperation (the case of the United States), security dialogue and confidence building (the case of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, and the EU Security Charter within the framework of the Barcelona process).

After September 11 and the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, the geography of the Middle East has expanded eastward, extending all the way to the Philippines and Indonesia. Accordingly, Gulf countries are no longer in the periphery of the system. The defining measures here are the types of security concerns, the nature of the threats posed, and the dimensions of the theater in which major operations are conducted. The geographical setting of any security system is a key determinant in planning, training, command-and-control, strategic-transport and intelligence operations. Geography can also dictate new

types of missions and operations. For example, any Egyptian role within a new security framework would have to take into consideration that Egyptian troops might be stationed in Afghanistan or that Egyptian vessels might be required to operate in the Indian Ocean.

### **Mechanisms of Change**

In the new Middle East, the surgical, interventionist, preemptive mechanism of change will replace – at least for a decade – the Clintonian mechanism based on dialogue, peace treaties, confidence building and economic incentives. If geography refers to space, mechanisms of change refer to the time factor of the process, relating also to efficiency, cost and possible side effects. While the interventionist approach raises ethical, legal and political implications, it also dictates a regional and international responsibility of rebuilding and reconstruction. Moreover, the experience of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan showed indications of change in the right direction and at a faster pace than before (for example, the Emirates' initiative calling on Saddam to step down before the war; the Saudi reform initiative; plans for reforming the Arab League; social, democratic and human-rights reforms in Egypt; democratic reforms in Bahrain, Qatar and Oman; the signing of the special protocols with Iran; the Libyan initiative to eliminate WMD; and the Sudanese peace process). Nonetheless, the recent experience in Iraq shows a fundamental lack of awareness of the culture of intervention on the levels of government and civil society in the region. This was particularly clear in the absence of regional crisis-management mechanisms for peacemaking, rescue operations and

reconstruction. As the “new geography” will shape the domain and content of action of the potential Egyptian role in the Gulf, a new mechanism of change would affect the responsiveness of this role. This result is not related to the U.S. heavy-handed approach as much as it is to the nature of the threat and to the complexity and uncertainty of the mission.

### **Change of System Boundaries**

One of the important results of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan is that the security boundaries of the 1990s are now physically in the system, and it is expected that they will remain so for a long time. The United States, most of the EU countries, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore and others now have troops and weapon systems in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Horn of Africa. NATO moved for the first time from its area of responsibility in Europe to Afghanistan and now provides support for Polish troops in Iraq. The implications of such changes on the NATO-Mediterranean dialogue are not yet known; neither is there a clear picture on the possibility of enhancing the dialogue to practical cooperation on the ground. In addition, the current reshuffling of mission priorities worldwide is expected to favor fighting terrorism and WMD proliferation. Again, Egypt must consider that dialogue, while necessary, is not sufficient. More important are cooperation and true partnership – and with plenty of new partners. Bright Star exercises, for example, should be redesigned to cope with the new actors in the area.

### **Balance of Power and Values**

The security dilemma in the Middle East, and particularly in the Gulf, is ex-

pected to worsen because of the huge imbalance of power caused by the American military presence and the uneven acquisition of nuclear weapons, missiles and advanced armaments. More important is the current process of attempting to drastically change the value system in the region to fit Western models. This process is likely to generate security stresses that may fuel even more terrorism. That said, Egypt should be ready to lead changes in the region and to provide a model in democracy, modern education, human rights and a free economy. Finally, dealing with the cultural factor of security and the problem of advancing new values will require crafting proper operational concepts and cooperation strategies between the countries of the region.

### **EGYPT AND GULF SECURITY**

Egypt could have a multi-tier approach to strengthen the security of the Gulf. This might be done through contributing to GCC collective-security arrangements and supplying armaments produced in Egypt in addition to organizing training programs. More important, it is now the time to reshape Bright Star and increase its membership. More countries from the Gulf should join, and countries such as Turkey, Iran, Syria and Israel should gradually share in the training.

Fighting terrorism also needs to become a central element in the regional-security strategy, with great emphasis on the Gulf region. There are obvious connections: the U.S. strategy towards Iraq, the global war on terrorism, the U.S. military presence in the Gulf, and the Middle East peace process. Egypt can assume an important role in fighting “energy terrorism” directed at the energy infrastructure

in the region. The vulnerability of vital shipping lanes makes the threat of energy terrorism a very real one in the Middle East. Any coordinated terrorist attack on the energy facilities of the region would cause serious disruption to global energy trade and the world economy.<sup>14</sup> The maritime environment is now being viewed as a viable alternative setting for the staging of mass-causality attacks, and several new concerns have been highlighted, including the use of container ships to smuggle nuclear and radiological weapons into target countries.<sup>15</sup>

Egypt has a good record in disaster relief and humanitarian-response missions. The Egyptian armed forces' medical and engineering teams stayed in Turkey several months after the earthquake of 1999. The creation of a system for the management of natural and man-made disasters is the first step towards "multilateralization" of disaster cooperation. The Iraqi post-war reconstruction experience has demonstrated the importance of deploying a civil rapid-response capacity to fill the gaps between military and civilian organizations in the areas of immediate post-conflict assistance. Such assistance is vital for reconstruction to begin.

Humanitarian demining has become an integral part of peace operation and peace building. The Egyptian Corps of Engineers contributed to a demining operation in Kuwait after the Gulf War of 1991. In addition to being dangerous, mines also present an obstacle to the economic development of entire areas. Action against mines could develop as an important field of cooperation and solidarity in the Middle East and in the Gulf region.

Peacekeeping operations are likely to be a major and fruitful area for mutual

cooperation and confidence building. In addition to training activities, cooperation in peacekeeping may be extended to joint-force planning, creation of regional peacekeeping modules, and military participation in disaster relief and humanitarian emergency-response missions. Egypt has conducted a large number of peacekeeping missions in Africa, Asia and Europe. The Egyptian Taba Battalion arrived in Sarajevo in 1992 and ended its mission in December 1998. In addition, Egypt could provide training to other countries.

Egypt could also contribute to joint media operations with other partners in the Gulf. Arab countries in general have an edge in the area of television satellite channels, an important facility to be used for fostering cultural, economic and democratic reforms.

However, the Middle East region lacks the essential regional infrastructure necessary to connect its countries. Building transportation, energy and information networks on the regional level is vital for security and the promotion of a regional spirit. In this regard, Egypt works on networking electricity and natural gas with its neighbors Jordan and Syria; the project is also expected to extend to other countries in the area. The Nile waters are now flowing through four tunnels under the Suez Canal in the "El-Salam Canal" (Canal of Peace), and two new bridges have been constructed over the Suez Canal for cars and trains. Some of these projects were funded mainly by Gulf countries.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, any potential Egyptian contribution to an evolving multilateral norm-based security framework in the Gulf is vitally linked to the level and health of U.S.-Egyptian relations. This is based on the assumption that the United States will act

as a guarantor and balancer of such a security arrangement in the region. In a recent joint study of American-Egyptian relations conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) based in Washington, D.C., and Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (CPSS) based in Cairo, it was concluded that U.S.-Egyptian relations are handicapped by the lack of a clear vision of where the relationship is heading in five or ten years. Accordingly, it recommended that the parties try to agree on what the relationship should look like a decade into

the future and delineate the steps required to get there. The study suggested a series of tasks for both the United States and Egypt in order to enhance their relations. It recommended that the United States continue its engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, try to successfully manage the post-conflict environment in Iraq, and encourage deeper business ties. As for Egypt, the tasks involve real and visible political and economic reforms. These will enhance both Egypt and its relationship with the United States.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik and David Gompert, "A New Persian Gulf Security System," RAND Issue Paper, 2003, p.7.

<sup>2</sup> Richard D. Sokolsky, ed., *The United States and the Persian Gulf: Reshaping Security Strategy for the Post-Containment Era* (National Defense University Press, 2003), p. 153.

<sup>3</sup> Mohamed Kadry Said, "Middle East Security Dialogue: Reflection on Issues and Framework," Workshop on Promoting Middle East Regional Stability, Istanbul, Turkey, July 1-3, 2001.

<sup>4</sup> Abdel Monem Said Aly and Mohamed Kadry, "Naval Arms Control in the Southern Mediterranean: An Arab perspective," *Europe and Naval Arms Control in the Gorbachev Era*, eds. Andreas Furst, Volker Heise and Steven E. Miller (Sipri, 1992), p. 303.

<sup>5</sup> Summer Said, "Lost Assets?" *Cairo Times Magazine*, Vol. 7, Issue 23, August 14-20, 2003, online at <http://www.cairotimes.com/content/archive07/Iraq0723.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Mohamed Kadry Said, "A Southern Perspective and Assessment of NATO's Mediterranean Security Dialogue," *Security and Environment in the Mediterranean*, eds. Hans Gunter Brauch, P.H.Liotta, Antonio Marquina, Paul F. Rogers and Mohammad El-Sayed Selim (Springer, 2003), p. 185.

<sup>7</sup> *Al-Ahram* Newspaper, November 3, 1997.

<sup>8</sup> Clyde R. Mark, "Egyptian-United States Relations," Issue Brief for Congress, Order Code IB93087, December 12, 2002, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, see Note 7, p. 12.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> "U.S. Pressurizes Riyadh into Sending Troops to Iraq," press AFP, *Khaleej Times*, July 14, 2003, online at <http://aljazeera.info/News%20archives/2003%20News%20archive.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Mohamed Kadry Said, ed., "Arab Perspectives and Formulations on Humanitarian Intervention," Report of the IISS Project on Intervention in the Gulf, p. 56.

<sup>13</sup> Gobal Ratnam, "Gulf States Turn from Arms: Jobs, Debts, Infrastructure Takes Renewed Importance," *Defense News*, May 28-June 3, 2001, pp. 1,4.

<sup>14</sup> Tamara Makarenko, "Terrorist Threat to Energy Infrastructure Increases," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 15, No. 6, June 2003, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Ed Blanche, "Terror Attacks Threaten Gulf's Oil Routes," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 14, No. 12, December 2002, pp. 6-11.

<sup>16</sup> Mohamed Kadry Said, "Crisis of Idealism in the Middle East," Pugwash workshop on Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, New Delhi-India, March 25-27, 2001.

<sup>17</sup> Jon B. Alterman, "The United States and Egypt: Building the Partnership: A Conference Report," *Middle East Note*, August 2003.