Hundreds of books have been written about Iraq since the U.S. invasion and occupation on March 18, 2003, but none with the passion of Nemir Kirdar's "Saving Iraq." The book is not political analysis or history; nor is it an apology for, or screed against, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is a passionate statement about how to set Iraq on a course toward achieving a vibrant, dynamic state that can fulfill its promising destiny.

Kirdar is an international banker educated in the United States who began his career with a U.S. bank and is a generous philanthropist to American institutions. He is descended from a distinguished Iraqi family, many of whom served in government positions. His grandfather represented Kirkuk in the first Ottoman parliament in 1908 in Istanbul. After the establishment of modern Iraq and throughout the years of the Hashemite monarchy, from 1921 to 1958, his grandfather, his father and finally his oldest brother were elected members from Kirkuk in the parliament in Baghdad. For Kirdar, Iraq's golden age was under the rule of King Faisal I, a period of optimism as Iraq emerged from British tutelage to become independent in 1932:

Like political systems everywhere, Iraq's fledgling constitutional monarchy may not always have been perfect, but it put the country on the right track. Under the energetic and wise leadership of King Faisal I and the prime ministers he appointed, ... Iraq made gigantic strides from a past of ethnic, tribal and religious divisions toward a future of unity, prosperity and national pride. Faisal I's 12-year rule laid the foundations for free enterprise, social welfare and a modern infrastructure (p.9).

Kirdar is especially proud of Iraq's early attempts at democracy, by adopting a constitution on March 21, 1925, that included clauses on individual rights: "There shall be no differentiation in the rights of Iraqis before the law, whatever differences may exist in language, race or creed" (Part 1, Article 6). "Needless to say," he writes, "the system in place in the Iraq of yesterday stands in stark contrast to the dictatorships that followed" (p. 9).

Kirdar supported deposing Saddam Hussein but dismisses the idea that the invasion, surge and elections have been a success. He chronicles a litany of U.S. policy failures but stops short of naming or blaming:

While the key role played by President George W. Bush in toppling the tyrant will be recognized by history, the declared intention of the US administration to create a stable, prosperous and democratic nation has not been achieved. By pointing out the misguided policies that led to this and other failures, and lamenting the immense harm done to Iraqi society and the cause of democracy and prosperity, I am in no way disparaging the United States and the great values upon which it stands (p. xv).

This is an example of the emotional tenor of the book, a cri de coeur from a native son lamenting the descent of his homeland into chaos, violence and ruin. "On the contrary, I have the highest respect and admiration for the US and its history of freedom, democracy and economic opportunity. Indeed, I have been the beneficiary of these values in my own life, and I continue to admire them" (pp. xv-xvi).

While Kirdar is supportive of the invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein, he blames the neoconservatives for their incompetent management, failed strategy, and general ignorance of Iraq and Iraqis:

The history of the occupation of Iraq provides a handbook of how not to build a new state. One major failure was to place the fate of the entire country in the hands of people who, for the most part, knew very little about Iraq. Other mistakes included providing US support to expatriate Iraqis who were unqualified for leadership positions; raising the status of warlords and other scavengers at the expense of more qualified Iraqis, and instituting policies that all but ensured that if Iraq survived as a country at all, it would be economically weak and politically fragmented (p. 111).

Kirdar understands the lack of transparency of today's government in Iraq; "This sham democracy, hastily cobbled together, based on sectarian differences, a flawed constitution and premature elections has made the goal of a just and stable political order in Iraq impossible to attain. In short, the current dysfunctional system, built on dubious principles and a shaky foundation, is sure to result in the end in no democracy at all" (p. 149). Indeed, there is no real or imagined prize in this sordid disaster that can possibly compensate for handing Iraq over to Iran.

Kirdar has not forgotten, however, the promise of a nation built from three disparate provinces, though it now threatens to split apart. "The new Iraq is a country I believe can still emerge from the broken Iraq of today. It is an Iraq of my dreams, and the dreams of many other Iraqis. This Iraq of tomorrow can be the country it was always meant to be if its leaders and people reassert the cherished values and principles of their country's promising early years: national pride, good governance, tolerance, openness and economic freedom" (p. xiii). Kirdar believes this can happen, "but first, Iraqis must disengage the current corrupt and incompetent warlords who have been injected by the occupation to rule the country. They must replace the destructive 2005 constitution with a new political charter that ensures unity, integrity, fairness and tolerance" (p. xx).

Kirdar's worst fears are that religious leaders will interfere in the politics of an Iraqi democracy and that the Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites will function as separate ethnic groups. To reduce the influence of religion and ethnic strife in politics, he encourages disqualifying religious leaders from taking part in political leadership, arguing that they are ill-equipped to play this role. He also advocates democratic economic reforms that would unify the country's diverse ethnic and religious groups. "The new government should abolish federalism, tribalism and ethnic and religious divides, offering instead a better lifestyle, personal freedom and the rule of law to every Iraqi, irrespective of gender, religion or ethnicity" (p. 156). Kirdar is a promoter of democracy, but with a caveat. He argues that it is not possible to move from dictatorship to a well-functioning democracy without first setting the nation on a course that can accomplish this objective — and it can only be done by centralized power during the initial phase.

Iraq may not evolve into a democratic secular state any time soon, but Kirdar, a banker, may make his most important contribution by proposing five steps for promoting a sustainable economy: (1) transparency, to fight corruption; (2) incentives, to encourage private development; (3) close working relationships with international institutions, to reinforce fiscal responsibility; (4) adoption of global best practices, to enhance efficiency; and (5) a social safety net, to protect all Iraqis, including women, who would have full participation in the workforce.

Kirdar's recommendations are commendable, needed and wise. One worries, however, that Iraq is a country deeply mired in a Middle East that resists modernization of economies and democratization. And even the "Arab Spring," while bringing some hope to the region, does not seem to affect Iraq. Ethnic and religious divisions, poor governance, and incitement from neighboring states are high hurdles for those leaders and thinkers attempting to move towards an open, secular, democratic Iraq. Optimism and a vision such as Kirdar's will not by themselves narrow the gap between where Iraq is and where it needs to be, but they could be very helpful for leaders willing to do some hard work.