Dr. Hemmer is an associate professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air War College or any other U.S. government department or agency.
Until quite recently, given the diversity of North Africa, it would have been difficult to talk in a coherent manner about U.S. policy towards the region as a whole. In Morocco, Washington was dealing with a monarchy with longstanding ties to the United States. Algeria, by contrast, has had troubled political (although surprisingly close economic) relations with the United States since its independence and in the 1990s was in the grips of a bloody civil war. Tunisia, like Morocco, has had close political ties with the United States, but its small size and its republican, but still authoritarian, political system presented distinctive political challenges. Libya was treated as a rogue state. As a result, the United States had policies towards the states of North Africa, but not a policy towards North Africa.
Recent years, however, have seen a greater convergence with regard to U.S. policies in North Africa. With most of the states in the region talking about political reform, the end of the civil war in Algeria, and Libya's decisions to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program and sever its ties to international terrorist groups, it is now possible to talk coherently about
U.S. policy towards the region as a whole. While many differences among the states of North Africa certainly remain, the important ones have significantly shrunk from the standpoint of American foreign policy. The increased regionalization of U.S. North Africa policy, however, has not led to any fundamental shifts in how Washington approaches the Maghreb. Instead, this regionalization has simply reinforced a number of pre-existing trends. In essence, the United States is attempting to slide Algeria and Libya into the policy framework already in existence with regard to American relations with Morocco and Tunisia. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch put it, America's relations with North Africa in recent years have "undergone an enormous expansion."1 Starting with its already close relations with Morocco and Tunisia, the United States is now working with Algeria and Libya "to build the foundation for relationships we expect to grow in importance in the coming years as they continue to emerge from war and isolation, respectively." Thus, while America's conception of North Africa has been enlarged to incorporate recent changes in Algeria and Libya, it’s preferred policy responses in the region have not significantly changed.
The purpose of this article is to discuss America's developing regional policies in North Africa. Mirroring past American practice, much of the literature on American foreign policy in North Africa is country specific.2 Even the writings that attempt to treat North Africa as a whole often consist of country-by-country studies strung together.3 In an attempt to treat
U.S. policy holistically, this article will explore three overarching themes in American foreign policy toward this region and their impact on past, current and future policies: North Africa as an area of secondary American security interests; the dominance of energy in U.S.-North African economic relations; and the constant American preference for what it regards as moderate regimes, even if those regimes are less than democratic. While certainly interrelated, these themes were selected to correspond to the three central issues for U.S. policy in North Africa and beyond as they deal with determining America's security interests, its economic interests, and the place of American values in the nation's foreign-policy hierarchy.
A REGION OF SECONDARY SECURITY INTERESTS
Virtually all discussions of U.S. interests in North Africa start with the region's strategic location. Comprising the southern coast of the Mediterranean and bestriding the communication routes among Europe, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb is a strategic crossroads.4 This location has proven to be a double-edged sword with regard to American foreign policy. While the region's pivotal position has increased its importance for Washington, this position has also meant that North Africa is less important to the United States in and of itself. As a result, the United States has tended to subordinate its relations with North Africa to what it sees as more important interests elsewhere.
Perhaps the only time that U.S.-North African relations were near the top of U.S. foreign-policy concerns goes back to the early 1800s and the so-called "Barbary Wars." Even then, however, these engagements between the nascent U.S. Navy and North African privateers were, from the American side, mostly an issue of domestic politics and national identity as the young republic tried to figure out what having an independent foreign policy required.5 While a relatively large number of works have recently appeared attempting to explore the links between America's wars with the Barbary pirates and the current war on terror,6 Charles Gallagher's now 45-yearold conclusion is probably closer to the truth that these interactions "are exotica of the past" with little impact on current U.S.-North African relations.7 Even American missionary activities, which helped produce some ties between the United States and other parts of the Middle East, were relatively sparse in North Africa.8
Modern interactions between the United States and North Africa probably best date to the TORCH landings during World War II. In what would become a pattern, the United States was less interested in North Africa itself, seeing the operation primarily as a learning experience and stepping stone to the more important subsequent landings in Italy and France.9 Following World War II, while nominally supportive of the region's efforts to achieve independence, the United States subordinated its relations with the region to its relationship with France, especially with regard to Algeria's long struggle for independence.
Throughout the Cold War, U.S. relations with North Africa were defined by America's broader struggle with the Soviet Union.10 For example, once the development of long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles made America's new Strategic Air Command bases in Libya and Morocco less necessary to deter a Soviet nuclear strike, those bases were quickly and easily dispensed with. Similarly, Algeria's leadership in the non-aligned movement throughout the Cold War strained its relations with the United States, even though Algeria was far from being an ally of Moscow.
As the Cold War became less dominant in U.S. foreign policy, North Africa did not come into its own as an important region for the United States, but instead found itself treated as an adjunct to the more important Middle East. North Africa's removal from the African Bureau and its transfer to the Near East-South Asian Bureau in the State Department in the mid-1970s symbolized and institutionalized this new position.11 Following Egypt's peace treaty with Israel as part of the Camp David accords, it was the government’s position toward the treaty that helped drive U.S. relations with the states of North Africa.12
Today, the prism through which the United States looks at North Africa is the war on terror. As far as Washington is concerned, this "is perhaps the most pressing of the issues that the Maghreb faces."13 One example of this increased emphasis on counterterrorism initiatives is NATO's Operation Active Endeavor.
Created soon after 9/11, this ongoing maritime surveillance regime in the Mediterranean involves increased naval cooperation between NATO and Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian forces.14 Another post-9/11 program is the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which now includes Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and may in the future include Libya as well. TSCTI, in the words of one American official addressing a regional gathering in Algiers, "seeks to link all of our CT [counterterrorism] efforts across the region . . . by helping to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, by enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation between your security forces and ours, and . . . by promoting economic development, good governance, education, liberal institutions and democracy."15
TSCTI grew out of an earlier (but also post-9/11) program, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which helped train and equip the border-security forces of Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. The transition to TSCTI not only expanded the geographical scope of the program to include North Africa (along with Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria); it also significantly increased the funding of this initiative and made this counter terrorism program an interagency, rather than just a Department of Defense program. While the military is still offering counterterrorism training and equipment to local forces, TSCTI also includes educational programs under the U.S. Agency for International Development and Treasury Department programs focusing on money laundering.16
The U.S. predilection for treating North Africa in terms of what it sees as other more important foreign-policy problems means that the United States often comes up short in addressing region-specific issues. For instance, the most important regional security issue in North Africa since independence from European colonialism has probably been the unsettled status of the Western Sahara. Conflict over the Western Sahara has consistently complicated relations between the two strongest states of North Africa – Morocco and Algeria – and has perhaps been the single most consequential roadblock in the way of greater North African regional cooperation.
While theoretically in favor of greater North African integration, the United States has consistently taken a hands-off role with regard to the dispute, even when former Secretary of State James Baker was the official U.N. envoy on the Western Sahara issue. While refusing to recognize Morocco's sovereignty over the Western Sahara and supporting any UN efforts to settle the conflict, the United States has also been reluctant to push any initiatives that could upset Morocco, its closest ally in
the region. As Yahia Zoubir has calculated, Morocco is second only to Egypt in the Arab world in the amount of U.S. aid it has received, is the recipient of about one-fifth of all U.S. aid to Africa, and in recent years has been the beneficiary of about 7080 percent of U.S. aid to North Africa.17 Consider the following statement from the Congressional Research Service discussing Washington's policy toward Morocco and its impact on American efforts with regard to the Western Sahara:
U.S. officials view Morocco as a moderate Arab ally, welcome supporter of the global war against terrorism, constructive player in the IsraeliPalestinian peace process, and leader in Arab efforts to reform and democratize. They would prefer a solution to the Western Sahara dispute that would not destabilize Mohammed VI's rule. Officials also believe that a settlement would enhance regional stability and economic prosperity.18
What is striking about this explanation is that none of these reasons deal with North Africa in particular. Instead, they are all about the potential impact Morocco can have in the Arab world, in the wider campaign against terrorism, and in the Middle East peace process. Indeed, the regional benefits that a settlement of this issue could have are treated purely as an afterthought. This is not just a side effect of the global war on terror as similar statements could have been made about
U.S. policy during the Cold War by simply replacing the war on terrorism with the struggle against the Soviets and Mohammed VI with Hassan II.
While treating North Africa as a secondary theater has meant that the United States may come up short in dealing with regional issues like the Western Sahara, on the positive side, it has also meant that the United States has avoided any serious crises or conflicts in the region.19 Indeed, the two times that U.S. policy could be said to have been most centered on issues in North Africa were also periods of U.S.-North African conflict: the Barbary Wars mentioned above and the brief military confrontation with Libya over its support for terrorism during the 1980s.
If U.S. interests in North Africa are largely secondary and derivative of its strategic location, then this placement of North Africa in American foreign policy is unlikely to change even as U.S. policy in the Maghreb becomes more consistent across the region. If anything, the attention the United States pays to North Africa may currently be on the decline after a post-9/11 high. In the war on terror, while North Africa is still seen as part of the larger Arab world, the Maghreb is also increasingly linked with sub-Saharan Africa and American foreign policy concerns there. As discussed above, the Trans Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Initiative in North Africa derived from an earlier Pan-Sahel initiative, and North Africa is currently in the process of being moved out of the area of responsibility of the American military's European Command and into the newly forming Africa Command. If the new Africa Command focuses the bulk of its efforts in the areas where most of its countries lie, namely in sub-Saharan Africa, and if Africa and the Africa Command continue to be a low priority for the United States, North Africa may see its status in American foreign policy further degraded to "sideshow to a sideshow."
The Dominance of Energy
Beyond its strategic location, the second claim that North Africa has made on America's attention derives from its energy resources, especially Libya's oil reserves and Algeria's natural-gas reserves. Ironically, this has meant that the United States has had a far greater economic stake in the two states with which it has had relatively poor political relations. Beyond the fact that both Morocco and Tunisia have small economies in relation to the United States, both of these countries do the bulk of their trading with the states of the European Union rather than the United States. In 2005, for example, over 70 percent of Morocco's exports went to the EU, which was also the source of over 50 percent of Morocco's imports. The United States, in contrast, received only 2.6 percent of Morocco's exports and supplied only 3.4 percent of its imports. The situation with Tunisia is almost identical, with Europe being the destination of over 80 percent of Tunisia's exports and the source of 75 percent of its imports, with the figures for the United States being in the low single digits for both.20
To increase trade with its longstanding allies in North Africa, the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with Tunisia in October 2002 (although momentum towards a free-
trade agreement seems to have ceased), and, in 2004, the United States and Morocco signed a free-trade agreement, which came into effect in early 2006.21 While such agreements may increase U.S. trade with both, they are unlikely to substantially alter either's overall trade patterns, especially as both countries already have longstanding association agreements with the European Union.
By contrast, America's economic relationship with Algeria, despite the troubled political relations between the two countries, has been of great significance for both. The United States is Algeria's biggest trading partner and largest source of foreign investment. Because about 97 percent of Algeria's export earnings come from its hydrocarbon reserves, the vast majority of this trade involves natural gas and oil. With the seventh-largest natural gas reserves in the world and the fourteenth-largest oil reserves, Algeria is likely to remain a key supplier for world markets. If you look at the approximately $4 billion that the United States has invested in Algeria, it is virtually all in the energy sector.22
Although the recently lifted U.S. sanctions against Libya meant that few of Libya's oil exports went directly to the United States, America is still heavily involved in the Libyan energy market. Libya's oil fields were largely built by U.S. companies, which is one of the reasons
U.S. sanctions had a detrimental effect on Libya's oil-production capabilities.23 Even during the long sanctions interlude, moreover, most of those assets were held in trust by the Libyan government and not sold to other oil companies.24 With improved U.S.-Libyan relations, both Occidental Petroleum and the Oasis Group (Amerada Hess, Marathon and ConocoPhillips) have struck deals with the Libyan government that will allow them to resume their operations.25
While periodically the United States offers new initiatives to increase overall trade with and within the region – such as the Eizenstat plan in the late 1990s or the current goal of creating a free-trade area in the Middle East by 2013 – with improved political relations with both Algeria and Libya, the dominant role of energy in U.S.-North African trade is only likely to increase in the coming years. For example, in June 2007, the United States signed an agreement with Algeria to cooperate on civilian nuclear-power production, an agreement that was finalized soon after Algeria announced its intent to triple its already large natural-gas exports to the United States.26
In Search of "Moderation"
A review of U.S. policy statements with regard to North Africa suggests that the highest accolade the United States can bestow on a regional ally is that it is a "moderate." While what it means to be a moderate has shifted over time, American support for what it sees as moderate forces in the region has remained constant. Although the United States has consistently spoken in favor of increased democracy in the region, being labeled as a moderate was enough to ensure good relations with the United States. If forced to choose, the United States has proven itself willing to favor moderation over increased democracy.
As the states of North Africa were seeking independence, moderation meant accepting that the decolonization process was going to be slow and that, in the meantime, violence, especially violence that risked creating a rift between the United States and France with regard to the developing North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had to be avoided. Thus, while the United States was nominally in favor of self-determination, it offered little tangible assistance to North African independence movements. As the Cold War worsened, moderation meant taking America's side against the Soviets. Thus, Algeria's role in the developing non-aligned movement was enough to classify it among the radicals.
As North Africa came to be viewed more in the context of Middle Eastern rather than Cold War politics, moderation has meant support for the peace process between Israel and its neighbors and the isolation of the Qadhafi regime in Libya for its rogue behavior.
Today, the dominant marker of a moderate regime is one that is cooperative in America's war on terror. While some have argued that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 "fundamentally altered U.S. attitudes and policy toward the region,"27 there is a good case to be made for arguing that there has been continuity in U.S. policy toward North Africa, with the war on terror simply replacing the Cold War, a transition that was underway well before the attacks on New York and Washington. For example, even as early as 1994, the United States was worried about the rise of politicized Islam in North Africa, insisting that Islam "is not our enemy" but that "U.S. policy is firmly opposed to fanaticism and extremism."28 During a Congressional delegation visit to Tunisia in 2005, Senator Russ Feingold remarked that, though his last visit to Tunis was over a decade before, the issues in U.S.-Tunisian relations had not changed: "We talked about three things 11 years ago, and we talked about those same three things again: terrorism, human rights and democracy."29
There is no denying that the attacks of September 11 and the resulting war on terror raised the amount of attention the United States is paying to North Africa. The linkages between North Africa and the war on terror have come in a number of forms. First, individuals of North African descent have participated in a number of high-profile terrorist attacks and plots, with the March 2004 Madrid train bombings being the most notorious example. Second, Washington has intensified its concerns over the increasing appearance of North African recruits fighting against the United States in Iraq. Finally, the fall 2006 merger between al-Qaeda and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and its subsequent re-designation as the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, has also raised alarms in the United States.30 While this has temporarily given North Africa a higher profile in American foreign policy, it has not led to a fundamentally different U.S. policy. If anything, it has served to increase the emphasis the United States puts on cooperation with those it designates as moderates in the region.
In a February 2006 trip to North Africa, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, commending each for "providing moderate leadership" and being "constructive in the problems of the world and the struggle against violent extremism."31 The secretary also expressed his confidence that North Africa would ultimately not be a growth area for al-Qaeda because there are no "large ungoverned spaces," and the states in the region are not "tolerant towards extremism." This position squares with that of the State Department, which has also put terrorism at the center of U.S.-North African relations and sees the answer to that challenge in the creation of a "secure, moderate and more unified Maghreb."32 Indeed, the recently concluded free-trade agreement with Morocco is probably more important to the United States in terms of how it can help "bolster Morocco's position as a moderate Arab state"33 than in terms of its direct economic benefit to the United States.
Morocco and Tunisia were able to make the transition relatively seamlessly from Cold War allies to allies in the war on terror. Throughout both periods, although the United States certainly gave vocal support for political reform, their moderate foreign-policy stands were enough to insulate these regimes from any criticism of the slow pace of democratic reforms.
Algeria's path to becoming an American ally in the war on terror, given its perception in Washington as a radical state during the Cold War, was a bit rockier. Even just a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the United States was tacitly willing to accept the suspension of elections in Algeria, while being explicitly unwilling to condone "a victory of extremism in Algeria."34 Ultimately, the end of the civil war; Algeria's positive steps towards democratization; its diplomatic assistance in situations such as the Iranian hostage crisis, the internal conflict in Sudan, and the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; and, most important, its cooperation in the war on terror have completed its transformation into a moderate state in America's eyes. Finally, Libya's renunciation of its WMD program and its acceptance of responsibility for earlier terrorist attacks has so far allowed it to achieve conditional "moderate" status, even given a complete lack of domestic political reform.
How does President George W. Bush's promotion of the expansion of democracy fit within this regional agenda? Certainly democracy occupies a prominent place in the administration's rhetoric as America consistently places itself in favor of political reforms. The commitment of the United States is not simply rhetorical, however, as the United States has indeed bulked up its democracy-promotion efforts in the region. One example is the role the United States played in creating the multilateral Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative, launched by the Group of Eight (G-8) nations at the Sea Island Summit in the summer of 2004. The principal organizational expression of the BMENA initiative is an ongoing series of ministerial meetings between the G-8 and regional states focused on issues of political reform. Following the first of these "Forums for the Future" in Rabat in 2004, they have been expanded to include representation by nongovernmental organizations.35
The central program in America's bilateral democracy-promotion efforts in North Africa is categorized under the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). MEPI defines its goals as "supporting democracy promotion, economic reform, quality education and women's empowerment in the Middle East."36 Going beyond simply using diplomacy to urge existing regimes to reform, the purpose of MEPI is to support individuals in the region seeking practical help in reforming their states and societies.37 As a result, MEPI consists of a large number of relatively small training programs and educational scholarships.
For instance, MEPI provided money for the training of political-party staff and bankers in Morocco, parliamentarians in Morocco and Algeria, and journalists in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Even Libya has taken part in a number of MEPI programs, such as those focused on helping entrepreneurs and providing scholarship opportunities. As of late 2006, MEPI had funded over 400 projects totaling over $350 million, spread over 15 Middle Eastern countries.38 While not to discount the value of such programs, it is nevertheless still true that the administration's rhetoric
on democratization greatly exceeds the resources it has committed to that goal.39
President Bush's famous assertion that "60 years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe," does a disservice to his predecessors in office. Moreover, the implication that his "forward strategy of freedom" represents a significant departure from past American policies is also overstated.40 The accommodations that his predecessors made with regard to democracy in North Africa during World War II, the Cold War, and afterward were based upon calculations that America had more pressing security concerns. Indeed, the current administration is still making similar accommodations. Isn't Libya's nuclear, chemical and biological disarmament more important to the United States than internal reform in Tripoli? Isn't the end of the civil war in Algeria an accomplishment worth supporting, even if progress toward democratization is slower than some would like? Isn't cooperation in the war on terror from the regimes in Rabat and Tunis more important to the United States than the question of internal reform in those countries? The administration certainly could, and does, defend its democratization strategy in the region by noting that political reform and institution building take time and that the situation of every country is distinct; but that is precisely what U.S. policy has been for the last 60 years. As Daniel Brumberg aptly noted, when it comes to democratization, the Bush administration and American foreign policy as a whole have “a philosophy, not a strategy, an aspiration rather than a coherent plan."41
The disjuncture between American rhetoric and American policies on democratization often leads to charges of hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy. Such conclusions are too harsh. Policies such as MEPI do support democracy, and American policy makers do believe that the spread of democracy, in the long term, will make America more secure and more prosperous. Democracy, however, has never been America's sole interest in North Africa or any other region of the world, nor has it ever been the most important of America's interests. As a result, when democratization comes into conflict with what are seen as more pressing interests, democratization is often sacrificed. Having to balance competing interests does not make one a hypocrite, although America could do much more to bring its rhetoric closer in line with its behavior by discussing such tradeoffs and the reasons for them more explicitly. In North Africa, the United States is likely to continue its policy of rhetorically supporting democracy and offering limited assistance for democratization in the form of MEPI-like programs but reserving its most consequential support for actors that prove their moderation by supporting American policy goals in the war on terror.
CONCLUSION
Writing in the early 1960s about American foreign policy in North Africa, Charles Gallagher concluded optimistically,
The United States, enmeshed in the Realpolitik of the nuclear and space age has, I think, outgrown the need to be "loved" from which it once suffered. We realize that those who are not always for us are not necessarily against us, and we do not seek excessively sycophantic friendships any more than we court enemies.42
Over 40 years later, judged by this standard, American policy toward North Africa has grown up somewhat. By maintaining close relations with Morocco and Tunisia and succeeding in improving relations with Algeria and Libya, the United States has moved beyond dividing the states of North Africa into those that are with us or against us. While some may discount this accomplishment because of the fact that all the regimes in North Africa have their own reasons to be with us in the war on terror, the rapprochements with Algeria and Libya were not inevitable and should be recognized as positive developments.
In order to continue this momentum into the future, two additional difficult steps are required on the part of the United States. The first is to avoid trading an external "with us or against us" stance for an internal one by assuming that any domestic opposition to the regimes with which the United States currently has positive relationships necessarily has an agenda hostile to the United States. As the states of North Africa continue their own internal growth, the United States must remain willing to accept that the potential empowerment of groups or individuals that are not necessarily with us, does not make those states our enemies. Second, if the United States wants to keep American allies with us, the Washington must also be willing to stand with them. While North Africa is likely to remain an area of secondary security interest to the United States, regional issues are certainly not secondary for Maghreb states themselves. If Washington is going to want to continue to have North African cooperation in solving issues outside of North Africa, the United States must also be willing to help the region solve the problems within the region. Now that American foreign policy has become more consistent across the Maghreb, the United States should take the next step and begin, at least in part, treating North Africa as a region in and of itself and not just as an adjunct to other more important regions.
1 David Welch, "Update on North Africa," Remarks to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 6, 2007:
p. 1. Available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/wel060607.htm. Accessed on June 11, 2007.
2 For example, on U.S. policies toward Algeria, see Yahia H. Zoubir, "Algeria and U.S. Interests: Containing Radical Islamism and Promoting Democracy," Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2002): pp. 64-81; and with regard to Libya, see Yahia H. Zoubir, "The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization," Middle East Policy, Vol.13, No. 2 (Summer 2006): pp. 48-70.
3 For examples see Richard B. Parker, North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns (Praeger, 1987), pp. 154-179; John Damis, "United States Relations with North Africa" Current History, Vol. 84, No.
402 (May 1985): pp. 193-196 and pp. 232-234; and Aaron Segal, "The United States and Northern Africa" Current History, Vol. 80, No. 470 (December 1981): pp. 401-404 and pp. 431-434. For useful counterexamples that do attempt a region-wide look, see L. Carl Brown, "The United States and the Maghrib" The Middle East Journal, Vol.30, No. 3 (Summer 1976): pp. 273-290; and his "U.S.-Maghribi Relations: Model or Muddle?" in Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration, Halim Barakat, ed. (Center For Contemporary Arab Studies, 1985): pp. 37-44. For a combined regional and bilateral study, see Yahia H. Zoubir, "American Policy in the Maghreb: The Conquest of a New Region?" Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 13, 2006, July 24, 2006. For a solid, if pessimistic and now dated, review of the literature on U.S.-North African relations, see Paul J. Zing, "The United States and North Africa: An Historiagraphical Wasteland," African Studies Review, Vol.16, No. 1 (April 1973): pp. 107-117.
4 See Mohamad Z. Yakan, "The United States and North Africa: Sustained Strategic Interests," in United States Interests and Policies in Africa: Transition to a New Era, Karl P. Magyar, ed. (St. Martin's Press, 2000): pp. 15-43, especially pp. 17 and 34-35.
5 Lawrence A. Peskin, "The Lessons of Independence: How the Algerian Crisis Shaped Early American Identity," Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 3 (June 2004): pp. 297-319.
6 See Paul A. Silverstein, "The New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier," The New Centennial Review, Vol.5, No.1 (Spring 2005): pp. 179-212.
7 Charles F. Gallagher, The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 231.
8 Brown, "The United States and the Maghrib," p. 284.
9 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (Henry Holt and Company, 2002).
10 See David D. Newsom, "The United States and North Africa: Lessons from the Past and Future Directions," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol.38, No. 6 (January 1, 1972): pp.162-166; Azzedine Layachi, The United States and North Africa: A Cognitive Approach to Foreign Policy (Praeger, 1990), p. 28; and Brown, "U.S.Maghribi Relations," p. 38.
11 Damis, "United States Relations with North Africa," p. 193.
12 Segal, "The United States and North Africa," p. 401.
13 Welch, "Update on North Africa," p. 1.
14 See http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm. Accessed on July 13, 2007.
15 Harry A. Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Remarks at Algiers Conference," February 6, 2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2006/62325.htm. Accessed on July 9, 2007.
16 On the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, see European Command's "Operations and Initiatives." Available at http://www.eucom.mil/english/Operations/main.asp; GlobalSecurity.org, "Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative," available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm; and Jessica R. Piombo, "Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview" Strategic Insights, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 2007): pp.1-11, available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Jan/piomboJan07.pdf. All accessed on July 9, 2007.
17 Zoubir, "American Policy in the Maghreb," p. 4.
18 Carol Migdalovitz, "Western Sahara: Status of Settlement Efforts" CRS Report for Congress, September 29, 2006. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20962.pdf. Accessed on July 9, 2007.
19 Paul J. Zing, "America and North Africa: A Case Study in United States-Third World Relations" The History Teacher, Vol.12, No. 2 (February 1979): pp. 253-270, see especially p. 256. See also Brown, "U.S.Maghribi Relations," p. 44.
20 The data in this paragraph come from the U.S. Department of State's "Background Notes" for both Morocco and Tunisia. Morocco's is available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm and Tunisia's is available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm. Both accessed on July 10, 2007.
21 On the Moroccan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, see Gregory W. White, "Free Trade as a Strategic Instrument in the War on Terror? The 2004 U.S.-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement," Middle East Journal, Vol.59, No.4 (Autumn 2005): pp. 597-615. On Tunisia, see the above cited U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes: Tunisia."
22 See Zoubir, "Algeria and U.S. Interests," p. 77, as well as U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes: Algeria," available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm. Accessed on July 10, 2007.
23 Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya: The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," International Security, Vol.30, No.3 (Winter 2005/6): pp. 47-86.
24 Christopher Boucek, "From Tactical Adversary to Strategic Ally, Qadhafi's Return from the Cold: An Analysis of the New Era of Libya's Relations with the West," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No.4 (Summer 2005), pp. 44-45.
25 Christopher Blanchard, "Libya: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report for Congress, June 13, 2006, p. 10. Available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33142.pdf. Accessed on July 10, 2007.
26 Derek Sands, "Analysis: Algeria, U.S. Reach Nuclear Pact," United Press International, June 11, 2007. Available at http://www.upi.com/Energy/Analysis/2007/06/11/analysis_algeria_us_reach_nuclear_pact/1065/. Accessed on August, 3, 2007.
27 Mohamed A. El Khawas, "North Africa and the War on Terror," Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.14, No.4 (Fall 2003), p. 176.
28 Robert H. Pelletreau, "U.S. Policy toward North Africa," Testimony of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol.5, No.40 (October 3, 1994): pp. 659662.
29 Press Briefing in Tunis, February 24, 2005, transcript available at http://tunis.usembassy.gov/uploads/ images/oy0t_Cz5dbokv8ixyjumaQ/codelmccain_02_05.pdf. Accessed on July 12, 2007.
30 See Kevin Whitelaw, "The Mutating Threat," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 139, No.24 (12/26/2005-1/ 02/06): pp. 32-36 and "The Long Arm of Al-Qaeda," The Economist, Vol. No. 383, No.8524 (4/14/07): p. 51.
31 "Media Availability with Secretary Rumsfeld Enroute to Tunisia," February 10, 2006. Available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=939. Accessed on June 12, 2007.
32 Welch, "Update on North Africa," p.1.
33 Raymond J. Ahearn, "Morocco-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," CRS Report for Congress, May 26, 2005, p. 1. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21464.pdf. Accessed on July 11, 2007.
34 Pelletreau, "U.S. Policy toward North Africa."
35 For the U.S. view of BMENA and its place in American foreign policy, see http://bmena.state.gov/. Accessed on July 12, 2007.
36 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "The Middle East Partnership Initiative: Supporting Freedom and Opportunity in the Middle East and North Africa," (2/15/06). Available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/61409.pdf. Accessed on July 12, 2007.
37 See interview with Peter Mulrean (the director of MEPI's regional office in Tunis) with l'Expression, October 18, 2006. Available at http://www.medregion.mepi.state.gov/peter_mulrean_lexpression_oct._06. Accessed on June 12, 2007.
38 For an exhaustive list of MEPI programs in North Africa, see main MEPI website at the State Department as well as the website of the regional office in Tunis, both of which list the programs by country, http:// www.mepi.state.gov/, http://www.medregion.mepi.state.gov/. Accessed on July 12, 2007.
39 Rachel Bronson, "Reconstructing the Middle East," Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.10, No.1 (Summer 2003), p. 279.
40 George W. Bush, "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East: Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy," November 6, 2003. Available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html. Accessed on July 12, 2007.
41 Daniel Brumberg, Democratization Versus Liberalization in the Arab World: Dilemmas and Challenges for
U.S. Foreign Policy, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2005, p. 1. Available at http:// www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB620.pdf. Accessed on July 12, 2007.
42 Gallagher, The United States and North Africa, p. 247.
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