 |
| Volume XI, Spring 2004, Number 1 |
| |
| EXCERPT: The Kurds in Iraq |
| |
| Michael M. Gunter / Denise Natali / Robert Olson / Nihat Ali Özcan / Khaled Salih / M. Hakan Yavuz |
| |
The following briefs are edited versions of papers presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association in Anchorage, Alaska, November 8, 2003. The editors were Hakan Yavuz and Michael Gunter, whose papers are included below.
Why Kurdish Statehood is Unlikely
Michael M. Gunter, professor of political science, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee
With the possible exception of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish statehood is unlikely in the near future for several reasons. In the first place, Kurdistan (the land of the Kurds) is completely contained within already existing states -- Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. To create an independent Kurdistan would threaten the territorial integrity of these pre-existing states. No state on earth would support a doctrine that sanctions its own potential breakup. Thus, the international community has generally been hostile to any redrawing of the map that was not part of the decolonization process. Between Iceland’s secession from Denmark in 1944 and the collapse of communism in 1991, the only successful secessionist movements were in Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971) and Eritrea (1991). The collapse of colonialism after World War II and the recent disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, led to two waves of state creation. However, there are no more empires to collapse and accordingly very few possibilities for further state creation today.
Transnational Networks: New Opportunities and Constraints for Kurdish Statehood
Denise Natali, visiting research fellow, Washington Kurdish Institute (WKI); director of WKI's transnational project
At first glance, the prospects for Kurdish statehood have never seemed so promising. International penetrations into Iraqi Kurdistan after the 1991 Gulf War, including the creation of a safe haven by coalition forces, have allowed the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) to flourish. After 12 years of political autonomy, Iraqi Kurds have institutionalized Kurdish self-rule in northern Iraq. Shifts in international norms, active international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the presence of highly politicized and influential Diaspora networks have semilegitimized the idea of Kurdish statehood. These transnational processes, added to ongoing restrictions against Kurds at home, have also facilitated the communication and movement of different Kurdish communities across borders. Autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan has become a magnet for transborder Kurdish organizations, political parties, publications and modern telecommunications networks, all of which have advanced the Kurdish nationalist movement at home and abroad.
Turkey and Kurdistan-Iraq, 2003
Robert Olson, professor of Middle East and Islamic history, University of Kentucky
In the period between the Turkish parliament's rejection on March 1, 2003, of the resolution to participate (with up to 45,000 troops) in the U.S.-British attack on Iraq and the decision of the Turkish government on November 7 not to send troops to Iraq, Turkey was compelled to enter more overtly into government-to-government relations with the Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which control major portions of northern Iraq. Processes of state formation have been taking place in the KDP- and PUK-controlled areas of northern Iraq for some time, especially since 1992, when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was established. These processes accelerated from March to November 2003.
Could a Kurdish State Be Set Up in Iraq?
Nihat Ali Özcan, author of PKK (Kurdistan İşçi Partisi) Tarihi, Ideolojisi ve Yönetimi (Ankara: Asam, 1999)
We can theoretically respond to this question with an immediate "yes." Kurds, like most other ethnic groups, may set up their own state. It would be plausible to assert, particularly after the recent operation of the coalition forces in Iraq, that the Kurds are much closer to this goal than ever. However, a closer look at the Middle East would reveal that there are serious practical difficulties to the setting up of a Kurdish state, and overcoming them would be extremely difficult and costly.
The first of these difficulties arises from the fact that Kurdish leaders have strong tendencies to cast their energies in favor of the divided local governments that they represent, rather than in favor of an independent state. Indeed leadership derives its legitimacy not from personal qualities and political institutions, but from the tribe-based social fabric prevalent in the region. Thus, neither Jalal Talabani nor Massoud Barzani is the leader of the most populous Kurdish tribes in their region; they are simply the leaders of the alliances of the best-organized tribes that managed to hold control by relying on the force of money and armaments. Tribal membership provides people living in this region with economic advantages, political power, social status and individual security. The establishment of an independent state may rapidly change the existing social order and power relations. Therefore, in the discussions over the feasibility of an independent state it should always be kept in mind that the social and political divisions between the Iraqi Kurds themselves constitute the main dynamic affecting the final outcome. Consequently, attention at this stage must be directed inside rather than outside because this division and competition could make an armed conflict inevitable.
Kurdish Reality in an Emerging Iraq
Khaled Salih, University of Southern Denmark
The Bush administration's decision to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power in Iraq might turn out to be a watershed in the modern history of Iraq and the Middle East. Whatever our personal opinions on this regime change, Iraq's different national, ethnic and religious groups now have a unique opportunity to redefine, negotiate and reshape the nature of the state, the division of power and what is generally called "Iraqi national identity," a collective identity that does not necessarily need to have one single group's symbolism and cultural imagination. A new Iraq would be reconstituted on new bases of legal plurality, decentralization, devolution or what is generally referred to as federation. In this way, dividing power will allow territorial communities to manage their own affairs, control their own resources, and make their own policy choices. The nature of the federation, however, will be the main source of tension and negotiation in the coming year or so.
Provincial Not Ethnic Federalism in Iraq
M. Hakan Yavuz, associate professor of political science, University of Utah
The dominant public discourse has assumed that the Kurds are a homogenous group of people who share the same language, ethnicity and political aspirations of independence. This totalized and imagined Kurdish nationhood is reinforced by the proclamations of some Kurdish nationalist intellectuals and American bureaucrats emphasizing the uniformity of the Kurds against Turks, Arabs and Persians.
The reality is different: Kurds are differentiated by a variety of cultural, economic, and political factors. Linguistically, the Kirmanci, Zaza and Sorani dialects (languages) are dominantly used by the diverse Kurdish groups. Religiously, the Kurds are divided into Sunni, Shia, Alevi and Yezidi faith groups. Politically, they are divided among four separate states. Economically, some Kurds are still nomadic, while most are either urbanized or rural. There are also major class differences.
|
| |
|
