John Turner
Mr. Turner is a doctoral candidate at Surrey University, United Kingdom.
The Middle East cold war has entered a new phase in the wake of the Arab Spring that will have significant implications for the region and the world at large. It has been common for scholars of international politics and the Middle East to view events of the region as extensions of external political experiences. However, this relationship has been equally reciprocal. The first Middle East cold war (1952-70), which Malcolm Kerr observed in the 1960s,1 was in part an extension of the global Cold War; however, it still held its own distinct regional characteristics. In what Valbjorn and Bank refer to as the new Arab cold war that began in 1979, this is still the case.2 This conflict intensified beginning around 2003 with the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and further escalated with the election of Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005. The tensions between the competing powers of the region have now been further strained by the events of the Arab Spring. It is argued here that, in this new conflict, great powers are not attempting to exploit regional rivalries to gain an advantage over other powers, but rather are themselves being manipulated by regional adversaries. As Pierre Guerlain asserts, "Client states and their leaders always exploit their relationships with their powerful allies to achieve their own goals."3 In the case of the new Middle East cold war, this is indeed the case, to such an extent that the clients themselves have become very adept at appealing to the fears and interests of their supposed benefactors.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran marked the beginning of the second Middle East cold war. Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with their allies, have been engaged in confrontation since that time. The new Arab cold war is composed of two competing alignments, the revolutionary bloc (Iran, Syria and Hezbollah) and the status quo bloc (Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar).4 Egypt, a former significant ally to the status quo states, is now an unknown. Iraq, which is in a period of transition, is also unaligned. Iran and Saudi Arabia are natural rivals that have competed aggressively to preserve and expand their power in the region.5 To some extent, tensions began to thaw in the years following the election of Muhammad Khatami to the Iranian presidency in 1997.6 However, the Arab Spring, along with Saddam Hussein's overthrow and Ahmadinejad's presidency, has renewed old tensions. This has put the world's great powers — the United States, Russia and China — in an awkward position. In general, these actors prefer regional stability. Regional unrest, however, has forced them to make a difficult choice: To what extent are they willing to hold to their traditional alliances?
The politics of the Middle East are influenced by a variety of factors. Ideas of Arab nationalism, Islamic unity, and imperialism, as well as sectarian and ethnic divides, have all plagued, undermined and at times strengthened the various states of the region. In spite of these persistent challenges to the sovereignty of individual states and the problems faced by the ruling elites, the Middle East substate system remains intact — if in some cases superficially. Although the Middle East cold war is defined by state interests, sectarian and ethnic divisions as well as ideological positions represent both the defining features of this war and the tools that are employed to fight it.
The Arab Spring represents both an opportunity and a danger to these cold-war adversaries. Egypt, once firmly bonded to Saudi Arabia, friendly to Western powers and committed to the Camp David Accords, is now an unknown.7 Iran may well see the prospects of an Islamist government in Egypt — though of Sunni origin — as an opportunity for stronger relations with that country and an opportunity to peel Egypt away from its traditional Arab and Western allies as well. The events in Egypt were largely an Egyptian enterprise. However, the case of Syria may not be quite so simple. Iran openly championed the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Bahrain, heralding them as a blow to Western intrusion and a victory for Islam.8 However, no such cheerful praise was afforded the Syrian revolutionaries from Ahmadinejad or the clerical establishment.9 With the uprising against Bashir al-Assad's regime, the tables are to some extent being turned on Iran. Its erstwhile ally is under threat and the status-quo bloc sees an opportunity to eliminate, or at least paralyze, Iran's most valuable ally. They are actively intervening in the conflict. Saudi Arabian clerics like Aead al-Qarni have urged jihad against the Syrian regime. Al-Qarni asserted that "Bashar's legitimacy has expired. What is needed is that he be killed."10 The Arab League attempted to stop Assad's crackdown diplomatically. However, Saudi Arabia has armed the Free Syrian Army through tribal channels in Iraq and Lebanon,11 and Qatar has openly proposed financing the rebels.12
HISTORY
Malcolm Kerr observed in 1965 that the politics of the Middle East from the 1952 Egyptian revolution until the death Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 could be understood in terms of an "Arab Cold War" that was a sub-feature of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States.13 The republics — Egypt, Syria and Lebanon — backed by the Soviets, endeavored to reshape the region along the lines of pan-Arab nationalism. The monarchies — primarily Saudi Arabia and Jordan, but also Iraq before the Baathist takeover — backed by the United States, sought to maintain the regional status quo that recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country. Although related to the broader Cold War, the Arab cold war had distinctly Arab features; it was not exclusively an extension of super-power rivalries.
The second Middle East cold war began in 1979 following the Iranian Islamic Revolution. It differed distinctly from the first conflict. The actors and alliances have changed over time; ethnicity and religion play a stronger role; and Iran, which had once largely sat on the sidelines of Middle East politics, is now a key player. At the heart of the new Middle East cold war the same struggle prevails: status-quo actors opposing revolutionary aspirants. There is no global cold war that the conflict can be attached to; the interests of great powers in the region — China, the United States and Russia — are still significant. However, the conflict cannot be viewed as an extension of global politics. Even though old loyalties that were formed during the Cold War remain, the conflict is not about the actors outside of the region seeking to manipulate the politics of the Middle East for advantage. Indeed, the leading world powers are more inclined towards stability. Even if the invasion of Iraq should be regarded as an ill-conceived departure from this position, the objective was a change of the head of state, not an attempt to best a foreign adversary for regional influence. Indeed, it was an attempt to guarantee stability, though this clearly has not met with the desired results.
The 1979 revolution in Iran dramatically altered the political landscape of the region, bringing to the forefront sectarian divisions. The influence of Iran on the Shia populations of the Middle East — a majority in Iraq and nearly 70 percent of the population of the Persian Gulf — has been a consistent concern for Arab leaders.14 Before the fall of the Baathist regime in 2003, Iraq served as a buffer against Iranian hegemonic ambitions. Iran never successfully managed to convince the Shia in Iraq to rebel against their Sunni masters, as was demonstrated most clearly during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Jordan's King Abdullah attempted, as Arab leaders have done before, to make political capital out of the sectarian issue. He warned before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq that, if the Baath regime in Iraq were dismantled, a "Shia Crescent" would engulf the region: "If pro-Iranian parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government a new crescent of dominant Shia movements or governments stretching from Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge."15 The sectarian divide between Sunni and Shiite has been a defining feature of the Arab cold war. However, the Middle East cold war has less to do with sectarian divisions and is linked rather to differing interpretations of regional politics. Iran and its affiliates are transformational actors seeking to limit Western influence and undermine Israel. The status quo actors seek greater regional stability and are willing to tolerate U.S. military presence, as it serves as a security guarantor.
Tensions between the competing powers began to ease in the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The election of Muhammad Khatemi to the Iranian presidency in 1997 represented a moment of detente. Khatemi spoke of a "dialogue of civilizations"16 and attempted to scale back Iranian hegemonic ambitions. This period of tempered ambitions was short-lived. The election of Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 marked the end of detente. Ahmadinejad began to "turn back the clock on the revolution" and steer the country on a course that would further intensify Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors.17 Additionally, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq created a political vacuum in what was an important buffer state. Iraq, which had been seen by the status quo bloc as an obstacle to Iranian ambitions, was now a weak state that could no longer provide for its own security. Further, the presence of large numbers of Western forces on Iran's borders in Iraq, and as well Afghanistan, presented an imminent security threat to the Islamic Republic. Iran, which has long attempted to influence the Shiite population of Iraq, was now more capable of doing so than it had been when Hussein was in power. In this sense, the situation in Iraq represented both a threat and an opportunity for Iranian ambitions. Iran may feel threatened by the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq, but the decapitation of the Sunni regime allowed Iraq potentially to move from the orbit of Saudi Arabia into that of Iran.18 The Saudi foreign minister displayed his concern when he insisted to U.S. officials in 2006 that the invasion of Iraq was a "handover to Iran."19
The Arab Spring represents the most recent shifting of the regional balance. The status quo bloc has lost, at least in the short term, an ally in Egypt. The country is now dominated by an Islamist government led by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party, which is an unknown. It may not be a potential ally of the revolutionary bloc, but at the least Egypt has been detached from the status quo powers. The uprisings in Bahrain and Yemen and the fall of Qadhafi and Ben Ali may not be of great significance. However, Syria is a different case. The chaos of Iraq and the fall of Mubarak may well have given Iran the advantage, but the Arab powers are proving they are keen to regain it by influencing the uprisings against Iran's ally Bashar al-Assad.
THE UTILITY OF GREAT POWERS, EAST VS. WEST
The Arab Spring further complicates the tensions between Riyadh and Tehran and represents both opportunities and challenges. Saudi Arabia and Iran have historically preferred to conduct operations through proxies. The Lebanese civil war of the 1980s provides an example.20 The fall of Iraq has opened a chasm in the political landscape. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was friendly to neither the status quo bloc nor the revolutionary bloc. At the center of the Middle East, Iraq presented an obstacle to the ambitions of both. The fall of the regime caused Arab leaders to point to the rise of the Shia and the potential influence Iran could conceivably exert over the region by exporting its revolutionary ideology. The sudden chaos of the Arab Spring forced the two blocs to seek an advantage. The fall of Iraq and the overthrow of Mubarak were the first blows to the status quo powers. Yet the uprising in Syria represents an opportunity for them to strike back and deprive Iran of its most valuable regional ally.
Following the global Cold War, relations between East and West were less hostile and continue to trend toward cooperation. For great powers, the Middle East is a crucial supplier of oil, and regional stability has in the broader sense been seen to serve the interests of all parties. The Cold War included a dichotomy of alliances. In essence, alliance with one camp prevented significant interaction with the other. Both East and West sought to collect clients in the Middle East by exploiting regional divisions and emerging situations. Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi was a Western client; however, following the revolution Iran gravitated towards the Soviet sphere of influence. Iraq pragmatically made use of any power it viewed as serving its interests.21 Egypt, a Soviet client under Nasser, fell inside the American sphere of influence during Sadat's administration.22 However, the relationships in place following the Cold War remain largely intact in the contemporary period. Iran and Syria look to the East, while the other Arab states and Saudi Arabia look primarily to the West.
Great Powers, it is argued, all ultimately desire regional stability, but they take different approaches to reach this end. As the United States, China and Russia have similar interests, broadly perceived, they are less in competition over access to resources and regional allies but, rather, make rival claims as to how this can be achieved. How regional stability can be preserved — or, to the mind of some, created — is a matter of debate. China and Russia historically have applied a general policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the Middle East, preferring to maintain the status quo, leaving existing regimes in place wherever possible. The West, however, approaches the problem from the alternative perspective. Regional stability, for Western policy makers, lies in the promotion of democracy and human rights. Iraq, it was argued in the prelude to the 2003 invasion, was a danger to its neighbors, not least of all to the world's second-largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia. In 1991, the international community, including the great powers, had agreed that Iraq was a threat. This was not a universally agreed-upon premise in 2003. Containing Saddam Hussein's regime was acceptable to the Chinese and Russians; dismantling it was another matter. Where the approaches of Russia, China and the United States may appear to be in stark opposition, they still, in effect, are intended to keep the region open for business.
Looking at the contemporary period through a different lens may afford better perspective on regional dynamics and the post-Cold War role of the great powers in the Middle East, most pressingly in the period since 9/11. Great powers desire stability; however, regional rivals have other interests. The Middle East cold war, defined by the two competing blocs led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, has largely been fought through proxies. Increasingly, though, it is also fought using more powerful outside players, exploiting their fears and interests. This is a departure from the conventional wisdom on the Middle East, which holds that the great powers, most obviously the United States, act to outmaneuver their peer competitors on the Middle East chessboard.
The new Middle East cold war, though led by states, also exists at the substate level and includes societal actors.23 The rhetoric resides at both levels. It is argued that various themes are employed in this securitization discourse,24 some for domestic consumption and some for the consumption of transnational groups, most specifically Shias and Sunnis. It is as well a performance to stimulate and ultimately manipulate outside actors.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said, "America's plans for Syria are evident, and unfortunately some foreign and regional countries take part in America's plans."25 In opposition to this assertion, a Saudi official warned,
Iran is a direct and imminent threat not only to the Saudi Kingdom, but to Sunnis across the region. They have shown this time and time again in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. If Washington can't protect our interests in the region we'll have to do it ourselves.26
Two themes consistently emerge: the United States is a facilitator of disruption and an imperialist power, and Shite Iran poses a threat to the Sunni Arabs.
On the one hand, Iran points to the United States as an imperial power, arguing for regional solidarity based on Islamic brotherhood to counter it. Iran attempts to deploy soft-power mechanisms to win the support of the Arab Shias. It attempts to be a vanguard of Islam, displaying its credentials through anti-Western, anti-Israel rhetoric and support for Hezbollah. Conversely, the players in the status quo bloc point to the security threat Iran poses by pointing out its transgressions and arguing for the potential crisis that a Shiite crescent and a nuclear-capable Iran may pose. Haji-Yousefi observes that these notions draw attention to Iran's growing regional influence.27 The powers of the cold-war blocs spin a variety of messages to each actor in relation to its particular view of world and regional affairs, pandering to interests and exploiting fears.
CHINA AND RUSSIA
The Eastern Players largely operate pragmatically, absent ideological encumbrances. They have, however, been tied, as a result of alignments that emerged during the global Cold War, to the revolutionary bloc, primarily Syria and Iran. Even so, Russia and China, wary of Tehran's nuclear ambitions, agreed to UN Security Council resolutions to impose sanctions on Iran.28 The Russians emphasized their desire to seek non-military solutions. Russian UN delegate Vitaly Churkin said his vote in favor of sanctions had been "guided by his country's consistent position on the need for to resolve through dialogue all questions involving Iran's nuclear programme."29 The Chinese delegate further confirmed this position from Beijing's perspective. Li Baodong noted, "like previous texts, the current one reflects international concerns as well as the desire of all parties to resolve the matter through dialogue and negotiations."30
Despite China's historical claims to Marxist ideology and its sympathetic position towards other rising postcolonial states, its foreign policy generally works to secure its own interests free of ideological concerns and attempts not to oppose the West directly. On the face of it, China's chief concern would appear to be oil; in 1993, China turned from an exporter to an importer.31 But China has other concerns, both economic and material. It exports labor services to the Gulf region, a measure that helps to lower employment pressure and increases foreign-exchange earnings.32 Additionally, there are Chinese concerns regarding its own Muslim populations in the Xinxiang region, which has demanded independence. For China, it is not desirable to be caught up in affairs that involve religion. The Chinese work not to be seen as supporting a majority Shiite state against its Sunni neighbors. In this, China has never made a definitive choice between Iran and Saudi Arabia.33
China has long been courted by Iran as a potential ally. The Iran-Iraq War forced Iran to turn to Asia for arms supplies and crude exports. The bulk of its arms trade came from Russia, China and North Korea.34 Iran has remained an important trading partner for China, using this relationship to enlist China in a strategic reorientation of the region.35 China, however, has not necessarily been sympathetic to Iranian ambitions. China largely employs a passive-reactive stance to regional events,36 not appearing to share the Iranian goal of severely undermining the U.S. presence in the region.37 Chinese policy makers have demonstrated an unwillingness to critically upset its ties with Washington.38 China supports many of the broader objectives of other great powers, principally stability. The development of nuclear weapons would no doubt threaten this. However, military intervention, which the West has stated remains an option, is understood by China as equally disruptive to regional stability.39 China's energy supplies and other economic concerns are dependent on more than just Iran, but rather on the region as a whole.40 Overall stability, then, is crucial.
China has not allowed its common interests with Iran to alter its policies or develop into a wide-ranging strategic relationship that would limit Chinese policy options.41 In so doing, China may well be a good economic partner for Iran, but it is scarcely a strategic one. The revolutionary bloc has failed to enlist China at the level it would prefer; it has not been manipulated by the Middle East cold warriors, but has endeavored to preserve its interests without upsetting other great powers or engaging in revisionist projects. China's Middle East policy is generally centered on peaceful coexistence, allowing countries to choose their own social and political systems, respecting the sovereignty of states and avoiding external intervention.42
Russian interests in the Middle East, like those of China, are economic as well as political. However, unlike China, Russia is not an importer but rather an exporter of oil.43 Politically, Russia has a long history in the region, being geographically linked to the Middle East and the broader Islamic world. Russia has a significant Muslim population within its own borders and is mindful of how its policies are perceived by Muslims, particularly in relation to the long-running conflict in Chechnya. Russian policy towards the Middle East is no longer ideologically driven, based on Cold War zero-sum thinking.44 In general, Russia views all conflicts in the Middle East as interconnected and prefers that international diplomatic action be used to find resolutions.45
In economic terms, Russia has established relations throughout the region and is a leading arms supplier, particularly to Iran and Syria.46 It has been a major partner in developing nuclear energy for Iran. Further, as an energy-exporting country, Russia views the Middle East states as both competitors and partners, sharing an interest in regulating competition.47 Politically for Russia, Islamic militancy is a security threat. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been no significant barrier between Russia and its Muslim neighbors. 48 One in seven Russians is a Muslim, and events in the Middle East are not politically distant concerns. Islamic extremism in the Middle East seeps into Russian soil, not least significantly in the north Caucasus.49 Russia does not want to be seen as hostile to Islam, and policy makers are keenly aware that instability in the region can have adverse effects, not only on Russia's borders but in the heart of Moscow. Russia employs a policy of great-power pragmatism. Its leaders insist on pursuing Russian interests, but prefer to do so within the constraints of international law, the market economy, and international cooperation on terrorism and energy policies.50
THE VIEW FROM THE WEST
The United States is the most significant foreign military power in the Middle East, maintaining a strong presence, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The United States has bases in Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait and Oman, among others.51 With the exception of the Russian naval base in the Syrian port city of Tartus, no other power has made significant inroads into the Middle East. The end of the Cold War and the military build-ups from the two Gulf wars allowed the United States to expand its reach, taking on the task of policing the region militarily.
Like Russia and China, the United States formed its client relationships with Middle Eastern partners during the global Cold War. Although Washington has a significant interest in maintaining oil resources, the origins of the alliances were equally political. The status quo bloc, in particular Saudi Arabia and Jordan, shared U.S. interests in containing the spread of communist ideology.52 The Iranian revolution and fear of Iranian aggression in the region helped to solidify these relations. The Cold War paradigm has diminished, but the United States and Saudi Arabia still share a common interest in containing Iranian expansionism and further concerns regarding al-Qaeda and the "War on Terror."53 Economically, the United States, like the Eastern powers, shares interests with its clients. Saudi Arabia is the third-largest source of U.S. oil imports, accounting for about 10 percent of U.S. gross consumption.54
The United States is in a more ambiguous position with its partners than Russia or China. Washington is forced to navigate between its material and security interests and its professed position on human rights and political pluralism. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt under Mubarak have been reliable allies in the "War on Terror." However, support for these regimes has damaged America's reputation. The United States chose not to intervene to save Mubarak from the populist uprisings, but has largely refrained from denouncing Saudi Arabia's human-rights record. It has largely isolated itself from the two key revolutionary-bloc actors, while Russia and China have sought to engage with the region at large. This pragmatism has benefited China and Russia; the United States has put itself in a more difficult position.
CONCLUSION
If the Middle East can be conceptualized in terms of two opposing blocs, one representing the status quo and the other revolutionary change, then East and West can be viewed as actors with conflicting notions of how to achieve order in the region. Paradoxically, however, it is the United States, with its expressed concerns about political liberty and human rights, that allies itself with conservative powers that have resisted political openness and change. As well, it seems contradictory that the revolutionary bloc views as its most persuasive benefactors the East, which sees stability as best achieved through the observance of absolute state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The preference of the revolutionary bloc for China and Russia may be indicated by the reluctance of these powers to intervene and their willingness to engage. However, this is not done in the name of ideology or a desire to seek advantage over the West. It is realism, an attempt to maintain stability in the pursuit of interests. The United States in particular, and more insistently through the neoconservative policies of the Bush administration, has been a much more willing volunteer for manipulation by its clients. The monarchies have successfully portrayed Iran as a pariah state that must be challenged. Syria has long been viewed as a tolerable but undesirable state. Political change in the region, accompanied by the hope for democracy, seems all too enticing for Western powers.
It would seem that in some sense these alliances are mismatched. The Western vision that stability will come through political freedom would not serve the interests of the Gulf monarchies. However, the Middle East cold war is a fluctuating affair. As has always been the case, alliances shift back and forth as needs change. However, the contemporary goals of great powers are less dissimilar today. Both East and West ultimately desire stability, even if they hold differing visions of how this may be achieved. For the moment, the interests of the revolutionary bloc coincide with those of the Eastern powers, and the status quo bloc has artfully presented the revolutionaries as threats to Western interests. In all, however, it must be observed that the status quo players are making far better use of their Western allies. China and Russia, it would seem, are not as enticed by misadventure with the Revolutionaries.
The political elites in Moscow, Beijing and Washington should indeed be mindful of the roles their allies in the Middle East want them to play.
1 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics (Oxford University Press, 1965).
2 Morten Valbjorn and Andre Bank, "The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab Dimension of Middle East Regional Politics," Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2011).
3 Pierre Guerlain, "The U.S.-Israel Special Relationship: Hegemon and Client State or Tail Wagging the Dog," 49th Parallel (Spring, 2010): 9.
4 Curtis Ryan, "The Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria," Middle East Forum, August 12, 2010, accessed May 5, 2012, http://www.meforum.org/2726/iraq-middle-eastern-cold-war.
5 Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off: The Growing Rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh," Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2011, accessed June 1, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136409/mohsen-m-milani/iran-and-….
6 Muhammad Khatemi served as the fifth president of Iran, from 1997-2005, capturing 69.1% of the vote; accessed June 1, 2012, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1997/.
7 The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) is the largest party in the Egyptian Parliament. It has not indicated that it would support abandoning the Camp David Accords, although it has hinted at the possibility of renegotiation. The second largest party, led by Al-Nour, also has not officially stated that it would seek to change the conditions of the treaty, yet some members have indicated otherwise. See Egypt's al-Nour Threatens to Change Treaty with Israel, December 26, 2011, accessed January 5, 2012, http:/www.albawaba.com/editorchoice/egypts-al-nour-party-threatens-change-tre…; and Troy Carter, "Ultraconservative Al-Nour Party Denies Radicalism amid Success," Global Post, January 3, 2012, accessed January 15, 2012. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/tahrir-square/ult….
8 Milani, "Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off."
9 Ibid.
10 "Murdering Assad More Noble Than Killing an Israeli," al-Arabiya, February 27, 2012, accessed May 4, 2012, http://www.alarabiya.com/news/articles/175/Murdering-Assad-more-Noble-t….
11 Jonathan Schanzer, "Saudi Arabia Is Arming Syrian Opposition," Foreign Policy, February 27, 2012, accessed May 4, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/saudi_arabia_is_arming….
12 Karen Deyoung, "Saudi, Qatari Plans to Arm Syrian Rebels Risk Overtaking Cautious Approach Favored by U.S.," Washington Post, March 2, 2012.
13 Kerr, The Arab Cold War.
14 Amir M. Haji-Yousefi, "Whose Agenda Is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent," Turkish Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (Spring, 2009): 115.
15 Haji-Yousefi, 116.
16 Mohammed Khatemi, "Dialogue of Civilisations," Address at the United Nations, New York, September 5, 2000, http://www.unesco.org/dialogue/en/khatami.htm.
17 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (Henry Holt and Co., 2006), 5.
18 Milani, "Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off."
19 Ibid.
20 Bill Spindle and Margaret Coker, "The New Cold War," Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2011.
21 Geraint Hughes, "Who Used Whom? Baathist Iraq and the Cold War, 1968–1990," accessed May 5, 2012. http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/cold/articles/hughes.html.
22 Jeremy Sharpe, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 4-5.
23 Valbjorn and Bank, 16.
24 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Japp de Wilds, Review of Security: A New Frame for Analysis (Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998).
25 Andrew Quinn, "Syria Raises Specter of Proxy Conflict for U.S., Russia," Reuters, February 7, 2012, accessed March 16, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/08/us-syria-usa-proxy-idUSTRE816….
26 Rami Khouri, "The Saudi-Iranian Cold War," October 9, 2011, accessed March 31, 2012, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21437/saudiiranian_cold….
27 Haju-Yousefi, 115.
28 United Nations Security Council 6335th Meeting, "Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran," June 9, 2010, accessed June 1, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Luo Yuan," China's Strategic Interests in the Gulf and Trilateral Relations among China, the U.S. and Arab Countries," in China's Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond (Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2010), 24.
32 Ibid., 25.
33 Sharam Chubin, "Iran and China: Political Partners or Strategic Allies," in China's Growing Role in the Middle East, 68.
34 Ibid., 63.
35 Ibid., 70.
36 Richard Weitz, "How China Sees the Middle East," The Diplomat, September 6, 2011, accessed April 25, 2012, http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2011/09/06/how-china-sees-middle-ea….
37 Chubin, 67.
38 Ibid., 68.
39 Yuan, 26.
40 Jin Liangxiang, "China's Middle East Policy Is Not Determined by Oil," April 19, 2010, accessed April 25, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-04/19/content_19853288.htm.
41 Chubin, 67.
42 Weitz.
43 Ekaterina Stepanova, "Russia's Middle East Policy: Old Divisions or New," (Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2006), 4.
44 Ilya Bourtman, "Putin and Russia's Middle Eastern Policy," Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 2 (June, 2006): 1.
45 Stepanova, 3.
46 Bourtman, 2.
47 Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Policy in the Middle East: Prospects for Consensus and Conflict with the United States (The Century Foundation, 2010), 6.
48 Ibid., 3.
49 Ibid., 40.
50 Andrei P. Tsygankou, Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Rowan and Littlefield, 2007), 137.
51 Department of Defence Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2011, accessed May 5, 2012, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/bsr2011baseline.pdf.
52 Rachel Bronson, "5 Myths about U.S.-Saudi Relations," Washington Post, May 21, 2006.
53 Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (Congressional Research Service, 2011), 2.
54 Ibid., 6.
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