The following articles stemmed from presentations at a roundtable that was held at the Middle East Studies Association meeting in Boston in November 2006. Matteo Legrenzi, assistant professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, was the organizer.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been numerous proposals aimed at redesigning the security architecture of the Persian Gulf. These calls have received renewed attention in the wake of a heightening of tensions in the region following the impasse in negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program. However, upon close scrutiny, most of these schemes do not seem to tackle the hard-political realities that characterize the international politics of the Gulf. In particular, by referring to institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that have been developed in completely different circumstances, the advocates of a new security architecture seem to confuse cause and effect.
The setting up of collective-security schemes and confidence-building measures has to be preceded by a resolution of the underlying political problems, not vice versa. At the moment, the Gulf is characterized by competition among states with widely divergent security agendas. Defense cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the closest thing to a collective-security institution in the area, has always been largely symbolic. In this regard, the recent disbanding of the common Peninsula Shield force, while presented to the world as a “reorganization,” represents a coming to terms with reality. In this context, it is important to understand the conflicting security perceptions of local actors as well as the conceptualization of the situation on the part of the United States, the foremost international power in the area.
The 2006 MESA roundtable from which these edited proceedings were gleaned sought to elucidate mutual threat perceptions in the Gulf. The aim is to overcome the usual distinction between “Arab” and “Persian” perspectives in tackling the subject of Gulf security and stability. The panel brought together experts who are thoroughly familiar with the threat perceptions of various states bordering the Gulf. These contributions are supplemented by those of an analyst who has had a direct hand in shaping American security policy in the region.
Gregory Gause sets the stage with an analysis of the impact of threat perceptions on states’ behavior in the international arena. He then argues that domestic destabilization threats are more salient in the perception of Gulf elites than classic power capabilities threats. He identifies what he imaginatively labels the “Bullwinkle Conundrum,” the tendency of Gulf states to overestimate their own domestic weaknesses in the face of efforts by foreign powers to interfere in their domestic politics. He concludes that, in the Gulf, the perception of a threat can be more important than an objective assessment in forming leaders’ world views. He warns that it would be a mistake for the United States to base its regional policies on the belief that regional states are weak reeds ready to be toppled by the latest ideological wind.
Mark Gasiorowski takes a close look at what is driving the new apparent aggressive- ness in Iranian foreign policy in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region. He identifies several areas in which Iran can be said to have adopted more intransigent policies recently and concludes that, while Iran’s foreign policy has been more aggressive in recent years, this new aggressiveness has been limited in scope, mainly involving Iraq and a more defiant posture on the nuclear dispute. He concludes with the recommendation that American efforts to influence Iranian behavior should take into account Iran’s legitimate security interests, and he suggests a few steps that might help ease the current Gulf security conundrum in the short and medium term.
Thomas Mattair, who recently completed a comprehensive work on the issue of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, is extremely well-qualified to provide insight into the threat perceptions of the six GCC states. He identifies four main areas of concern: terrorism, Iraq, Iran and overall U.S. policy in the region. For each of these, he provides a first-hand account of the shared threat perceptions of GCC members.
Finally, James Russell details the genesis of the current regional-security architecture in the Gulf. This is a subject often alluded to without an in-depth understanding of its textured and nuanced development. James Russell shows that the United States inherited a security infrastructure from the British and developed it to the current level of sophistication. This careful analysis should give pause to those who, often in light of the Iraqi tragedy, talk about a “reduced footprint” and an “over the horizon” presence without realizing that this would involve a major restructuring of the U.S. — and, more generally, the Western — security posture in the area. In particular, proponents of often-imaginative new security compacts for the Gulf would do well to reflecting on how the current, fairly shaky, security complex is underwritten by a solid U.S. military presence.
It is hoped that this collection of short papers will help readers to gain a better understanding of the international relations of an ever more crucial area of the world, on that is often grossly caricatured in the contemporary policy debate.
Matteo Legrenzi
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