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| Volume X, Spring 2003, Number 1 |
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| EXCERPT: Time for Making Historic Decisions in the Middle East |
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| Vahan Zanoyan |
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Mr. Zanoyan is the president and chief executive officer of PFC Energy, a strategic advisory firm in global energy, based in Washington. The following study was written by Mr. Zanoyan on commission from the Kuwait Center for Strategic and Future Studies (CSFS). The ideas and opinions expressed in this study do not necessarily represent the views of CSFS, its Board of Trustees or Kuwait University.
It has become common knowledge
that, after September 11, the geopoliti-
cal landscape changed to the detri-
ment of the Gulf region in general and of Saudi Arabia in particular. However, the depth of the implications of this reality for the future of the Middle East region has not been properly understood. The region is going through a critical period in its history, in which the decisions, policies and events of today will set a course that will determine the fate of the people of the region for at least several generations. What makes the situation even more serious is that it is not the region itself that is driving this process.
A year after September 11, the conventional wisdom in the United States is that Osama bin Laden is not an isolated phenomenon, but represents a fundamental failing of the Arab system. The internal responsibilities and challenges of Saudi Arabia have come under sharp focus, with the overall perception being that the status quo is too weak and vulnerable to cope with the threat of terrorism. This perception is constantly reinforced by what Washington justifiably views as a weak, ambiguous, unconvincing and delayed official reaction to September 11 from the Arab Middle East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. This, in part, is responsible for the deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations.
In the perception of the American public, the "downgrading" of Saudi Arabia by U.S. officials and media has been extended to the Gulf region in general. The significant differences among the GCC states often get lost as irrelevant details. At the most senior levels of the U.S. administration, the strategic value of the relationship with the Gulf and some of the nuances of U.S. relations with various Gulf states continue to be recognized. Nevertheless, in the absence of active and credible regional efforts to bolster this perception, a vacuum has been created that has allowed the ultra-radical elements within the conservative intelligentsia in Washington to gain sway and promote both perceptions and policy initiatives that can have more potential impact on the future of the region than any external interference in the post-war period. The agenda of this newly empowered radicalism will be discussed in more detail below. |
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