Middle East Policy Council

Journal Essay

Egypt's Spring: Causes of the Revolution

Ann M. Lesch

Dr. Lesch is a professor of political science at The American University in Cairo.

On January 25, 2011, thousands poured into Tahrir Square, the symbolic heart of Cairo. They streamed across the venerable Qasr al-Nil bridge, broke through security barriers as they raced through downtown streets, and marched in small clusters or long lines along the Nile Corniche from the southern and northern districts. Chanting and waving placards, they denounced the security forces and the hated minister of interior and called for karama (dignity) and hurriyyah (freedom). By late afternoon, it seemed that nearly all of the 90,000 people who had responded to the Facebook request to demonstrate on Police Day had filled the square, crowded into central Alexandria, and confronted the security forces in Suez City. This huge outpouring of anger astonished the youthful organizers, whose previous attempts to demonstrate had usually resulted in a mere one hundred people assembling in Tahrir Square — and those few were quickly surrounded and detained by riot police.

This time the activists went into the streets to appeal directly for support. For example, thousands of men and women from Boulaq al-Dakrour, a severely deprived district that suffered intense police repression, responded to the appeals of the young activists. The crowd swelled as they walked through upscale districts toward the city center.

Once in the square, the protesters outnumbered the heavily armed riot police. Even though trucks with powerful water cannons charged into the crowds, and police shot tear gas and rubber bullets, the demonstrators held their ground chanting "silmiyya! silmiyya!" (Peaceful! Peaceful!) They pushed back against the barricades, seeking to reach the nearby People's Assembly, Council of Ministers and Ministry of Interior. A protest seeking limited reforms was swiftly transformed into a revolutionary uprising. By that evening, people were calling, not just for police brutality to end, but for President Hosni Mubarak to leave.

Anger at Mubarak's rule had built up over the past decade. An accidental president, who came to power because of Anwar Sadat's assassination on October 6, 1981, Mubarak initially calmed the public, stressed the rule of law, released political prisoners and encouraged parliamentary elections. However, as soon as he began his second term, in 1987, he refused to reform the constitution, extended the state of emergency, promulgated laws to exclude opposition parties from local councils and tightened the grip of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) over parliament. He denounced opposition groups for criticizing his policies and asserted, threateningly, "I am in charge, and I have the authority to adopt measures…. I have all the pieces of the puzzle, while you do not."1

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