Since the beginnings of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish foreign policy and popular imagination have been both captivated and repelled by Europe. Western political, military and material innovations, juxtaposed with what many consider a spiritual and moral vacuum, have made Europe both a club Turks eagerly want to join and an object of scorn and condescension. Europe could not simply be ignored, particularly when the Empire fell into decline, and eventually acceptance or rejection of European norms and institutions produced social and cultural dichotomies within Ottoman society.
A similar fault line runs through Turkey today. Turks point out that theirs is a nation that includes both Occidental and Oriental civilizations. However, despite years of interaction with Europe and various attempts to imitate and manufacture European institutions, Turks have never been able to gain full admission to Europe. This was driven home most recently in December 1997, when the European Union essentially tabled Turkey's membership bid, allowing others such as Czechs, Estonians and Bulgarians to cut in line for entry. This has renewed debate in Turkey about whether it can ever become a true European nation and whether it should perhaps turn away from Europe and knock on other doors in the hope of finding acceptance.
This article reviews the issues surrounding Turkish-European acrimony and seeks to nest them in a broader cultural and historical context, in particular the Turkish efforts to "Europeanize"1 the country's internal and external orientation. This project is far from complete; fissures within contemporary Turkish politics complicate efforts to convince Europeans that Turkey truly belongs in the European home.
THE EUROPEANIZATION PROJECT
A leitmotif in modem Turkish history has been the effort to modernize society in the image of Europe. This stretches back to the time of the Tanzimat reforms of 1839, when the Ottomans began to adopt European legal, political and cultural features in an effort to revitalize the empire. According to one scholar, the goal was to achieve a civilization "as seen through French eyes.”2 Ultimately, however, the mixing of new with old did not work out as planned, and a rift emerged between a more Westernized (especially Francophile) elite and a folk stratum of peasants.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the movement of the Committee of Union and Progress (more commonly known in the West as the "Young Turks"), dominated by junior military officers and intellectuals, began to push for more reforms to modernize the Empire. They forced a constitution on the tyrannical Sultan Abdulhamid II, aspired to reassert Ottoman power against European encroachments, and, most significantly, began to fashion a distinctive Turkish (as opposed to Ottoman) nationalism and identity.3 The leading theoretician of "Turkism" was Ziya Gokalp, who advised that a cultural awakening among Turks would help restore stability and strength to an empire beset by nationalist movements among its non-Turkish peoples. This was not simply Turkish jingoism. Gokalp recognized that the nation would also have to accept Western civilization whole-heartedly, more so than with the Tanzimat reforms. He wrote, "There is only one road to salvation:...to adapt ourselves to Western civilization completely."4 He made a distinction between civilization and culture, however, arguing that European civilization, especially its material and scientific aspects, could be adopted while Turkish culture was preserved. For him, "Turkism" was to be a synthesis of traditional religious culture and Western civilization.
This point leads to the core dilemmas and tensions of the Turkish Europeanization project, features that manifested themselves in the Atatürk era and continue to the present day. First, the concept of Turkish nationalism and identity, as expounded by Gokalp and later under the Republic, is based on a contradiction: a rejection of the West and a celebration of Turkish culture coupled with a recognition that the West must be emulated in order for Turkey to achieve, in Atatürk's words, a "modem" and "civilized" state of society.5 Partha Chatterjee recognizes this as a theme of "post-colonial" or "Eastern" nationalism, and it can easily lead to insoluble problems.6 One attempts to borrow from outside and simultaneously preserve what is intrinsic to the culture, hoping that the borrowings will not fundamentally transform the bases of the culture itself. The goal is to be both more like Europe and to be Turkish. This has been difficult to accomplish in practice, as one often confronts either/or choices (should a woman cover her head or not?) that preclude a middle ground.7
Second, this type of nationalism requires empowered agents who will produce a new, heterogeneous identity for the masses. This form of nationalism does not simply evolve over time or have a natural resonance with the populace. It is manufactured or invented, a carefully constructed artifice that requires backing by the state in order to be imposed on society. It is a social-engineering project. The masses are to be taught the new concepts promulgated by the elites, who are the only ones who can truly appreciate the advantages of Westernization. In order to be successfully created, this formulation would need a full-fledged revolution and strong state elites to impose from above their vision of the proper path to modernization.
The revolution and its cadres emerged under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, leader of Turkish forces in the War of Independence (1919-23) and president until his death in 1938. A Turkish nationalist par excellence, Atatürk recognized that post-Ottoman Turkey would have to be built on the basis of Turkish nationalism. The achievements of the Turks, real and invented, were celebrated in new histories.8 Anti-imperialism was to be the basis of foreign policy, and the newly won national sovereignty was zealously defended. However, in the tradition of Gokalp, he realized that Turks would also have to adopt European institutions, values and norms in order to build a modem society. He singled out Ottoman and Islamic institutions as "backward," and abolished the sultanate and caliphate in favor of a republic led by a single party. He also imposed Europeanization upon the masses by numerous measures: banning the fez in favor of a European-style brimmed hat; adopting a Latin alphabet, thereby cutting off Turks from much of their recorded history; replacing the Sharia with European legal codes; closing religious institutions and orders; and expanding public education and women's rights. Europe was clearly the model, and links to Europe, not Turkey's Islamic neighbors, were given top priority. Atatürk declared, "The Ottoman Empire began to decline on the day when, proud of her successes against the West, she cut the ties that bound her to the European nations."9 The new republic would not make the same mistake.
Atatürk's agenda was clearly ambitious. According to one observer, "the whole nation has turned its skin inside out."10 There were rebellions against his rule, particularly Kurdish/Islamic ones that did not accept the new path. He responded with harsh measures, and Turkey remained a single-party dictatorship throughout his reign. By the early 1930s, he began to articulate a set of principles that came to be known as "Kemalism": republicanism, secularism, populism, étatism, nationalism and revolutionism. These principles, symbolized by six arrows, would form the basis of the Turkish state and are largely held sacrosanct today by the Kemalist establishment.
It is worth noting what these principles do not include: democracy, liberalism and civil rights, the basic principles of modem European democratic states. On the contrary, Kemalism required a strong and often repressive state in order to "bring civilization" to the masses. As Samuel Huntington has noted, the interests of reform and maintaining order superseded the interests of greater liberalization and participation, since popular mobilization would most likely have helped more conservative groups and undermined Atatürk' s efforts.11 Moreover, Atatürk helped instill in Turks a high respect for the military, a strong and interventionist state, and national sovereignty. Civil society, on the other hand, found little room to develop and maneuver in this environment.
The general orientation of Atatürk's policies has been continued by his successors and forms the basis for today's Turkish Republic. However, despite his and earlier attempts to modernize society - to become more like Europe - the results are at best incomplete. There have been no clear winners in the Turkish "culture wars," and the cultural divide that ran through the post-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire remains in place today. "Europeanization" has been limited and selective.
While Atatürk's policies were in many ways revolutionary, they did not for many years trickle down to all of Turkish society. The Kurds remained isolated and retained their own identity, and for many rural Turks in Anatolia who had minimal contact with state institutions (especially education), identity was still centered on the village and/or Is lam.12 Moreover, some elements of life did not change. The masses were still more subjects than citizens, and they were often regarded by elites as objects that needed to be molded to fit Western styles. The dichotomy between the Westernizing elite and the masses was reconstituted after the "national," "popular" revolution, and it is debatable whether the masses ever truly internalized the new ways.
Westernization is seen by many Turks as the abandonment of one's culture and past, an admission of one's inferiority. Serif Mardin argues that the Islamic or folk culture of Turks has been associated by many with what is just and legitimate, whereas Western culture is contrasted as foreign, unjust and incompatible with traditional ways.13 The true soul of the nation rests with the "simple" Turk and his values. This discourse is exemplified by the following statement by a prominent Turkish author:
...the common people, whom we had always despised as ignorant and idle, taught the intellectuals of this country some divine truths. One of these is that the heart is superior to the mind. Another is that apart from sincerity and devotion and simple faith there is no way of salvation. The third is that there must be no separation between the nation and the religious community.14
Although this statement was made in 1921, one hears echoes of it in contemporary debates over culture and Turkish identity, as many seek to return to the "true" Turkish beliefs and values.
This distinction between the masses and elite began to acquire greater political importance as the state began to democratize in the 1950s. Voters now had a say, and politicians were forced to incorporate their views and agendas. All could no longer be dictated from above. It is therefore not surprising that, beginning in the 1950s and extending through the 1990s, Islamic discourse began to enter Turkish politics and compete with Atatürk's secularism. Bernard Lewis's words of almost 40 years ago still have resonance:
After a century of Westernization, Turkey has undergone immense changes-greater than any outside observer had thought possible. But the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture are still alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still unchallenged. The resurgence of Islam after a long interval responds to a profound national need. The occasional outbursts of the tarikats (religious orders), far more than a limited restoration of official Islam, show how powerful are the forces stirring beneath the surface.15
After the 1980 coup, Islam became integrated into the nationalist ideology, since it could be appropriated to battle communism. The state began to support the religious Imam Hatip schools, unwittingly contributing to a resurgence of political Islam in the 1990s under the banner of the Refah and Fazilet (Welfare and Virtue) parties. These parties make use of the "just/unjust" distinction, appealing to rural elements and recent urban migrants who do not feel a part of "European" Turkey and have heretofore been politically and economically marginalized.16
This most recent manifestation of political Islam has sent shockwaves through the Kemalist establishment. Necmettin Erbakan and other leaders of Refah were branded as political extremists, despite the fact that they won a narrow plurality (21 percent) in the 1995 parliamentary elections and formed a coalition with the establishment, center right True Path party. Refah's time in government, however, was short-lived due to rumblings from a military dedicated to secularism. In 1998, Refah was banned as illegal for threatening the constitutionally mandated secular order, although the party has been resurrected as Fazilet, and will undoubtedly capture a large share of votes in the next round of elections. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that Turkey will be the next Iran or Algeria, there is no doubt that Islam is an important element in contemporary politics and that battle lines have been drawn between a Europeanized secular elite and religious elements who want to change both domestic and foreign policies so that Turkey becomes more "Eastern." According to one observer, Turkey now suffers from "nationalist schizophrenia," as the multiple identities and cultural traits within the country are becoming more manifest and harder to reconcile."17
Comparative public-opinion surveys shed more light on the differing beliefs and values of Turks and citizens of EU countries. Ronald Inglehart, for example, in his World Value Survey of dozens of countries, places Turkey in a "South Asian" bloc on the dimensions of rational versus traditional authority and postmodern values versus scarcity values.18 On these issues Turks differ markedly from most Europeans (particularly northern Europeans), who are more prone to value participation and rights over economic security and maintenance of political order. Based upon this 1990-91 survey, Turks are more likely than EU citizens to favor state ownership, have abysmally low levels of interpersonal trust, express high confidence in the military, be more religious, and value national pride. Similar findings have been reported in later surveys, and Turkey's "distinctiveness" has been noted by many Turkish political scientists.19 In short, one could say that Turkey exhibits more of an authoritarian political culture than Europe. Inglehart and his collaborators would attribute most of this difference to the relatively low level of economic development in the country, although the growing value placed on religion might undermine the notion that once Turks are as rich as Europeans they will hold the same values and beliefs as Europeans.
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE, 1945-98
After 1945, Turkish Europeanization efforts were extended into the realm of foreign policy. Atatürk had sounded anti-imperialist tones in an effort to preserve Turkish independence. Turkey was removed from the struggles among the Great Powers and prudently remained neutral during World War II.20 At the end of the war, however, Turkey found itself a possible target for Soviet expansionism and made overtures to place itself squarely in the Western camp. For the Turkish leadership, however, this was not strictly motivated by military interests. Rather, entry into Western institutions was seen as the culmination of Europeanization efforts at home. It was a cultural project. One writer maintained,
There are different ways of being with the West. Spain, Portugal, South Korea, Formosa, and even the Sheikdoms of Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar are with the West - or rather out-posts of the West. But these are not truly members of the Western North American world. Their joining the West is not a result of identical world outlook, identical social philosophy or identical ideals and principles....They are with the West because of strategic or economic requirements and other calculations of self-interest. Turkey cannot be included in this category.21
Turkey could initially claim great success in its endeavor to join Europe. It became a member of the Council of Europe, the OECD, and, in 1952, NATO. Turkey was generally welcomed by Western countries as an important asset in the fight against communism due to its geopolitical position. Western aid flowed into the country. After the Treaty of Rome was concluded in 1957, Turkey made a bid to join the European Economic Community as an associate member, and this status was granted by the Ankara Treaty of 1963. Closer cooperation and an eventual customs union were envisioned by this accord. Most important perhaps was the fact that Turkey's eligibility for eventual membership (albeit at an unspecified date) was confirmed. Walter Hallstein, then president of the European Commission, declared, "Turkey is part of Europe."22
Yet problems soon emerged that made some in Turkey question pursuing close relations with the West. One triggering event was the 1964 Cyprus crisis, during which the United States warned Turkey against involvement in the island's problems, despite the fact that Turkey was a guarantor of its security by the 1960 Cyprus constitution. In reaction, Turkey began a flirtation with the Soviet Union, and Turkish leftists, Islamists and nationalists began to see their country as a victim of Western imperialism. In addition, for these groups, Europe did not seem worthy of emulation. In the 1970s, Turkish society became more polarized, and violence threatened to overwhelm its fragile democratic institutions. In 1974, Turkish troops landed on Cyprus in response to Greek Cypriot efforts to unify the island with Greece. Turkish action prompted outcries on both sides of the Atlantic and an arms embargo. Western reaction against Turkey, and an implicit favoritism to arch-rival Greece, stung Turkey hard. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit retreated into the safe confines of Turkish nationalism and closed some U.S. institutions in Turkey. For many Turks, the hostile reaction of their ostensible allies was a sign that, despite years of service as a loyal NATO ally, Turkey had not been fully accepted as an equal and that the West made no effort to understand the Turkish side. A military coup in 1980 did not help Turkey's image in the West, nor did a new Kurdish insurgency, which led many in the West to focus on the country's civil and human-rights problems.
Nonetheless, after civilian rule was restored in 1983, Turkey tried to mend its fences with its Western allies. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, in addition to launching market-reform policies at home, also initiated a Turkish bid for full membership in the European Community in 1987. Turkey, he claimed, had a "European vocation and a commitment to European unity."23 Ozal hoped that the EC would support him in an effort to bolster democracy in Turkey, as it had with Spain, Portugal and Greece. The Turkish application, however, was rejected, as it was clear the EC would only confirm possible Turkish membership in the future and not move into immediate ascension talks. This did not stop the Turks from trying, however. Hopes for eventual membership were buoyed in 1995, when Turkey joined a Customs Union with the European Union. Full membership now did not seem so far away. As one Turkish official explained, Turkey is the only EU applicant that is a NATO member; it has the longest-standing association agreement with the EU; and it is the only would-be member in a Customs Union.24
It is in this context that Turkish hopes were dashed in 1997, when the EU placed Turkey in a special category, allowing former communist countries to move ahead of it in line. Luxemburg's prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, then the EU's president, said Turkish member-ship was decades away and that at the moment Turkey, because of its human- rights record, was not worthy to sit at the EU table. Wilifried Martens, chairman of the Belgian Christian Democratic party, went even further, claiming that Europe is a "civilizational project" and that Turkey's candidacy for membership is "unacceptable."25 These dismissals confirmed Turkish suspicions that Europe wanted to keep itself a "Christian club." National outrage erupted, with one leading Turkish daily proclaiming, "Go to hell Europe!"26 Turkish officials stated that relations with Europe had reached a new low.
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Several factors pushed Turkish-European relations to this low point. One is the end of the Cold War, which profoundly changed the interests, expectations and calculations of both sides. Many in Turkey optimistically hoped that Turkey could take advantage of the Soviet collapse to expand its influence among Turkic states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.27 In addition, the more fluid international environment encouraged Islamic elements to think that Turkey could now expand its ties with a host of fellow Muslim countries. Europeans, for their part, have been considering how to transform the Cold War political architecture of Europe. Turkish inclusion, however, was rooted in the Cold War, and now that conditions have changed Turkey's status as a "European" nation is also being reevaluated.28 This is especially true now that the "politics of identity" has replaced the "politics of ideology." The unfortunate demonization of Islam has not helped the Turkish cause. True, the metaphor of Turkey as a "bridge" between Europe and Asia is still frequently heard, but this underscores the fact that the European approach to Turkey has been awash in generalities.29 One expert on Turkish-European relations noted that we have reached the end of an era when talk of Turkey's European vocation filled the air. The two sides must move beyond abstraction and determine their common interests.30
What is notable as well is that European objections to Turkish membership in the EU are no longer couched primarily in economic terms. Political and particularly cultural dimensions have assumed more importance.31 In its 1997 decision, the EU cited several issues that must be resolved before Turkey can achieve full membership: the on-going Kurdish conflict and attendant human-rights problems, shortcomings in Turkish democracy, and failure to resolve the Cyprus dispute. Let us examine these in tum, and focus on cultural differences as an underlying factor.
THE KURDISH CONFLICT
No contemporary problem has strained Turkish-European relations as much as the Kurdish conflict, which has claimed over 30,000 lives since 1984.32 The Turkish government has found itself in a fierce struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK), a group that has attacked government positions in the predominantly Kurdish regions of southeastern Turkey. It is viewed by Ankara as a terrorist-separatist organization, although the PKK has not published any explicit set of demands and has occasionally shown a willingness to talk to Turkish authorities about a political solution. Ankara, however, refuses to engage in any dialogue, and has ruthlessly hunted down PKK activists as well as imprisoning those who are deemed to be sympathetic to Kurdish nationalism. Extending cultural rights to the Kurds, such as allowing Kurdish-language newspapers and schools, is not on the immediate political horizon. Government action against the Kurds has contributed to immense human-rights problems, and it has also restricted the political discourse in the country, as various "pro-Kurdish" parties have been closed down and had their members of parliament expelled from the legislature and arrested.
At the end of 1998, matters came to head, dramatically "internationalizing" the Kurdish problem.33 Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was expelled from Syria, went to Moscow, and eventually was arrested in Italy. The Italians refused to extradite him to Turkey, citing Italian law prohibiting extradition to a country which has the death penalty. Some leftists in Italy even wanted to grant him political asylum. Eventually, with Greek assistance, he was shipped to Kenya, where Turkish commandos apprehended him. As of this writing, he is on trial for his life in Istanbul.
Turkish handling of the Kurdish question has outraged many in Europe. It has led to arms embargoes against Turkey, and it stands in the way of Turkish entry into the EU. Ocalan's capture sparked protests and riots all over Europe. One Turkish writer noted that Turkey's attempts to redefine its place in the new European order will fail unless it can find a way to integrate the Kurds into the political community.34 For Europeans, the issue is clear: the Kurds are an ethnic minority that deserves protection of its distinct identity. Turkish politicians should recognize that Kurds are different from Turks and that forced assimilation will not work - and make necessary political reforms. The Basque model is upheld by some as an example that the Turks might follow.35 The controversy over Ocalan gave Europeans another chance to assert their differences with the "barbaric" Turks, who were assumed likely to execute him after a show trial. Not only did Italy harbor a man known in Turkey as "Babykiller," but many expressed sympathy for him and his cause. Even Germany, often looked upon in Turkey as its most steadfast friend in Europe, refused to request Ocalan' s extradition so that he could be tried for terrorism in a German court.
Turks, however, see the matter quite differently, both at the elite and mass levels. Ocalan is a criminal, and European unwillingness to hand him over to Turkey is an act of "criminal collaboration" that flouts the EU principle of the rule of law.36 Not only can no Turkish leader speak of appeasement and compromise and expect to survive, but most Turks also agree that the only solution to the conflict is “to stop terrorism.”37 Various rationales are given for the unwillingness to negotiate (it will encourage terrorism, other minorities will want to secede, etc.), but at root is the Turkish view of the state and its people, which goes back to Atatürk. The Turkish state is unitary; it must be strong; concessions under the Ottomans (forced upon it by Europe) led to the dismemberment of the state, and Kurds do not constitute an ethnic minority, as they too are Muslims.38 This last point has begun to waver, but the idea of tinkering with state institutions to satisfy the Kurds remains impolitic. The reasons have something to do with the Kurds and the problem of separatism but also, implicitly at least, is the fear that this reform, which would fundamentally alter Atatürk's notion of the state, would call into question a number of other policies that hold the state together. For Turks, then, the Kurdish issue is far more threatening than it might appear to outsiders because it constitutes nothing less than an "identity crisis."39
DEMOCRATIC SHORTCOMINGS
In addition to the problems engendered by the Kurdish conflict, Turkish democracy is also criticized by many as being institutionally weak and too limited. Two issues stand out. The first is the role of the military in politics. In modem European democracies, militaries are under strict civilian control and do not interfere in political life. This is not the case in Turkey, where there have been three overt military coups since 1960, and institutions such as the National Security Council give the military a direct say in policy making. Efforts by the military to fight fundamentalism and interfere in politics are only thinly concealed. Some see this as evidence that Turkish democracy is a sham. Turks, however, view the matter differently, in large part due to historical experience. The military has always been one of the more modem groups in Turkish society, and Atatürk's reforms were carried out by soldiers turned politicians. The military sees itself as a guardian of his legacy, the protector of democracy from internal threats. Trust in the military runs well over 70 percent, far higher than for any political party or politician.40 Giving the military a prominent political role is therefore something that many Turks would claim is part of their political culture and identity.
Second, by constitutional provisions, political competition in Turkey is far more constrained than in other European countries. Parties and interest associations on the basis of class, region, ethnic group and religion are prohibited.41 Trade-union rights are restricted. This derives loosely from Atatürk's notion of "populism," interpreted to mean that the Turkish people are all one. One might wonder, therefore, how parties and other associations could develop, as the prohibited bases for groups constitute their major raisons d'être in other democracies. Specific appeals on these bases are also prohibited, as they cause discord and undermine social unity. Periodically, of course, parties emerge that cross the line. This was the case with the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Labor party and Democracy party. closed in 1993 and 1994, and more recently in 1998 with the closing of Refah and the arrest of the leaders of the People's Democracy party (HADEP), another "Kurdish" party. Advocates of free speech and organization in the liberal tradition were outraged at these events, prompting many to question Turkish democracy. But loyal Kemalists would claim that they have good reason to shut down such activities and that an "anything goes" democracy is simply untenable given the current Turkish political environment. Related to this is the notion that Turkey is not fully "ready" for democracy, as all modernizing reforms have come from above and liberal and civic norms have not been sufficiently internalized. Turks thus ask Europeans to understand their current predicament and give them time to "catch up."
CYPRUS
Cyprus is another sticking-point in Turkish relations with Europe, particularly as Turkey's primary antagonist is Greece, a member of the EU. The conflict on the island, of course, has a long history, and the current Turkish "occupation" of the north and the self-proclaimed Republic of Northern Cyprus are not recognized as legitimate. Much has been written on this topic, and a lengthy discussion need not detain us here.42 Turks blame the Greek lobby as well as civilizational affinities with Greeks as reasons for bias against their case. The Turks see their action in 1974 as a perfectly acceptable means to protect their co-ethnics, whose lives and property were jeopardized by Greeks seeking unity with Athens. The Greek Cypriots, they note, unilaterally abrogated the London and Zurich agreements on the status of the island and its two communities, initiated ethnic cleansing in the 1960s, and launched a coup against Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios in 1974 in an illegitimate attempt to unify the island with Greece. Despite these actions, however, Turks feel they have been singled out as the villain. Western condemnation of Turkish actions is therefore viewed as continuation of an anti-Turkish line that dates back to the Ottoman period. Greece has largely escaped censure and now rests comfortably in the European home, where it has frequently used its veto power to affect EU policy toward Turkey. Now Brussels says it might grant EU membership to Cyprus, despite the fact that Turkey (with Greece and Great Britain) is by treaty a guarantor of the island's security and would have to approve its joining any international organization.
Efforts to find a solution to the division of the island have been redoubled in recent years, but the basic issue of how to guarantee that each side is treated fairly and can live securely has not been resolved. Moreover, Turks fear that any outside mediation efforts, particularly from the EU, will be disingenuous, as the EU recognizes the Greek Cypriot side but refuses to recognize the Republic of Northern (Turkish) Cyprus. Moreover, now that the EU has confirmed Cypriot eligibility for membership and placed it ahead of Turkey in line, the EU is no longer a neutral player in the Cyprus dispute, so it is debatable how far the EU can push the Cyprus card in dealing with Turkey. The risk is that, in lieu of a solution on the island, Europe may go ahead and admit Greek Cyprus as a member. This would widen the rift between Europe and Turkey and perhaps push Turkey to annex Northern Cyprus. Resolving the Cyprus question would obviously go a long way toward improving Turkish-European relations, but at the moment the Turks feel that Europe is running roughshod over their concerns.
CULTURAL UNDERPINNINGS
Many Turks suspect that the above reasons are mere "excuses" from Europe. The real reasons, they claim, are cultural differences, factors that cannot be "solved." Increased exposure to Turks, through tourism and contact with Turkish migrants, have arguably heightened awareness of cultural differences. Europeans may be asking themselves that if they have problems integrating Turks into their home communities,43 how can they accommodate Turkey in the EU? "Ironically," as one author notes, "in opening up to the European system of states in order to gain recognition as a European country, Turkey has revealed aspects of its identity which are incompatible with European culture."44
Certainly, despite efforts from above to recast Turks in the European image, there are real cultural differences. Turks frequently claim that Europeans do not understand Turkish traditions, history or predicaments. Moreover, the growing role of Islam makes Europeans fear for the stability and general orientation of Turkey. Problems of Turkish identity also play a role. Atatürk's phrase, "Happy is he who calls himself a Turk," is still displayed throughout the country, but what a Turk is, is not so clear. As Yavuz notes, there is now a widening gap between a hegemonic, albeit anachronistic and occasionally coercive, Kemalist discourse and the experience of many. Efforts by the elite to uphold and defend Kemalism may only be exacerbating the problem and fomenting an Islamist reaction.45 Problems of identity will inevitably lead to a sense of confusion and resentment when outside perceptions do not jibe with self-assessments. As issues of identity assume more and more salience, one might believe that Turkish-European relations have reached a cul-de-sac.
ARE THE PROBLEMS INTRACTABLE?
There will be no quick fix to the complex problems besetting Turkish-European relations. New thinking will be required. One classic remedy, of course, is for Turks (and, by extension, Europeans) simply to accept the duality of Turkish identity. Mümtaz Soysal, writing in Milliyet, argued that it would be best to "rid ourselves of the complex of 'being considered Europeans'." Instead, he suggested, "Turkey is a country with one bank in Europe and the other in Asia....We must realize this as such and we must tum this embarrassment into a sense of opportunity."46 In recent times, there have been signs of this being manifested in policy, particularly Turkish involvement in the Caspian area and Central Asia, regions where Turks assume that their cultural affinities with local inhabitants will allow them to play the role of broker between West and East. Thus far, however, the windfall has not been what Turks initially expected, in large part because the West has more to offer the new states of these regions.
More to the point, however, this tired refrain and the omnipresent metaphor of a "bridge" between West and East may be little more than a dead end.47 Gokalp pointed to the problems of fusing civilizations, and Lewis also recognized that talk of achieving a "synthesis of West and East" is a "vain hope," as (in words that anticipate Huntington) "the clash of civilizations in history does not usually culminate in a marriage of selected best elements, but rather in a promiscuous cohabitation of good, bad and indifferent alike."48 In Huntington's terms, Turkey is a "torn country,"49 and, given increasing awareness of difference among peoples as well as popular mobilization, it may be difficult to reconcile the two sides.
How long can Turkey live in Europe's half-way house? Will continued rejection compel Turks to abandon their long-held European dream? If not Europe, then what for Turkey? What policies would best avoid open conflict, keep Turkey in the Western alliance, and preserve stability? It is easy to conjure up worst-case scenarios: Islamists come to power, civil war ensues, Turkey withdraws from NATO and joins the ranks of anti-Western "rogue states." These doomsday fears are unwarranted for a variety of reasons.
First, Turks have exhibited remarkable patience and an ability to bounce back from adversity. They implicitly accept the fact that they cannot join the EU and all European institutions just yet. They know it will take time for further development and reforms. Turkish intellectuals are gingerly pushing human-rights and democratization agendas, and mainstream politicians acknowledge that progress must be made on these fronts. Moreover, the Turkish elite has stuck with its basic path (both foreign and domestic) for the past seventy-five years, despite various bumps in the road. Their patience may eventually wear out, but it would be premature to assume that the events of 1997 are a watershed.
Second, there is ample room for political engagement with Europe and with the West more generally. This includes strengthening existing ties between Turkey and the EU, renewing the search for solutions to on-going problems such as Cyprus that would address Turkish concerns, and supporting Turkish objectives in the Caspian and Central Asia. The latest EU expansion debate was handled very undiplomatically. Turkey needs to be reassured that it can qualify for membership, and Europeans might try to work with the Turks on that goal, rather than simply telling Turkey what to do.
Third, many aspects of Europeanization are firmly entrenched in Turkey. Globalization is transforming former backwaters into vibrant places of commerce. Urbanization and expanding educational opportunities are wearing away old traditions. True, gececondo residents in big cities are struggling to retain their village mores, but one wonders how easily these will be instilled in a new generation fully exposed to Western culture.50 Moreover, years of hearing "we are European," (and many Turks do have a European heritage) have had their effects. A wholesale abandonment of Europe would require nothing short of another revolution, and there is no sign of a groundswell in that direction.51
Fourth, Turks simply cannot afford to abandon Europe. They are not well-liked in the Arab world (nor are Turks fond of Arabs), and Central Asia offers limited prospects.52 The example of Iran is not appealing to most Turks. While there may no longer be a repressive state to push them to modernity, the opportunities in the global market provide a strong pull. Resisting that in an effort to revive "pure" Turkish culture is likely a non-starter. One pair of writers suggests that "there is little that they [reactionary forces in Turkey] can do to stop the people's convergence with the rest of the world."53
Finally, there is not a complete connection between foreign policy and domestic politics. Ties to the West can continue and grow while the Turkish polity becomes more Islamic or "Eastern." This has been the case since the 1950s. Indeed, today only the most extreme elements in the Islamic movement reject cooperation with the West; most see it as necessary and beneficial. At the same time, displeasure with the West does not mean the Islamization of Turkish politics. Atatürk himself saw many European powers as enemies, yet he recognized that Turkey must emulate Western practices.
Over the years there has been an effort to accommodate more "traditional" aspects of Turkish life into Atatürk's revolutionary program. There are tensions between the two that have polarized Turkish society, but the status quo is not necessarily untenable. Multi-culturalism can work, although it may not make for tranquil politics. Like Americans, Turks have their own unifying myths associated with a revolution, and Atatürk and his principles are still revered and flexible enough to allow some modifications. Islam, the apparent rival to Atatürk, need not be an implacable enemy or a radicalized force. It can become one of several components of Turkish identity and need not crowd out all the others. Signs of a burgeoning civil society rooted in Islamic orders is a case in point, although it will require some modification of the Kemalist ideology.54
Ultimately, I would agree with Gokalp and Lewis that if one's choice is simply West or East, one cannot have both. However, multiple identities are commonplace, and different aspects of identity can be emphasized by different people. If Jews can feel themselves to be Turks, as the evidence from the several-thousand person Jewish community indicates, Turkish identity can accommodate different traditions. It may not be easy to finesse this ground, mined as it is, but it can be done through gradual change and tolerance. Given the alternative – violence – one can hope that cool heads will prevail.55
Finding policies to promote fuller accommodation between Europe and Turkey will also require finesse and some degree of sacrifice. Both sides need to rethink some of their fundamental assumptions. For example, the Turkish commitment to a unitary state and sovereignty at all costs appears to many as anachronistic, not to mention counterproductive to the state's own foreign policy. Opening up the political process for fuller debate on these issues would obviously be a positive step, allowing Turks to rid themselves of unnecessary ideological baggage and determine their own future. As one Turkish writer observed, recent attempts to join Europe may have placed the cart before the horse; further consolidation of a liberal democratic state at home should be considered a prerequisite.56 Another notes that Turkish elites may now be forced to reconsider some previously axiomatic truths on questions such as identity and sovereignty, as changes in the world make past positions more difficult to maintain.57 The arrest of Ocalan might provide an excellent opportunity for Turkey. The government should conduct a fair and open trial, punish him and declare victory in the war with the PKK (which has suffered a number of military setbacks in recent years), and launch a series of reforms to eradicate many of the political roots of the conflict. This would go a long way in improving Turkey's image in Europe, as well as solving its primary domestic problem.
For their part, Europeans might be wise to reconsider what caused the difficulties on Cyprus and think about how stereotypes of Turks might be affecting their policies. Turkey has served as an important ally to the West. It has something to offer Europe, and Europeans should be interested in helping Turks sort out their current problems. Enacting policies that widen the gap between Turkey and Europe is only counterproductive. Both sides, ostensibly, want to be partners. In that spirit of cooperation, they will need to listen, try to understand and compromise.
1 Others might call this "Westernization." I will use "Europeanization," which captures better the quest to become like and a part of Europe, traditionally seen in Turkey as the center for "Western" civilization.
2 Ayse Kadioglu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," Middle Eastern Studies 32:2, April 1996, p. 180.
3 Prior to this time, intellectuals tried to create an "Ottomanism" among all the Empire's peoples, and the word "Turk" was used as a pejorative to denote an Anatolian peasant. On the change in connotation of the word "Turk," see David Kushner, The Rise o/Turkish Nationalism /876-/908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977).
4 Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya G6kalp, ed. and trans. by Niyazi Berkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 276.
5 1925 speech by Ataturk quoted in Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2..i edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 410.
6 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
7 Gokalp himself criticized the Tanzimat reformers for failing to the see that "the two (Eastern and Western civilizations), with their diametrically opposed principles, could not be reconciled...Any attempt to reconcile East and West means carrying medieval conditions to the modem age and trying to keep them alive." In Berkes, ed., 1959, pp. 276-277.
8 The seminal sources on the Ataturk period remain Lewis, 1968 and Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964). For a more critical appraisal of Atatilrk's nation-building efforts, see Erik Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994) and Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
9 Quoted in Vakur Versan, "The Kemalist Reform of Turkish Law and Its Impact," in Jacob Landau, ed. Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder: Westview, 1984), p. 247.
10 Paul Gentizon, quoted in Paul Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology," in Landau, 1984, p. 26.
11 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 376. Huntington devotes much attention to Ataturk's "Fabian strategy" and holds it up as a successful model for would-be reformers and modernizers.
12 Poulton, 1997, p.129, and Paul Stirling, "Social Change and Social Control in Republican Turkey," in Papers and Discussions: International Symposium on Ataturk (Istanbul: Turkiye ls Bankasi, 1982).
13 Serif Mardin, "The Just and Unjust," Daedalus 120:3, Summer 1991: 113-129.
14 Yakup Karaosmanoglu, quoted in Lewis, 1968, p. 401.
15 Lewis, 1968, p. 424.
16 For the best analysis of the Re/ah phenomenon in English, see M. Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey," Comparative Politics 30: I, October 1997: 63-82.
17 Poulton, 1997, p. 322.
18 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 349.
19 Presentation of Yilmaz Esmer and Ronald lnglehart, "Turkey and the 1997 World Value Survey," in Istanbul, Turkey, 1997.
20 In February 1945, Turkey did declare war on Germany, but this was purely symbolic and motivated primarily so Turkey could be a founding member of the UN.
21 Unnamed author quoted in Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 201-202.
22 Quoted in Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 5.
23 Quoted in Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 88.
24 Onur Oyrnen, "Turkey's European Foreign Policy," Perceptions (Ankara) 2:1, March-May 1997: 5-14.
25 Ayin Tarihi, (January-March 1997), pp. 144-145.
26 Hurriyet, December 13, 1997.
27 Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States," Middle East Journal 47:4, Autumn 1993: 593-610.
28 Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 18.
29 Heinz Kramer, "Turkey and the European Union: A Multi-Dimensional Relationship with Hazy Perspectives," in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, Turkey Between East and West (Boulder: Westview, 1996), p. 223.
30 Andrew Mango, "Turkey and the Enlargement of the European Mind," Middle Eastern Studies 34:2, April 1998, p. 173.
31 Geoffrey Lewis, "Turkey, The Fit Man of Europe," in Turkey and Europe in a Cu/Jura! Context, proceedings of symposium held on June 7, 1988, Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Cambridge University.
32 For major works on the Kurds, see Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997); and Michael Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).
33 M. Hakan Yavuz, "Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah Gulen, the Virtue Party and the Kurds," SAIS Review 19:1, Winter-Spring 1999: 114-143.
34 Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 25.
35 Hugh Pope, “Ciller Charms Washington,” Middle East International, October 22, 1993, p. 12.
36 Turkish Foreign Ministry statement, quoted in The New York Times, March 14, 1999, p. A7.
37 Milliyet, February 27, 1993. In this survey of 15,683 Istanbulites, over 66 percent favored the fight against terrorism as a solution, and ambitious political reforms such as federalism or autonomy for Kurdish areas were unequivocally rejected.
38 The Treaty of Lausanne defined Turkish ethnic minorities in religious terms. By definition, there cannot be Muslim ethnic minorities.
39 Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West Since World War II," in Mastny and Nation, 1996, p. 64.
40 Esmer and Inglehart, 1997.
41 This provision has been sporadically enforced. The Marxist Turkish Labor party, the Alevi-based Unity party, and the Islamist National Salvation party existed in the 1960s-70s, and there have been Refah and several Kurdish-oriented parties in the 1990s. However, when any of these parties becomes too threatening, this provision can be (and has been) invoked. Moreover, other countries, Germany being the clearest case, have banned parties, particularly the Nazis, due to their potential to undermine democracy.
42 For useful reviews with different points of view, see Michael Attalides, Cyprus, Nationalism, and International Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 1979); Zaim Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Clement Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio (Huntingdon UK: Eothen Press, 1998).
43 As of 1993, over 2,500,000 Turks lived in EU countries. Of these, 1,854,945 lived in Germany. See Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p.20.
44 Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 23.
45 Yavuz, 1999.
46 Quoted in Kushner, "Atatürk's Legacy: Westernism in Contemporary Turkey," in Landau, 1984, p. 240.
47 For more on Turkey's potential and desire to serve as a "bridge," see Ian Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War," in Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, eds. Turkey's New Geopolitics (Boulder: Westview, 1993).
48 Lewis, 1968, p. 424.
49 Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72:3, Summer I993: 22-49.
50 I do recognize the immense problems of assimilating millions of rural migrants into "modem" Turkish society, and do not expect the process to be simple or even a one-way transmission of values. People who grew up in Istanbul, for example, will acknowledge how the various new arrivals have changed the face of the city, often for the worse in their view. And, certainly a large urban poor amidst a richer, Westernized elite might prove a fertile ground for an Islamic revival. This is happening now in Turkey. However, my point is that exposure to schools (mandatory education was increased from five to eight years), the urban working environment, and urban culture will tear away at village culture and prevent a sweeping return to the past.
51 Birol Yesilada notes that Turkey is fundamentally tied to Europe and therefore Turkey cannot and will not break away from Europe. See his "The Worsening EU-Turkey Relations," SAIS Review 19:1, Winter-Spring 1999: 144-161.
52 See Henri Barkey, ed. Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).
53 Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After (London: John Murray, 1997), p. 347.
54 Yavuz 1999.
55 Lewis also concludes on a hopeful note, albeit in more flowery language. "The Turkish people, by the exercise of their practical common sense and powers of improvisation, may yet find a workable compromise between Islam and modernism that will enable them, without conflict, to follow both their fathers' path to freedom and progress and their grandfathers' path to God." (p. 424.)
56 Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists," in Metin Hcper, Ayse Oneil, and Heinz Kramer, eds. Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities (London: LB. Tauris, 1993), p. 68.
57 Ayse Oneil, "Small Worlds and Grand Projects," in Heper et al, 1993.
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