After the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, the traditional balance of power consisting of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia was destroyed, producing a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf. A new triangle comprising the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia has both enabled Iran to create a sphere of influence that instrumentalizes the Iraqi Shiites and made the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries vulnerable.

Since 2003, the longstanding structural tensions in the Persian Gulf have become more evident, increasing the divergent interests of Iran and the GCC countries. This article will focus on the reasons Iran has been increasingly perceived as a threat by the Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), with a special emphasis on the course of relations during the 1990s. In addition, to what extent can regionalism be applied in the Gulf region? This will be discussed by taking into consideration factors such as identity, definition of security challenges, and dependency on outside support.

Three points will be stressed. First, it is not possible to ensure stability and peace in the region if Iran is totally excluded and identities are formulated on the basis of inclusion. Second, Tehran’s rejection of any partnership with Washington and its assertive revisionist policies serve to promote the status quo, which makes the GCC states more dependent on the United States. Finally, because human security, grass-roots relations, and nations’ political demands and expectations are gaining importance, security challenges are no longer defined in terms of hard interstate rivalries. Therefore, the alarm bells regarding Iran’s influence over the Shiite population in the region so as to enhance the importance of grass-roots relations might have been a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy in the formation of that Shiite crescent.