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| Volume X, Spring 2003, Number 1 |
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| EXCERPT: Iran's Theocracy Under Siege |
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| Jahangir Amuzegar |
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Dr. Amuzegar is an international economic consultant. He was finance minister and economic ambassador in Iran's pre-1979 government.
In a Newsweek commentary four
years ago, a knowledgeable observer
of global politics described Iran as
"ripe for counterrevolution" and wondered if the July 1999 students' uprising was the "beginning of the end" of the Islamic Republic.1 Some other seasoned Middle East analysts regarded the same event as "Iran's second revolution," or "a revolution within a revolution."2 A brief review of the situation at the time suggested that these prognoses were unduly alarmist, and that a counterrevolution was not yet in sight. However, it was considered likely that a prolonged intensification of the ongoing sociopolitical crises might ultimately lead to a systemic implosion.3
The passage of time has since proved that the darker forecasts were indeed somewhat wishful. The regime also avoided an implosion, and managed to muddle through, albeit in a crisis mode, thanks to a fortuitous combination of certain internal and external factors. President Khatami's initial personal popularity and lofty campaign promises, the election of a reformist new Majlis (national assembly), and the establishment of nationwide city and village councils promised the dawn of a more liberal and quasi-democratic era. The shock of electoral defeat and depressed morale in the conservative camps caused a temporary lull in factional bickering and resulted in a notable relaxation of harsh sociocultural restrictions. Supportive reactions to the Khatami government's reform agenda by Japan, the European Union and the Persian Gulf countries further reduced Iran's diplomatic isolation. Warmer relations with Russia and China acted as a counterweight to continued U.S. hostility and trade sanctions. And, most significantly, a gradual firmness in the price of oil helped the government to cope successfully with its most urgent and vital economic needs.
1 Fareed Zakaria, "The Beginning of the End," Newsweek, July 26, 1999. For the story of the student unrest see Geneive Abdo, "Days of Rage in Tehran," Middle East Policy, October 1999.
2 See Dilip Hiro, "Another Iranian Revolution," The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1999; Robert Fisk, "Iran's Old Guard Brings Revolution Upon Itself," The Independent, July 14, 1999; and The Economist, July 17,1999.
3 Jahangir Amuzegar, "Civil Society or Civil Unrest," Middle East Policy, October 1999.
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