America’s diplomatic and commercial intercourse with Libya is one of the oldest such relationships in the history of the United States. Concerned with the threat posed by Mediterranean privateers, the U.S. Congress as early as 1784 had dispatched to Europe the famous trio of the Declaration of Independence, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, as ministers plenipotentiary with the mission to negotiate as many commercial treaties as possible with European and Mediterranean powers, including agreements with the Barbary states. This early diplomatic mission ended in failure, and Libya and the United States enjoyed full, productive and engaged relations for a mere two decades in the ensuing centuries. Elements of the current American-Libyan dialogue, while highlighting the growing ambiguity of the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, offer the real prospect of a new era in bilateral relations.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI
Following the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy on September 1, 1969, Muammar al-Qadhafi began to articulate an increasingly comprehensive ideology with strong Libyan antecedents but also enjoying similarities with the ideologies of other Arab revolutionary movements. He skillfully combined nationalism, anti- imperialism and pan-Islamic loyalty, political currents that had emerged in Libya at the beginning of the twentieth century, with more contemporary movements for Arab nationalism, Arab socialism and Arab unity.1
Arab nationalism was the core element of Qadhafi’s ideology, and the concept of jihad was the action element of that Arab nationalism. Qadhafi viewed jihad as a means to achieve social justice both inside and outside Libya. His revisionist approach to this traditional concept led the Libyan leader to support an eclectic mix of liberation movements from the African National Congress to the Irish Republican Army to Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines. That said, the Libyan concept of jihad found its most pragmatic expression in early support for a variety of Palestinian groups. Palestine being an integral part of the Arab nation, Qadhafi believed the latter could never be truly free and united until Palestine was completely liberated. Qadhafi’s support for liberation movements brought him into prolonged contact with international groups and activities that the U.S. government associated with terrorism. In response, he expended considerable effort in attempting to differentiate between revolutionary violence, which he supported, and terrorism, which he claimed to oppose.2 American officials generally proved unable or unwilling to differentiate between the two policies.
On the other hand, key American policy makers at the outset of the September 1 Revolution did believe, wrongly as it turned out, that the revolutionary government could become an ally in support of U.S. policy to keep Soviet influence out of the Middle East.3 Benevolently neutral toward the new regime, U.S. officials shielded Qadhafi from internal and external threats on multiple occasions in the early years of the revolution.4 This initial window of opportunity to develop a working relationship, if in fact it ever existed, subsequently disappeared as Libya’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question soured the prevailing policy mix. Before long, Libyan foreign policy was challenging the status quo in Africa and the Middle East at every opportunity.
The 1973 October war, followed by Libyan nationalization of U.S. oil interests – an action Qadhafi had earnestly promised American officials in 1969 he would never take – proved a watershed event. U.S.-Libyan relations rapidly deteriorated in the second half of the decade. The single exception was a brief, moderate improvement during the Carter administration. If the Carter presidency offered a second window of opportunity for improved relations, it was Qadhafi himself who slammed it shut. Libyan opposition to a negotiated Arab-Israeli peace, coupled with links to subversion, destabilization and terrorism before 1977 and after 1979, left no room for a sustained improvement in U.S.-Libyan relations.5
With the trashing of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli in December 1979, common ground for discussion disappeared. State- sponsored terrorism, according to the White House, was a weapon of unconventional warfare against the democracies of the West, a weapon that took advantage of their openness to build political hostility toward them. The subsequent closure of the U.S. embassy in 1980, together with the closure of the Libyan People’s Bureau in 1981, marked the outset of a sharp deterioration in diplomatic and, later, commercial relations.
POLICY OF CONFRONTATION
Falsely labeling Libya a Soviet puppet, the Reagan administration systematically increased diplomatic, economic and military pressure on the Qadhafi regime. As it moved to reassert American power and influence in the world, particularly in the Middle East, the confrontational policies of the U.S. government led to the American bombing in 1986 of Benghazi and Tripoli. At the time, Secretary of State George Shultz claimed that radio intercepts related to the La Belle Discothèque bombing attack, which had taken place 10 days earlier in West Berlin, were the “smoking gun” that proved Libyan complicity in terrorism. Nonetheless, questions continued to be raised years later as to the government or governments actually behind the bombing.6
Reagan’s attack on Libya differed from that of Thomas Jefferson on Tripoli almost two centuries earlier only in that Reagan appeared to target a head of state for destruction. Otherwise, the two actions were similar; both administrations sought to punish a relatively weak, minor player in the region in support of broader policy objectives. The Reagan administration ended its second term with its Libya policy intact; however, that policy had produced, at the very best, mixed results. On the one hand, President Reagan did succeed in making Libya a symbol of the international behavior he found unacceptable. On the other, core components of Libyan foreign policy in 1988, despite Reagan administration claims to the contrary, remained very similar to those before 1981.7 Moreover, bringing the full weight of American power on Libya did not eliminate global terrorism. This threw into question the actual role of the Qadhafi regime in many terrorist acts. In the end, the Reagan administration found it extremely difficult to confront Qadhafi in a way that played as well in Amman, Cairo or Riyadh as it played in Peoria.
Inexplicably, Qadhafi thought the end of the Reagan era offered yet another window of opportunity for improved diplomatic ties. In early January 1989, he invited the George H.W. Bush administration to conduct talks aimed at resolving issues that had dogged U.S.-Libyan relations for years. Shortly thereafter, Libya returned the body of a U.S. airman shot down during the April 1986 American raid. The first Bush administration soon dampened Qadhafi’s enthusiasm. Pressuring Libya on the issue of chemical weapons, it expanded the U.S. sanctions regime in place and orchestrated a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing an embargo on Libya. Adopting the so-called rogue-state doctrine, it linked the issues of state- sponsored terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to Libya and a few other states.8
Once again misreading the American political landscape, Qadhafi responded to the election of Bill Clinton with unmitigated glee, believing a Democratic administration offered a fresh window of opportunity to improve bilateral relations. Not surprisingly, he soon found all such windows tightly shuttered. In a virtually seamless transition, the Clinton administration from the beginning articulated a policy toward Libya that was difficult to distinguish in tone or content from that of its predecessor.
In May 1998, with U.N. sanctions on Libya beginning to crack, the Clinton administration reached a deal with European leaders to ease U.S. restrictions on multinational companies doing business with Cuba, Iran and Libya. Two months later, the State Department announced that Britain and the United States would consider the creation of a special court in the Netherlands to try two Libyan suspects for the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing. In March 1999, a French court convicted in absentia six Libyans, including Qadhafi’s brother-in-law, for the 1989 bombing of a French airliner, UTA flight 772, over Niger. The Libyan government refused to ac- knowledge responsibility for the attack or to turn over the indicted suspects, but it did agree to compensate the families of the 171 victims of the bombing. In July 1999, Britain restored full diplomatic relations with Libya after Tripoli agreed to cooper- ate with investigations into the fatal shooting in 1984 of a British policewoman outside the Libyan embassy in London.
As the Clinton administration neared the end of its second term, the future direction of U.S. policy toward Libya remained unclear. In March 2000, the Department of State quietly dispatched four consular officials on a lightning trip to Libya to assess travel safety for Americans. At the time, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that she would be inclined to lift the restrictions on travel to Libya if the safety assessment team recommended that action. Months later, in a period in which thousands of Europeans and others visited Libya with no problems, the issue remained open. This was due to the fact that representatives of the victims of the Lockerbie disaster, supported by a few highly influential members of Congress, had effectively stonewalled what many thought to be a relatively simple, clear-cut decision.9 In the State Department’s annual Overview of State- Sponsored Terrorism, issued in May 2000, Libya received a decidedly mixed assessment. More critical than the previous year, the new report stated that it remained unclear whether or not Libya’s recent attempts to distance itself from a terrorist past represented a true change in policy.10
A few days later, Ambassador Ronald Neumann, deputy assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs, confirmed before a Senate Foreign Relations Sub- committee that U.S. policy goals toward Libya had remained unchanged over the last three administrations. These goals were to end Libyan support for terrorism while limiting Libya’s ability to obtain weapons of mass destruction, to contain Libya’s regional ambitions, and to end Libyan opposition to the Middle East peace process. In the wake of the Pan Am 103 attack, a fourth goal, he said, was to bring to justice those persons responsible for the Lockerbie disaster. In a moment of candor, he concluded that the U.S. objective was to deter what he termed “Libyan policies of concern”; “an improved bilateral relation- ship” was not “in itself an end.”11
In a surprise announcement, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in June 2000 declared that rogue states, in effect, had ceased to exist as they would now be known as “states of concern.” Through the application of a more nuanced vocabulary, the Clinton administration hoped to encourage internal reforms in this unofficial gallery of states. The Qadhafi regime welcomed the change in nomenclature, describing it as a rational move that symbolized the return of Washington to more just criteria. One of the last official acts of the Clinton administration was to continue the state of emergency with Libya declared in January 1986. In part, the December 2000 notice read, “There are still concerns about the Libyan government’s support for terrorist activities and its noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992), and 883 (1993).”12
NEW INITIATIVES
The time appeared ripe, at the outset of the George W. Bush administration, to rethink U.S. policy toward Libya as part of a broader reevaluation of the U.S. role in the Middle East and the world. In spite of the spotlight on Qadhafi for more than three decades, misconceptions about his aims, conduct and theories were rife. Fundamental errors regarding the history of Libya were repeated ad nauseam, and a confused picture of the historical, economic and political perspectives dominating Libya were recurrent. On all sides, it appeared time to recognize that the American-Libyan relationship was an important one, certainly far more important than recent U.S. conduct would suggest.
Given the opportunity, there was some indication in the early days of the second Bush administration that American policy toward Libya would be substantially modified if not radically overhauled. On January 31, 2001, after a 12-year investigation and an 84-day trial costing an estimated $106 million (when costs of appeals were included), the three Scottish judges sitting in the special court at Camp Zeist found one of the two Libyan defendants guilty in the attack on Pan Am flight 103.13
The verdict in the Lockerbie trial, together with an appellate-court ruling in March 2002 that upheld the guilty verdict, brought some closure to the case. At the same time, it reinforced the belief of some of the family members of the victims, as well as others, that the Qadhafi regime was aware of and likely orchestrated the bombing. Responding to the Lockerbie verdict, President Bush indicated that the United States would maintain the unilateral sanctions in place on Libya, and oppose permanently lifting U.N. sanctions until Libya disclosed all it knew about the Lockerbie bombing, accepted responsibility for the role of Libyan officials in the act, compensated the families of the victims, and renounced support for terrorism. Administration officials and their British counterparts later met with Libyan representatives to discuss in more detail the specific actions the Libyan government would have to take to end U.N. sanctions.
At the same time, the White House initiated a review of U.S. sanctions policies. Arguing that sanctions were often ineffective and needlessly harmed American companies, the Bush administration advocated more flexibility than the U.S. Congress later proved willing to back. Where the White House favored a renewal of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act for two years only, Congress eventually voted overwhelmingly for a five-year extension. The 2001 ILSA Extension Act also lowered the operative investment level for the triggering of sanctions from $40 million to $20 million for Libya, the same level applied to Iran since 1997.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, followed by a heightened threat that terrorists might employ biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological weapons of mass destruction (WMD), destroyed any immediate opportunity for a more thorough rethinking of Libyan policy. Following Qadhafi’s measured response to both the terrorist attacks and the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan, the Libyan government rushed to share with the Bush administration intelligence information on Libyan organizations with ties to the Osama bin Laden terrorist network. Nevertheless, Libya’s close association with terrorism, long-time interest in nuclear technology, ongoing attempts to develop chemical weapons, and recent purchases of missile-delivery systems made any immediate change in U.S. policy improbable if not impossible.14
This was not to say both sides did not have much to gain from rapprochement. For Libya, resolution of the Lockerbie affair would be a first step in the eventual lifting of U.S. sanctions. This would open the way for American oil companies to do business in Libya and for Libya to rehabilitate its battered economy. While Europe remains the principal market for Libyan oil, European access to high-quality Libyan crude keeps global oil supplies up and U.S. gasoline prices down. It could also result in Libya’s being the first state to graduate from the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. With five of the seven countries on the list Muslim states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan), it would also buttress the Bush administration’s argument that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam.
Diplomatically, the U.S. embargo continues to strain American relations with key European partners like France, Germany and Italy, as well as important allies in the Arab and Muslim worlds and Africa. In addition, it stifles research by Americans in Libya and chokes the flow of Libyan students to the United States. The impact of the embargo on the 1990s generation of American students of North Africa and the Middle East has been especially noteworthy and unfortunate. Unilateral and multi- lateral sanctions, together with comprehensive travel restrictions to Libya, have also compromised the knowledge base that had begun to develop in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and in the process, largely returned us to a state of ignorance about Libya. Lacking anything more than the most basic information, we must recognize that U.S. policy toward Libya today is at best grounded in an incomplete assessment of Libyan affairs.
Bush administration policy toward Libya after September 11 also highlighted the growing ambiguity of the war on terrorism. The State Department in November 2001 extended for another year the restrictions on using U.S. passports for travel to Libya. And in March 2002, the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review listed Libya, together with Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Syria, as potential adversaries because of their long-term hostility toward the United States, links to terrorism and programs to develop missiles and other WMD. The most recent State Department Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism, issued in May 2002, again included Libya, albeit with the significant qualification that “Sudan and Libya seem closest to understanding what they must do to get out of the terrorism business, and each has taken measures pointing it in the right direction.”15
At the same time, Bush administration officials continued to meet with their Libyan counterparts to solicit their support in the war on terrorism. And talks between Libyan officials and representatives of the families of the Lockerbie victims also continued. An indication of the substance of these talks finally surfaced publicly in late May 2002, when the legal team representing many of the families of the 270 Lockerbie victims suggested that Libya was prepared to pay each of the families $10 million for a total compensation package of $2.7 billion. The proposed deal called for the money to be put in escrow with 40 percent distributed when U.N. sanctions were lifted, an additional 40 percent released when U.S. sanctions were lifted, and the final 20 percent released when the United States removed Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Secretary of State Colin Powell termed the offer a “step in the right direction” but reserved further judgment until Libya had presented a formal proposal.16
RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS
Crafting engagement with Libya presents a unique challenge that begins with the tricky question of how to reward the Qadhafi regime for partial rehabilitation while encouraging it to do more. In this regard, the sanctions regime in place since 1986 is part of the problem as opposed to part of the solution because it greatly restricts U.S. freedom of movement absent further progress. For the last two decades, the United States has relied on a basket of coercive measures, both unilateral and multilateral, to force change in Libyan foreign policy. With the suspension of U.N. sanctions and the conclusion of the Lockerbie trial, overseas support for sanctions has evaporated. Since it is impossible for the United States unilaterally to isolate Libya, the Bush administration needs to advance an alternate strategy, a road map that directly ties U.S. policy initiatives to positive actions on the part of Libya.17
Obvious milestones on the road map would begin with the actions called for in U.N. Security Council resolutions. Libya has yet to meet four of the demands contained in those resolutions: 1) to dis- close all it knows about the Lockerbie bombing; 2) to accept responsibility for the role of Libyan officials in the Lockerbie bombing; 3) to formally renounce terror- ism; and 4) to pay compensation to the relatives of the Lockerbie victims. Reciprocal obligations on the part of the United States as Libya reaches these four mile- stones would include lifting U.N. sanctions, rescinding the restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Libya, unfreezing Libyan government assets in the United States, and removing Libya from the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism.
A subsequent set of milestones would block Libyan acquisition of WMD through a broad-based, international strategy designed to prevent the sale to Libya of WMD technology, together with attendant missile systems. This initiative would be coupled to Libyan reaffirmation of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (which Libya has signed), compliance with the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (which Libya has indicated a willingness to sign) and reaffirmation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (to which Libya acceded in 1982). As these milestones are met, reciprocal obligations would include a gradual relaxation of U.S. sanctions, beginning with the non-oil sectors of the Libyan economy and leading eventually to the permanent lifting of the U.S. sanctions regime; granting Libya access to international capital markets; and initiating low-level diplomatic contacts in the form of “interests offices” in Tripoli and Washington.
The endgame in this scenario would be a normalization of commercial ties, together with the restoration of full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, an action that might not occur until Qadhafi has departed the Libyan scene. A road map of this sort could take years to traverse. Along the way, opportunities will almost surely develop for delays and detours, with little chance for short-cuts and acceleration, unless there is a regime change in Libya.
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, many of the suggested milestones on the proposed road map are not new, but the emphasis on clearly spelled-out, reciprocal obligations has been sorely lacking in U.S. policy. Like Vietnam a decade ago, Libya needs to be given specific, incremental incentives to adopt the policy behavior we expect. To achieve success in the war on terrorism, the United States would be wise to move beyond the stale rhetoric of the past. The country faces a new enemy that must be met with bold, new strategies if it is to be thwarted. U.S. strategy encouraging reform and cooperation from old adversaries while preparing to combat new ones has much to recommend it.
There is no evidence to suggest that Libya has been directly involved in state- sponsored terrorism for more than a decade. While it must atone for past acts, it should also be encouraged to move in positive new directions. Switching sides in the war on terrorism, Qadhafi appears to be trying to come in from the cold. He should be encouraged in this transformation. The first step is the creation of a clear road map with reciprocal obligations at each milestone to encourage and reward policy change.
1 For an introduction to the ideology of the Libyan revolution see Ronald Bruce St John, “The Ideology of Mu’ammar al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, November 1983, pp. 471-90.
2 Qadhafi later summarized his opposition to the prevailing world order in a short essay published after the implosion of the Soviet Union. Muammar al-Qadhafi, “Is Communism Truly Dead?” Escape to Hell and Other Stories (New York: Stanké, 1998), pp. 167-81.
3 Mahmoud G. El Warfally, Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Libya, 1969-1982 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), pp. 76-77, 85-86; Salah El Saadany, Egypt and Libya from Inside, 1969-1976: The Qadhafi Revolution and the Eventual Break in Relations, by the Former Egyptian Ambassador to Libya (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1994), pp. 75-77.
4 John K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm: The Complete Account of Qadhafi’s Revolution (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), pp. 80-100; Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, Colin Legum, ed., Vol. 5, 1972-73 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1973), p. B54; Peter Maas, “Selling Out,” The New York Times Magazine, April 13, 1986; Seymour M. Hersh, “The Qadhafi Connection,” The New York Times Magazine, June 14, 1981.
5 For a detailed discussion of American-Libyan relations after 1969, see Ronald Bruce St John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).
6 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 683. A German court convicted four people in late 2001 of bombing the La Belle Discothèque at the behest of Libya. “Libya bears at the very least a considerable part of the responsibility for the attack,” said the judge, adding that the personal responsibility of Qadhafi had not been proven. Steven Erlanger, “4 Guilty in 1986 Disco Bombing, Linked to Libya, in West Berlin,” The New York Times, November 14, 2001.
7 Ronald Bruce St John, “Qadhafi’s World Design Revisited,” Global Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 161-73.
8 Michael T. Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), pp. 33-34, 44-45, 61-64, 146-48.
9 Apathetic internationalism encourages politicians to neglect foreign-policy issues. It also empowers the squeaky wheel, in that American politicians cater to groups with narrow but intense interests. James M. Lindsay, “The New Apathy: How an Uninterested Public Is Reshaping Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 5, September/October 2000, pp. 2-8.
10 U.S. Department of State, “Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism,” Internet edition, May 1, 2000, pp. 3- 4, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/2000/overview.htm.
11 “Statement of Hon. Ronald E. Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC,” U.S. Foreign Policy toward Libya, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, Internet edition, May 4, 2000, pp. 4-7, quote 7, http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ senate.
12 “Letter from the President: Continuing the Libya Emergency,” White House Press Office, January 4, 2001, Mimeograph copy.
13 In the High Court of Justiciary at Camp Zeist (Case No: 1475/99), Opinion of the Court, delivered by Lord Sutherland in causa Her Majesty’s Advocate v Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa, Mimeograph copy.
14 In June 2001, a German court sentenced a German engineer to 2.5 years in prison for delivering parts to a Libyan factory that could manufacture poison gas. Libya News List, Internet edition, June 19, 2001. Four months later, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera reported the arrest of a Libyan chemist implicated in preparations for bioterrorist attacks planned by the Osama bin Laden organization. AFP (Rome), Libya News List, Internet edition, October 22, 2001.
15 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and New Targets,” The New York Times, May 10, 2002; U.S. Department of State, “Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism,” Internet edition, May 21, 2002, p. 1, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/2001 overview.htm.
16 Steven A. Holmes, “Libyan Money for Flight 103 Isn’t Remorse, U.S. Says,” The New York Times, May 30, 2002; Matthew L. Wald, “Libyan Offer of $2.7 Billion in Pan Am Blast,” The New York Times, May 29, 2002; Robert S. Greenberger, “Sept. 11 Aids Gadhafi in Effort to Get Libya off U.S. Terrorist List,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2002.
17 Ray Takeyh, Milton Viorst and David Mack, “U.S.-Libya Relations: A Way Forward?” Policy Briefs, The Middle East Institute, Internet edition, April 12, 2002, http://www.mideasti.org/html/b-mack041202.html; Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, May/June 2001, pp. 62-72; David L. Mack, “U.S. Policy toward Libya: Concerns, Interests, and Options,” Policy Briefs, The Middle East Institute, Internet edition, November 16, 2001, http://www.mideasti.org/html/b- mack021601.html.
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